ACCEPTED 03-15-00128-CV 5606085 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/9/2015 3:21:27 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK

CAUSE NUMBER 03-15-00128-CV FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS FOR THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 6/9/2015 3:21:27 PM DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk

TEDDER. BLUNCK, Appellant, v. CATHY A. BLUNCK, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 22N° DISTRICT COURT, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

TRIAL COURT CAUSE N0.11-1217

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

TEDDER. BLUNCK, PRO SE 502 QUITMAN STREET P 0 BOX 1152 PITTSBURG, TEXAS 75686 TELEPHONE: (903) 855-8460 TELECOPIER: (903) 855-8465 E-MAIL: [email protected] Identity of Parties and Counsel Appellant/Petitioner: Petitioner/Appellant's Appellate Counsel: Tedde R. Blunck TeddeR. Blunck, ProSe 502 Quitman Street 502 Quitman Street P 0 Box 1152 P 0 Box 1152 Pittsburg, Texas 75686 Pittsburg, Texas 75686 Telephone: (903) 855-8460 Telephone: (903) 855-8460 Telecopier: (903) 855-8465 Telecopier: (903) 855-8465 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Appellee/Respondent: Respondent/Appellee's Appellate Counsel: Cathy A. Blunck Mr. Karl E. Hays 1433 Preston Road, Suite 1707 Law Office of Karl E . Hays, PLLC Dallas, Texas 75254 2101 South Highway 35 , Suite 210 Mobile: (214) 668-9468 Austin, Texas 78741 Telecopier: unknown Telephone: (512) 476-1911 E-mail: [email protected] Telecopier: (512) 476-1904 [email protected] Respectfully Submitted: i II \ ,.,.-- ~~-\_/ i./ · ~z""-"'---- - - / TeddeR. Blunck, ProSe 502 Quitman Street P 0 Box 1152 Pittsburg, Texas 75686 Telephone: (903) 855-8460 Telecopier: (903) 855-8465 E-mail: [email protected] II TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS 111 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES IV STATEl\tfENT OF THE CASE 1 ISSUES PRESENTED 2 STATEl\tfENT OF FACTS 3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 ARGUl\tfENT 13 PRAYER 23 CERTIFICATE OF NUNIBER OF WORDS IN BRIEF 24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24 APPENDIX 25 ll l --~------ INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE(S) M-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F .3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006) 8, 14 Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991) 8, 14 Bergeron v. Sessions, 561 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) 21,22 Bergman v. Bergman, 828 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App. - El Paso, 1992, no writ.) 19 Burns v. Miller, et al, 948 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App. -Dallas, 1997, writ denied) 12, 18,20 Clayton v. Wisener, 169 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.) 10, 16, 17 Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) 17 Estate of Guerrero, 2015 Tex. App. Lexis 4121 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], no pet.)_ 11, 16 Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1983) 8, 14 Finotti v. Old Harbor Co., 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8514 (Tex. App. -- Dallas, no pet.) 9, 15 Garza v. Wilson, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 581 , (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], no pet.) 11, 17 Hodges v. Peden, 634 S.W.2d 8, (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) 23 iv Jones v. Strayhorn, 321 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1959) 20, 22 Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 365 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2013) 11 , 16 Mayo v. Suemaur Exploration & Prod. LLC, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7164, (Tex. App.-Houston [14 1h Dist.], no pet.) 11 , 16 Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.)_ _ _ __ 9, 12, 15, 18, 19 Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S.W.3d 160, (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.)_ _ __ 9, 12, 15, 17, 18 Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1991)_ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ 9, 10, 15, 16, 19 Shanze Enters. V. Amigo MGA, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 156512 (N.D. Tex. 2014)_ _ _ __ _ _ 9, 15, 19 Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7967, (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], no pet.) 8, 9, 14, 15 Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S.W.3d 311, (Tex. App.-Houston [lstDist.] 2008, no pet.) 8, 10, 14, 16 Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R&G Produce Co., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3369, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, no pet.)__ 10, 15 STATUTES Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code§ 31.002_ __ __ _ _ 8, 11, 14, 17 Texas Property Code Section 42 _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ 19 v ------ CAUSE NUMBER 03-15-00128-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TIDRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS TEDDE R. BLUNCK, Appellant, v. CATHY A. BLUNCK, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 22N° DISTRICT COURT, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE N0.11-1217 APPELLANT'S BRIEF BRIEF OF APPELLANT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS: TeddeR. Blunck files this Appellant brief and prays that the judgment of the District Court be reversed and that the matter be remanded to the District Court for a new trial.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

This appeal arises from an action brought by Tedde R. Blunck. Original

Petition for Divorce was filed on June 11, 20 11 in the District Court, 22nd Judicial

District, Hays County, Texas. On August 8, 9, and 16, 2012, the District Court held a bench trial in the matter. Appellant filed a Request for Finding of Fact on

September 3, 2012. A Motion for Judgment with a proposed judgment was filed

October 3, 1012. A Final Decree of Divorce was signed October 24, 2012. A

second Request for Findings of Fact was filed on November 13, 2012. Finding of Fact were signed on November 15, 2012. Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial

November 16, 2012. No order was entered on the Motion for a New Trial.

Appellant filed a Motion to Modify, Correct or Reform Judgment November 21, 2012. No order was entered on the Motion to Modify, Correct or Reform

Judgment. A Notice of Appeal was filed on January 22, 2013 . The Appeal was dismissed and a Mandate was issued by this Court December 11 , 2014. Appellee filed a Motion for Post-Judgment Receivership Pursuant to Section 31.002, Civil

Practices and Remedies Code on January 30, 2015 . (See Clerk's Record at 33, Appendix at 33) Appellant filed an Objection and Special Exception to Appellee's

Motion for Post-Judgment Receivership Pursuant to Section 31.002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code (See Clerk's Record at 85, Appendix at 85) and an Objection

