United States v. Diane L. Dally, United States of Am. v. James Harold Holiday, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
United States v. Diane L. Dally, United States of Am. v. James Harold Holiday, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
121 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Barry (ca9, 2025-06-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barry
9th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cuevas v. De Roco
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
In United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979), we held that officers must have a “reasonable basis” to think that a parolee lived at an address they wished to search.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cuevas v. State of California
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
In United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979), we held that officers must have a “rea- sonable basis” to think that a parolee lived at an address they wished to search.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Curtis Ray Howard (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Motley, 432 F.3d at 1082 ("[The co-resident’s] statement that [the parolee] did not live at that address, coming from a less-than-disinterested source, did not undermine the information the officers previously had received....’’); Dally, 606 F.2d at 862, 863 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Howard (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Motley, 432 F.3d at 1082 (“[The co-resident’s] statement that [the parolee] did not live at that address, coming from a less-than-disinterested source, did not undermine the information the officers previously had received . . . .”); Dally, 606 F.2d at 862, 863 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Motley v. Parks (2×)
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Section 1983 Illegal Search Claim 17 A. Probable Cause Is Needed to Establish Residence 18 Where a law enforcement officer's observations support "a reasonable belief" that a parolee resides at a particular address, this "provide[s] a reasonable basis for [a parole] search." United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Motley v. Parks (4×)
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Section 1983 Illegal Search Claim A. Probable Cause Is Needed to Establish Residence [1] Where a law enforcement officer’s observations support “a reasonable belief” that a parolee resides at a particular address, this “provide[s] a reasonable basis for [a parole] search.” United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moreno v. Baca (2×)
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
We cited the “reasonable suspicion” standard when evaluating the constitutionality of a parole search in United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that a parole search was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment because the parole officer had a “reasonable belief’ that the parolee had violated his parole by changing addresses), and after concluding that the Fourth Amendment rights of parolees and probationers were indistinguishable, we applied the “reasonable suspicion” standard when evaluating the search of a probationer in Davis, 932 F.2d at 758 (“Th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R. Moreno v. Baca
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
We cited the "reasonable suspicion" standard when evaluating the constitutionality of a parole search in United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that a parole search was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because the parole officer had a "reasonable belief" that the parolee had violated his parole by changing addresses), and after concluding that the Fourth Amendment rights of parolees and probationers were indistinguishable, we applied the "reasonable suspicion" standard when evaluating the search of a probationer in Davis, 932 F.2d at 758 ("The permissible boun…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Motley v. Parks (5×)
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding parole search where the parolee was arrested just outside the house and right afterward, the officers searched the house); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir.1975) (upholding parole search where officers arrested parolee away from his residence with marijuana in his possession, then went to his house and found more marijuana); United States v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 683, 686-87 (7th Cir.1998) (upholding the search of a parolee's home the day he was arrested because the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Motley v. Parks (5×)
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding parole search where the parolee was arrested just outside the house and right afterward, the officers searched the house); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir.1975) (upholding parole search where officers arrested parolee away from his residence with marijuana in his possession, then went to his house and found more marijuana); United States v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 683, 686-87 (7th Cir.1998) (upholding the search of a parolee’s home the day he was arrested because the officers had reasonable grounds to believe th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Binti Watts and Christopher Pryor v. County of Sacramento, a Municipal Corporation Lorie Timberlake Bryan Munn Donald Black and Jeffrey Morace
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir.2000) (anonymous tip corroborated by officer’s independent verification of suspect’s address, as well as suspect’s friend’s face-to-face indication that suspect was inside); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896-97 (9th Cir.1991) (anonymous tip corroborated by (1) confirmation that the home was leased to suspect’s family, (2) fact that suspect’s two brothers lived there, (3) police observation of suspect entering home with his own keys, (4) evidence suggesting that suspect had no other residence, and (5) police observ…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenny CONWAY, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
But in United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979), we held that a “reasonable belief’ that the parolee had moved to the residence in question provided a “reasonable basis” for the parole search.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon WATTS, Defendant-Appellant (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Harper, 928 F.2d at 896 ; United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lance Ramel Johnson (2×)
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Davis, 932 F.2d at 758 ; Duff, 831 F.2d at 179 ; United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Taylor (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979). 10 "A parole search is proper if conducted in a manner consistent with state law." United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Green (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979); Latta, supra; Jarvis El, supra. Lastly, we find untenable the suppression court's argument that the parole officer should have obtained a warrant to search the Defendant's room, the absence of which converted the parole officer into a police officer seeking new criminal charges against the Defendant.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lloyd Eugene Butcher
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 862-63 (9th Cir.1979); People v. Kanos, 14 Cal.App.3d at 646 , 92 Cal.Rptr. 614 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edward Cardona (2×)
1st Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Richardson, 849 F.2d at 442 (decision to authorize search more important than identity of those present during its course); 5 United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 862-63 (9th Cir.1979) (parole officer may constitutionally authorize valid parole search by corrections official, notwithstanding parole officer's absence during search); cf. United States v. Polito, 583 F.2d 48, 56 (2d Cir.1978) (where PVW outstanding, law enforcement officer may detain parolee for purpose of assisting parole authorities). 25 The force of this postulate is not slowed by appellant's protest that parole officers …
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Steven Vasquez
9th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
Unlike in cases in which probable cause as to a probationer’s or parolee’s residence was found, nothing the officers observed before going to the apartment confirmed that Apartment 26 was Vasquez’s “‘home base.’” Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 976 (quoting United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257 , 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2006)); see United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 , 862–63 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Franklin, 603 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2010); Conway, 122 F.3d at 843 .
discussed Cited "see" Watts v. County of Sacramento
E.D. Cal. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 863 ; see also Perez, 900 F.2d at 213 (holding that officers who enter a home without “reasonable grounds” for believing the suspect named in an arrest warrant is a resident of the home violate the third party homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Gregory Mays, United States of America v. John Washington Pauley (2×)
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Mark Samuel Richardson
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Michael Rabb
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dally, 606 F.2d at 862-63 ; Latta, 521 F.2d at 253 (Wright, J., concurring).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Bush
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979) (holding a parole search constitutional by concluding, inter alia, that parole officer’s observations “supported a reasonable belief” that the parolee had moved to the address), and United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (concluding that "police must have reasonable suspicion, that an item to be searched is owned, controlled, or possessed by probationer, in order for the item to fall within the permissible bounds of a probation search”), with United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir.1991) (“…
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Howard
Ohio Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir.1979) (police entitled to search apartment because they had sufficient evidence to reasonably believe parole violator resided there).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. David L. Harper, United States of America v. Adrian A. Harper
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir.1979) (police entitled to search apartment because they had sufficient evidence to reasonably believe parole violator resided there).
cited Cited "see, e.g." People v. Boyd
Cal. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
Fed 135]; see also United States v. Dally (9th Cir. 1979) 606 F.2d 861, 862-863 .) 1 B.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Johnson (2×)
Utah · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.1979); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 , 96 S.Ct. 200 , 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Rea
E.D.N.Y · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Quigg v. France
D. Mont. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Diane L. DALLY, Defendant-Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Harold HOLIDAY, Defendant-Appellant
78-3012, 78-3336.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 4, 1979.
606 F.2d 861
Joe Reichmann, Los Angeles, Cal., Richard D. Burda, Deputy Fed. Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellants., Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Kathleen P. March, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Wright, Goodwin, Solomon.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

