¹ Whether the Two-year limitation period of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §16.003 bars Appellee's Forcible Detainer suit for possession of the property? Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 9 of26 MOTION FOR REHEARING STATEMENT OF FACTS On or about September 6, 20 11, the Appellee wrongfully conducted a foreclosure sale of this property.5 RR2 at 6; RR3 at PI's Exh. 2. September 23, 2011, the Appellee provided the Appellant with the Notice prescribed in Texas Property Code§ 24.005(b).6 RR2 at D's Exh. B. October 18, 2011 the Appellee filed a Forcible Detainer Action, authorized under Texas Property Code§ 24.005(b). RR2 at 18. November 7, 2011, the JP Court issued a judgment in favor of Appellant, denying the possession to the Appellee.? RR2 at 20. Appellee re- filed its lawsuit under Cause No. 051840 and the JP Court dismissed it as a duplicate case on November 7, 2011.8 RR2 at 20; Appellant's Brief at 9. November 7, 2011, a party in interest, at the time, filed in District Court a Quiet Title Action, Cause No. D-1-G.N-Il-003424.9 RR2 at 37; Appellant's Brief at 9. November 21, 2011, the Appellee filed yet another FED Action in this Court, Cause No. 052212. RR2 at 20; Appellant's Briefat 9. December 29, 2011, this Court again issued Judgment for the Appellant. I 0 RR2 at 20; Appellant's Brief at 5 Exhibit A: Trustee Deed, dated September 6, 2011 6 Exhibit B: Notice to Vacate, dated September 23, 2011 7 Exhibit C: FED Order 1, in favor ofDefendant, dated November 7, 2011, Cause No. 051975. 8 Exhibit D: FED Order 2, in favor ofDefendant, Duplicate Case Dismissal Order, dated November 7, 2011, Cause No. 051840. 9 Exhibit E: Quiet Title Action, filed in the 345 1h District of Travis County, dated November 7, 2011, Cause No. D- 1GN-11-003424. 10 Exhibit F: FED Order 3, in favor of Defendant, dated December 29, 2011. Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 10 of26 9. October 30, 2013, the Appellee mailed the Appellant a superfluous Notice to Vacate letter. CR 116-38, Bus. Records Aff.- Notices to Vacate' see also Appellant's Brief at 9. Finally, over two years after September 26, 2011, when the Appellee sent the Appellant the Notice required under Texas Property Code§ 24.005(b), on November 6, 2013, the Appellee filed yet another FED action (FED Action 4) in the JP Court, Cause No. J3CV13056327. The JP Court rendered judgment in favor of the Appellee. The Appellant appealed to the County Court at Law No. 1. The County Court held a trial de novo and ruled in favor of the Appellee without issuing an opinion. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The Court's holding on Appeal and Appellee's Appeal Brief are based on the holdings of two cases. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Crawford, Cause No. 14-13-0010-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 9, 2014]; and Puentes v. Fannie Mae, 350 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, pet.. dism'd). These cases are inapplicable to this case before this court. The applicable statute of limitations on a suit for forcible detainer is two years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West Supp. 1998). For a suit to be timely under a two-year statute of limitations, it must be brought within two years from the date on which the cause of action accrues. !d. A cause of action generally accrues at the time when facts come into existence authorizing a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.l990). In Texas, a Plaintiffs cause of action accrues, and the applicable limitations period starts to run, "when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 11 of26 of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred." S. V. v. R. V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1996). See also Doe v. Catholic Diocese ofEl Paso, 362 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2011, no pet.)(same). For the purposes of application of statute of limitations, a cause of action generally accrues at the time when facts come into existence which authorizes a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex.1977). Put another way, "a cause of action can generally be said to accrue when the wrongful act effects an injury. In this case, the Appellee did not suffer an injury until it sent the Three-day Notice to Vacate and the Appellant refused to vacate. The Appellee sent the Three-day Notice September 23, 2011. Three days later, September 26, 2011, and not sooner, the Appellee could file an FED Action. The Appellee's injury occurred when the Appellant did not comply with the September 23, 2011 Three-day Notice to Vacate. This conduct caused the injury and gave rise to the FED cause of action, because at this point in time all the elements of Texas Property Code 24.002 were satisfied. Despite the Appellee filing four FED actions, it was the Appellant's noncompliance with the September 23, 2011, Three-day Notice to Vacate that caused the injury and gave rise to the filing of all four FED actions. However, the fourth FED Action was time barred