- - -- ----- to Receiver's Motion to Approve Final Report of Receiver, for Payment of Receiver's Fees and Expenses and to Discharge Receiver (See Clerk's Record at 81, Appendix at 81) on February 9, 2015 prior to the Hearing scheduled for that day. A Hearing was held on the Motion February 9, 2015. Appellant did not attend the Hearing. The District Comi did not rule on either of Appellant's Objections. The District Court entered an Order Approving Receiver's Final Rep01i, Authorizing Payment of Receiver's Fees and Expenses, and Discharging Receiver and an Order Appointing Receiver Pursuant to Section 31.002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code (See Clerk's Record at 72, Appendix at 72) on February 9, 2015. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal with the District Court (See Clerk's Record at 90, Appendix at 90) February 26, 2015 appealing the District Court's Order Appointing Receiver Pursuant to Section 31 .002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code. ISSUES PRESENTED I. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by entering an Order for turnover relief without any evidence in the record supporting the finding that Appellant had any non-exempt property that cannot be readily attached or levied on by ordinary legal process. II. Whether the District Court abused its discretion because the turnover relief ordered by the District Court is insufficiently specific regarding the property to be turned over and extends to exempt property and property of third parties. m. Whether the Court abused its discretion when it awarded the Receiver, who is an attorney, a fee of $300 per hour for all receiver services, his hourly rate as an attorney, without consideration of a lesser reasonable fee when

performing non-attorney functions and when there is no evidence in the record to support that the fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts and circumstances relative to the case are these:

Appellant filed for divorce on June 15, 2011. The Parties were married on May

26, 1988 and ceased to live together on or about July 6, 2009. The District Court

granted the divorce August 16, 2012 and the Judge signed the Final Decree of Divorce on October 24, 2012. A Notice of Appeal was filed on January 22, 2013.

The Appeal was dismissed and a Mandate was issued by this Court December 11 , 2014. Appellee filed a Motion for Post-Judgment Receivership Pursuant to

Section 31.002~ Civil Practices and Remedies Code (See Clerk's Record at 33, Appendix at 33) on January 30, 2015. Appellant filed an Objection and Special

Exception to Appellee's Motion for Post-Judgment Receivership Pursuant to ------------ - Section 31.002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code (See Clerk's Record at 85, Appendix at 85) and an Objection to Receiver's Motion to Approve Final Report of Receiver, for Payment of Receiver's Fees and Expenses and to Discharge Receiver (See Clerk's Record at 81, Appendix at 81) on February 9, 2015 prior to the Hearing scheduled for that day. A Hearing was held on the Motion February 9, 2015. Appellant did not attend the Hearing. The District Court did not rule on either of Appellant's Objections. (See Clerk's Record at 96, Appendix at 96) The District Court entered an Order Approving Receiver's Final Report, Authorizing Payment of Receiver's Fees and Expenses, and Discharging Receiver (See Clerk's Record at 80, Appendix at 80) and an Order Appointing Receiver Pursuant to Section 31.002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code (See Clerk's Record at 72, Appendix at 72) on February 9, 2015. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal with the District Court February 26, 2015 appealing the District Court's Order Appointing Receiver Pursuant to Section 31.002, Civil Practices and Remedies Code. (See Clerk's Record at 90, Appendix at 90)

No post-judgment discovery has taken place. No testimony was provided at the Hearing on February 9, 2015. (See Reporter's Record at 4, Appendix at 108) The Judge listened only to oral argument of counsel. Counsel for Appellee offered only two exhibits into the record in support of his argument, neither of which was authenticated. The first exhibit "Movant's 1, which is the Living Trust in which Mr. Blunck transferred all of this property." (see Reporter's Record at 15. Appendix at 119) This document was dated December 24, 2012. No evidence was presented that the Living Trust had not been revoked or modified since that date, when in fact the document has been modified twice and both modifications are of public record with the County Clerk in Camp County, Texas and whether the Living Trust even owns any property at this time. Counsel argues that the turnover order is needed so that the Receiver can "exercise Mr. Blunck's rights that he would have under the living trust." (see Reporter's Record at 16, Appendix at 120) No testimony was offered either in open court or via affidavit to authenticate Movant's Exhibit No. 1 (See Appendix at 142) . The document does not comply with Rule 902 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore is not self- authenticating (the copy offered as Exhibit No.1 shows the pen and ink changes initiated by the Settlor and the Trustee, the copy was never recorded). The second exhibit, Movant's No.2, (See Appendix at 173) Counsel argues that ''these are schedules that Mr. Blunck submitted [to the Bankruptcy Court]. And in those schedules Mr. Blunck represented to the Bankruptcy Court that he had exempt property, in addition to what we showed you with the trust and the contract rights that can be executed pursuant to the turnover order." (see Reporter's Record at 19, Appendix at 123) The document is dated July 23, 2013. No evidence was presented that the property listed in the schedules still exists. No evidence or argument was offered or presented in the record that any of the property listed on the schedules was non-exempt. The schedules offered as Movant's No. 2 were not authenticated by testimony or affidavit. The document does not comply with Rule 902 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore is not self-authenticating.

The Court's turnover order states in pet1inent part: "Leon Breeden .. . is hereby appointed Receiver. .. with the power and authority to take possession of and sell all leviable property of the Judgment Debtor, including, but not limited to the following non-exempt property: (1) all documents or records, including financial records, related to such property that is in the actual or constructive possession or control of the Judgment Debtor; (2) all fmancial accounts (bank accounts), certificates of deposit, money-market accounts, accounts held by any third party; (3) all securities; (4) all real property, equipment, vehicles, boats, and planes; (5) all safety deposit boxes or vaults; (6) all cash; (7) all negotiable instruments, including promissory notes, drafts, and checks; (8) cause of action or choses of action; (9) contract rights, whether present or future; and ( 10) accounts receivable; and that all such property shall beheld [sic] in custodia legis by said Receiver as of the date of this Order." (see Clerk's Record at 73, Appendix at 73) There is no evidence in the record to support the finding that the Judgment Debtor has any exempt property. The record is devoid of any evidence to suppm1 a finding that the Judgment Debtor has actual or constructive possession of any of the 10 items specified to be turned over to the Receiver. Item No. 2 specifically relates to property held by third patties. The Order goes on to state: "Judgment

Debtor is ORDERED to turnover to the Receiver at his office address within five ill [emphasis added] from Judgment Debtor's receipt of a copy of this Order: ( 1) the documents contained on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together will all documents and financial records which may be requested by Receiver; (2) all

checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title, and contracts owned by or in the name of Judgment Debtor." (see Clerks' Record

at 73, Appendix at 73). There is no time frame stated in the Order regarding the above. It is impossible to comply with the Order when no time frame is stated.

Additionally, this provision of the Order reaches to exempt property and property in the possession of third parties.

The Order states in pertinent part: "It is ORDERED the Receiver shall not post a bond. It is further ORDERED that the Receiver sha11 be entitled to

Receiver's fees at a rate of $300.00 per hour, which the Court finds to be the customary and usual fee for a turnover receiver." (see Clerk's Record at 76, Appendix at 76). There is no evidence in the record to support the finding that the fees awarded to the Receiver are customary or usual, or reasonable or necessary.

