Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2026
Top citers, strongest first. 45 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Rios
(2×)
For example, in United States v. Maynard, a prisoner argued for a reduction in his sentence on the basis of his good behavior in prison. 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Guilford
Cir. 1968); then citing U.S. v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); and then citing State v. Tinsley, 928 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)). 13 Rule 35(b) motions filed after 90 days are generally time-barred, except under “extraordinary circumstances” or as provided by 11 Del.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Mitchell
Cir. 1968); then citing U.S. v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); and then citing State v. Tinsley, 928 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)). 21 See D.I. 31 at 2; D.I. 32 at 2. 22 See D.I. 31 at 2; D.I. 32 at 2. 23 State v. Evans, 2024 WL 36518 , at *2 (Del.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Bowen
R. 35(b) (emphasis added). 19 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 22 D.I. 21. 4 multiple roles Defendant played in orchestrating, committing, and creating electronic images of the sexual offenses against his child, that they were committed by a person in a position of trust, and that anything less than the period imposed would unduly appreciate the nature of the offense of Rape First Degree.23 10.
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Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Green
Medinilla Judge oc: Prothonotary cc: Defendant Department of Justice Investigative Services 10 Id. 11 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 12 D.I. 25. 13 11 Del.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
R. 35(b). 5 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 6 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 7 State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2008) (“Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 not been decided whether Defendant’s last six months of Level V time will be substituted with a Level IV program. 8 5.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Luis Levante
R. 35(b). 6 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 7 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 2 minimum sentence.8 5.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Walker
R. 35(b). 8 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 9 Id. 10 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 3 pleading guilty, and the consequences of his plea.11 Remorse, educational or employment opportunities, etc., do not persuade the Court to reduce the Level V sentences.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Panaro
R. 35(b). 10 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 13 See Del.
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Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Swanson
R. 35(b). 3 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 4 Td. 15 Tq. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 16 State v. Colburn, No. ID 1411002179, 2015 WL 1881181 , at *3 (Del.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Sullivan
Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 10 Td. 1 I. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (oth Cir. 1973)). 12 Defendant is required to: (1) have no contact with Steven Sullivan; (2) undergo mental health evaluation and follow recommendation for counseling and treatment; (3) successfully complete anger management, counseling, treatment program, (4) be evaluated for substance abuse and follow any recommendations for counseling, testing or treatment deemed appropriate; (5) undergo TASC evaluation; (6) complete a Domestic Violence course, and take all medications as prescri…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. White
R. 35(b) (emphasis added). ° State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (De. 2002). 10 Td. ' 7g. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973). 12 State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2008). 3 for his two consecutive terms of minimum mandatory incarceration, to run concurrently.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Glenn
R. 35(b). 9 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (De. 2002). 10 Td. 11 Jd, at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973). 12 State y.
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Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Glenn
R. 35(b). 9 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (De. 2002). 10 Td. 'l Tq. at 1202 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 3 6.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Thomas
Ct. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (Explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).)); United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 35 allows sentencing court “to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh” such request “is essentially a “plea for leniency.””) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Thomas
Ct. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (Explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).)); United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 35 allows sentencing court “to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh” such request “is essentially a ‘plea for leniency.’”) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Allen
R. 35(b). 3 Id. 4 State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002). 5 See ia’. at 1201. 6 Ia'. at 1202 (quoting Um'ted States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)). 2 concurrently, not consecutively7 The bases for relief are as follows: (1) That the Court was “puzzled” why Defendant’s Level V sentence was not concurrent due to Defendant’s last charge being over 12 years ago and successful employment within that time; (2) that he understands the mistakes he made and the consequences of his actions; and (3) that “Counsel was ineffective” and should have noticed he is a “h…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Delaware v. Tollis.
Ct. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining time limitation and -6- limited that time to 90 days while permitting a certain restrained level of discretion to extend that period under the rule if a defendant demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances” for consideration outside the 90 days. 22But“[i]n order to uphold the finality of judgments, a heavy burden is placed on the defendant to prove extraordinary circumstances when a Rule 35 motion is filed outside of ninety days of the imposition of a sentence.” 23 The term “extra…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Delaware v. Remedio.
