green
Positive treatment
16.0 score
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979
2002
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Bexas County
But see, Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 78 F.R.D. 37 (N.D.Miss.1977) remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1978) and Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). 2 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Austin III
As Austin correctly pointed out, when a plaintiff brings a lawsuit to challenge an amended or repealed statute or regulation, mootness is considered “the default.” See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 832 (5th Cir. 2023); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Suits regarding the constitutionality of statutes become moot once the statute is repealed.”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Crocker v. Austin
Mootness doctrine as applied to Plaintiffs’ claims Generally, where a plaintiff brings a lawsuit to challenge an amended or repealed statute or regulation, mootness is “the default.” See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 832 (5th Cir. 2023); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Suits regarding the constitutionality of statutes become moot once the statute is repealed.”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“[T]he enactment of a superseding statute which satisfies all the principles sought in an …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Atheists of Florida, Inc. v. City of Lakeland
The repeal or replacement of a challenged law will moot a case only: (a) “ ‘if subsequent events ma[k]e it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” Coral Springs [Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise], 371 F.3d [1320], at 1328 [ (11th Cir.2004) ] (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Burger King Corp., 955 F.2d 681, 684 (11th Cir.1992)); and (b) “where ‘a superseding statute satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute.’ ” Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphas…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ATHEISTS OF FLORIDA v. City of Lakeland, Fla.
The repeal or replacement of a challenged law will moot a case only: (a) “ ‘if subsequent events ma[k]e it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Burger King Corp., 955 F.2d 681, 684 (11th Cir.1992)); and (b) “where ‘a superseding statute satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute.’ ” Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir.1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Larry Horton v. City of St. Augustine
See also Ciudadanos Unidos De San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commissioners, 622 F.2d 807, 824 (5th Cir.1980) (finding amendment to grand jury selection system did not moot challenge and that when an amendment causes mootness it has “generally been one which completely eliminated the harm of *1327 which plaintiffs complained”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1978) (concluding entire case becomes moot where "a superseding statute ... satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute”); accord, Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta
(2×)
Accordingly, we must review the 2000 Festival Ordinance to ascertain whether it " 'satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute.' " Naturist Soc'y, Inc., 958 F.2d at 1520 (quoting Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1978)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Coalition for the Abolition v. City of Atlanta
Accordingly, we must review the 2000 Festival Ordinance to ascertain whether it “‘satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute.’” Naturist Soc’y, Inc., 958 F.2d at 1520 (quoting Johnson v. 7 Hereinafter, we will refer to this case as Northeastern Fla. Chapter. 16 State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1978)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Naturist Society, Inc., T.A. Wyner v. John Fillyaw, Individually and as Official Park Manager, John D. MacArthur Beach State Park, Florida
(2×)
The entire case becomes moot only where “a superseding statute ... satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute.” Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1978) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
deLeiris Ex Rel. deLeiris v. Scott
Thus, courts have often held that “the enactment of a superseding statute which satisfies all of the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute simply moots the case,” Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1978), because the “amendment eliminate[s] or diminished] the danger so as to render moot what had been a live controversy.” McCollester v. City of Keene, 668 F.2d 617 , 618 n. 3 (1st Cir.1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Summer
The Fifth Circuit then dismissed the appeal, and remanded the action to this court for “an appropriate adjudication as to the reserved issue of attorney’s fees.” Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rita Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross v. The State of Mississippi, Defendants-Appellants-Cross
On December 14, 1978, this Court dismissed the appeal as moot and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal of the complaint “after an appropriate adjudication as to the reserved issue of attorneys’ fees.” Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed
Cited "see"
Rothe Development Corp. v. U.S. Department of Defense
Concrete Works IV, 321 F.3d at 954 ; Fillyaw, 958 F.2d at 1520 ; see Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir.1978) (“We adhere to the rule that the enactment of a superseding statute which satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute simply moots the case.”).
cited
Cited "see"
Ron Checki v. Richard Webb
See Johnson v. Mississippi, 78 F.R.D. 37, 40-41 (N.D.Miss.1977), remanded on other grounds, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1978).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Padron v. Feaver
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 , 73 S.Ct. 894 , 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)); See also, Johnson v. State, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1978) (changed policy, or voluntary cessation must satisfy all deficiencies of prior statute); Naturist Society, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir.1992) (superseding statute, or regulation moots a case only to the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Doe v. Marshall
See, e. g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1978); McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 , 97 S.Ct. 61 , 50 L.Ed.2d 77 (1976). 4 Moreover, a determination of mootness does not prevent an award of attorneys' fees on remand.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Doe v. Marshall
See, e. g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 586 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1978); McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 , 97 S.Ct. 61 , 50 L.Ed.2d 77 (1976). 4 Moreover, a determination of mootness does not prevent an award of attorneys’ fees on remand.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rita JOHNSON Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
the STATE of Mississippi Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
v.
the STATE of Mississippi Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
78-2368.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 14, 1978.
Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellants., Wynn & Bogen, Eugene M. Bogen, Greenville, Miss., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Brown, Coleman, Per Curiam, Vance.
Cited by 19 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM:
Mississippi Code § 37-41-3 provided that students living one mile or more from their attendance centers were entitled to state financed transportation, with the exception that students residing within the corporate limits of a municipality and attending school within those corporate limits were not entitled to free transportation regardless of the distance from the school.
Upon a challenge filed on behalf of students residing within corporate limits, the District Court held that the statutory distinction between students residing within[*388] and without corporate limits was an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws, both on its face and as applied. The enforcement of the statute was permanently enjoined.
After this appeal was filed, the Mississippi Legislature responded to the decision of the District Court by amending the statute so as to provide free transportation for all students living one mile or more from their attendance center. This legislative action eliminated the unconstitutionality denounced by the District Court.
This being so, we are no longer presented with a live case or controversy. We adhere to the rule that the enactment of a superseding statute which satisfies all the principles sought in an attack on the prior statute simply moots the case. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977).
See, also, Bowles v. Blue Lake Development Corporation, 5 Cir., 1974, 504 F.2d 1094, 1098.
The District Court reserved its judgment on the issue of attorneys’ fees, a matter it is amply able to hear and decide in keeping with the applicable jurisprudence.
We therefore remand the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint as moot after an appropriate adjudication as to the reserved issue of attorneys’ fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.