No testimony was presented or received, nor were any authenticated exhibits offered or received into evidence to support the fmding.

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SUMMARYOFTHEARGUMlliNT

The trial court must have some evidence to establish the necessary conditions for the application of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 31.002 exist.

The Texas Turnover Statute, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 31.002, is a procedural device by which judgment creditors may reach assets of a debtor that are otherwise difficult to attach or levy. See Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 41 7, 426 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S. W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. 1991)). The turnover statute itself does not require notice and a hearing prior to issuance of a turnover order. See Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1983). Nevertheless, the trial court "must have some evidence before it that establishes that the necessary conditions for the application of31.002 exist." Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S. W.3d 311, 322 (Tex. App. -- Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). The creditor must show the trial court that: "(1) the debtor owns the property, (2) the property cannot be readily attached, and (3) the property is not exempt." Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, No. 14-2-130-cv, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7967, 2003 WL 22097781, at *2 (Tex. App. --Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 11, 2003, [*3] no pet.). Creditor failed to carry its burden of proving that the Judgment Debtor owns non-exempt property that could not be readily attached. The District Court abused its di scretion in finding "that the Judgment Debtor owns non-exempt property that cannot be readily attached or levied on by ordinary legal process" (See Clerk's Record at 72, Appendix at 72) when the record contains no evidence to support the finding.

For a judgment creditor to prove the required elements, the creditor must "introduce more evidence than just a motion for turnover. The statute requires a factual showing that the judgment debtor has non-exempt property that is not readily subject to ordinary execution." I d. (citing Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1991)) . "A turnover order must be specific in both identifying the non-exempt property that is susceptible to turnover relief and in tailoring the turnover relief to that property." Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W3d 48, 54 (Tex. App. --Austin 2005, no pet.); see also Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S. W3d 160, 163 (Tex. App. -- Beaumont 2002, no pet.) ("A reference to broad categories of assets does not constitute a reference to specific assets that is required in a turnover order."); !d. at 54. ("[T]he trial comt's order must be definite, clear, and concise in its description of the property to be turned over eliminating the need for interpretations, inferences or conclusions."). Shanze Enters. V Amigo MGA, LLC, 13-CV-4311-D, 2014 US. Dist. Lexis 156512 at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2014). Citing Finotti v. Old Harbor Co., No. 5-97-1365-cv, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8514, 1999 WL 1034607, at *1 (Tex. App. --Dallas Nov. 16, 1999, no pet.)

The Court therefore may not properly enter a turnover order if there is not at least some probative evidence of the necessary facts supporting the trial court's discretion. See Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R&G Produce Co. , No. 13-

12-00365-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3369, 2014 WL 1266118, at *4 {Tex. App. --

Corpus Christi 2014, no pet.).

[A] judgment creditor may not receive aid from the court under the provisions of section 31.002 if the judgment debtor does not own property that is non-exempt and that could not readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal process. Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S.W3d 311, 322 (2008 Tex. App -Houston, [1st Dist.]) [A] trial court must nonetheless determine that the request for aid pending before the court falls within the scope of section 3 1.002 before it enters an order granting relief under that section. In making this determination, the trial comi must have some evidence before it establishes that the necessary conditions for the application of 3 1.002 exist. See

Schultz, 810 S. W2d at 740 (holding that turnover statute requires factual showing that judgment debtor has non-exempt property that is not readily subject to ordinary execution); Clayton v. Wisener, 169 S. W.3d 682, 683-84 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no

pet.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in entering a turnover order without any evidence of facts required by section 31.002(a) and based only on motion and argument of judgment creditor's counsel). !d.

The Texas Supreme Court has held that the complete absence of authenticating - ------------- evidence is a defect in substance that can be raised for the first time on appeal. See Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 365 S.W3d 314 at 317{Tex. 2013). This court's precedent holds the same. Estate of Guerrero, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4124 at 27 (2015 Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.], no per.) citing Mayo v. Suemaur Exploration & Prod. LLC, No. 14-07-00491-CV, 2008 Te.x:. App. LEXIS 7164, 2008 WL 4355259, at *5; see also Garza v. Wilson, No. 14-98-00928-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 581, 2000 WL 64052, at *2 {Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2000, no pet).

The absence of an affidavit verifying a copy of the instrument attached as summary judgment proof amounts to no proof. Id. at 25. No testimony was provided to authenticate Movant's No. 1 or Movant's No. 2, nor was either authenticated via affidavit. Movant's No. 1 and Movant' s No. 2 do not comply with Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 902, and therefore are not self-authenticating. Movant's No. 1 and Movant's No. 2 are not evidence in support of the Movant's motion. Movant has provided no evidence that establishes the necessary conditions for the application of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code§ 31.002 exist.

Appellee has the burden to -- but does not -- identify any specific non- exempt property or provide any evidence to establish that any specific non -exempt property is susceptible to turnover relief. Appellee has failed to establish that: (1) Appellant owns the property, (2) the property cannot be readily attached, and (3) the property is not exempt. AppeJlee's motion only identifies "broad categories of assets," rather than specific assets as required for a turnover order. Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S. W 3d 160, 163 (2002, Tex. App. -Beaumont). It is not to be left to the debtor to determine what property that person has and whether it is exempt. Otherwise, there would be no need for any 'factual showing' by 'proof of the necessary facts' as required by [the supreme court's] opinion. Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W3d 48, 54 (2005 Tex. App.-Austin). Others [cases] acknowledge that this requirement aids in ensuring that the turnover order does not extend to exempt property or property of third parties. Roebuck, 74 S. W3d at 163-64 (broad turnover order improperly extended to assets owned in whole or part by third parties); Burns v. Miller, et al, 05-94-01288 CV, 948 S.W.2d 317, 326-27 (Tex. App. - Dallas, 1997, writ denied). (non-specific order to turn over "cash, money orders, checks . . . in any form and in anyone's possession which Burns beneficially owns or may own in the future" improperly extended to exempt and currently nonexistent property). Id.

The Turnover Order states in pertinent part: "Judgment Debtor is ORDERED to turnover to the Receiver at his office address within five (5) [emphasis added] from Judgment Debtor's receipt of a copy of this Order: (I) the documents contained on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together with all documents and financial records which may be requested by Receiver; (2) all checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title, and contracts owned by or in the name of Judgment Debtor." (See Clerks' Record at 73 , Appendix at 73). There is no time frame stated in the Order regarding the above. It is impossible to comply with the Order when no time frame is stated. Additionally, this provision of the Order reaches to exempt property and property in the possession of third parties.

