Anthony M. Gartman v. State of Florida, 197 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). · Go Syfert
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Anthony M. Gartman v. State of Florida, 197 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Bonner v. State (fladistctapp, 2018-04-05)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bonner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Simmons v. State , 215 So.3d 162 , 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (noting that concurrent sentences were required for convictions of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder based on shooting of two people by co-defendant because jury found that appellant only possessed a firearm); Clark v. State , 208 So.3d 853 , 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (holding that consecutive sentences were improper for convictions of attempted armed robbery and aggravated battery because the two offenses arose from the same criminal episode and jury found that appellant only possessed, as opposed to discharged…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Toland Jerome Bonner v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The State relies on a series of cases to establish distinct acts but they are distinguishable because each involved discharging a firearm. 2 In contrast, where a defendant does not fire a firearm, stacking consecutive sentences has generally not been authorized. 3 Some older caselaw involved Clark v. State, 208 So. 3d 853, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (holding that consecutive sentences were improper for convictions of attempted armed robbery and aggravated battery because the two offenses arose from the same criminal episode and jury found that appellant only possessed, as opposed to discharged, a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simmons v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
See Williams, 186 So.3d 993 (holding that consecutive mandatory minimum terms under the 10-20-Life statute are permissible—but not mandatory—when multiple victims were shot at, but that they are “impermissible ... if the firearm was merely possessed but not discharged”); State v. Christian, 692 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1997) (“The stacking of firearm mandatory minimum terms thus is ... impermissible where the defendant does not fire the weapon.”); Gartman, 197 So.3d at 1182 (construing Williams to mean that no portion of a sentence under the 10-20-Life statute for a second qualifying o…
examined Cited "see" Anthony M. Gartman v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gartman v. State, 197 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
cited Cited "see" Clark v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gartman v. State, 197 So.3d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Garfield Plummer v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Gartman v. State, 197 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing, based on Williams, consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where no discharge of the firearm occurred).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Anthony M. GARTMAN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee
1D15-1875.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jul 13, 2016.
197 So. 3d 1181
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Thomas, Bilbrey, Kelsey.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Following his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 12 years, with a 10-year mandatory minimum term for use of a firearm for the armed robbery offense, and to a term of 6 years with a 3-year mandatory minimum for use of a firearm. The sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was ordered to be served consecutively to the term imposed for armed robbery. Given the case law as it existed at the time of sentencing, the trial court understandably believed the sentences had to be imposed consecutively. Appellant raises several issues on appeal, but we will address only one.

While this appeal was pending, the Florida Supreme Court decided Williams v. State, 186 So.3d 989 (Fla.2016). In Williams, the Court held that consecutive mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for use or possession of a firearm during a qualifying felony are permissible but not required by section 775.087, Florida Statutes. The Supreme Court stated in Williams that “[generally, consecutive sentencing of mandatory minimum imprisonment terms for multiple firearm offenses is impermissible if the offenses arose from the same criminal episode and a firearm was merely possessed but not discharged.” Id. at 993. While the Court frequently used the term “mandatory minimum imprisonment terms” in Williams, it is apparent from reading the opinion as a whole that it meant a sentence imposed under the 10-20-Life statute for an offense specified in that section as qualifying for such sentencing, a sentence which may be greater than the minimum term mandated. See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (“If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, S. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section.”).

Per Williams, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. Thus, in the instant case, no portion of Appellant’s sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon may be ordered to be served consecutively. See also Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983).

The remaining issues raised on appeal are without merit.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

B.L. THOMAS, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.