Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1981 · …congress had indicated that, in federal tax law, claims of reliance are to be given little weight. at p. 1279 ✓
9 citation events across 6 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1278 (5th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Victor P. Diedrich and Frances T. Diedrich v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., of the Estate of Frances d.grant, Deceased v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In any event, "Congress had indicated that, in federal tax law, claims of reliance are to be given little weight." Gulf Inland Corporation v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978). 13 Accordingly, we hold that to the extent the gift taxes paid by donees exceeded donor's adjusted bases in the property transferred, the donors realized taxable income. 14 The decisions of the tax court are reversed. 1 Diedrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Diedrich v. Commissioner
8th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In any event, “Congress had indicated that, in federal tax law, claims of reliance are to be given little weight.” Gulf Inland Corporation v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Maher v. Zapata Corp.
S.D. Tex. · 1980 · confidence medium
Tex.1970); Gulf Inland Corp. v. U. S., 570 F.2d 1277, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C. Blake McDowell, Inc. v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1978 · confidence medium
Very recently, in Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States , 570 F.2d 1277 *73 (5th Cir. 1978) , the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the taxpayer's reliance on Wetter as a ground for not applying Fulman retroactively.
discussed Cited "see" First Charter Financial Corp., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee (2×)
1st Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978); North American Life & Casualty Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976); Federal Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975).
discussed Cited "see" H. Douglas Wilson, and Roberta D. Wilson v. United States
6th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), suggesting that reliance upon a federal court of appeals opinion could rarely be justifiable in the context of retroactive application of tax regulations. 18 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GULF INLAND CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant
75-3767.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 7, 1978.
570 F.2d 1277
Donald E. Walter, U. S. Atty., Lawrence L. Jones, Asst. U. S. Atty., Shreveport, La., Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tax Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Michael L. Paup, Joseph L. Liegl, Gilbert E. Andrews, Act. Chief, App. See., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Gary R. Allen, Tax Division, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Eugene G. Sayre, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellant., Albert Mintz, Máchale A. Miller, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee., Joseph B. Brennan, Walter H. Wingfield, Atlanta, Ga., for amicus curiae.
Gewin, Roney, Hill.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
RONEY, Circuit Judge:

Internal Revenue Code § 541 imposes a penalty tax on the undistributed income of personal holding companies. To avoid that levy, Gulf Inland distributed appreciated property to its shareholders. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(a) (1958), Gulf Inland could only take a deduction from income for the adjusted basis of the property, even though the shareholders who received it would have to pay individual taxes on the higher fair market value. Because a then-recent case from the Sixth Circuit, H. Wetter Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1972), had held Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(a) invalid, Gulf Inland treated as distributed income the full fair market value of the property distributed.

The Government did not seek Supreme Court review in Wetter. After Gulf Inland made its distribution, the Internal Revenue Service formally announced its disagreement with Wetter, and in this litigation, the Government seeks to apply the regulation to Gulf Inland. The district court, agreeing with Wetter, held for the taxpayer.

The Supreme Court has now rejected Wetter and upheld Treas.Reg. § 1.562-1(a) as having a reasonable basis in the legislative history of the Tax Code. Fulman v. United States, -U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 841, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), affirming 545 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1976).

Conceding it would now lose the issue under Fulman, Gulf Inland nevertheless argues that Fulman should not be applied retroactively, because Fulman changed the Wetter law on which Gulf Inland relied. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).

Gulf Inland’s reliance, however, was not of a type which would justify nonretroactivity. The risks of its position were manifest from the beginning. Treasury Regulation § 1.562-1(a) had been in force since 1958. Before Wetter it had never been challenged. After Wetter, it was still the law, at least presumably being applied by the Internal Revenue Service in all, circuits other than the Sixth. See Fulman v. United States, 545 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1976); C. Blake McDowell, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 67 T.C. 1043 (1977); cf. Golsen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 742, 756-758 (1970) (dictum) (even when it disagrees, the Tax Court will follow the law of the Circuit to which appeal will lie), overruling Lawrence v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 713, 717-720 (1957).

As a policy matter, the Courts of Appeals may defer to each other in tax cases in order to promote uniformity. See Federal Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-1099 (7th Cir. 1975). Stare decisis, however, does not apply, and the decision of one Court of Appeals does not bind that of another. 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[1] at 62-63 (2d ed. 1974); see United States v. Northside Realty Associates, 518 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977, 96 S.Ct. 1483, 47 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Shultz v. Crotty Brothers Texas, Inc., 310 F.Supp. 761, 768 (E.D.Tex.1970).

Just as this Court did not have to follow Wetter, neither did the Government, outside the confines of that litigation. As the Supreme Court has said:

the United States, like other parties, is entitled to adhere to what it believes to be the correct interpretation of a statute, and to reap the benefits of that adherence if it proves to be correct, except where bound to the contrary by a final judgment in a particular case.

[*1279] United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-295, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 1038, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970).

Finally, Congress has indicated that, in federal tax law, claims of reliance are to be given little weight. Under I.R.C. § 7805(b), the Service even has the discretion to apply its interpretations of the law retroactively, and its exercise of that discretion has been upheld even when it applied a view of the law expressly contrary to the law of the Court of Appeals at the time the taxpayer planned his transaction. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 447-452 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc); Hartman Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); see Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 85 S.Ct. 1301, 14 L.Ed.2d 223 (1965); 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 at § 29. But cf. 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[3. -2-4] (2d ed. 1974) (citing state cases).

REVERSED.