by Civil Practice and Remedies Code 16.03 Two Year Limitation, because the Appellant filed FED Action 4 November 6, 2013, over Two-years after September 23, 2011, the date the Appellee filed the notice effecting the injury, giving rise to an FED cause of action. ARGUMENT Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 12 of26 Whether the Two-year limitation period of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §16.003 bars Appellee's Forcible Detainer suit for possession of the property? Yes, it does! The Puentes and Crawford Holdings In short, both cases hold that res judicata does not bar a subsequent forcible detainer action, because each forcible detainer action is a new and independent action. The Puentes Court held that each FED action is a new and independent action not subject to res judicata, because each FED action is uniquely limited in time and an award of possession on a particular date does not implicate a party's possessory right on a future date. Whereas, the Crawford Court held each FED action is a new and independent action not subject to res judicata, if before filing each FED Action a new notice is delivered and the tenant refuses to surrender possessiOn. Neither case mentions the statute of limitations of FED actions under Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code 16.003. These cases are a classic red herring by the Plaintiff. They are irrelevant to the question of how to apply CPRC 16.003 to forcible detainer actions. Therefore, the court should ignore these cases. Puentes v. Fannie Mae Case Summary In Puentes, the plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") filed a forcible detainer action against Juan and Socorro Puentes on April 17, 2009, but lost that suit when it was unable to produce admissible evidence that it had properly provided the Puenteses with a notice to vacate. Puentes v. Fannie Mae, 350 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, pet. dism'd). Fannie Mae filed another forcible detainer suit on July 2, 2009, and in response the Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 13 of26 Puenteses moved for summary judgment, arguing that res judicata barred the second suit. Id. at 735. The trial court denied the Puenteses' motion and proceeded to hear evidence on the forcible detainer suit. Following Juan Puentes's testimony that he did not receive any notice to vacate, Fannie Mae offered a business records affidavit with attached exhibits reflecting that notice to vacate was sent by regular and certified mail before the second action was filed. Id. at 735-36, 738. The evidence was admitted over objection, and the trial court ultimately ruled in favor of Fannie Mae. Id. at 736. On appeal, the Puenteses raised three issues, contending that the second suit was barred by res judicata, the trial court erred in admitting Fannie Mae's business records affidavit, and Fannie Mae's failure to pursue an appeal of the first suit deprived the justice and county courts hearing the second action of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The appellate court rejected the second and third issues, and as to the Puenteses' res judicata argument, the court held that the second forcible detainer action was "'a new and independent action to determine which party had the superior right of immediate possession at the time it was filed" that was not barred by res judicata. I d. at 739. The Puentes court reasoned that a forcible detainer action is "uniquely limited in time" and, because an award of possession on a particular date does not implicate a party's possessory right on a future date, the third element of res judicata was not satisfied. Id. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Crawford Case Summary On May 22,2012, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("'Freddie Mac") filed a petition for forcible detainer in the justice court against Trinh Pham, Gary Block, and Katherine Crawford. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 14 of26 Crawford, Cause No. 14-13-0010-CV, pg 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 9, 2014]. Crawford, inter alia, denied that Freddie Mac gave proper notice to vacate in accordance with the Texas Property Code. The justice court rendered judgment in favor of Freddie Mac in June 2012, and Crawford appealed to the county court for de novo review. Id. In a supplemental answer filed in the county court, Crawford asserted an affirmative defense that Freddie Mac's forcible detainer action was barred by res judicata. I d. Crawford also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Freddie Mac was barred by res judicata from filing the forcible detainer action, the third such action initiated by Freddie Mac against the defendants. Id. Crawford supported her motion with evidence of Freddie Mac's first forcible detainer action in October 201 0 against Pham. Id. In the 201 0 action, a justice court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Pham, and on appeal de novo, the county court rendered an order in February 2011, granting Freddie Mac's