Danielson v. Mixon, 95 S.E. 515 (S.C. 1918). · Go Syfert
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Danielson v. Mixon, 95 S.E. 515 (S.C. 1918). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
103 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1930 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1930 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" State v. Sandlin, Unpublished Decision (10-23-2000)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , certiorari denied (1988), 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 .
cited Cited "see" State v. King, Unpublished Decision (8-23-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , certiorari denied (1988), 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Rhude
Ohio Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 , 524 N.E.2d 489, 490 , certiorari denied (1988), 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Jimmie L. Ward
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988); United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir.1978).
cited Cited "see" United States Ex Rel. Rockman v. DeRobertis
N.D. Ill. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 239 , 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 295-96 , 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1154-55 , cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Lawson, Unpublished Decision (3-19-2003)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
The police must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." Terry , 392 U.S. at 21 ; see, also, State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 180-81 , certiorari denied (1988), 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 ; Andrews , 57 Ohio St.3d at 87 -88 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Fitzgerald
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
The police must “be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ; see, also, State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 180-181 , 524 N.E.2d 489 , certiorari denied (1988), 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 ; Andrews at 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bishop v. Kelso
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221 , 119 Ill.Dec. 287 , 522 N.E.2d 1146 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988); Pittman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.1988); United States v. Merrill, 484 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 , 94 S.Ct. 594 , 38 L.Ed.2d 484 (1973); State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272, 279 (N.D.1955); People v. Gittings, 136 Ill.App.3d 655 , 91 Ill.Dec. 207 , 483 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1st Dist.1985); Commonwealth v. Drew, 11 Mass.App. 517 , 417 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1981). 7 The harder question concerns actual cause--whether the evidence was suf…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bishop v. Kelso
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221 , 119 Ill.Dec. 287 , 522 N.E.2d 1146 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 , 109 S.Ct. 264 , 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988); Pittman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.1988); United States v. Merrill, 484 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 , 94 S.Ct. 594 , 38 L.Ed.2d 484 (1973); State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272, 279 (N.D.1955); People v. Gittings, 136 Ill.App.3d 655 , 91 Ill.Dec. 207 , 483 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1st Dist.1985); Commonwealth v. Drew, 11 Mass.App. 517 , 417 N.E.2d 53, 57 (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Vincent Harry Hayes v. United States
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir.1987); Schaflander, 743 F.2d at 717-18 (no effective assistance of counsel when testimony is cumulative; must show prejudice); see also United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir.) (decision whether to call witnesses is matter of trial strategy), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 264 (1988); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1980) (mere criticism of trial tactic not sufficient to support charge of ineffective assistance of counsel). 7 Second, Hayes claims that his counsel erred by failing to request in advance the name…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. David D. Schoolcraft (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence low
United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 580, 581 (8th Cir.) ("it is the criminal episodes underlying the convictions, not the dates of conviction, that must be distinct to trigger the provisions of the ACCA"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2908 , 101 L.Ed.2d 940 (1988); United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir.1988) ("multiple convictions arising from multiple criminal transactions should be treated as separate convictions"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2074 , 104 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that the language of …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Danielson
v.
Mixon Et Al.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jan 28, 1918.
95 S.E. 515
Messrs. Thomas Lumpkin and J. Wesley Crum, Jr. , for appellant, submit: The fee for negotiating the loan is not unreasonable: 83 S.C. 528 ; 1 S.C. 227 ; 44 S.C. 81 ; Civil Code, 1912, sec. 2519. Messrs. V.S. Owens and Bates Simms , for respondent, submit: That the transaction was usurious: 111 Ga. 242 ; 43 Minn. 307 ; 45 N.W. 439 . The Circuit Judge having concurred with the master in his findings of fact, they should not be disturbed: 94 S.C. 88 ; 100 S.C. 324 ; 100 S.C. 157 ; 100 S.C. 331 . As to party lending money for another, being agent of the lender: 91 S.C. 491 ; 83 S.C. 525 ; 37 S.C. 88 ; 38 S.C. 173 ; 44 S.C. 478 ; 49 S.C. 346 ; 65 S.C. 105 ; 83 S.C. 525 ; 49 S.C. 356 .
Eraser.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Eraser.

