“a court can only consider the affidavit of an expert witness on a motion for summary judgment if that expert's testimony would be admissible at trial”
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Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Harris v. Key Bank National Ass'n
a court can only consider the affidavit of an expert witness on a motion for summary judgment if that expert's testimony would be admissible at trial
cited
Cited "see"
Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum, Inc.
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 175-76 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bunt v. Altec Industries, Inc.
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176-77 (5th Cir.1990) (witnesses allowed to testify on safety of brake design despite lack of personal design experience), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir.1985) (design engineer permitted to testify on safety of crawler tractor despite lack of experience approving crawler tractor designs); Wylie v. Ford Motor Co., 536 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir.1976) (knowledge of basic physics rendered a physicist competent to testify concerning the…
discussed
Cited "see"
W.G. Pettigrew Distributing Co. v. Borden, Inc.
See Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993)).
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Cited "see"
Terry Roger Skipper, etc. v. Commonwealth
See Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 277 , 427 S.E.2d 411, 418 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993).
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Cited "see"
Bynum v. Commonwealth
While searching for coins, police may “look into every part of [a] building,” as coins “might have been hidden in one or more boxes of diminutive size.” 2 Blair v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 483, 489 , 303 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1983); see Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 275-76 , 427 S.E.2d 411, 417 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993).
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Cited "see"
Dwayne Blair Gloria Blair v. Sealift, Inc., Defendant-Third Party v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, Defendant-Third Party
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 920 F.2d 259 , 260 (5th Cir.1990) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). 35 .
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Cited "see"
Brandon v. Commonwealth
See Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280 , 427 S.E.2d 411, 420 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993); Asbury v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 101, 104 , 175 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1970). [I]n view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar.
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Cited "see"
In Re Watford
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 , 173 (5th Cir.1990) (if failure of party to present evidence is attributable to carelessness or negligence of attorney, it would be an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant Rule 60(b) relief), reh’g denied, 920 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.1990), ce rt. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993); see also Engleson v. Burlington N. R.R.
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Cited "see"
Pedraza v. Jones
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Search & Seizure of Shivers
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, -U.S. ——, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
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Cited "see"
Ford Motor Credit Company v. William A. Bright
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 , 173-74 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
cited
Cited "see"
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bright
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
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Cited "see"
Lewis C. Hopper, Individually and as General Partner of Gulf Coast Television, Ltd., and Joe Sanderson v. Harvey Frank
See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). 3 .The parties agree that Mississippi substantive law controls this case. 4 .
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Cited "see"
Hopper v. Frank
See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). 3 The parties agree that Mississippi substantive law controls this case. (2)(a) The lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so, or (b) fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, knowing that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services, or (c) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services.
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Cited "see"
American Economy Insurance v. Tomlinson
See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
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Cited "see"
De La Torre v. Continental Ins. Co.
See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 910 ___ _________ ___________________________ F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to grant a Rule 60(b)(1) motion seeking relief from a party's failure, through carelessness, to submit evidence in a timely manner), cert. _____ denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993).6 ______ IV IV We need go no further.
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Cited "see"
Designer Showrooms, Inc. v. Kelley
(2×)
See Hallman v. Lipscomb, 114 S.C. 171 , 103 S.E. 513 (1920).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Fishman Jackson PLLC v. Israely
P. 54(b); see also Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069 , 1075 n. 14 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Lupo v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories
Compare Mot. at 1, 15 with Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 , 173 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 , 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993) and Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., Civ.A.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sulco, Inc.
As long as an expert stays “within the reasonable confines of his subject area,” the Tenth Circuit has held “a lack of specialization does not affect the admissibility of [the expert] opinion, but only its weight.” Wheeler, 935 F.2d at 1100 (mechanical engineer with expertise in the design of farm equipment permitted to testify on consumer expectations despite lack of experience in consumer sampling); see also, Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 , 176-77 (5th Cir.1990) (engineer experienced in designing devices similar to a brake press qualified to testify on s…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.
As long as an expert stays “within the reasonable confines of his subject area,” our case law establishes “a lack of specialization does not affect the admissibility of [the expert] opinion, but only its weight.” Wheeler, 935 F.2d at 1100 (mechanical engineer with expertise in the design of farm equipment permitted to testify on consumer expectations despite lack of experience in consumer sampling); see also, Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 , 176-77 (5th Cir.1990) (engineer experienced in designing devices similar to a brake press qualified to testify on saf…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 312, prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,649 Steven D. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. Fuji Heavy Industries, Inc., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae
Although Mr. Bihlmeyer never conducted or observed rollover tests or static tests for roof crush while at Ford, in the eight years since leaving Ford to become a "consulting engineer," Mr. Bihlmeyer has performed numerous design analyses on the roof and roof support structures of various vehicles. 29 As long as an expert stays "within the reasonable confines of his subject area," our case law establishes "a lack of specialization does not affect the admissibility of [the expert] opinion, but only its weight." Wheeler, 935 F.2d at 1100 (mechanical engineer with expertise in the design of farm e…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Edwards v. City of Houston
See also Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Undray D. Ford, Etc. v. Ernie Elsbury
See also Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 171 , 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993): The Federal Rules do not recognize a "motion for reconsideration” in haec verba.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mickens v. Commonwealth
See, e.g., Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 273 , 427 S.E.2d 411, 416 , cert. denied,_U.S._, 114 S.Ct. 171 (1993); Yeatts, 242 Va. at 127 , 410 S.E.2d at 258 ; Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 371 , 402 S.E.2d 218, 223 , cert. denied, 502 U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 113 (1991); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 405 , 384 S.E.2d 757, 767 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990). 6 Mickens claims that Virginia’s rule barring evidence about an accused’s parole eligibility “prevents the jury from giving full consideration to all mitigating factors.” He asserts that he would not h…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hallman
v.