motion for nonsuit. Crawford also provided evidence of a second forcible detainer action filed by Freddie Mac against Pham, Crawford, and Block. Id. The 2011 action resulted in a take-nothing judgment in favor of the defendants, and on appeal de novo, the county court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Crawford's evidence included Freddie Mac's petitions, the justice court judgments, and the county court orders from the 2010 and 2011 actions. Id. In response, Freddie Mac challenged only the third element of res judicata, arguing that a new, independent cause of action for forcible detainer accrued because the occupants were served with new notices to vacate served in February and May 2012. Freddie Mac attached case law in support of its summary judgment response. Id at 2. The Crawford Court agreed with Freddie Mac and held that a Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 15 of26 new and independent cause of action for forcible detainer arises each time a person refuses to surrender possession of real property after a person entitled to possession of the property delivers a proper written notice to vacate; therefore, res judicata would not bar a second suit based on the commission of a subsequent forcible detainer. Id at 5. Res Judicata in Forcible Detainer Actions Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections addressing res judicata and estoppel effect of judgment or determination of fact or law in small claims court, justice of peace court, or lower trial court do not preclude res judicata effect of judgment or determination of those courts as to claims actually litigated therein. Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code 31.005 (2013). Brown v. Henderson, 941 S.W.2d 190 (App. 13 Dist. 1996) (stating, "purpose ofthose statutes is to narrow preclusive effect of judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction by barring only claims actually litigated in limited-jurisdiction courts and allowing unlitigated claims to be tried, respectively, in county and district courts."); Houtex Ready Mix Concrete & Materials v. Eagle Canst. & Environmental Services, L.P., 226 S.W.3d 514 (App. 1 Dist. 2006) (stating "the code provision abrogating the general common law rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel for justice courts and small claims courts creates an exception to the general rule against splitting causes of action, allowing unlitigated claims from courts of limited jurisdiction to be tried in county courts."). The doctrine of res judicata precludes re-litigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated or that arise out of the same subject matter and that could have been litigated in the prior action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). Res judicata requires proof of the following elements: (1) a fmal Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 16 of26 judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Id A forcible detainer action is a special proceeding governed by Texas Property Code 24.002-008, and Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 510 (738-754, Repealed by Order of April15, 2013, eff. Aug. 31, 2013). Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705; 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1831; Kennedy v. Highland Hills Apartments, 905 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no writ). It was created to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means for resolving the question of the right to possession of premises. Id. To preserve the simplicity .and speedy nature of the remedy, the applicable rule of civil procedure provides that "the only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession; and the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated." see Tex.R. Civ. P. 510; Johnson v. Fellowship Baptist Church, 627 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ). The sole issue in a forcible detainer suit is who has the right to immediate possession of the premises. Fandey v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.App.-EI Paso 1994, writ denied); Cuellar v. Martinez, 625 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493,495 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 568 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.1978). The exclusive purpose of an FED action is to provide a person who is entitled to the immediate possession of real property a legal remedy (emphasis added), rather than force or violence, to gain possession of the property. To prevail in a forcible detainer action pursuant to section 24.002 of the Texas Property Code, the plaintiff is not required to prove title but is only required Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 17 of26 to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Ward v. Malone, 115, S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. Denied). For these reasons, a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination only of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in question. Lopez v. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Therefore, an FED judgment is not a final judgment. Consequently, an FED judgment inherently is not final and determines a time dependent issue (i.e., which party has the superior right to immediate possession). In other words, a subsequent FED action is not barred by res judicata, because the subsequent FED action does not meet the first and third prong of the res judicata test, even if only a single 3-Day notice was sent prior to filing both FED actions. The judgment is not fmal and the claims are different, i.e., the sole issue decided in an FED action, which party has the superior right to possession now, changes by the passage of time. There is no rule requiring a landlord to necessarily send a separate 3-Day Notice prior to filing an FED. The holdings in Crawford and Puentes point out that each FED is a new and independent action, and, therefore, res judicata does not bar the filing of subsequent FED actions. However, as pointed out above, this is true even where a single notice is delivered prior to filing more than one FED action. Legal Injury Rule The limitations statute governing forcible detainer actions does not defme the accrual date, and thus it falls to the courts to establish when such claims accrue. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp. 35 S.W.3d 643 (Sup. 2000); Childs v. Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 18 of26 Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Sup. 1998, rehearing overruled) (stating, "Because the accrual date for personal injury actions is not defmed by statute of limitations, the courts are charged with the responsibility of articulating the rules governing accrual."); Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430 (App. 2 Dist. 1997, rehearing overruled, review denied, rehearing of petition for review overruled) (stating "Determining what rule of accrual to apply is question of law"); Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc. (App. 7 Dist. 1996) 930 S.W.2d 157, modified on rehearing, writ denied, rehearing of writ of error overruled) (stating, "Question of when cause of action accrues is judicial one to be determined with due regard to underlying statutory policy of repose, without, however, permitting unnecessary individual injustices."). For limitations purposes, the general rule is that cause of action accrues when wrongful act effects injury. Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 948 S.W.2d 858 (App. 4 Dist. 1997); Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477 (App. 5 Dist. 1995, writ denied, rehearing ofwrit of error overruled) (stating, "Accrual of limitations period occurs when facts come into existence authorizing claimant to seek judicial remedy."). In this case, the Appellee did not suffer an injury until it sent the first 3-Day Notice to Vacate, September 23, 2011, and the Appellant refused to vacate, four days later, September 27, 2011. On that date, and not sooner, the Appellee could file an FED Action. The Appellee's injury occurred when the Appellant did not comply with the September 23, 2011 Three-day Notice to Vacate. This conduct caused the injury and gave rise to the FED cause of action, because at this point in time all the elements of Texas Property Code 24.002 were satisfied. It was the Appellant's noncompliance with the September 23, 2011, Three-day Notice to Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 19 of26 Vacate that caused the injury and gave rise to the filing of all four FED actions. The legal status of the Appellants changed from tenant at sufferance to unlawful detainer and has not changed since. The sending of additional notices did not change the legal status of the Appellants. From September 23, 2011 to date the Appellants have not surrendered possession to the Appellee. The fact that the Appellee demanded possession more than once did not change the legal status of the Appellant, nor were the additional notices necessarily mandatory prior to filing FED Actions 2, 3, and 4. However, hypothetically, had the Appellee and Appellants entered an agreement, wherein the parties agreed that the Appellants could retain possession at will or for a term, the legal status of the Appellants would have changed. In this case, the SOL's would be cut off, and subsequently, if the Appellants defaulted on the agreement, and the Appellee sent the Appellants a demand to vacate and the Appellants refused, the SOL's would start anew. This hypothetical is inconsistent with the facts of this case. However, this situation occurs in the rental cases. For example, if a tenant under a written lease defaults on the rent one month, the landlord sends a demand to vacate, and the tenant cures. At this point in time and circumstances, the legal status of the tenant has changed. He is no longer in default. The facts giving rise to a forcible detainer action are lacking. Therefore, the SOL's is cut off. However, if the same tenant later defaults on rent, the landlord sends an appropriate demand to vacate, and the tenant does not