United States v. F/v Repulse, in Rem, & Arnie Kjarstad, Claimant-Appellant, 688 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
United States v. F/v Repulse, in Rem, & Arnie Kjarstad, Claimant-Appellant, 688 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Flockhart v. Wyant (sd, 1991-03-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flockhart v. Wyant (2×)
S.D. · 1991 · confidence medium
“The few exceptions are very limited and include only those cases involving fraud 6 or possible loss of individual liberty, citizenship, or parental rights.” United States v. F/V Repulse, 688 F.2d 1283, 1284 (1982) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Ackley v. Chicago and North Western Transportation Company, a Corporation
8th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Transp., 688 F.2d at 1283. 6 The Supreme Court has emphasized the jury’s role in determining whether an employer has breached its duties under the FELA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joseph A. Roach v. The National Transportation Safety Board, and J. Lynn Helms, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
10th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Aponte v. United States, 465 U.S. 1099 , 104 S.Ct. 1591 , 80 L.Ed.2d 123 , reh. denied, 466 U.S. 994 , 104 S.Ct. 2376 , 80 L.Ed.2d 848 (1984); United States v. F/V Repulse, 688 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jack J. Bender v. William P. Clark, as Successor to James G. Watt (2×)
10th Cir. · 1984 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. F/V Repulse, 688 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir.1982) (preponderance standard properly applied in "civil penalty" case).
cited Cited "see" Rudy Pavlik Andy Pavlik Thomas H. Schmidt v. United States
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. F/V Repulse, 688 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
F/V REPULSE, in Rem, Defendant-Appellant, and Arnie Kjarstad, Claimant-Appellant
81-3182.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Sep 28, 1982.
688 F.2d 1283
Richard H. Friedman, Royce, Wollenberg & Friedman, Sitka, Alaska, for defendant-appellant., Martin W. Matzen, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Pregerson, Alarcon, Nelson.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
NELSON, Circuit Judge:

The claimant Arnie Kjarstad, as master of the vessel, appeals from the district court’s in rem judgment assessing a $15,000 civil penalty against the fishing vessel Repulse pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1376(b) for the “unlawful taking of a marine mammal.” Kjarstad argues that the action and the penalty are more criminal than civil in nature, and thus, the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than either the beyond a reasonable doubt or intermediate clear and convincing standards of proof.

The preponderance of the evidence standard applies in civil cases, including civil penalty cases. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978). See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). The few exceptions are very limited and include only those cases involving fraud or possible loss of individual liberty, citizenship, or parental rights. Santosky v. Kramer, -U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1396, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808; Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 87 S.Ct. 483,17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966). “The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than the mere loss of money . . . . ” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808. The penalty in the present case calls only for loss of money.

Congress expressly labelled the sanction in 16 U.S.C. § 1376(b) a “civil penalty.” Moreover, in the preceding section, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b), Congress provided for criminal penalties. The specific “civil” label and juxtaposition with criminal penalties indicate Congress’ clear intent to establish § 1376(b) as a civil penalty. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49, 100 S.Ct. at 2640-2641. The civil penalty is not so punitive as to negate that intent. Id.; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963).

The statute and penalty in this case are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal in nature. Consequently, preponderance of the evidence was the proper standard of proof.

AFFIRMED.