James Holiday, a California parolee, appeals from a conviction for possession of a firearm. Diane Dally appeals from a conviction for possession of stolen mail. The stolen mail and guns were found in Daily’s apartment during a parole search. They contend that the search was improper; that[*862] the guns, mail and other evidence should have been suppressed.

Holiday was convicted of first degree murder in California in 1961. He was sentenced to life imprisonment but in July 1975, he was paroled. His parole required him to obtain prior permission from his parole officer before he changed his address, and he agreed to notify his parole officer of any emergency move within 72 hours. He also consented to the search of his residence by his “Parole Agent, any agent of the Department of Corrections, or any law enforcement officer.”

Holiday was supervised by Welch Go-lightly, a California State Parole Agent. On January 30, 1978, Golightly was unsuccessful in finding Holiday at his reported residence in Pasadena. Golightly left a message with Holiday’s nephew for Holiday to get in touch with him.

Bertram Rice is a Special Agent of the California Department of Corrections Law Enforcement Liason Unit, who describes himself as an investigator. He knew the terms of Holiday’s parole and also knew that Holiday had a Pasadena address.

On January 31, Rice talked with Christ Heart, a United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Agent, about other California parolees. Heart was investigating Holiday for a gun charge. Heart had information that Holiday was living at Daily’s Venice apartment. While Rice was with Heart another ATF agent asked Heart about Holiday. Heart then told Rice that Holiday was living in Venice and Rice then checked with Golightly who confirmed that Holiday was supposed to be living in Pasadena.

Rice had neither the manpower nor the equipment to watch Daily’s residence. He therefore asked the ATF to help him. Rice then supervised the surveillance by the ATF and the Los Angeles Police Department.

ATF agents saw Holiday enter the Dally apartment on February 2. They photographed him taking out the garbage, bringing in his laundry and talking with neighbors. They reported their observations to Rice.