cure, the legal status of the tenant has changed to an unlawful detainer. At this point in time and circumstances, the landlord suffers a new injury, giving rise to a new FED cause of action. If the legal status of the tenant effects a new injury, or recurring injury, the Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 20 of26 SOL's commences anew. In the case of a tenant at sufferance who refuses the first demand to vacate, as in this case, the landlord cannot fairly assert he suffers a new injury because the unlawful detainer ignores subsequent notices. The legal status of the former tenant at sufferance changed to unlawful detainer upon refusing to surrender possession after the first demand to vacate, and the tenant's legal status of unlawful detainer did not change with delivery of each subsequent notice. Note that subsequent notices do not cure the unlawful detainment, there is no agreement between the parties, and the injury suffered does not subside. The injury suffered by the landlord is that he is denied possession by the unlawful detainer. Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code 16.003 affords the landlord two years from the date of unlawful detainment to obtain possession by filing a forcible detainer action, regardless of how many FED actions filed within the two-year period. This construction of the statute is fair and reasonable. An FED action is not a fmal judgment, res judicata does not bar refiling FED actions. An FED action is a special proceeding, cumulative of remedies available to the Appellee. At the end of two-year SOL, the Appellee has to invoke another legal remedy to obtain possession (e.g., trespass to try title, declaratory judgment action, writ of possession from district court). However, this construction of the statute allows an exception for rental cases, which are fundamentally different from the tenant at sufferance situation, as pointed out above. In this case, FED4 was time barred by Civil Practice and Remedies Code 16.03 Two Year Limitation, because the Appellee filed FED4 November 6, 2013, over two years after September 27, 2011, the date the Appellants failed to comply with the September 23, 2011 notice effecting the injury, giving rise to an FED Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 21 of26 cause of action. Continuing Tort Rule A continuing tort involves wrongful conduct inflicted over a period of time that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulflns. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 500 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (citing Arquette v.Hancock, 656 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. App.- -San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.)). In determining whether there is a continuing tort, "care must be taken to distinguish between 1) repeated injury proximately caused by repetitive wrongful or tortious acts and 2) continuing injury arising from one wrongful act. While the former evinces a continuing tort, the latter does not." Krohn, 201 S.W.3d at 880; (quoting Rogers, 162 S.W.3d at 290). In this case, the Appellants were purportedly tenants at sufferance, who refused to comply with a Notice to Vacate ever since September 27, 2011. In this case, prior to September 27, 2011, the Appellants, occupancy were not unlawful. After that date the Appellants detained possession unlawfully ever since. With the passage of each day, and for that matter, the filing of each subsequent 3-Day notice to vacate and filing of FED action, a new injury did not occur. After October 15, 2011, the Appellant's occupancy or possession was hostile and defiant. Their legal status changed to unlawful detainers. This state of affairs has not changed heretofore and gave rise to all four of the Appellee's FED Actions. The September 23, 2011 Notice and the Appellants' noncompliance with it Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 22 of26 inflicted an injury on the Appellee, and was required for the Appellee to file all four FED actions (although FED4 is time barred). Subsequent notices to vacate were superfluous. PRAYER The Appellee obtained a Substitute Trustee Deed to the Property September 6, 2011. The Appellee served the Appellant with Notice to Vacate September 23, 2011. The Appellee subsequently filed Four FED Actions, including this Action filed November 6, 2013, over two after the September 23, 2011 Notice to Vacate. For a suit to be timely under Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code 16.03 two- year statute of limitations, it must be brought within two years from the date on which the cause of action accrues. In Texas, a Appellee's cause of action accrues, and the applicable limitations period starts to run, when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred. The Appellee's injury occurred when the Appellant did not comply with the September 23, 2011, Three-day Notice to Vacate. This injury gave rise to the FED cause of action, because at this point in time all the elements of Texas Property Code 24.002 were satisfied. Therefore, the