Flowers, Brown Hester and E.O. Sykes, for appellants. The answer of the board says that this matter is res adjudicata, that these complaints are bound by former adjudications of this court, in the two cases of Dean et al. v. The Board of Supervisors, the first case reported in 120 Miss. 334 , the second case reported in 135 Miss. 268 . Both of those cases were mandamus suits brought in the circuit court by Dean and the others for the purpose of compelling the board of supervisors to issue the bonds of this district. In neither of these cases were any of the complainants in the present suit parties to the litigation, and we contend and hope to show the court that they were not privies to the litigation and, consequently, are not bound by the doctrine of res adjudicata nor the doctrine of the law of the case. These complainants (appellants here) were not parties to those two suits. The real question here is, were they privies in those two suits and therefore bound by the doctrine of res judicata? True it is that they are taxpayers in this void district. In no sense of the term were they privies to Dean and the other individuals who instituted the mandamus proceedings. There was no sort of privity between them. We think this question does not require consideration at our hands. In fact, we do not expect counsel for appellee to make any such contention. But the real question is: Was the board of supervisors the representative of these present appellants in the sense of the term by which they would now be included as being privies because of their representation by the board of supervisors. This is the vital question in the case relating to res adjudicata. In considering this question, it is very important to bear in mind that the action of the board of supervisors in this matter was as the representative of the separate road district, not as the representative of the ordinary county affairs. This distinction is vital and controlling in the determination of this question. A very interesting note upon this question by Judge ROSE is found in 105 Am. St. Rep. 208. A condition precedent to the board becoming the agent of the taxing district and its inhabitants, is the valid organization of the taxing district. The board never became the constituted representative or agent of the taxpayers of this separate road district because the order organizing the district is utterly and absolutely void. See Brooks et al. v. Board of Supervisors of Simpson County, 102 So. 777. Under these two decisions we confidently assert that if the process of the board be void, and that, if the judgment of the board be also void, these complainants, on these two void papers, were never brought into court. These proceedings are in the nature of both proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem. The land is brought in through the owner, consequently the court never acquired jurisdiction either of the person, or of the land of these complainants, until the voluntary filing of this suit by them. See Bryant v. Board of Supervisors, 98 So. 148; Bookout v. Board of Supervisors, 103 Miss. 417 . We submit that before the board of supervisors can be their agent these appellants must have due process of law; they must be brought into court by valid process. Since this was not done, they were not privies to either of the mandamus suits and the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to them. The second opinion of the Dean case, by Judge ANDERSON in 135 Miss. 268 , decides that since Dean and the other appellants were parties to the first mandamus suit, the doctrine of res adjudicata applies in this second suit, for the reason that the question as to the validity of the organization of the district was necessarily before the court and is res adjudicata as to these same parties. We understand this case, inferentially at least, to hold that were this not true, then under the Borroum case, 131 Miss. 778 , and under the Bryant case, 98 So. supra, the court would have held the organization of this district void. We do not understand the opinion of Judge ANDERSON to question in any way the soundness of the opinions in the Bryant and the Borroum cases, supra, but merely to hold that as to Dean and the other parties the question is res adjudicata, under which doctrine black sometimes becomes white and straight lines crooked. We therefore submit that in this case these appellants have never before been in court, that they were not brought into court by due process of law by the void orders of the board of supervisors above referred to, that they did not voluntarily come into court in the mandamus proceedings; and that, therefore, neither Dean and the others represented them, nor did the board of supervisors represent them, and therefore, the doctrine of res adjudicata cannot be invoked against these appellants. We close this portion of the brief with a quotation from the opinion of Chief Justice MILLER in the case of Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U.S. 493 , 32 L.Ed. 784. If we are mistaken in this, then we wish to join with our able associate Counsel and submit that the parallel they have drawn in the Brewer-Browning case, 107 Miss. 729 , and 115, Miss. 538, and the present litigation over this road district is striking. Holmes Bowdre, also for appellants. I. THESE COMPLAINANTS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE RULE RES ADJUDICATA, AND THESE COMPLAINANTS ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE FORMER LITIGATION. \A decree in rem is binding upon nonresident parties by reason of the constructive notice given them through the seizure of the property.\" Hollingsworth v. Barbour

Anderson.

4 Pet. 466.