John Sebron Morrell v. The City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
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John Sebron Morrell v. The City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jerry Lynn Young v. Neal B. Biggers, Jr. (ca5, 1987-07-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Lynn Young v. Neal B. Biggers, Jr. (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
When the magistrate dismissed Young’s 1982 complaint without prejudice, supra at 216 n. 1, he found that the dismissal would not “likely subject a subsequent § 1983 action by plaintiff against defendants to a statute of limitations defense.” The magistrate explained as follows: In addition, in 1982, the dicta of Shaw became our holding in Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469, 470 (5th Cir.1982), where we stated that “the one-year statute governing actions for intentional torts by ordinary citizens does not apply to torts by police.” Finally, none of the defendants, with several…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simons v. City of Columbus
N.D. Miss. · 1984 · confidence medium
Finally, in Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469, 470 (5th Cir.1982), the court flatly stated that “the one-year statute governing actions for intentional torts by ordinary citizens does not apply to torts by police.” In light of the authorities cited above, this court finds that the plaintiff’s action is not time barred by Mississippi’s one-year statute of limitations governing intentional torts.
discussed Cited "see" City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson
Miss. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469, 470 (5th Cir.1982); Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir.1976); Simons v. City of Columbus, 593 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D.Miss. 1984); and Mathis v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 588 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.Miss. 1983); Harvey v. Dunaway, 461 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (N.D.Miss. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" Gary Garcia v. Richard Wilson and Martin Vigil
10th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mor-rell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (assault by police officer not gov *646 erned by Mississippi one-year statute because under Mississippi law such is not mere assault and battery but breach of sheriffs official duty); Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1980) (Louisiana one-year assault statute of limitations applied in § 1983 action).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Sebron MORRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
the CITY OF PICAYUNE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
82-4153.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Nov 1, 1982.
690 F.2d 469
Robert F. Shearman, J. Michael Cumberland, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant., M. D. Tate, II, Picayune, Miss., for defendants-appellees.
Gee, Tate.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant sued the City, its police department and various policemen, invoking 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and asserting deprivation “of his Constitutional right to freedom from physical abuse and intimidation.” This was done, he asserts, when in the course of arresting and jailing him two policemen hurled him headfirst into the concrete floor and wall of a cell. The court below concluded that the one-year Mississippi limitations provision governing actions for assault and battery applied. Since the action was filed about thirteen months after the incident complained of, appellant suffered summary judgment on this ground. We reverse.

Long ago, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the one-year assault and battery statute does not apply to actions such as this. In a suit brought on similar facts, where a deputy sheriff shot an arrestee, it observed

It will be observed that the causes of action set forth in the statute result from breaches of duties which all persons owe to every other person, and do not cover the breach of a duty specially imposed by law on one for the benefit of another.... The declaration sets forth not a mere, assault and battery, or maiming, but a breach of the sheriff’s official duty, the assault and battery, or maiming, being the particular breach thereof; and the cause of action is this breach of the deputy sheriff’s official duties. The statute, therefore, does not apply.

State for the Use of Smith v. Smith, 156 Miss. 288, 125 So. 825, 826 (1930). We have ourselves recently applied the holdings of[*470] Smith in a case very similar to this. Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976).

Appellee seeks to distinguish Smith and Shaw, pointing out that in those cases the bonding company of the policemen sued was also made a party [1] so that the suit might be characterized as one on the bond .for breach of official duty. As we noted in Shaw, however, the square holding of the Mississippi court in Smith is that the one-year statute governing actions for intentional torts by ordinary citizens does not apply to torts by police. 537 F.2d at 1294 n.ll. Since it does not, it appears that the six-year catch-all statute controls. [2] This statute includes actions on written contract, and for that reason was applied in Smith and Shaw. But it also generally governs actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed. For this reason it applies here. The judgment below is VACATED and the cause is REMANDED. It is so

ORDERED.

1

. As appellant sought to do here by a motion to amend that was denied.