Rice called Golightly on February 6 and told Golightly he had information that Holiday was living at another residence. Go-lightly said Holiday had not answered the message he left at the Pasadena address and for Rice to make a parole search if Holiday had a new residence.

ATF agents saw Holiday’s car near Daily’s apartment on the morning of February 8. The car’s windows were fogged; they concluded that the car had been there overnight and reported this information to Rice.

Rice and ATF agents watched the apartment on February 9. Holiday came out and left in another car which had been parked overnight. Holiday returned with dry cleaning, changed his clothes and left the apartment carrying laundry. Holiday returned again with more dry cleaning. He used a key to open the door.

Rice arrested Holiday when he came out a third time.

Rice knocked on the door and identified himself. Dally refused to let him in saying that Holiday did not live there. Rice attempted to open the door with Holiday’s key but Dally had bolted the door. Rice and other officers then opened the door with force.

Rice found men’s and women’s clothing, papers in Holiday’s name and papers in Daily’s name in one of the bedrooms. He found the challenged evidence, two guns, the stolen United States Treasury checks, and false identification, in the same bedroom.

Holiday and Dally were indicted for possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Holiday was also indicted for possession of firearms by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a).

Both defendants moved to suppress this evidence and evidence found in Daily’s purse and vanity. Except for the evidence found in Daily’s purse and vanity, the District Court denied the motion.

Holiday and Dally were tried together. The jury found Holiday guilty of possession[*863] of a firearm and Dally guilty of possession of stolen mail. They acquitted Holiday of the stolen mail charge.

On this appeal, both Holiday and Dally contend that the search was not a valid parole search under either California law or federal law because:

1) the search was not conducted by Parole Agent Golightly and therefore was not a parole search;
2) the parole search was unreasonable;
3) the search was not authorized by California law; and
4) the search was a subterfuge for a criminal investigation.

Dally also contends that the evidence found during the parole search, even if valid, is not admissible against her.

We find no merit in any contention and we affirm.

A state parolee may be searched, pursuant to a consent provision in his parole terms, if his parole officer reasonably believes a search is appropriate. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975). Holiday failed to return Golightly’s call and Golightly learned that other officers had information that Holiday had another residence. Only after Golightly had this information was the parole search authorized. The District Court properly determined that Parole Agent Golightly knowingly authorized it.

Appellants’ reliance on United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) is misplaced. Consuelo-Gonzalez held that the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651, does not authorize other law enforcement agents to search a federal probationer even though the probationer consented to the search as part of the probation terms. Unlike Consuelo-Gonzalez, here the parole officer adequately supervised the search and this case did not arise under the Federal Probation Act but under the Fourth Amendment and California law.

Holiday and Dally also contend that the facts did not provide a reasonable basis for the belief that Holiday lived with Dally. We disagree. The observations supported a reasonable belief that Holiday had moved to this address and was now living with Dally. It is immaterial that he had not lived at this address for a long period of time. The known facts provided a reasonable basis for the search.

Holiday’s arrest for a parole violation did not end the need for a parole search. California had a continuing interest in Holiday’s progress so it could determine whether to continue, modify or revoke his parole. Latta, 521 F.2d 246, 252; People v. Kanos, 14 Cal.App.3d 642, 648-49, 92 Cal.Rptr. 614, 617 (Ct.App.1971).

Appellants also contend that this search was not authorized by California law. They rely on People v. Natale, 77 Cal.App.3d 568, 143 Cal.Rptr. 629 (Ct.App. 1978). But in Natale a parole officer had no knowledge of the facts and he delegated his complete authority to police officers. Here Golightly authorized a search only after he became aware that Holiday was not living in Pasadena and that he had another residence. Golightly then authorized Rice to search Holiday’s actual residence if Rice found that Holiday was in fact living at another address. California specifically allows Special Agents to make parole searches. Kanos, 14 Cal.App.3d 642, 649, 92 Cal-Rptr. 614. This search was authorized by California law.

There is no merit in Dally and Holiday’s contention that this search was a subterfuge for a criminal investigation forbidden by Latta. The record adequately supports the District Court’s finding that law enforcement assistance did not make this parole investigation a subterfuge for a criminal investigation.

Dally argues that evidence from a parole search is not admissible against a third party. This contention has no merit. California admits evidence found during a parole search against third parties. People v. Icenogle, 71 Cal.App.3d 576, 139 Cal.Rptr. 637 (Ct.App.1977). The Fourth Amend[*864] ment does not require the exclusion of evidence found in the course of a proper investigation. Cf. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).

The District Court properly denied the motion to suppress. The convictions are AFFIRMED.