The District Court abused its discretion when it entered a Turnover Order that sets out only in generality the property (which may be exempt and or in the possession of third parties) that is to be turned over and does not specifically state the non-exempt property owned by Judgment Debtor to be turned over and does not Order a specific time frame that the property is be turned over.

The District Court also abused its discretion when it Ordered Judgment Debtor to pay the appointed Receiver fees of $300.00 per hour when there is no evidence in the Record to support the finding that such fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

ENTERED AN ORDER FOR TURNOVER RELIEF WITHOUT ANY

EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTING THE FINDING 1HAT

APPELLANT HAD ANY NON-EXEMPT PROPERTY THAT CANNOT

BE READILY AITACHED OR LEVIED ON BY ORDINARY LEGAL

PROCESS.

The trial court must have some evidence to establish the necessary conditions for the application of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code§ 31.002 exist.

The Texas Turnover Statute, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 31.002, is a procedural device by which judgment creditors may reach assets of a debtor that are otherwise difficult to attach or levy. See Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F3d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Beaumont Bank, NA. v. Buller, 806 S. W2d 223, 224 (Tex. 1991)). The turnover statute itself does not require notice and a hearing prior to issuance of a turnover order. See Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1983). Nevertheless, the trial court "must have some evidence before it that establishes that the necessary conditions for the application of 31.002 exist." Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S. W3d 311, 322 (Tex. App. --Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) . The creditor must show the trial court that: "(1) the debtor owns the property, (2) the property cannot be readily attached, and (3) the property is not exempt." Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, No. 14-2-130-cv, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7967, 2003 WL 22097781, at *2 (Tex. App. --Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 11, 2003, no pet.).

For a judgment creditor to prove the required elements, the creditor must "introduce more evidence than just a motion for turnover. The statute requires a factual showing that the judgment debtor has non-exempt property that is not readily subject to ordinary execution.'' I d. (citing Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, 810 S.W2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1991)). "A turnover order must be specific in both identifying the non-exempt property that is susceptible to turnover relief and in tailoring the turnover relief to that property." Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W3d 48, 54 (Tex. App. --Austin 2005, no pet.); see also Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S. W3d 160, 163 (Tex. App. --Beaumont 2002, no pet.) ("A reference to broad categories of assets does not constitute a reference to specific assets that is required in a turnover order."); ld. at 54. ("[T]he trial court's order must be definite, clear, and concise in its description of the property to be turned over eliminating the need for interpretations, inferences or conclusions."). Shanze . Enters. V Amigo MGA, LLC, 13-CV-4311-D, 2014 US. Dist. Lexis 156512 at *3 (ND. Tex. 2014). Citing Finotti v. Old Harbor Co. , No. 5-97-1365-cv, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8514, 1999 WL 1034607, at *1 (Tex. App. --Dallas Nov. 16, 1999, no pet.)

The Court therefore may not properly enter a turnover order if there is not at least some probative evidence of the necessary facts supporting the trial court's discretion. See Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R&G Produce Co. , No. 13- 12-00365-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3369, 2014 WL 1266118, at *4 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 2014, no p et.) .

[A] judgment creditor may not receive aid from the court under the provisions of section 31.002 if the judgment debtor does not own property that is non-exempt and that could not readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal process. Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S. W3d 311, 322 (2008 Tex. App - Houston, [1st Dist.]) [A] trial court must nonetheless determine that the request for aid pending before the court falls within the scope of section 31.002 before it enters an order granting relief under that section. In making this determination, the trial court must have some evidence before it that establishes that the necessary conditions for the application of 31.002 exist. See Schultz, 810 S. W2d at 740 (holding that turnover statute requires factual showing that judgment debtor has non-exempt property that is not readily subject to ordinary execution); Clayton v. Wisener, 169 S. W3d 682, 683-84 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in entering a turnover order without any evidence of facts required by section 31.002(a) and based only on motion and argument of judgment creditor's counsel). !d.

The Texas Supreme Court has held that the complete absence of authenticating evidence is a defect in substance that can be raised for the first time on appeal. See Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 365 S. W3d 314 at 317(Fex. 2013). This court's precedent holds the same. Estate of Guerrero, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4124 at 27 (2015 Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.], no pet. ) citing Mayo v.

Suemaur Exploration & Prod. LLC, No. 14-07-00491-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7164, 2008 WL 4355259, at *5; see also Garza v. Wilson, No. 14-98-00928-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXJS 581, 2000 WL 64052, at *2 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2000, no pet.).

The absence of an affidavit verifying a copy of the instrument attached as summary judgment proof amounts to no proof. Id. at 25. No testimony was provided to authenticate Movant's No. 1 or Movant's No. 2, nor was either authenticated via affidavit. Movant's No. 1 and Movant's No. 2 do not comply with Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 902, and therefore are not self-authenticating. Movant's No. 1 and Movant's No. 2 are not evidence in support of the Movant's motion. Motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence. Clayton v. Wisener, 169 S. W 3d 682, 684 (Tex. App. - Tyler 2005, no pet.) citing Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103 S. W 3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) . Movant has provided no evidence that establishes the necessary conditions for the application of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 31.002 exist.

Appellee has the burden to -- but does not -- identifY any specific non- exempt property or provide any evidence to establ ish that any specific non-exempt property is susceptible to turnover relief. Appellee has failed to establish that: ( 1) Appellant owns the property, (2) the property cannot be readily attached, and (3) the property is not exempt. Appellee's motion only identifies "broad categories of assets," rather than specific assets as required for a turnover order. Roebuck v. Horn, 74 S. W. 3d 160, 163 (2002, Tex. App. -Beaumont) . It is not to be left to the debtor to determine what property that person has and whether it is exempt. Otherwise, there would be no need for any 'factual showing' by 'proof of the necessary facts' as required by [the supreme court's] opinion. Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W.3d 48, 54 (2005 Tex. App.- Austin). Others [cases] acknowledge that this requirement aids in ensuring that the turnover order does not extend to exempt property or property of third parties. Roebuck, 74 S. W3d at 163-64 (broad turnover order improperly extended to assets owned in whole or part by third parties); Burns, 948 S. W2d at 326-27 (non-specific order to turn over "cash, money orders, checks .. . in any form and in anyone's possession which Burns beneficially owns or may own in the future" improperly extended to exempt and currently nonexistent property). !d.

The District Court abused its discretion in finding "that the Judgment Debtor owns non-exempt property that cannot be readily attached or levied on by ordinary legal process" (See Clerk's Record at 72, Appendix at 72) when the record contains no evidence to support the finding.

