“the policy of rule 412, to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim's private life, may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice under rule 403.”
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Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Jason Pumpkin Seed
the policy of rule 412, to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim's private life, may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice under rule 403.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Fontana
(U.S. v. One Feather (8th Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 736, 739 [the policy of the rape shield law “to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim’s private life . . . may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice”].) For some jurors, the fact that the victim has engaged in sexual conduct outside of marriage automatically suggests a receptivity to the activity or is proof that the victim got what she deserved—neither of which is a rational or permissible inference.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Flood
See United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C.Cir.1997); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Flood
See United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C.Cir.1997); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dennis E. Mentzos
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), a district court is authorized to provide a defendant with expert services “necessary for adequate representation” if the court determines “after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them.” The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that these services are necessary to an adequate defense, United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1983), and must show a “reasonable probability that the requested expert would aid in his defense and that denial…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dennis Eugene Mentzos, II
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), a district court is authorized to provide a defendant with expert services “necessary for adequate representation” if the court determines “after appropriate inquiry in an' ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them.” The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that these services are necessary to an adequate defense, United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983), and must show a “reasonable probability that the requested expert would aid in his defense and that denial…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Saffa v. Oklahoma Oncology, Inc.
The Court is sensitive to the policy concerns of Rule 412 as articulated in United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983), where the Court found that Rule 412 is designed to protect the privacy interest of victims of sexual misconduct by guarding “against unwarranted intrusion into the victim’s private life.” Therefore, this portion of the hearing before the Court was sealed, and the parties complied with the notice requirements of Rule 412.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Melillo
Richmond, 122 F.3d at 872 (noting that legitimate state interests behind Colorado's rape shield statute such as giving rape victims heightened protection against "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy" may allow the exclusion of relevant evidence if the state's interests in excluding the evidence outweigh the defendant's interests in having the evidence admitted); see also, Ramone, 218 F.3d at 1237-38 (noting that when determining whether relevant evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct should be excluded under FRE 403, "trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose re…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jerome F. Deering
See United States v. Valverde, 846 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir.1988) (reviewing district court’s denial of expert services for abuse of discretion); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983) (defendant has burden to show expert services are necessary to present adequate defense).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
No. 97-3714
See United States v. Valverde, 846 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir.1988) (reviewing district court's denial of expert services for abuse of discretion); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983) (defendant has burden to show expert services are necessary to present adequate defense).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
The law of this Circuit firmly establishes that “evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of [rape or assault] is not admissible.” Rule 4.12(a), Federal Rules of Evidence; see also United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503, 1505 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shaw v. United States
(Tr. 291) See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983) ("The policy of Rule 412, to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim’s private life, may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.”) 5 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Pierre Blue Horse
See also Fed.R.Evid. 403; United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Joseph Francis Valverde, III
United States v. One *517 Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Terri Janis
“The defendant has the burden of satisfying the court that expert services are necessary to present an adequate de *778 fense.” United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Jacobs
United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1983).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Jeffrey Pendleton
See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding admission of photographs of an injury in part because they assisted the jury in evaluating the witness’s credibility).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Pumpkin Seed
See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 , 739 (8th Cir.1983) (“The policy of Rule 412, to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim’s private life, may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.”); see also United States v. Tail, 459 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Admission of this evidence [under Rule 412] would have triggered mini-trials concerning allegations unrelated to Tail’s case, and thus increased the danger of jury confusion and speculation.”); Fed.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. George Don Galloway, A/K/A Saul D. Davis
(2×)
See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983) (Policy of Rule 412 taken into account by the district court in excluding evidence of past sexual behavior under Rule 403).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Lawrence C. Cardinal
See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Albert
See United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983) (policy behind Rule 412 may be considered in determining the amount of unfair prejudice under Rule 403).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Tarrats
Even where such evidence bears some marginal relevance, “it has ‘an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury’ and is ‘likely to distort the jury’s deliberative process,’” id. (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989)), and should therefore be excluded. ¶ 22 This rule applies to “all activities that involve actual physical conduct ... or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir.1983) (holding evidence of the birth of an illegitimate child inadmissib…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Andreozzi
See, e.g., United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.1983) (evidence that fits one of the Rule 412 exceptions can nonetheless be excluded [under Rule 403] if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. John W. Duncan
See, e.g., United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.1983); Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir.1981) (per curiam).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Timothy Paul SCANLON, Appellant
v.
Timothy Paul SCANLON, Appellant
82-2195.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 28, 1983.
David Skeen, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant., James M. Rosenbaum, U.S. Atty., Joseph T. Walbran, Asst. U.S. Atty., D. Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Heaney, Ross, Fagg.
Published
PER CURIAM.
Timothy Paul Scanlon appeals the denial of his motion to vacate and set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On May 9,1980, Scanlon was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight years plus a special parole term of four years following his conviction on charges of importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine. On June 4, 1981, the district court entered an order pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure modifying the original sentence to provide for a term of imprisonment for a period of seven years as to each count, plus a four year special parole term, again, with the sentences to be served concurrently and not consecutively.
Scanlon alleges that the sentence he received is illegal because the district court improperly considered two prior Columbian convictions, which were introduced at trial, in fixing and enhancing the sentence. Scanlon contends that these convictions were obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) and a hearing is required under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) to remedy a denial of his due process rights.
The district court found that Scanlon’s sentence was founded upon proper and substantial information which was furnished to the court, both at trial and as a part of the presentence investigation report, by Scan-lon himself. The district court then ordered that Scanlon was not entitled to have his sentence vacated and set aside pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
We have carefully studied the record, including the district court’s order and the briefs of the parties to this action. We find no merit to Scanlon’s arguments, and accordingly enforce the order of the district court pursuant to Rule 14 of the rules of this court.