Dec. 16, 2014) (citing United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir.1968) (explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b)); United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973) (Rule 35 allows sentencing court "to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh” such request "is essentially a 'plea for leniency.’ ”) (citations omitted); State v. Tinsley, 928 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Alaska Ct.App.1996) (explaining …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lewis
(2×)
The motion is directed to the court's discretion and is essentially a `plea for leniency.'" Maynard, 485 F.2d at 248 (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Vernon Leroy Rich
The function of this version of Rule 35 is " 'simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.' " United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973))
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Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Seymour Pollack
The district court should have construed Pollack's motion as one made pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. 1 "The function of Rule 35(b) is 'simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.' " United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir.1981 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. David Alan Hunt
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to state in open court its reasons for denying a reduction of the sentence, see Thompson, 541 F.2d at 795-96 , or denying Hunt a hearing on his Rule 35 motion, see Eastman, 758 F.2d at 795 . 5 "The function of Rule 35(b) is 'simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.' " United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jaime Lopez Carrillo
"The function of Rule 35(b) is 'simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.' " United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Richard Benedict, United States of America v. Richard Benedict
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973). 16 Since Benedict has demonstrated no abuse of discretion, we find that the district court's decision to deny Benedict's motion without a hearing was proper.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Garvis Eugene Freeny
Rule 35 allows the district court “to decide, if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.” United States v. Rapp, 814 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sheela
The purpose of Rule 35 “is simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.” United States v. Rapp, 814 F.2d 1398,1399 (9th Cir.1987) quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. William Ritter Rapp
The purpose of Rule 35 “is simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.” United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Hill
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gerald Lee Eastman
A motion brought under Rule 35(b) is a plea to the sentencing court for leniency, allowing the district court to decide whether, “on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.” United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d. 206, 208 (9th Cir., 1981), quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d. 247, 248 (9th Cir., 1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gerald Lee Eastman
United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir., 1981) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir., 1973)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cotton
United States v. Colvin, 644 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir.1981); cf, United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973) (rule allows court to decide if original sentence seems unduly harsh).
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Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Joseph E. Krohn
The classic function of motions for reduction of sentence is “simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh,” United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247,248 (9th Cir.1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lowery
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973).
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Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Leroy Richard Smith, Sr., United States of America v. Gary Lynn Welton, United States of America v. Michael Stephen Kliment, United States of America v. Robert David Collins, United States of America v. William Henry Rengifo, United States of America v. John Steven Delude, United States of America v. Leonard D. Clemens, Iii, United States of America v. Paul Bee Stewart
(2×)
Because the district court's jurisdiction lapsed when it did not act within a "reasonable time" after the running of the 120-day period established by the Rule, we dismiss the appeal. 3 The function of Rule 35(b) is "simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh." United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Smith
(2×)
The function of Rule 35(b) is “simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh.” United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Allen Gordon Sims
United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas v. State
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 639 (Alaska 1977).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Danny Mack Martin
United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Cattaneo.
See State v. Kong, 140 Hawai‘i 103, 110, 398 P.3d 692, 699 (2017) (quoting United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973), for the proposition that “[i]f a lawful sentence was lawfully imposed in the first instance, then the function of Rule 35 is simply to allow the [sentencing] court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh”). 7 The distinction between sentencing and a hearing on a Rule 35(b) motion is also shown by their procedural differences.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Delaware v. Reed.
Oct. 7, 2014) (“When, as here, a motion for reduction of sentence is filed within ninety days of sentencing, the Superior Court has broad discretion to decide whether to alter its judgment.”). 16 See United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b)); see also United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 35 allows sentencing court “to decide if, on further reflection, the o…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Delaware v. Coverdale.
The reason for such a rule is to give a sentencing judge a second chance to consider whether the initial sentence is appropriate.12 But, while the Court has wide discretion to reduce a sentence upon a timely Rule 35 application, the Court has no authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any substantive statutory minimum sentence. 13 (6) The Court was constrained to impose at least a 3-year mandatory prison term for each first degree robbery charge 14 and at least a 11 Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam). 12 See United States v. Ellenbogan, 390 F.2d 537, 5…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Delaware v. Coverdale.
