United States v. Lorchid Goff, United States of Am. v. Deola R. Richardson, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Lorchid Goff, United States of Am. v. Deola R. Richardson, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
70 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 26 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Salvador Hernandez-Estrada (ca9, 2014-04-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#7 28 U.S.C. § 1862 cited 2× in this case · 146 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Salvador Hernandez-Estrada (2×)
9th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
See United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 657-58 (2d Cir.1996) (applying absolute disparity and absolute impact); Mosley v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 467 , 479 n. 5 (5th Cir.2004) (applying absolute disparity and noting comparative disparity could be used in another case); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.1975) (applying absolute impact test).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wyatt Henderson (2×)
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gibbs
Conn. · 2000 · confidence medium
See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 590 (10th Cir. 1976) (two out of fifty insubstantial under Duren); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S. Ct. 109 , 46 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rioux
D. Conn. · 1995 · confidence medium
Detre, supra at 1919, 1938 n. 33 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir.1984); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23-24 ; United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975); United States v. Armsbury, 408 F.Supp. 1130, 1136 (D.Or.1976) (parentheticals omitted)); see also Jenkins, 496 F.2d at 66 (adopting absolute impact measure for Second Circuit).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ramseur (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.J. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F. 2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Goff, 509 F. 2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 83 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F. 2d 57, 65 (2d Cir.1974), cert. den., 420 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 1119 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 394 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McCarthy
Conn. · 1985 · confidence medium
Probs. 269, 275 (1983); see United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. Casscles, 531 F.2d 682 , 685 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S. Ct. 109 , 46 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Waller v. Butkovich (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D.N.C. · 1984 · confidence medium
Indeed, those cases include several where the disparities were greater in all respects than the disparities alleged here. *951 In United States v. Goff 509 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975), the jury selection plan for the Eastern District of Louisiana was upheld against a challenge based on the Act.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. E.A. Gregory, Vonna Jo Gregory, G.W. Atkinson and Robert T. Spurlock, Jr.
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 528-30 (5th Cir.1981) (Hispanic Americans), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 , 102 S.Ct. 2244 , 72 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442-43 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (residents of divisions within judicial district), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 , 102 S.Ct. 2274 , 2967, 73 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1982); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.) (blacks and indigents), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charles Allen Tuttle and Dean Frederick Vereen
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
McCain v. United States, 456 U.S. 991 , 102 S.Ct. 2274 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1982); Maskeny, 609 F.2d at 191 ; United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) De La Garza v. State
Tex. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
United *875 States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir.1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cerda v. State
Tex. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir.1975). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Obregon v. United States
D.C. · 1980 · confidence medium
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Villafane v. Manson
D. Conn. · 1980 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 1119 , 43 L.Ed.2d 394 (1975) (construing “substantial” in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1863 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Test
D. Colo. · 1975 · confidence medium
We find this underrepresentation is not so substantial as to require supplementation of the voter registration list. [ 509 F.2d at 826, 827 (footnote omitted)] There are three modes of comparison utilized by the courts in Jenkins and Goff : (1) absolute percentage difference; (2) comparative percentage underrepresentation; and (3) actual impact on jury panels, grand juries, and petit juries. 9 The following table sum *697 marizes the evidence in Jenkins and Goff , and compares this evidence with the data reported by defendants in the present case.
cited Cited "see" State v. Lopez
Idaho Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. McDaniels, 370 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.La.1973), affd, 509 F.2d 825 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Rosenthal
M.D. Ga. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Goff, supra. This is not substantial underrepresentation.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Walter John Carter
5th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See U. S. v. Goff, 5 Cir. 1975, 509 F.2d 825 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Edward J. Arlt, III
5th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Goff, 5 Cir. 1975, 509 F.2d 825 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed. 83 (1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cervantes Salazar v. Dretke
W.D. Tex. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d at 249 (“the fact that an identifiable minority group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population and is therefore underrepresented [sic] on jury panels presents no constitutional issue.”), quoting United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 527 (5th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 456 U.S. 977 , 102 S.Ct. 2244 , 72 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982), in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 588 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 , 99 S.Ct. 2895 , 61 L.Ed.2d 319 (1979), in turn citing United States v. Arlt, 567 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir.1978…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Carwise v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare U.S. v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.1975), cert. den., 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975) (exclusive reliance on voter registration lists as a source of potential jurors upheld).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Allen M. Anderson v. J. Leland Casscles, Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 , 96 S.Ct. 109 , 46 L.Ed.2d 83 , 44 U.S.L.W. 3204 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 , 95 S.Ct. 1119 , 43 L.Ed.2d 394 (1975); United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Test, 399 F.Supp. 683 (D.Colo.1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lorchid GOFF, Defendant-Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deola R. RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant
74-2648, 74-2847.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 9, 1975.
509 F.2d 825
Richard B. Sobol, Anne Pardee Buxton, Leesburg, Va., David J. Dennis, New Orleans, La., Richard T. Seymour, Washington, D. C., Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen Ralston, New York City, for defendants-appellants., Gerald J. Gallinghouse, U. S. Atty., James J. O’Connor, Mary Williams Cázalas, Asst. U. S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
Thornberry, Coleman, Rosenn.
Cited by 51 opinions  |  Published
THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