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant, by his answer, set up usury. The defendant was the owner of a tract of land covered by two mortgages. He went to James Prank & Son, of Augusta, Ga., to procure a new loan to take up these two mortgages. The mortgagor signed an application for a loan, appointing James Prank & Son his agents to procure a loan and also an agreement to pay them $136 as commissions for procuring the loan. The note and mortgage were made to Union Savings Bank of Augusta, for $1,700, at 7 per cent, dated November 16, 1910, payable November 1, 1915. The note provided that, if any part of the principal or interest was not payable at maturity, the rate of interest should be 8 instead of 7 per[*269] cent. The note and mortgage were purchased by the appellant from the bank. It was referred to the master, who made the following statement:

Amount of old loan, $858; Bank of Western'Carolina, $685.85; cost new loan, J. F. S., $136; check for recording and abstracting new tract, $18.50; balance, $1.65; total, $1,700.

1 The master held that the contract was usurious. Upon exceptions to the master’s report, his Honor held: “By the same reasoning we conclude that the master was right in holding that the commissions charged in this case was unreasonable, and, inasmuch as the commission and the interest charged exceed the lawful rate, the contract was usurious.”

In this his Honor was in error. An unconscionable fee is not necessarily usury.

In Mayfield v. Mort. Co., 104 S. C. 157, 158, 88 S. E. 370, 372:

“When a Court is probing a contract for unlawfulness, the mere name by which it is called does not work an estoppel. It is the substance, and not the name, that governs. There are some cases in this State that have not stated the true test of usury. It does not change the practical result to come back to the true rule, but it tends to confusion to call things by the wrong name. People have the right to make any contract the law does not forbid. A contract may work a hardship on one of the contracting parties; but, unless the law forbids the contracts, the Courts of law must enforce it. People must take care of themselves, or the legislature must protect them by making the contract unlawful.
“When a litigant goes into a Court of equity, the Court may refuse its aid to enforce an unconscionable demand. ‘He who seeks equity must do equity.’ Neither the Court of equity nor the Court of law has the right to take money[*270] or any kind of property from one and give it to another, except in obedience to some law. There is no law that forbids or penalizes the charging of an unreasonable commission or an unreasonable fee. An unconscionable commission or fee being paid, there is no remedy at law or in equity. The Courts have, however, the right to uncover the hidden unlawfulness of a contract and declare its true character. A sum of money retained or paid in an attempt to evade the law against usury may be declared to be in fact usurious interest; and, when it is adjudged to be usurious interest, then the law against usurious interest applies, and should be enforced. The practical result is not changed, but it is well to give logical and lawful names to the matters with which w'e deal. The question for the Court is: Was the payment of this fee a cloak to hide usurious interest? If so, the penalty of usury attaches to the transaction.”

This is a stronger case than the Mayfield case. In that case the mortgagee knew the amount of the fee. In this case the only evidence on the subject is that neither the mortgágee nor its assignee knew the amount of the commission charged.

2, 3 In this case the trial Judge allowed a fee of $85 and -declared the excess of $51 to be usurious. The appellant agreed in writing to pay the fee and could have agreed to pay 8 per cent, on the money. The note had five years to run before its maturity. Accepting his Honor’s method as correct, we have (let the Circuit decree be reported), take off the $51 disallowed, and we have interest (the difference between 7 and 8 per cent.) on $1,649, is $16.49 per year. Now multiply that by 5, the number of years allowed for payment by the note, and we get $82.45, or a margin within the usury statute of $31.45. So whether we consider the commission charged a scheme or not, there was no violation of the usury laws. The agreement was in writing. Therefore 8 per cent, could be[*271] charged and taken, and the amount charged and taken did not exceed 8 per cent.

The judgment is reversed.