Henry H. Brown v. The Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Henry H. Brown v. The Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the waiver would be meaningless if it could be eluded merely because an unsatisfied party, with whatever sincerity or correctness, felt that the district court had incorrectly construed the standards by which damages were to be assessed.”
8 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. (ca8, 2023-06-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C.
8th Cir. · 2023 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
hose who give up the advantage of a lawsuit in return for obligations contained in a negotiated decree, rely upon and have a right to expect a fairly literal interpretation of the bargain that was struck and approved by the court.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Edelen
1st Cir. · 2008 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the waiver would be meaningless if it could be eluded merely because an unsatisfied party, with whatever sincerity or correctness, felt that the district court had incorrectly construed the standards by which damages were to be assessed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc.
1st Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Supplemental Appendix ("SA") at 3 (emphasis added). - 5 - A party who agrees in writing to settle a lawsuit in return for certain obligations has a "right to expect a fairly literal interpretation of the bargain that was struck and approved by the court," Brown v. Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 192, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted), and where the wording is unambiguous, its terms will be strictly enforced, see, e.g., Alison H. v. Byard, 163 F.3d 2, 5 (1st Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 1651 North Collins Corp. v. Laboratory Corporation of Am.
6th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 827-28 (10th Cir.2005) ("Judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and nonappealable...."); Brown v. Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 192, 192 (1st Cir.1983) ("The parties agree that the determinations of the [district] Court on such claims shall be final and binding and hereby waive any and all rights of appeal with respect to such determinations.”); Goodsell v. Shea, 651 F.2d 765 , *632 766 (C.C.P.A.1981) ("[T]he decision of the Board of Patent Interferences ... shall be accepted as final and conclusive upon the parties and each party h…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ziyad Mini Market v. United States
W.D.N.Y. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Lybarger, 793 F.2d 136, 137 (6th Cir.1986) (upholding settlement agreement in which parties agreed that court’s determination of attorney’s fee would be final and the “parties waive all rights of appeal and further review”); Brown v. Gillette, 723 F.2d 192, 192-93 (1st Cir.1983) (upholding settlement agreement in which parties stipulated that determinations to be made by district court would be “final and binding” and waiving all appellate rights).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hameli v. Nazario
D. Del. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Brown v. Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1983); AMF, Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1101 (1st Cir.1983) (“Those who give up the advantage of a lawsuit in return for obligations contained in a negotiated decree, rely upon and have a right to expect a fairly literal interpretation of the bargain that was struck and approved by the court.”); Goodsell v. Shea, 651 F.2d 765, 766 (C.C.P.A.1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Henry H. BROWN, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
the GILLETTE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant
83-1614.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Dec 27, 1983.
723 F.2d 192
Richard L. Neumeier, with whom Cheri L. Crow, and Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant., Amos Hugh Scott, with whom Robert S. Frank, Jr., Frank A. Libby, Jr., and Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees.
Campbell, Coffin, Breyer.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Gillette appeals from an order of the district court awarding certain damages to the plaintiff, Samuel Jones, under a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided that certain promotion claims of, the named plaintiffs would be resolved by the district court, and that all other claims would be arbitrated. With respect to the named plaintiffs, the agreement stipulated,

The parties agree that the determinations of the [district] Court on such claims shall be final and binding and hereby waive any and all rights of appeal with respect to such determinations.

Notwithstanding this language, Gillette contends that it is entitled to appeal from the damages award made here, arguing that the award is based on an incorrect interpretation of the matter before the court and the parties’ agreement relative thereto, and that the waiver does not preclude an appeal from such arbitrary decision-making.

We hold that Gillette is bound by the waiver. As we have stated, “[t]hose who give up the advantage of a lawsuit in re[*193] turn for obligations contained in a negotiated decree, rely upon and have a right to expect a fairly literal interpretation of the bargain that was struck and approved by the court.” AMF, Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1101 (1st Cir.1983). This principle extends to clauses waiving the right to appeal. Goodsell v. Shea, 651 F.2d 765, 767 (Cust. & Pat.App.1981); cf. Payne v. SS Tropic Breeze, 423 F.2d 236, 238 & n. 4 (1st Cir. 1970). The settlement agreement in question was negotiated at arms length over a period of eleven months. Gillette agreed to waive any right to appeal from the district court’s determinations of the named plaintiffs’ claims. The waiver would be meaningless if it could be eluded merely because an unsatisfied party, with whatever sincerity or correctness, felt that the district court had incorrectly construed the standards by which damages were to be assessed. Even assuming there could be determinations going so far beyond a district court’s mandate as to vitiate the waiver, this is plainly not that situation — nor would we expect to find such a situation except in unusual and egregious circumstances well beyond anything presented here.

Appeal dismissed.