Keith X. Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Keith X. Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Phillips, Sherron Dondriel (texapp, 2015-03-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips, Sherron Dondriel
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d at 327 . 16 1157, 1159 (8th Cir. 1983) (because the applicable statutes did not require the granting of commutation or parole upon a set criteria, the inmate did not have “a statutorily created expectation” of early release, and was therefore not entitled to written reasons for denial); Fabries v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973) (where board is given a broad range of discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application for parole, “a prisoner need not be . . . provided with a statement of reasons for the Board’s actions”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bergee v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles
S.D. · 2000 · confidence medium
Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Fain (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Not only can worthy work release applications be thereby denied but similar influences may compel admittance to the program of undesirable and unqualified applicants." ( Id., at p. 1008, fn. 14.) (See also Farries v. United States Board of Parole (7th Cir.1973) 484 F.2d 948, 949 [prisoner may not discriminatorily be denied parole on account of religious prejudice]; Freeman v. Schoen (D.Minn. 1974) 370 F. Supp. 1144 [failure to submit name of petitioner, who met all requirements for parole release to live-in, community *309 based residential program, on ground of political sensitivity and adver…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cummings v. Regan
N.Y. App. Div. · 1974 · confidence medium
We much prefer the possible approaches discussed in Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole ( 484 F. 2d 948, 949, 950 ) as alternatives to judicially mandating that a statement of reasons be supplied in each and every case of parole refusal..
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Joseph King, Jr. v. United States of America
7th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
On the other hand, in Farries v. United States Board of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973), we cited Menechino v. Oswald, supra, for the proposition that “a prisoner need not be accorded a hearing on his application [for parole] or provided with a statement of reasons.” 21 Petitioner argues that Menechino is no longer acceptable authority because it was decided before Morrissey .
cited Cited "see" Persico v. United States Department of Justice
E.D. Ill. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Farries v. United States Board of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole
2d Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Farries v. United States Board of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973), which likewise interpreted Menechino to deny a statement of reasons. 35 The majority believes that since Menechino the applicable law has been changed by virtue of the holding of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), that a parolee is entitled to certain due process rights before revocation of his parole.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole
2d Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Farries v. United States Board of Parole, 484 F.2d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 1973), which likewise interpreted Menechino to deny a statement of reasons.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Keith X. FARRIES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, Respondent-Appellee
72-1311.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Aug 10, 1973.
484 F.2d 948
Stanley A. Bass, New York City, for petitioner-appellant., Michael L. Levinson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Danville, 111., Henry A. Schwarz, U. S. Atty., E. St. Louis, 111., for respondent-appellee.
Pell, Sprecher, Campbell.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.

The plaintiff, an inmate of the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois filed this action pro se, challenging the legality of the Parole Board’s unexplained and allegedly discriminatory denial of plaintiff’s application for parole. A writ of mandamus was sought against the United States Board of Parole. On March 1, 1972, the district court granted leave to file the petition in forma pau-peris, and in the same order, summarily dismissed the petition without having held an evidentiary hearing and without having called for a response from the government. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Although inartfully drawn, the complaint or petition charged that the plaintiff’s procedural constitutional rights had been violated when the Parole Board denied his application without a hearing or a statement of reasons for the denial. The complaint also claimed that the Parole Board’s denial was motivated by religious prejudice.

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of this Circuit have greatly restricted the circumstances in which prisoner petitions may be summarily dismissed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ; Bryant v. Harris, 465 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1972). The sufficiency of a pro se prisoner petition is to be judged by a “less stringent” standard, and accordingly such petitions are not subject to summary dismissal unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.

Parole Boards, of course, enjoy a broad range of discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application for parole, and it has therefore been held that a prisoner need not be accorded a hearing on his application or provided with a statement of reasons for the Board’s actions. See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S.Ct. 588, 27 L.Ed.2d 635 (1971). It seems equally true, however, that a prisoner may not discriminatorily be denied parole on account of religious prejudice. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1967). Although the plaintiff may ultimately be unable to prevail on the merits of his claim, Haines and Bryant require that this case be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Upon remand, the district court has several alternatives available to it short of granting a full evidentiary hearing. Counsel might be appointed to assist the prisoner in the presentation of his claim. See Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971). A dismissal without prejudice would provide a prisoner with an opportunity to correct technical deficiencies in his complaint. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 502, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Too, the court may wish to utilize a Magistrate to screen prisoner petitions. See United States v. Simpson, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 436 F.2d 162, 167 (1970). The court could also request the prisoner to amplify his complaint by providing more specific facts and details. See United States v. Simpson, supra at 166; Raines v. United[*950] States, 423 F.2d 526, 529-530 (4th Cir. 1970). Of course, the simple expedient of ordering a response from the government is always available to the district court. Raines v. United States, supra at 529. Our intention in noting these alternatives is not to restrict the discretion of the district court, but only to call attention to procedures that have been employed successfully in other courts. The selection of which procedure best suits a particular case is left to the district court.

For the reasons stated, the district court’s order of summary dismissal is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.