Jeffrey Vincent Smith v. Jiro J. Enomoto, Dir., California Dep't of Corr., 615 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
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Jeffrey Vincent Smith v. Jiro J. Enomoto, Dir., California Dep't of Corr., 615 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the present rule is that an indigent williams v. stewart 3435 defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services, but that such right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant.”
10 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. Stewart (ca9, 2006-04-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Williams v. Stewart
9th Cir. · 2006 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the present rule is that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services, but that such right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Williams v. Stewart
9th Cir. · 2006 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the present rule is that an indigent williams v. stewart 3435 defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services, but that such right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Masters v. Bell
N.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
May 6, 1991) (citing Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Apelt v. Charles Ryan
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
In Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006), we stated that the then “present rule is that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services, but that such right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant.” Id. at 1053-54 (quoting Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 1980)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mikhel
9th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1053 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Turney Williams v. Terry L. Stewart, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir.1980) (“The present rule is that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services, but that such *1054 right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant.”) (citation omitted); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 323 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (“Given that petitioner offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due process in the trial judge’s decision [to deny funds for vario…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Raymond Earl Rigsby v. John Avenenti, Warden
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Anaya
Me. · 1983 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir.1980) (expert medical witness); Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 , 101 S.Ct. 199 , 66 L.Ed.2d 84 (1980) (investigative services); McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d 368, 374-75 (Mont.1982) (psychiatrist); Oregon v. Acosta, 41 Or.App. 257, 260 , 597 P.2d 1282, 1284 (1979) (interpreter and polygraph expert).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Williams v. Vasquez
E.D. Cal. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 , 101 S.Ct. 199 , 66 L.Ed.2d 84 (1980). “[HJowever ... such assistance is not automatically mandatory but rather depends upon the need as revealed by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. at 1352.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stubbs v. Thomas
S.D.N.Y. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 936 , 95 S.Ct. 1145 , 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); see also Smith v. Enomoto, 615 F.2d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir.), (following Mason)-, Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the trial judge’s refusal to provide an expert deprived the defendant of the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jeffrey Vincent SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Jiro J. ENOMOTO, Director, California Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee
79-2560.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 31, 1980.
615 F.2d 1251
Therene Powell, Deputy State Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner-appellant., Mark Alan Hart, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent-appellee.
Sneed, Ferguson, Smith.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
RUSSELL E. SMITH, Senior District Judge:

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree burglary in the California courts. Following the exhaustion of his state remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. From the denial of that petition he takes this appeal.

Petitioner, by his choice, appeared pro se in the state court proceedings. He was incarcerated between the time of arrest and the time of trial. He moved for an order requiring the state to provide funds for the employment of an investigator, and later requested that the court appoint an investigator. In neither motion did petitioner indicate what his defense would be or relate any facts which would support the need for an investigator. The court denied both motions, and the sole basis for this petition is that, as a result, petitioner was denied due process and equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner contends that at the time of the burglary he was unconscious; that, by virtue of his incarceration, he was personally unable to investigate; that, if an investigator had been appointed, he might have been able to find evidence that on the morning of the crime a person known only as “Leonard” had, without petitioner’s knowledge, put “acid” in a “joint” which petitioner smoked, rendering him unconscious; that a general questioning of persons near the scene of the crime might have revealed that someone had seen petitioner, then drugged, being assisted into the burglarized apartment; that an unknown person, a cellmate of petitioner’s, would have testified that when petitioner was brought into the cell he was unconscious. It is urged that all of this would have corroborated petitioner’s claim of unconsciousness.

[*1252] We assume without deciding that an investigator might have found evidence supporting in some degree petitioner’s defense and that the denial of such services was prejudicial.

This bring us to the pivotal question: Is a defendant appearing pro se, who is incarcerated prior to trial, entitled to state-funded,investigative services without making any showing of need? The present rule is that an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to investigative services (Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974)), but that such right comes into existence only when some need is demonstrated by the defendant. See Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Davis, 582 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d at 1352.

Petitioner argues, citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), that, where a defendant is represented by an attorney, the attorney can conduct the ordinary routine investigation which a pro se defendant in custody cannot; that it should be presumed that such a defendant is entitled to investigative help; and that the presumption should control unless rebutted by the state. We believe that Britt does establish a presumption rebuttable by the state where the subject matter of the request is a transcript of a prior trial. We refuse, however, to extend the doctrine of Britt to investigative services.

Britt does no more than generalize the time-honored belief that a transcript of the prior testimony of any witness is essential to proper trial preparation. With the transcript a lawyer may determine how the substance of the testimony fits into the pattern of the prosecution or defense, as the case may be. In addition, as indicated by Justice Marshall speaking for the majority and Justice Douglas in dissent in Britt, the transcript furnishes a basis for the impeachment of witnesses by prior contradictory statements. The impeachment in some cases may be effective only where counsel has readily available the exact language used on the prior occasion rather than some memory-produced approximation of it. The belief is so thoroughly held that rarely is an important civil case tried before every important witness has been deposed.

A generalization is not possible where investigative services are involved. In many cases a lawyer, after talking to a client, knows that any investigation would be futile. In others the lawyer may secure such investigation as is needed by available processes of discovery. Petitioner urges that he was denied the kind of routine discovery which a lawyer would conduct in every case, but the fact is that what might be routine in one case is not necessarily so in another. In this case the kind of investigation which petitioner says should have been conducted would never have been conducted as a matter of routine by any lawyer. Not until petitioner himself had indicated to his lawyer the facts, which he now says that he knew, pointing to the need for corroboration of his claim of unconsciousness, would a lawyer have made the investigation which petitioner says should have been made. Had petitioner indicated to the court as much as he would have had to indicate to a lawyer, the problem here would be an entirely different one.

For the reasons indicated we hold that there is no presumption of need for investigative services and that petitioner was not entitled to them until he indicated need.

The judgment is affirmed.