OPINION

Ramon Gasca-Kraft, an alien, appeals from a conviction, following a nonjury trial, on a two count indictment charging him with (1) illegal entry into the United States after he had been previously deported, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, ^[1] and (2) making[*151] a willful false claim of citizenship in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911. ^[2] Appellant Gasca-Kraft argues (1) that a deportation order entered after a hearing in which he, as the respondent, was not offered appointed counsel may not be used as one of the “elements” of a subsequent criminal prosecution for illegal reentry and (2) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction on the willful false claim count.

In 1973 Ramon Gasca-Kraft appeared as respondent at a deportation hearing. He was informed at that time that he had a right to have counsel present if he could afford to retain one. ^[3] Apparently he indicated, along with 14 other respondents that he had no such desire. ^[4] A deportation order was entered and on September 17, 1973 Gasca-Kraft was deported to Mexico.

On September 13, 1974, Gasca-Kraft attempted to enter the United States once again at Calexico and, in response to a question of a customs officer as to his citizenship, he answered that he was a United States citizen. He had no valid immigration documents and was detained while the customs officers investigated and determined that Gasca-Kraft had been deported in 1973. He was then arrested on the charge of illegal re-entry and false claim of citizenship.

As above-mentioned, he was indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the 1973 deportation hearing was conducted without an offer of counsel at government expense. The motion was denied and Gasca-Kraft elected to be tried by the court without a jury on the basis of Stipulated Facts. ^[5]

[*152] A material element of the offense defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a lawful deportation. Thus, in prosecuting an alleged violation of § 1326, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “illegally entered the United States after being deported according to law.” (Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1968) [citing United States v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742, 750 (3rd Cir. 1964)]; see also United States v. Osuna-Picos, 443 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971) [reversing a § 1326 conviction on the ground that the deportation was unlawful]; United States v. Bowles, supra. [“When Congress made use of the word ‘deported’ in the statute, it meant ‘deported according to law’ ”] United States v. Heikkinen, 221 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1955) [“Validity of that order is an inescapable ingredient of the statutory offense with which defendant is charged”].)

Appellant now argues that his 1973 deportation was not “according to law” for two reasons: (1) that the proceeding which resulted in the order was infirm in that he was not furnished with counsel and (2) that the deportation order was unlawful because he had derivative United States citizenship since his mother had been born in the United States and had resided there until she was eighteen years of age at which time she moved to Mexico.

As to the first ground:

A deportation hearing is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one, and a deportation order is not criminal punishment. See e. g. Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966) and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 contains the first explicit statement of the requirement of a hearing in deportation proceedings and due process requires that the respondent in a deportation hearing receive timely notice; that he have an opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses against him, and to produce evidence; that the decision be based on the evidence and only on the evidence produced at the hearing; and that the decision be supported by substantial evidence. The 1952 legislation also added a provision embodying the right to representation. However, courts have uniformly held in this circuit and elsewhere that in light of the non-criminal nature of both the proceedings and the order which may be a result, that respondents are not entitled to have counsel appointed at government expense. See e. g., Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974); Dunn-Marin v. District Director, 426 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1970); Murgia-Melendrez v. INS, 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1960). See, also, Rosales-Caballero v. INS, 472 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1973); Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968, 93 S.Ct. 1452, 35 L.Ed.2d 703 (1972); Carbonell v. INS, 460 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972); Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. INS, 447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971).

Since under the law an alien in a deportation proceeding is not entitled to appointed counsel, the deportation order was plainly not unlawful on that ground.

As to the second ground:

The facts are undisputed that Gasca-Kraft’s mother did not continue to reside in the United States for the required period of not less than ten years, “at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen”, ^[6] namely, through her nineteenth birthday. Therefore, he did not have a defense to deportation on this ground. In short, al[*153] though he was entitled to put in issue the legality of his 1973 deportation, he simply failed to do so on legal and factual bases.

Turning to appellant’s argument as to sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for willful false claim of United States citizenship, we find viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government ^[7] that the evidence supports the conviction.

Therefore, we affirm the conviction on both counts.