II. THE DISTRJCT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE THE TURNOVER RELIEF ORDERED IS INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC

REGARDING THE PROPERTY TO BE TURNED OVER AND EXTENDS TO EXElvfPT PROPERTY AND PROPERTY OF TIDRD

PARTIES. The Turnover Order is in the nature of a mandatory injunction and is appealable. Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Ct. of App. at Dallas, 810 S. W2d, 738, 740 (Tex. 1991). To meet the requirements of Section 31.002, the com1's order must be specific in both identifying the non-exempt propet1y that is susceptible to turnover relief and in tailoring the turnover relief to the property. Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W3d 48, 54 (Tex. App. - Austin, 2005) . The trial court's order must be definite, clear, and concise in its description of the property to be turned over eliminating the need for interpretations, inferences or conclusions. Shanze Enters. V. Amigo MGA, LLC, 13-CV-4311-D, 2014 U S Dist. Lexis 156512 (N.D. Tex. 2014). It is elementary that an injunction must be definite and concise, leaving the person enjoined in no doubt about his duties, and should not be such as would call on him for interpretation, inferences or conclusions. Bergman v. Bergman, 828 S. W2d 555, 557 (Tex. App. - El Paso, 1992, no writ.) The Turnover Order is neither specific in terms of what is to be turned over or when any particular item is to be turned over. It is not to be left to the debtor to determine what propetiy that person has and whether it is exempt. Otherwise, there would be no need for any 'factual showing' by 'proof of the necessary facts' as required by [the supreme court's] opinion. Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S. W3d 48, 54 (2005 Tex. App.-Austin). Texas Property Code Section 42 specifies certain real and personal property that is exempt. Additional real and personal property is exempt if it is in the possession of third parties or is the assets of a spendthrift trust. Distributions from trusts are not subject to turnover because they are proceeds or disbursements of exempt property. Burns v. Miller, et al, 05-94-01288 CV, 948 S. W2d 317, 326 (Tex. App. -Dallas, 1997, writ denied). The Court's order fails to state specifically what non-exempt property in the possession of the Judgment Debtor is to be turned over or when it is to be turned over.

The District Court abused its discretion when it Ordered broad categories of property which may or may not be in the possession of the Judgment Debtor to be turned over to the Receiver without specifYing when such property was to be turned over. ill. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

AWARDED THE RECEIVER, WHO IS AN ATTORNEY, A FEE OF $300

PER HOUR FOR ALL RECEIVER SERVICES, HIS HOURLY RATE AS

AN ATTORNEY, WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF A LESSER

REASONABLE FEE WHEN PERFORMING NON-ATTORNEY

FUNCTIONS AND WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD

TO SUPPORT THAT THE FEES ARE USUAL AND CUSTOMARY OR REASONABLE AND NECESSARY.

Receivers are entitled to reasonable compensation. Jones v. Strayhorn, 159 Tex. 421, 321 S. W2d 290, 292-293 (1959). The value of a receiver's services determines the appropriate amount of compensation. Bergeron v. Sessions, 561 S. W2d 551, 554 {Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r. e.) . To determine the value of a receiver's services, courts consider the following factors:

(1) the nature, extent and value of the administered estate;

(2) the complexity and difficulty of the work;

(3) the time spent;

(4) the knowledge, experience, labor and skill required of, or devoted by the receiver;

(5) the diligence and thoroughness displayed; and (6) the results accomplished. !d. at 554-55. While courts should "cautiously avoid excessive or improper" fees, sufficient fees should be permitted "to induce competent persons to serve as receiver[.]" !d. at 555.

The District Court abused its discretion when it found that the Receiver's fees requested were usual and customary:

( 1) the nature, extent and value of the administered estate - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding the nature, extent and value of the administered estate

(2) the complexity and difficulty of the work - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding·the complexity and difficulty of the work to be done.

(3) the time spent - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding when there is no evidence of the estimate of the time to be spent.

(4) the knowledge, experience, labor and skill required of, or devoted by the receiver - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding whether the skills necessary to perform the anticipated services require the services of a licensed attorney. "[A] receiver is not entitJed to compensation at a legal rate for work which does not require legal skills." Bergeron, 561 S W2d at 554.

(5) the diligence and thoroughness displayed - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding the diligence and thoroughness necessary to perform any of the anticipated services. The record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding any necessary services whatsoever.

(6) the results accomplished - the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that the Receiver's fees are usual and customary or reasonable and necessary regarding any results will be accomplished whatsoever.

Receiver has not provided any evidence in the record, only argument, that his charged rate of $300 per hour is usual and customary or reasonable and necessary compensation for the services anticipated to be provided. In fact such a high rate for the services that are undefined is highly unreasonable, especially the use of such an egregious rate for travel and meals as was awarded in the underlying matter.

Additionally, the District Court abused its discretion when it Ordered the Receiver's fee to be taxed as cost against the Judgment Debtor. (See Clerk's Record at 76, Appendix at 76). We should be mindful that "[t]he apportionment of costs should be controlled by equitable principles and the ultimate success or failure of the party who requests the appointment of a receiver is not in itself controlling, but is a prime factor in determining who shall ultimately pay the costs ofthe receivership." Hodges v. Peden, 634 S. W2d 8, 12 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ (citing Jones, 321 S. W2d at 293-94).

PRAYER Appellant Tedde R. Blunck respectfully prays that the Judgment of the District Court granting the Turnover Order be reversed and remanded to the District Court for a New Trial in all respects.

CERTIFICATE OF THE NUMBER OF WORDS CONTAINED IN BRIEF I hereby certify in accordance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3) that the Appellant's brief contains 6,409 words. Tedde R. Blunck CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true copy of the above Appellant's Brief was served on Karl Hays, 2101 South Highway 35, Suite 210 Austin, Texas 78741, attorney for Appellee Cathy A. Blunck in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellant Civil Procedure on June 8, 2015 . Tedde R. Blunck

CAUSE NUMBER 03-13-0007 4-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS

TEDDER. BLUNCK, Appellant, v. CATHY A. BLUNCK, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 22N° DISTRICT COURT, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

TRIAL COURT CAUSE N0. 11-1217

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

TEDDER. BLUNCK, PRO SE 502 QUITMAN STREET POBOX 1152 PITTSBURG, TEXAS 75686 TELEPHONE: (903) 855-8460 TELECOPIER: (903) 855-8465 EMAIL: [email protected] - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - -

TABLE OF CONTENTS District Clerk's Record_ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ 1 Reporter's Record-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - 100 Movant's Exhibit No. 1 - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - ---- 141 Movant's Exhibit No. 2 172 --------------------------- CLERK'S RECORD VOLUME one OF ONE

Trial Court Cause No. 11-1217

IN THE 22nd DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS, AT SAN MARCOS, TEXAS

THE HONORABLE BILL HENRY JUDGE PRESIDING

TEDDE R. BLUNCK Plaintiff(s) VS. CATHY A. BLUNCK Defendant(s) Appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas, at Austin , Texas ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT(s) Name: Tedde R.Blunck, Pro Se SB# 00793355 Address: P. O. Box 1152 Telephone #: (903) 855-8460 Pittsburg, Texas 75686 Fax No.: (903) 855-8465 E-Mail Address: [email protected]____________________________________ Attorney for Tedde R. Blunck, Pro Se Appellant(s) Delivered by electronically filing with the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas at Austin , Texas on the 18th day of March , 2015. BEVERLY CRUMLEY District Clerk, Hays County, Texas BY: /s/ Kathy Orlowski Deputy Appellate Court Cause No. 03-15-00128-CV Page 1 of 207 000001 ---------------------------------------------------------------- INDEX ---------------------------------------------------------------- COVER PAGE ..................................................... 1 INDEX ........................................................... 2 MOTION TO RELEASE AND TRANSFER PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF RECEIVER AND TO AUTHORIZE RECEIVER TO SUBMIT FINAL REPORT FILED DECEMBER 12, 2014 ................................ OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SET HEARING ON MOTION TO RELEASE AND TRANSFER PROPERTY IN THE POSSESSION OF RECEIVER AND TO AUTHORIZE RECEIVER TO SUBMIT FINAL REPORT FILED DECEMBER 15, 2014 ................................ ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO RELEASE AND TRANSFER PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF RECEIVER AND TO AUTHORIZE RECEIVER TO SUBMIT FINAL REPORT FILED DECEMBER 18, 2014 ................................ MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER FILED JANUARY 14, 2015 ................................. MOTION FOR POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP PURSUANT TO SECTION 31.002, CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE FILED JANUARY 30, 2015 ................................. ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER PURSUANT TO SECTION 31.002, CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE SIGNED & FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ....................... OATH OF RECEIVER FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ...................................... ORDER APPROVING RECEIVER'S FINAL REPORT, AUTHORIZING PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FINAL FEES AND EXPENSES, AND DISCHARGING RECEIVER SIGNED & FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ........................ Page 2 of 207 000002 OBJECTION TO RECEIVER'S MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ................................. OBJECTION AND SPECIAL EXCEPTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP PURSUANT TO SECTION 31.002, CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ................................. RECEIPT OF EXHIBITS FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 ...................................... DESIGNATION OF CLERK'S RECORD FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2015 ..................................... NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2015 ..................................... COURT'S DOCKET SHEET ............................................. BILL OF COSTS .................................................... CLERK'S CERTIFICATE .............................................. Page 3 of 207 000003 FILED 12/12/2014 10:46:07 AM Beverly Crumley District Clerk Hays County, Texas CAUSE NUMBER 11-1217 IN THE MATTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE MARRIAGE OF § § TEDDER. BLUNCK § 22Nn JUDICIAL DISTRICT AND § CATHY A. BLUNCK § HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS MOTION TO RELEASE AND TRANSFER PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF RECEIVER AND TO AUTHORIZE RECEIVER TO SUBMIT FINAL REPORT TO Tl IE HONORABI ,E JlJDGE OF SAID COURT: This motion is brought by Cathy A. Blunck, who is the Respondent in these proceedings. In specific support of her request for an order authorizing the Receiver to release and transfer property in his possession and to submit a linal report in this case, Cathy A. Blunck would present the following: Applicable Facts The Final Decree (~/Divorce was signed in this case on 24 October 20 I 2. By notice of appeal filed on 22 January 2013, Teddc R. Blunck, the Petitioner in this proceeding, appealed the Court's order to the Third Court of Appeals. On 22 January 2013, within the time period prescribed by Section 109.001 of the Texas Family Code, Cathy A. Blunck sought and obtained temporary orders pending appeal. Among the relief granted by the Court at that time was the appointment of a receiver to take possession of certain property. The orders rendered by the Court specifically authorized the In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page I Page 4 of 207 000004 Receiver to take possession of the following property: a. the following property awarded to Cathy A. Blunck in the Final Decree of Divorce signed 1n this cause on October 24, 2012: 100% of Tedde R. Blunck's retirement benefits in Parsons Brinckerhoff Group, Inc. Retirement Savings Plan, c/o T. Rowe Price, arising oul of Tedde R. Blunck's employment with Parsons Brinckerhoff Group Inc. as of 16 August 2012, together with any interest, dj vidends, gains, or J osses on that amount arising since that date and more particularly dc:fined in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order signed by the Cou rl on the day th i_ s E'i na 7 Decree of Divorce is signed. In determining the division oi the parties' estate, lhe Court has considered the tax effect relating to the retirement benefits Cathy Blunck is to rece1ve, as authorized under Lhe Texas Family Code. b. all documents or records, including financial records, related to the above- described properly that is in the actual or constructive posses:;_i on or controJ of Tedde R. Blunck. c. all financial accounts (bank accounts), certificates of deposit, money-market accounts, accounts containing the proceeds of the above-described property, including, but not limited to, accounts in the following institutions: 1st National Dank of Gilmer, Pilgrim's Bank of Pittsburg, and Bank One, Pittsburg. The Court's temporary orders provided that the Receiver was to hold the above- referenced property "in custodia legis during the pendency of any appeal from the Final In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page 2 Page 5 of 207 000005 Decree of Divorce signed on 24 October 2012." In compliance with the Court's orders, Leon Breeden, the duly appointed receiver, levied on certain bank accounts belonging to Teddc R. Blunck and placed those accounts under the control of the receivership. As reflected in the Initial Report of Receiver and Application for Payment <~{Receiver's Fees and Expenses filed with the Court on 15 February 2013, the receiver is currently in possession of the following: First National Rank, Tedde R. Blunck IRA xx111, $237,093.13 Pl1grJm Bank, TeddeR. Blunck IRA xxxx865, $]81,467.49 Capital One Bank, Tedde R. Blunck fRA xxxxxxx474, $229,772.65 On 20 February 2013, the Court rendered additional temporary orders expanding the role of the Receiver and authorizing the Receiver to take control over additional property. Specifically, the order provided that the Receiver was to take possession of the following: a. All property real or personal which was under the direct or constructive control of Tedde R. Blunck as of 8 August 2012, the date the trial began in thi~ case, including, but not limited to rea I estate, bank account~, brokerage accounts, l rus L accounts, ret l remen t accounts, and retirement proc~eds. Although the Receiver has not taken physical possession of any property, save and except the IRA accounts identified above, technically any property falling within the parameters of the