United States v. Earl Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1975). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Earl Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he issue of the district court's disqualification was not properly raised by the appellant below and therefore, is not cognizable in this court.”
26 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bank of China v. NBM LLC (ca2, 2004-02-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1975 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Bank of China v. NBM LLC
2d Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he issue of the district court's disqualification was not properly raised by the appellant below and therefore, is not cognizable in this court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Tennessee v. Trinidad Martinez Flores
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Va., 1997)(Recusal not required when the trial judge previously authorized a wiretap leading to a defendant’s arrest); Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482, 490 (1st Cir.1989)(The “mere fact” that the trial judge had authorized “some (or all) of the underlying intercepts” did not require recusal.); United States v. Garramone, 374 F.Supp. 256, 258-59 (E.D.Pa.1974)(The judge refused to recuse himself, ruling that “prior judicial exposure to the parties or questions [is] not sufficient to establish personal bias or prejudice.”); United States v. Foddrell, 5…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hanhardt
N.D. Ill. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482, 490 (1st Cir.1989) (emphasizing that nothing about the fact that the judge signed the orders would lead a reasonable person to question the jurist’s impartiality); Cf. United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2nd Cir.1975) (holding that recusal was not warranted for conducting a hearing on wire tapping); United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307, 1316 (4th Cir.1979) (holding that the judge properly refused to recuse himself from issuing an order to seal tapes obtained through surveillance); United States v. de la Fuente, 548 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nicholson
E.D. Va. · 1997 · confidence medium
The Second Circuit ruled proper a trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself in a case in which he had “conducted an eleven-day hearing on the wire tapping.” United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Isaac Camacho v. Autoridad De Telefonos De Puerto Rico
1st Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Nothing about the fact that the judge signed the orders sought by federal officials would lead a reasonable person to question the jurist’s impartiality. 8 See United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 890-91 (1st Cir.1983) (fact that judge approved wiretap on party’s attorney did not give rise to reasonable fears of partiality); Union Independiente de Empleados de Servicios Legales v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (D.P.R.1982) (similar); United States v. Garramone, 374 F.Supp. 256, 258 (E.D.Pa.1974) (that judge had authorized wiretap did not necessitate recusal)…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Frezzo
E.D. Pa. · 1983 · confidence medium
United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1303-04 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gloria Aulet
2d Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
United States v. Hermann, 524 F.2d 1103, 1104 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Aaron Watson, Robert Whitley, and John Muse (2×)
2d Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
See United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 321-22 , 92 S.Ct. at 463-64 ; United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87-88 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975); United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541, 544 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 , 97 S.Ct. 323 , 50 L.Ed.2d 291 (1976); United States v. Quinn, 540 F.2d 357, 362 (8 Cir. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Williams
W.D.N.Y. · 1977 · confidence medium
United States v. Marion, supra, at 326, 92 S.Ct. 455 ; United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 526 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 , 96 S.Ct. 1742 , 48 L.Ed.2d 205 (1976); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975); United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Angelo Ricco
2d Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph C. Vispi (2×)
2d Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
There is no evidence that the government utilized the delay as an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over Vispi or that it resulted in some specific prejudice to him. 4 See United States v. Marion, supra; United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975); United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Iannelii, 461 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 , 93 S.Ct. 310 , 34 L.Ed.2d 243 (1972); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 9…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Terjeson
E.D.N.Y · 1976 · confidence medium
See United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 326 , 92 S.Ct. 455 ; United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 526 (2d Cir., 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 960 , 96 S.Ct. 1742 , 48 L.Ed.2d 205 (1976); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir., 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Noel Quinn, United States of America v. Lee Wilson (2×)
8th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 280, 289-90 , 524 F.2d 834, 843-44 (1975) (13 month delay); United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86, 87-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 , 96 S.Ct. 370 , 46 L.Ed.2d 286 (1975) (15 month delay).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Finkelstein
2d Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 at 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Villa
N.D.N.Y. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 526 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 429 U.S. 923 , 97 S.Ct. 323 , 50 L.Ed.2d 291 (1976).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Mejias
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Foddrell, 523 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Finkelstein, supra, 526 F.2d at 526 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Earl FODDRELL, Defendant-Appellant
978, Docket 75-1048.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 28, 1975.
523 F.2d 86
Robert P. Leighton, New York City, for defendant-appellant Foddrell., Thomas E. Engel, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Paul J. Curran, U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York, Lawrence S. Feld, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Moore, Mansfield, Holden.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 80%
Citer courts: Second Circuit (1)
PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction rendered on January 30, 1975, following a jury trial in which the defendant was found guilty of possessing heroin, with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) 197Q. [1]

The appellant raises five issues on appeal. Our review of the record convinces us that the District Court properly refused to recuse itself on the ground that the trial judge had conducted an eleven day hearing on wire tapping and had read a presentence report before sentencing the defendant on July 31, 1973, after the appellant had pleaded guilty in the prior case. [2]

The trial court properly denied the motion for a hearing on the legality of the wire taps conducted in the earlier prosecution. In response to the motion, the Government represented to the court that no material obtained from surveillance of the telephone calls in the prior case led to any information concerning the present indictment. Judge Gagliardi was entirely justified in accepting the representations made by the Assistant United States Attorney on the point. Although the appellant had access to the transcript of the eleven day hearing in the prior case, he has produced nothing to suggest that the court’s reliance on the Government’s representation was misplaced, or that the prosecutor’s assurance was untrue in any respect.

The appellant had failed to demonstrate prejudice or an abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for severance. Moreover, the claim of prejudice advanced on appeal was not raised in its present context at the trial.

The same holds true of the appellant’s claim of error in the Government’s summation. No objection was voiced at the time the argument was made and there was no request for curative instruction. No prejudice has been demonstrated. Although the prosecutor’s remarks concerning th availability of the record for the jury’s reference in the jury room were misspoken, it clearly does not “rise to the level of prejudice required for reversal.” United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974).

The appellant’s final point that the fifteen-month delay from the date of the offense to the indictment is without merit. The claim of prejudice is asserted on the principal ground that the delay made it impossible for the accused to remember his whereabouts on the date of the offense charged in the indictment and was unable to produce witnesses to verify his whereabouts on the date alleged. In denying the motion, the district court was persuaded that the government did not seek an indictment until the defendants were positively identified with the offense charged. No other cause for the delay is suggested. The appellant’s claim that his memory was dimmed, concerning his whereabouts[*88] over a span of fifteen months, raises at most the possibility of prejudice. No actual prejudice is established. There is no showing that the Government withheld prosecution to harass or gain tactical advantage. The motion to dismiss was properly denied. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-326, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).

Judgment affirmed.

1

. On January 30, 1975, the appellant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, concurrent with another 11 year sentence imposed in a different case, followed by a special parole term of 6 years.

2

. As an additional basis tor affirmance, we note that the issue of the District Court’s disqualification was not properly raised by the appellant below and therefore, is not cognizable in this Court. Schwartz v. S.S. Nassau, 345 F.2d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919, 86 S.Ct. 294, 15 L.Ed.2d 234 (1965).