fourth FED Action was time barred by Civil Practice and Remedies Code 16.03 Two Year Limitation. The Appellant filed FED Action 4 November 6, 2013, over two years after September 23, 2011, the date the Appellee filed the notice effecting the injury, giving rise to an FED cause of action. FED Orders 1, 2, and 3 were in favor of the Appellant. The County Court had a de novo trial and ruled in favor of the Appellee without issuing an opinion. The County Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 23 of26 Court FED Action is likewise time barred, and should be reversed. Date: March 19, 2015 Respectfully submitted, Is/ JAMES MINERVE James Minerve State Bar No. 24008692 115 Saddle Blanket Trail Buda, Texas 78610 (210) 336-5867 (888) 230-6397 (Fax) Attorney for Appellant Nemer Massaad Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 24 of26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was sent to the Appellee in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 19th day of March 2015: Mackie WolfZientz & Mann, P.C. Mark D. Cronenwett State Bar No. 00787303 Parkway Office Center, Ste 900 14160 North Dallas Parkway Dallas, Texas 75254 Is/ James Minerve James Minerv CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Because this brief contains 6929 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2), Appellant has simultaneously filed a Motion to Exceed Word Number Limitation that is required per Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2) Is/ James Minerve James Minerve Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 25 of26 Appendix 1. Travis County Court at Law Number One Judgment. 2. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.003 Appellant's Motion for Rehearing Brief Page 26 of26 ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 2011135329 TRV 3 PGS FORECLOSURE SALE DEED (With attached Affidavit for recording as one document) Deed of Trust Date: August3! , 2006 Grantor(s): NEMER MASSAAD Original Mortgagee: OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CALlFORN1A CORPORATION Current Mortgagee: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-3, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3 Recording Information: Docurilent 2006171794 of the real property records of Travis County, Texas. Property Legal LOT 19, BLOCK E, OL YNrPIC :HEIGHTS SECTION 2, A Description: SUBDIVISION INTRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, ACCORDING TO THE MAP OR PLAT THEREOF RECORDED IN DOCUMENT ~"111v1BER 200200216 Of TIIE PLAT RECORDS OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS. Date of Sale: 09/06/20JJ Time of Sale: I;;L: DI r---- Place of Sale: THE AREA UNDER THE REAR PORTICO OF THE COURTHOUSE LOCATED ON THE WEST SIDE OF COURTHOUSE IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF AND SLIGHTLY EAST OF liTH & SAN ANTONIO STREET, REFERRED TO AS THE SALL YPORT OR AS DESIGNATED BY THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE Buyer: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.. AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION O:NE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-3, ASSET -BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3 ~ Buyer's Mailing c/o AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. Address: 1525 S. BELT LINE RD COPPELL, TX750!9 Amount of Sale: $122,400.00 By Deed of Trust, Grantor conveyed to THOMAS F. VETTERS, as Trustee, certain property for the purpose of securing and enforcing payment of the indebtedness and obligations therein described, including but not limited to the Note and all renewals and ex1ensions of the note. M>\RK HOPKINS; PAUL CetLEY. JR., A:f±!SON CW.NDLER., M. MATTHEW WILLIAMS, JeHN L YNCJ !, EMILY STR68PE-eR-MIGm-W-Z.lENJ:Z was appointed by an Appointment of Substitute Trustee executed by WELLS FARGO BANK. N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOA..N TRUST 2006-3, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3, the current mortgagee of the Deed of Trust, who requested 1vfttR:!E-HGJ2X.lNS, P..M::f!:;-e<Jt:tEY;-3-R::;-ALHSQ.N...GHAtiD.bER; M. MATTHEW WILLIAMS, Jel#!..LYNC-H, EMILY STR09P&-OR..MI.CHAEI..-W.-ZI~. as Substitute Trustee, to enforce the !rust of the Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the requirements of the Deed of Tmst and the laws of the stale of Texas, written notice of the time, place, date, and tenns of the public foreclosure sale of the Property was . poshx.l at the courthouse of Travis County, Texas, the county in. which the Property is situated, and a copy of the notice was also filed with the county clerk of Travis County, Texas, each notice having been posted and filed for at least twenty-one days preceding the date of the foreclosure sale. Written notice of the time, date, place, and terms of the foreclosure sale was served on behalf of the current Mortgagee by certified mail on each debtor who, according to the records of the cun·enl Mortgagee, is obligated to pay any of the indebtedness and obligations. The certified-mail r.otices were timely sent by depositing th.c