R. 35(b). 9 Id. 10 Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam). -3- rule is to give a sentencing judge a second chance to consider whether the initial sentence is appropriate.11 But, while the Court has wide discretion to reduce a sentence upon a timely Rule 35 application, the Court has no authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any substantive statutory minimum sentence. 12 (6) The Court was constrained to impose at least a 3-year mandatory prison term for each first degree robbery charge 13 and at least a 3-year mandatory prison term for each PFDCF charge. 1…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Delaware v. Rivera.
R. 35(b). 6 Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam). 7 See United States v. Ellenbogan, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b)); see also United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 35 allows sentencing court “to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh” . . . such request “is essentially a ‘plea for leniency.’”) (citations om…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Ronald Stump
As we have previously noted, “Rule 35(b) authorizes only reductions of otherwise legal sentences, and ‘the negative pregnant inherent in rule 35(b)’ prohibits increases of such sentences.” Minor, 846 F.2d at 1189 (quoting United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 312 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir.1973) (if lawful sentence was lawfully imposed, then function of Rule 35 is simply to allow district court to decide if original sentence now seems “unduly harsh”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Wayne Wilburn MAYNARD, Defendant-Appellant
v.
Wayne Wilburn MAYNARD, Defendant-Appellant
73-1928.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 2, 1973.
Harry E. Claiborne (argued), Annette R. Quintana, Atty., Las Vegas, Nev., for defendant-appellant., Lawrence J. Semenza, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), V. DeVoe Heaton, U. S. Atty., Las Vegas, Nev., for plaintiff-appellee.
Carter, Goodwin, East.
Cited by 49 opinions | Published
OPINION
JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge:This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to modify a sentence under Rule 35, F.R.Crim.P. We affirm.
The defendant Maynard was convicted of concealing assets in a bankruptcy pro[*248] ceeding. After a pre-sentence report he was sentenced to three years imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2). Under that section he was eligible for parole at such time as the Board of Parole might determine. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, and Maynard was imprisoned on January 15, 1973.
On April 4, 1973, Maynard moved the sentencing court under Rule 35 for a reduction or revision of his lawful sentence. He further moved the court to order the prison warden to prepare and submit a report on Maynard’s behavior since his imprisonment. Without ordering the report, and without holding a hearing, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion.
Maynard contends that the summary denial of the motion was in violation of his constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. He contends that the district court, by refusing to order the preparation and submission of a post-incarceration report, denied him due process. Since the Rule 35 motion was based entirely on an anticipated favorable report, he argues that a failure to consider the report is tantamount to a failure to consider the Rule 35 motion. This argument, however, misconceives the nature of Rule 35.
If a lawful sentence was lawfully imposed in the first instance, then the function of Rule 35 is simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh. The motion is directed to the court’s discretion (Flores v. United States (9 Cir. 1956) 238 F.2d 758, 760) and is essentially a “plea for leniency.” Poole v. United States (1957) 102 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 250 F.2d 396, 401. Ordinarily, no hearing is required. United States v. Krueger (9 Cir. 1972) 454 F.2d 1154.
The court had thorough knowledge of Maynard’s relevant history when imposing the original sentence and apparently now believed that a report, regardless of how glowing a picture it might paint of Maynard’s behavior in prison, could not alter the discretionary decision that a sentence of three years was apt. If every prisoner who alleged good behavior were entitled to have a warden prepare and submit a report to the court, the burden on the warden would be overwhelming and the court would be taking on the function of a parole board. Surely 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2), under which Maynard was sentenced, reflects the sound policy that good behavior by a prisoner is chiefly for the Board of Parole to consider, not the judge.
We need not decide whether the sixth amendment applies to a post-prosecution proceeding under Rule 35, for even if it does, its guarantee is not absolute. A motion to have a witness or document produced at government expense is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, the court having a duty to prevent useless process. Murdock v. United States (10 Cir. 1960) 283 F.2d 585, 587, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 953, 81 S.Ct. 1910, 6 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1961).
We affirm.