Lipscomb.
v.
Lipscomb.
10435.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jun 28, 1920.
Messrs. Butler Hall , for appellant, cite: Testimony as to oral contract which had been superseded by written contract was admitted in error and should have been stricken out: 46 S.C. 411 ; 47 S.C. 176 ; 77 S.C. 191 ; 83 S.C. 204 ; 90 S.C. 541 ; 108 S.C. 47 ; 109 S.C. 29 ; 111 S.C. 287 ; 27 S.C. 376 ; 99 S.C. 108 ; 17 Cyc. 632. Jury should have been instructed as to the elements of fraud: 20 Cyc. 127, et seq.; 62 S.C. 42 .
Messrs. Dobson Vassy , for respondent. Oral argument.
Fraser.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.The plaintiff is a real estate agent. The defendant was the owner of a tract of land in Cherokee county, near Gaffney. The plaintiff asked the defendant to allow him to sell her plantation for her. The defendant was not anxious to sell. There were several interviews between the parties in reference to the sale. About the conversations there is much conflict of evidence. The plaintiff claims that the defendant agreed to pay commissions of 5 per cent, on the selling price. The defendant claims that the price of $12,000, for which she sold the place, was to be net to her; that she finally consented to- the sale at that price. The last of these interviews took place on the morning of the 11th of January, 1918. Later in the day of the 11th of January, 1918, the defendant agreed to sell for $12,000. The plaintiff then had an agreement prepared and signed by the defendant, as follows:
[*173] “Exhibit A. State of South Carolina, County of Cherokee. Received of A. L. Hallman the sum of $500 as part payment of the purchase price of $12,000 of my farm, in Cherokee county, containing 104 acres, more or less, bounded on the north by lands of J. C. Pettit, on the east by lands of J. C. Pettit and June Humphreys, on the south by lands of Anthony Hopper, and on the west by lands of R. L. Morgan; and upon the payment of the balance of said sum of $12,000 February 1, 1918, I do hereby agree to execute and deliver to the said A. L. Hallman a deed of conveyance in fee simple of the above described premises free of incumbrances. It is understood that the present tenant is to farm said land this year.
“Witness my hand and seal this January 11, 1918. Mrs. Emma G. Lipscomb. Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of J. L- Moorehead.”
In pursuance of this contract, the plaintiff demanded and defendant executed the conveyance of the land to those to whom the plaintiff assigned the contract. After the sale the plaintiff demanded commissions and the defendant refused to pay them. The plaintiff brought suit on his view of the verbal contract. . The. plaintiff admitted the written contract. The defendant objected to all testimony in reference to any evidence of the parol contracts. The objections were overruled. At the conclusion of the testimony for the plaintiff the defendant moved for a new trial and directed verdict, which were refused. At the conclusion of all the testimony for the plaintiff the defendant renewed her motion for a directed verdict. This was alsb refused.
1 2. The plaintiff abandoned the position of agent for the defendant, even if he had ever occupied such a position, and took the contract directly to himsfelf. The positions of agent to sell and purchase are conflicting, and the plaintiff could not occupy both positions. The plaintiff procured the conveyance under his contract as purchaser.
[*174] 2, 3 3. The plaintiff asked the presiding Judge to charge that if there was fraud it would vitiate the written contract. The testimony upon which this request to charge was based was that on the morning of the 11th the defendant' told him that she had had an offer of $12,600 for the land and he found that that statement was not true. The record does not show that the plaintiff discovered the falsity of the statement, if it was false, after the contract was made, and it is now too late for him to repudiate the contract. Even if the defendant made the statement and it was false, it cannot affect this case. The record shows that when the plaintiff was on the stand the following occurred:
“Q. State what it was that induced you to tell Mrs. Lipscomb that if she would let your people have it you would knock off your commission. A. It was a matter of business; I was going to take the medicine and let my people have the land. I had done tied up with them, and went up and subdivided it for them. Q. State whether or not anything Mrs. Lipscomb said induced you to tell her that you would knock off your commission. A. I seen she wasn’t going to sign up no other way.”
In other words,' the plaintiff says that he induced the defendant to sign the contract by his promise to surrender his commissions. It is not necessary to consider the exceptions in detail.
The judgment is reversed.