Court's order of20 February 2013, would be in custodia legis and subject In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page 3 Page 6 of 207 000006 to the Receiver's control and authority. In response to the Receiver's report, the parties entered into an agreed order authorizing the Receiver to retain the IRA accounts under his control at the banks where such accounts were currently located. On 26 June 2013, Tcdde R. Blunck filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas Marshall Division. At that time, an automatic stay went into ctTect precluding any further action which might materially effect property belonging to the bankruptcy estate. By order dated 4 November 2013, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth at length, the Court granted Cathy A. Blunck's request to modify the automatic stay to permit her to take all steps necessary, short of contempt, to obtain possession of the property originally awarded to her under the parties' final decree of divorce. These orders were rati lied in the Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan and Related Orders dated 27 December 2013, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth at length. On 2 July 2014, the Court of Appeals lor the Third District ofTcxas issued an order dismissing Teddc R. Blunck's appeal. On I I December 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas issued its Mandate, confirming its dismissal of Tcddc R. Blunck's appeal. A true and correct copy of the Mandate is attached as Exhibit "C" and is incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth at length. In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page 4 Page 7 of 207 000007 Requested Relief In light ofthe dismissal ofTedde R. Blunck's appeal, Cathy A. Blunck is requesting that she he allowed to take possession of the property that was awarded to her in the Court's original order and which is currently under the control of the Receiver. Accordingly, Cathy A. Blunck requests that this Court authorize the Receiver to release possession of all of the property under his control. Cathy A. Blunck additionally requests that she he appointed as attorney-in-fact for Tcdde R. Blunck lor the purposes of executing any documents necessary to transfer title to and/or control of any of the property awarded to her under the final decree ol' divorce. In the alternative, Cathy A. Blunck would request that the Court authorize the Receiver to operate as Mr. Blunck's attorney-in-fact to efTcct the transfer of property into Ms. Blunck's name. Such orders should specifically include a grant of authority to execute any and all documents necessary to transfer title to Cathy A. Blunck of the IRA accounts in Ted de R. Blunck's name at First National Bank, Pilgrim Bank, and Capital One Bank that arc under the control of the Receiver. Cathy A. Blunck further requests that the Receiver be authorized to thereafter submit a final report to the Court and that, upon acceptance of that report, the Receiver be discharged and the receivership dissolved. WHEREFORE ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Cathy A. I3lunck respectfully requests that, upon consideration of the matters set forth herein, the Court grant her requested relief and such other and further relief to which she may be justly entitled. In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page 5 Page 8 of 207 000008 Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF KARL E. HAYS, PLLC 2101 South IH35, Suite 210 Austin, Texas 78741 5 12-4 7 6-1 91 1 512-476-1904 facsimile By:---7'.~L__v_y'?_/z_·--"---;--=d-=--------_ Karl E. Hays State Bar Number 09307050 John Barrett State Bar Number 01816300 BARRETT AND COBLE 7200 North MoPac Expressway, Suite 440 Austin, Texas 78731 512-482-8193 512-482-0525 facsimile A1TORNI ~YS FOR CATllY A. BLUNCK CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned attorney certifies pursuant to Rule 21 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, that a true and correct copy or the foregoing Motion to Release and Tramfer Property in Possession qf'Receiver and to Authorize Receiver to Suhmit Final Report has been served upon the below-named individual, in the manner noted below, as prescribed by Rule 21a of the Texas Rules ofCivil Procedure, on this the _ll~day of December 2014 . .L~!~Ld:: -__ Karl E. Hays Via Facsimile Transmission TeddeR. Blunck 502 Quitman St. P.O. Box 1152 Pittsburg, Texas 75686 903-855-8456 facsimile In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck Motion to Release and Transfer Property Page 6 Page 9 of 207 000009 Case 13-20129 Doc 60 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 14:34:4tr.t ~Main Document Page 1 of 3 .C..VlJ 11/04/2013 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION INRE: § § TEDDE ROBIN BLUNCK § CASE NO. 13-20129 SSN: xxx-xx-3054 § CHAPTER 13 1347 CR 4510 § Pittsburg, TX 75686 § § DEBTOR § ORDER MODIFYING TilE AUTOMATIC STAY On October 23, 2013, the Court heard the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay (the "Motion") filed by Cathy A. nlunck (the "Movant") on September 5, 2013, in the above referenced case. The Court finds that proper notice of the Motion and the hearing was given pursuant to the Federal and Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Charles Lauffer appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Movant, Cathy A. Blunck. Gordon Mosley appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Debtor, TeddeR. Blunck. Upon due consideration of the evidence, including factual stipulations on the record, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds the Divorce Decree issued on October 24,2012 and thereafter entered on November 1, 2012 (the "Divorce Decree"), in that certain litigation styled In The Matter of the Marriage ofTedde R. Blunck and Cathy A. Blunck, pending as Cause No. 11-1217 before the 22"d Judicial District Court in and for Hays County, Texas (the "Hays County Action") is a final and enforceable judgment, having not been properly superseded according to law. Accordingly, the Court finds that just cause exists for the entry of the following order. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay filed ' by Cathy A. Blunck on September 5, 2013 is GRANTED as set forth in this Order. Page 10 of 207 000010 Case 13-20129 Doc 60 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 14:34:46 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay is hereby MODIFIED so as to allow all parties to take all appropriate actions to continue and to complete the prosecution of the appellate action regarding the Divorce Decree, currently pending as Cause No. 03-13-00074-CV, before the Third Court of Appeals of Texas in Austin, Texas, and styled TeddeR. Blunck, Appellant v. Cathy A. Blunck, Appellee, together with any further appellate action as may be necessary or advisable. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the fact that the Debtor-Defendant, Tedde R. Blunck, has failed to supersede the enforcement of the Divorce Decree issued by the 22"d Judicial District Court in and for Hays County, Texas pending appeal, the automatic stay is hereby further MODIFIED to allow the continued enforcement of the Divorce Decree according to law, and Cathy Dlunck is hereby authorized to seek and to exercise any and all appropriate remedies available under state law to enforce the terms of the Divorce Decree, including any orders regarding the property awarded to her therein including but not limited to the following: 1. 100% of Tedde R. Blunck's retirement benefits in Parsons Brinckerhoff Group Inc. Retirement savings plan, c/o T. Rowe Price, arising out of Tedde R. Blunck's employment with Parsons Brinckerhoff Group Inc. as of 16 August 2002, together with any interest, dividends, gains, or losses on that amount arising since that date and more particularly defined in a Qualified Domestic Relations order signed by the 22"d Judicial District Court in and for Hays County, Texas. This includes the amounts now held in the following accounts: a. First National Bank of Pittsburg, Texas, account no. xxxx111, IRA account in the name ofTedde Blunck; b. Pilgrim Bank of Pittsburg, Texas, account no. xxxx865, IRA account in the name ofTedde R. Blunck, Leon Breeden, Receiver; c. Capital One Bank, Pittsburg, Texas, account no. xxxxxxx474, IRA account in the name ofTedde R. Blunck; d. 401kAccount held at T-Rowe Price in the amount of$40,120.25; Page 11 of 207 000011

