NO. 03-14-00804-CV
In the Matter of A. C.
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-JV-14-030650, HONORABLE RHONDA HURLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The district court, sitting as a juvenile court, adjudicated appellant A.C. delinquent for committing the offense of burglary of a habitation with attempted sexual assault,1 assessed a determinate sentence of ten years, and placed him on probation. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to modify the disposition, alleging that A.C. had violated the terms and conditions of his
probation. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion and committed A.C. to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a determinate period of ten years.[2] In two issues on appeal, A.C. asserts that his determinate sentence is “void,” i.e., unauthorized by law, and that the juvenile court failed to give him credit for time served. We will affirm the juvenile court’s order.
[*2]ANALYSIS
Legality of determinate sentence
In his first issue, A.C. asserts that his determinate sentence is unauthorized by law because the offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent, burglary of a habitation, is not
an offense listed in section 53.045(a) of the Juvenile Justice Code. Therefore, according to A.C., he was not eligible for a determinate sentence.[5] The State responds that A.C. was adjudicated
delinquent for conduct that included attempted sexual assault, which is an offense listed in section 53.045(a) of the Juvenile Justice Code. Thus, in the State’s view, A.C. was eligible for a determinate sentence.
This issue presents a question of statutory construction. “When construing a statute, we begin with its language.”6 “Our primary objective is to determine the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the words chosen.”7 “If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its words according to their common meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.”8 The Juvenile Justice Code authorizes a determinate sentence if, among other requirements not relevant here, “the court or jury found at the conclusion of the adjudication hearing
[*3]that the child engaged in delinquent conduct that included a violation of a penal law listed in Section 53.045(a).”9 It is undisputed that burglary of a habitation is not among the offenses listed in Section 53.045(a) of the Juvenile Justice Code.[10] However, the offense of criminal attempt is
listed in Section 53.045(a), “if the offense attempted was . . . an offense listed by Section 3g(a)(1), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure.”11 And sexual assault is among the offenses listed in Section 3g(a)(1), Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[12] Thus, in this case, a determinate sentence was authorized if the juvenile court found at the conclusion of the adjudication hearing that A.C. had engaged in delinquent conduct that included the offense of attempted sexual assault.
The record reflects that such a finding was made here. The State alleged that A.C. had engaged in delinquent conduct by “knowingly and intentionally … enter[ing] a habitation without the effective consent of [the owner], and therein attempted to commit the sexual assault of [the owner].” Thus, attempted sexual assault was included in the delinquent conduct that A.C. was alleged to have committed.[13] At the adjudication hearing, A.C. pleaded true to that allegation
[*4]and the juvenile court found that allegation to be true. By finding the State’s allegation to be true, the juvenile court necessarily found that A.C. had engaged in delinquent conduct that included a violation of a penal law listed in Section 53.045(a), specifically, the offense of attempted sexual assault.[14] Consequently, according to the plain language of Section 54.04 of the Juvenile Justice
Code, a determinate sentence was authorized under these circumstances.[15]
We overrule A.C.’s first issue.
Credit for time served
In his second issue, A.C. asserts that he was not properly given credit for time spent in a secure detention facility as required by Section 54.052 of the Juvenile Justice Code. In relevant
part, that section provides, “The judge of the court in which a child is adjudicated shall give the child credit on the child’s sentence for the time spent by the child, in connection with the conduct for which the child was adjudicated, in a secure detention facility before the child’s transfer to a Texas Juvenile Justice Department facility or a post-adjudication secure correctional facility, as applicable.”16 According to A.C., he is entitled to a total of 360 days of credit for time served, which is not reflected in the juvenile court’s disposition order. However, the record contains a separate order by the juvenile court in which it found that A.C. “has been detained in the Travis County
[*5]Detention Center for this offense and shall receive credit.” The order also lists the specific dates when A.C. was detained, and those dates correspond to the amount of time credit to which A.C. claims he is entitled. Thus, contrary to A.C.’s contention, the record reflects that the juvenile court has ordered that A.C. be given credit for time served.[17]
We overrule A.C.’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the juvenile court’s disposition order.
__________________________________________ Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Field Affirmed Filed: August 30, 2016
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