Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd Cir. 1978). · Go Syfert
Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd Cir. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman) (ilnb, 2014-09-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman)
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2014 · confidence medium
Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090 (3rd Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gould v. Salem
virginislands · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 579 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2009) (defendant entitled to Rule 60(b)(5) relief when it presented “unrefuted evidence” that it paid all property taxes directly to the taxing authority and that requiring it to also pay that amount to plaintiff would result in the plaintiff receiving a windfall); Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting Rule 60(b)(5) serves as mechanism to preclude double recovery, such as when plaintiff seeks to execute full amount of judgm…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BUC International Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd.
11th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting that *1275 “a motion for a credit on a judgment should be treated as a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from a judgment which has been satisfied, released or discharged”); Sun-derland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090-91 (3d Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson Waste Materials v. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
We agree with the conclusion of the Third Circuit that “a district court does not have the discretion to require two satisfactions, [when] the opposing party has suffered no prejudice from the moving party’s delay in raising the satisfaction issue.” Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1978).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Harry S. Stonehill Robert P. Brooks, Jerome S. Katzin, Receiver
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd Cir.1978); Kassman v. American University, 546 F.2d 1029 (D.C.Cir.1976); Snowden v. D.C.
cited Cited "see" Carlos Torres-Troche v. Municipality of Yauco
1st Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd Cir.1978) (Rule 60(b)(5) does not permit two satisfactions).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bryan v. Erie County Office of Children & Youth
3rd Cir. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090 (3d Cir.1978); see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir.2007); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 157 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
As a general matter, “a motion for a credit on a judgment should be treated as a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from a judgment which has been satisfied, released or discharged.” Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C.Cir.1976) (awarding de fendant a credit on the judgment against him in the amount plaintiff received from his settlement of another related suit against defendant); see also Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant entitled to relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), to the extent the judgment was satisfied by…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles Sunderland
v.
City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Gas Works and United Gas Improvement Company A/K/A Ugi Corporation, Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation. Appeal of Philadelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation
77-1956.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
May 9, 1978.
575 F.2d 1089
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

575 F.2d 1089

Charles SUNDERLAND
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Gas Works and United
Gas Improvement Company a/k/a UGI Corporation,
Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation.
Appeal of PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS and Philadelphia Facilities
Management Corporation.

No. 77-1956.

United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.

Argued March 28, 1978.
Decided May 9, 1978.

Gerald A. Inglesby, Richard D. Solo, Solo, Padova & Lisi, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.

William Goldstein, Paul M. Goldstein, Goldstein & Goldstein, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before ALDISERT, GIBBONS and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

1

In this diversity action for property damage and personal injuries resulting from a gas explosion, the jury returned a verdict against defendants Philadelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation in the total amount of $35,000. Judgment was entered in that amount. Thereafter the defendants filed an inartfully drawn motion to alter or amend the judgment. In that motion they called to the court's attention the fact that Philadelphia Gas Works had paid to American Mutual Insurance Company $7,500 on account of the latter's subrogation claim against the defendants. The subrogation claim arose out of a payment of $10,000 to the plaintiff Sunderland by American Mutual Insurance Company. That $10,000 payment represented the policy limit under a casualty policy covering the property destroyed in the explosion. Probably because the moving papers made no express reference to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court denied relief.

2

Rule 60(b)(5) provides that upon a party's motion the district court may relieve that party from a final judgment on the ground that the judgment has been satisfied. Sunderland does not dispute that on account of his loss he received $10,000 from American Mutual Insurance Company. Nor does he dispute that Philadelphia Gas Works paid $7,500 to the carrier on its subrogated claim. Nevertheless, he resists the defendants' effort to receive credit against the judgment for the $7,500 which was paid. But the only reason he suggests for not granting the defendants relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is that they failed to specify that rule in their post-judgment motion. Since a Rule 60(b)(5) motion is not subject to a specific time limitation, such a motion could be made even now. There is no reason, therefore, why we should not treat the inartful motion which was filed as a motion under that rule. Sunderland argues that the denial of the relief sought here was within the discretion of the trial judge. It is true that a trial judge has considerable discretion in deciding motions under Rule 60(b). See Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977). But a district court does not have discretion to require two satisfactions, and the opposing party has suffered no prejudice from the moving party's delay in raising the satisfaction issue. Since no reason appears why the motion should not have been granted, we will remand to the district court for the entry of an order granting the defendant relief from the $35,000 judgment to the extent of the $7,500 paid by Philadelphia Gas Works to American Mutual Insurance Company. The defendants ask for a $10,000 credit, since this is the amount received by Sunderland. The $2,500 difference, however, is a matter between Sunderland and his insurance carrier. The defendants are entitled to relief from the judgment only to the extent of their own payments.

3

The defendants also seek a reversal of the judgment because of trial errors. We find no merit in any of their contentions in this respect.

4

The judgment appealed from will be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for the purpose of entering an order relieving the defendant from that judgment to the extent of $7,500. No costs.