United States v. William Samuel Hancock, A/K/A Harlan Duane Wixson, 607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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United States v. William Samuel Hancock, A/K/A Harlan Duane Wixson, 607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Koskella (2×)
D. Utah · 2003 · confidence medium
In U.S. v. Hickok, the Tenth Circuit stated, “ ‘[o]ne who enters a guilty plea has no right to withdraw it,’ and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating ‘a fair and just reason’ for withdrawal of his guilty plea.” 907 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir.1990) quoting Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.1978) (additional citations omitted). 1 In U.S. v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337, 337 (10th Cir.1979), the Tenth Circuit ruled that “although a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty, a request to withdraw such a plea made before impo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bollig
Wis. · 2000 · confidence medium
See e.g., United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d 308, 313 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337, 338 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nahodil, 776 F. Supp. 991, 996 (M.D.Pa. 1991). *580 ¶ 37.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Johney B. Kearney, Sr.
10th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337, 337 (10th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Scarborough
W.D. Tex. · 1981 · confidence medium
Present counsel cited reliance on United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337, 338 (10th Cir. 1979) 6 and United States v. Brown, 617 F.2d 54 , 55 7 (4th Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see" Love v. State (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337, 338 (10th Cir.1979). [1] As the majority points out, the plea was to a charge of robbery, reduced from robbery while armed.
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Handy
N.C. · 1990 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979) (withdrawal before sentencing) with United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1979) (withdrawal after sentencing).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Samuel HANCOCK, A/K/A Harlan Duane Wixson, Defendant-Appellant
77-2098.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Oct 16, 1979.
607 F.2d 337
Peter G. Pierce, III, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant-appellant., Larry D. Patton, U.S. Atty., and Charles Lee Waters, Asst. U.S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.
Doyle, McKay, Logan.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
McKAY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty at his sentencing hearing prior to imposition of sentence. This motion was authorized by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d). The trial court summarily denied the request and sentenced appellant.

Although a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty, a request to withdraw such a plea made before imposition of sentence should be considered carefully and with liberality. Dorton v. United States, 447 F.2d 401, 411-12 (10th Cir. 1971); Burnett v. United States, 404 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1968). The granting of permission to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the court, id., but that discretion is properly exercised only if the decision reached comports with the broad standards of liberality mandated by earlier cases. See Dorton v. United States, 447 F.2d at 412; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927).

Reviewing the record as a whole we believe that under our standards for the exercise of discretion the motion to withdraw the plea should have been granted. No hearing was held in which appellant had[*338] an adequate opportunity to develop support for his reasons for wanting to change his plea. The court did not outline its reasons for denying the motion. [1] The government opposed the motion, but it did not claim, much less did it demonstrate, that it would be prejudiced in any way by appellant changing his plea. [2] Nor is this a case where the defendant’s motivation was found to be manipulation of the legal system. See Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 1978). [3]

REVERSED and remanded with directions to grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.

1

. Cf. Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1978) (denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea affirmed; district judge had “issued a memorandum and order detailing the reasons for the denial”).

2

. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, when made prior to sentencing,

should be freely allowed in the interest of justice, unless the prosecution will be substantially prejudiced thereby. The liberality found here is a result of a desire to protect defendants’ rights to a jury trial. This right has found a favored place in our law.

8A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 32.07[2], at 109-11 (2d ed. 1978) (footnotes omitted).

3

. In Barker, defendant had received, in exchange for changing his initial plea to guilty, the government’s promises that it would not oppose his release on bond pending sentencing, would not seek to increase his bond, and would not use certain evidence in its possession at any release hearing. 579 F.2d at 1221. The district court, in explaining its denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluded that defendant had been “attempting to manipulate the Government and the Court so that he could obtain that to which he was not entitled — six weeks of freedom on bond — without any adverse consequences.” Id. at 1222. We found the district court’s conclusion warranted, and affirmed. Id. at 1226.