In these appeals two criminal defendants claim that we must reverse their mail fraud convictions [1] since the jury selection process in their cases violated the standards of the Jury Selection Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. In the district court, appellants properly filed a timely motion to dismiss the indictments for failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a). They based their challenge to the Eastern District of Louisiana’s jury pool on inadequate representation of blacks, and poor people. The district court denied the motion, finding that there was no substantial underrepresentation of blacks, and that poor people did not constitute [1] a cognizable class under 28 U.S.C. § 1862. [2] We agree that appellants have failed to show substantial underrepresentation of blacks. Since we reach the same conclusion as to poor people, we do not consider whether they are a cognizable class under the Jury Selection Act of 1968. Thus, finding no infirmity in the Eastern District of Louisiana jury selection procedures, we affirm the convictions.

UNDERREPRESENTATION OF BLACKS:

Appellants’ statistics showed that in 1970 (the date of grand jury selection) blacks comprised 26.33% of the voting age population and 21.06% of the registered voters in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Thus there was a 5.27% absolute differential between blacks in the voting age population and registered black voters, and a 20.02 percentage underrepresentation of blacks on the jury list. [3] The court below found that this underrepresentation was not substantial within the meaning of the Jury Selection Act after assessing the impact of this underrepresentation on a grand jury of twenty-three persons. 370 F.Supp. at 302-04. A grand jury that statistically mirrored the voter registration list would contain 4.6 black persons, while one statistically mirroring the voting age population would contain 6.0 black persons. The court concluded that this amount of underrepresentation was not sufficiently substantial to require the[*827] Eastern District of Louisiana to supplement its voter registration list. 28 U.S.C. § 1863. We hold that the district court properly disposed of that issue. See United States v. McDaniels, 370 F.Supp. 295, 302-04 (E.D.La.1973).

UNDERREPRESENTATION OF FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS:

The district court also examined the underrepresentation of the class of food stamp recipients in the Eastern District of Louisiana on the jury list. [4] The appellants’ statistics demonstrated that in the Eastern District only 30.03% of the food stamp recipients over twenty-one are registered to vote. In contrast 77.76% of the remainder of the voting age population have registered. [5] The district court felt these figures proved substantial underrepresentation, concluding, “. . . food stamp recipients, as a group, are 47.73% underrepresented on voters registration list.” 370 F.Supp. at 304. The district court erred in concluding that this underrepresentation on the voters’ registration list thereby established an underrepresentation on the grand jury list'. The above statistics show only the registration rate differential between food stamp recipients of voting age and the voting age population at-large. That figure, however, does not accurately disclose the impact of that registration differential on the jury list. We think the district court should have proceeded to assess the impact of this registration rate differential on a typical grand jury, just as it did in the case of blacks. The figures showed that food stamp recipients constitute 10.51% of the voting age population, and 4.34% of those on the jury list. Thus a twenty-three person grand jury that mirrored the jury list would contain 1.0 food stamp recipients, while one that mirrored the voting age population would contain 2.4 food stamp recipients. The registration rate differential has the same impact as in the case of blacks. We find this underrepresentation is not so substantial as to require supplementation of the voter registration list. Thus we express no view on the cognizability of the class of food stamp recipients or poor people under 28 U.S.C. § 1862.

Our result comports with the underlying purposes of the Jury Selection Act of 1968. The Act primarily sought to eliminate the “key man” system in the federal jury selection process. Congress felt that utilization of voter registration lists as the primary source of names for the master jury list would provide a more representative cross section of the community. That body recognized that in some instances, failure of particular groups in a community to register would mean that the voter registration list would not accurately represent a fair cross section of the community. But where, as in this case, the impact of the underrepresentation does not substantially affect the composition of the average grand jury, the Act does not require the district to incur the substantial expense and administrative inconvenience necessary to supplement the voter registration list. [6]

Affirmed.

1

. The government charged that the appellants fraudulently received welfare benefits, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

2

. The full text of that opinion is found in United States v. McDaniels, 370 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.La. 1973).

3

. Neither the absolute nor the comparative measure of underrepresentation can be considered determinative of the substantiality question. See Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decision, 506 F.2d 811, 834-35 (1975) (printed as an appendix to Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975)).

4

. Appellants defined “poor people” for the purpose of their challenge as “food stamp recipients.” They took a statistically significant sample of food stamp recipients and checked to see how many of those names appeared on the voter registration lists in Eastern District of Louisiana parishes. The measure of economic status, then, was whether a prospective juror qualified for food stamp assistance rather than an absolute dollar ceiling on income.

5

. Appellants point out that their figures probably understate the differential because not all poor people register for food stamps. Brief for Appellants at 24-26. But in this case, there is no indication of the steps taken to purge the voter registration list. Failure to do so would tend to offset the understatement. See Gewin, The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 Mercer L.Rev. 349, 369 (1969).

6

. Our analysis is similar to that of the Second Circuit in United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1974).