notices in tl1e United Stales mail, postage prepaid in proper amount, and addressed to each debtor at the debtor's last known address as shown by the records of the current Mortgagee at least twenty-one days preceding Ute date of the foreclosure. Wtitten notice of default and of the opportunity to core the default to avoid acceleration of the maturity of the note w as· served on behalf of the current Mortgagee by certified mail on each debtor who, according to the records of the current Mortgagee, is obligated to pay any of the indebtedness and obligations. The certified-mail notices were timely se.'lt by depositing the notices in the United States mail, postage prepaid in proper amount, and addressed to each debtor at the debtor's last known address as shown by the records of the current Mortgagee at least thirty days preceding the date of the acceleration of the maturity of the note and the posting of the mortgaged Property for foreclosure. In consideration of the premises and of the bid and payment of the amount of $122,400.00, the higbest bid by Buyer, I, as Subs titute Trustee, by virtue of the authority conferred on me in the Deed of Trust, have GRANTED, SOLD, and CONVEYED all of the Property to Buyer and Buyer's heirs and assigns, to have and to hold the Property, together with the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging unto Buyer and Buyer's heirs and assigns forever. ~l~ue:~~u~~~t~~~~~~' D~f~~~b~~eb~:op~~~nt~ ;~~ero::t~~;.:-~~d O:~si;~~~~ forever, against the claim or claims of all persons claiming the same or an art thereof. Executed on~ day of ~ '~=, 201 L MARK HOPKINS;WrCJI:;-eeJ:;l":;l3¥;-fR., AI.HSeN CHANDI:;ER, M. MATTHEW WILLIAMS, JOHI<I LYNCM, EMII::T" 8'FROOPE OR: MlCHA£L W. ~EEHTZ STATE OF TE~ · § COUNTY OF J tUJL1 § BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared MARKc :~;:JR., ALLISON CI!A:Nl3tER, M MATTHEW WILLIAMS, JGHN TYl>!C:W, JilM!LY STROOPE OR MICHAEL ~~z. as Substitute Trustee, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he/she executed the same for the pUiposes and consideration therein expressed and in the capacity therein stated. · tJ-ik ~11. Given under my hand and seal of office this rL.__ day o:!\ · · · t 1"' LuJL tki_ Notary Public, State of Texas XXXXXX0834/J J-000298-910 AFTER RECORDATION RETIJRN TO: Mru:kie WolfZientz & Mann, P. C. Pacific Center I. Suite 660 14180 North Dallas Parkway Dallas, 1X 75254 CINDEE K. CHARD Notary Public. Slate ot Texas My Commi ~~lon E>p•res Juno \9,2.013 AFFIDAVIT STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF DALLAS BEFORE ME, the undersigned on this day personally appeared BRANDON WOLF and after being duly sworn; deposed and stales under oath, as follows: I. I am over the age of eighteen ( 18), have not been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit.

² All notices required pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust and Texas Property Code Section 5!.002(h) and (d) were provided to the debtors.

³ In accordance with Texas Property Code Section 51.002, the Notice of Sale was posted at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of sale at the proper location designated by the County Commissioner's Cow1. Additionally, a copy of the Notice of Sale was filed at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of sale in the office of the County Clerk of the county in which the sale occurred.

⁴ The Defendants identified in above paragraphs shall be referred to collectively as "Defendants".

⁵ Whenever reference is made in this Petition to any act of any Defendant(s), that allegation shall mean that each Defendant acted individua!ly and jointly with the other Defendants.

⁷ At all retevant times, each Defendant committed the acts, caused or directed others to commit the acts, or permitted others to commit the acts as stated in this Petition. Additionally, some or all of the Defendants acted as the agent of the other Defendants and all of the Defendants acted within the scope of their agency if acting as an agent of another.

⁸ At all relevant times, each Defendant knew or realized that the other Defendants were engaging in or planned to engage in the violations of law as stated in this Petition. Knowing or realizing that other Defendants \.vere engaging in or planning to engage in unlawful conduct, each Defendant nevertheless facilitated the commission of those unlawful acts_ Each Defendant intended to and did encourage, facilitate. or assist in the commission of the unlawfuf acts, and thereby aided and abetted the other Defendants in the unlawful conduct.

⁹ The violations of law as stated in this Petition occurred in Texas and the United States. JURISDICTION AND 'VENUE 10. The subject matter in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits of this Court The Court has personal jurisdiction because the property, which is the subject of the litigation and the same, is located in Travis County Texas . See §17.56 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 11 . Defendants are doing business in Texas and, have committed torts in the State of Texas.