United States v. Carson Robert Yeager, 537 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Carson Robert Yeager, 537 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Vilma Allison Olmeda
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See abo United States v. Yeager, 537 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (following Manduja-no ’s holding that "in a perjury prosecution a defendant may not use the privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for suppressing the very grand jury testimony that prompted the perjury charge."); United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 159, 163 (7th Cir.1976) (“'the Government’s failure to give Miranda-type warnings to a grand jury witness, even one as to whom the proceedings have become accusatory, does not bar a perjury prosecution for false testimony before the grand jury.’ ”) (quoting …
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Frederick C. Prior, United States of America v. Frederick C. Prior
5th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, United States v. Yeager, 537 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wendling, 535 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1976).
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Carson Robert YEAGER, Defendant-Appellant
75--3331.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Aug 26, 1976.
537 F.2d 835
Edward J. David, Fayetteville, N. C., for defendant-appellant., Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., William R. Northcutt, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Brown, Gewin, Morgan, Per Curiam.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Carson Robert Yeager appeals from his conviction on two counts of making false declarations to a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a).

Yeager’s principal argument is that his testimony before the grand jury should have been suppressed in the perjury trial because he was not given a Miranda [1] warning prior to the grand jury testimony. A Miranda warning was required, he contends, because he was a “putative defendant” at the time he gave the grand jury testimony.

We held our decision on this issue pending the Supreme Court’s review of our decision in United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974), because the Mandujano case involved the same issue as presented here by Yeager. On May 19, 1976, the Supreme Court reversed Mandujano, holding that in a perjury prosecution a defendant may not use the privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for suppressing the very grand jury testimony that prompted the perjury charge. United States v. Mandujano, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). The defendant in Mandujano was not entitled to suppression of his grand jury testimony even though he may have been a “putative defendant” and was not given a full Miranda warning:

[A] witness sworn to tell the truth before a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call for suppression of false statements made to that jury. . Assuming, arguendo, that respondent was indeed a “putative defendant,” that fact would have no bearing on the validity of a conviction for testifying falsely.

-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. at 1789, 48 L.Ed.2d at 226. Mandujano controls here.

We have examined Yeager’s remaining contentions and have found them without merit.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).