Meyer v. Cooper, 7 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1928). · Go Syfert
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Meyer v. Cooper, 7 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1928). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
85 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gardenia Parker v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC (tennctapp, 2020-05-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gardenia Parker v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
It has long been recognized that “[t]he amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence.” Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lester Eugene Siler v. Charles Scott
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence.’ ” Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., 532 S.W.3d 274, 309 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donriel A. Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc. (2×)
Tenn. · 2017 · confidence medium
It has long been recognized that “[t]he amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence.” Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928), “The power of a trial judge to disturb a verdict because of his dissatisfaction with the amount of damages rests in this state on more than a century of precedent and practice.” Foster, 621 S.W.2d at 144 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aundrey Meals, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of William Meals v. Ford Motor Company
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Jenkins v. Commodore Corp. S., 584 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tenn.1979) (quoting Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Wayne Webb v. Brandon O.Canada
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court has opined that “[t]he amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence.” Thrailkill, 879 S.W.2d at 841 (quoting Reeves v. Catignani, 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tenn. 1928)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Palanki Ex Rel. Palanki v. Vanderbilt University
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
As stated by this Court many years ago, in the case of Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928): “The right to revise even the amount of the verdict by the process of suggesting a remittitur is a delicate one and one that a court should be slow to adopt; and if it should appear that there was in the verdict an element of actual corruption, we think the proper course would be to set it aside.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Tenn. 1978) (citing Reeves v. Catignani, 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tenn. 1928)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas, et. ux. v. Crockett
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
In Shelton the range of reasonableness test was formulated with the following guideline in mind: The amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence. 569 S.W.2d at 427, citing Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas, et. ux. v. Crockett
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
In Shelton the range of reasonableness test was formulated with the following guideline in mind: The amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence. 569 S.W.2d at 427, citing Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Foster v. Amcon International, Inc.
Tenn. · 1981 · confidence medium
In Shelton the range of reasonableness test was formulated with the following guideline in mind: The amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence. 569 S.W.2d at 427 , citing Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. Commodore Corp. Southern
Tenn. · 1979 · confidence medium
As stated by this Court many years ago, in the case of Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1928): “The right to revise even the amount of the verdict by the process of suggesting a remittitur is a delicate one and one that a court should be slow to adopt; and if it should appear that there was in the verdict an element of actual corruption, we think the proper course would be to set it aside.
discussed Cited "see" Brittney Patterson v. Jerry Dunn
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foster v. Bue, 749 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tenn. 1988). “ ‘The amount of the verdict is primarily for the jury to determine, and next to the jury the most competent person to pass upon the matter is the judge who presided at the trial and heard the evidence.’ ” Thrailkill v. Patterson, 879 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting Reeves v. Catignani, 7 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tenn. 1928).
cited Cited "see" Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc.
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38, 39-40 (1928); Sholodge Franchise Sys., Inc. v. McKibbon Bros., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995).
cited Cited "see" Sarah Beth Clingan Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc.
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 176 , 7 S.W.2d 38 , 39-40 (1928); Sholodge Franchise Sys., Inc. v. McKibbon Bros., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Suzanne Bishop West v. Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC
unknown court · 2017 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Reeves v. Catignani, 7 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1928).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Louis W. Adams v. Megan Elizabeth Leamon
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Reeves v. Catignani, 7 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1928).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Kaiser v. Cannon
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 175 , 7 S.W.2d 38 (1928).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
W. B. Meyer
v.
C. N. and Beattie Cooper
Tennessee Supreme Court.
Mar 31, 1928.
7 S.W.2d 38
Edgar ‘Webster, for appellants., W. C. Rodgers, for appellee.
Cook.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Cook

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Questions of fact are not discussed because foreclosed by concurrent findings against the contentions of defendants.

The questions of law relied on by the defendants arise from the following facts. Urijderberg bought land from the Coopers and executed to them ten notes of $500 each, and secured the notes by a deed of trust oh the land which lay in Mississippi. The defendants endorsed four of the Underberg lien notes to complainant Meyer. Underberg defaulted in payments after having paid a portion of the notes and the land was sold under the deed of trust to satisfy the remaining notes. The trustee distributed the proceeds of sale pro rato to all holders of lien notes. After deducting payments made by Underberg before the .foreclosure upon the notes enidlorsed to complainant Meyer, and after deducting the pro rata applied to these notes from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, a balance remained unpaid on the notes which the defendants had endorsed to Meyer. The Chancellor and the Court of Appeals held them liable upon their endorsement for the unpaid balance.

On behalf of the defendants as endorsers, the doctrine of the application of payments is invoked. It is insisted that the proceeds of the sale under the deed of trust should have been applied to relieve them as endorsers.

The rule governing the application of payments as between the principal debtor and the creditor does not ap[*639] ply, for third persons such as guarantors, sureties, and endorsers, secondarily liable on one of the debts, cannot control the application of payment by 'either the debtor or the creditor. Neither the debtor nor the creditor need apply the payments in the manner most beneficial to such persons. 30 Cyc., 1250-51; 21 R. C. L., 115.

The Coopers had no lien or equity in the proceeds of sale under the deed to the exclusion of other holders of the series of lien notes executed by XJnderberg. Their right was limited to a pro rata of the proceeds of sale under the deed of trust. They were entitled to share equally with Meyer, but the proceeds of sale under the deed of trust was not subject to liability for their notes as a prior claim. No equity existed in their favor as endorsers or otherwise to have the notes endorsed by them preferred to the other lien notes of equal dignity with theirs. Without such a preference either in the deed of trust or in some valid collateral agreement, the rule invoked on their behalf has no application. 21 R. C. L., 109; Wyandotte Coal Co. v. Paving Co., Anno. Cas. 1917C, page 580, and notes.

These controlling principles sustain the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. Writ denied.