Case 13-20129 Doc 60 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 14:34:46 Desc Main Document Page 3 of 3

The Court acknowledges the foregoing property (a)-(d), awarded to the Movant in the Divorce Decree, is subject to the receivership imposed by the previous orders of the 22nd Judicial District Court of Hays County, Texas, for the purpose of protecting the existence and integrity of property awarded to the Movant in the Divorce Decree and the automatic stay is further MODIFIED to allow the court-appointed receiver to exercise all rights and to seek all remedies necessary to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him by the 22nd Judicial District Court of Hays County, Texas, with respect to the property affected by this order; Page 12 of 207 000012

Case 13-20129 Doc 80 Filed 12/27/13 Entered 12/27/13 11:18:2EO!) Main UNITEBqrp~ sA~t<~u~-ffif couRT 12/27/2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION IN RE: ) CASE NO: 13-20129 Tedde Robin Blunck ) Chapter 13 ) SSN(s): xxx-xx-3054 ) 1347 CR4510 ) Pittsburg, TX 75686 ) ) ) ) Debtor(s)

ORDER CONFIRMING CHAPTER 13 PLAN AND RELATED ORDERS After notice and hearing, wherein the Court considered the matters on file herein, including the Trustee's Report of Creditors Meeting held pursuant to Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code, and all objections to confirmation of the Plan, The Court finds: 1. Written notice of the Meeting of Creditors held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341 and of this hearing on the confirmation of the Plan was given as required by Rule 2002; and 2. All scheduled creditors have been served with a copy of the Debtor's Plan or summary thereof in accordance with Rule 3015; and 3. The Plan as presented for confirmation (hereinafter referred to as "the Plan") complies with the provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code and the other applicable provisions of said Title; and 4. With respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the Plan, the holder of such claim either accepted or was deemed to have accepted the Plan, or, in the alternative a. The Plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and b. The value, as of the effective date of the Plan, of property to be distributed under the Plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claims; or c. The Debtor has surrendered or abandoned the collateral securing such claim; or d. The treatment of the claim complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 1. The Debtor's Plan dated 11/13/2013 as filed or as amended is CONFIRMED subject to the allowance of claims herein and the Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims which shall be filed within 30 days of the latter of entry of this Order or the deadline for all creditors (including a government unit) to file a claim. With respect to all claims allowed or not yet allowed at the time of execution of this Order, said claims are subject to the Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims as follows:

I. (a). The Trustee, the Debtor, and the Debtor's attorney shall examine proofs of claim or summaries thereof and shall object to the allowance of improper claims as provided by Rule 3007.

(b). The Trustee shall file and serve all parties in interest with the Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims within thirty (30) days of the latter of entry of this Order or the claim filing deadline for all creditors (including a government unit). Such Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims shall include the Trustee's objections to claims, if any, recommendations as to the extent and validity of each creditor's security interest, if any, and recommendations as to the value of any collateral not previously valued by the Court. The Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims shall be deemed to be an objection to claims, a motion to value any such collateral, and an action to determine the validity of each creditor's security interest or an action to avoid any such security interest as set forth therein.

(c). Unless an objection or response is timely filed as to the treatment of any claim, the claim will be allowed only in the manner and amount listed in the Trustee's Recommendation Concerning Claims, and such treatment will be final and binding on all parties without further order of the Court. Page 13 of 207 000013 TXEB Local Fonn 3015-b [Revised January 18, 2006] Page 1

Case 13-20129 Doc80 Filed 12/27/13 Entered 12/27/13 11:18:22 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 6 Case No: 13-20129 Debtor(s): Tedde Robin Blunck Page 25 of 207 000025

FILED 1/14/2015 12:40:25 PM Beverly Crumley District Clerk Hays County, Texas

NO. 11-1217 JN THE MATTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE MARRIAGE OF § § TEDDER BLUNCK § 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT AND § CATHY A. BLUNCK § IIAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER TO fHE HO~ORABLE JUDGe BILL HENRY:

FINAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES

This report covers my activites as receiver in this case from and after the hearing held on March 5, 2014, after which the Court entered its "Order on Motion to Release Property in Possession of Receiver and for Clerk to Rcleruie Cash I3ond to Receiver.. which was signed on Mat'Ch 18, 2014. At that time the Court denied the motion of Cathy A. Bl unck to release property in possession of receiver but did approve additional fees incutTed by the Receiver and for payment of the cash bond on file with the clerk of court for partial payment of my fees.

I. 1 did receive payment of $7.000.00 for the cash bond from the district derk's office as part1al payment of my total approved fees in that order of $16.037.51. leaving a balance of approved fees in the amount of $9.037.50.

2. Since the bearing in March, 2014. [only received sporadic emails from Ms. Blunck's anorney regarding the status of the appeal in this case. along with a request to sign an affidavit to be filed in the appeal. which r did sign and return to Mr. Hays. ro fees are requested for these matters. l Page 27 of 207 000027 transfen·ed to Ms. Blunck as quickly as possible.

At the conclusion of the hearing 1 contacted tbe disttict clerk in Pittsburg to inquire about a suit which Mr. Blw1ck advised during the hearing that he had flied in District Court in Camp County and in which he anticipated seeking a temporary restraining against me transferring the accounts to Ms. Blunck. The clerk sent me a copy of the petition which had been filed on December 17 in Cause No. CV -14-2462 styled ''Paulette M . Blunck, as Trustee of the Tedde R. Blunck Living Trust v. Cathy A. Blunck." The original petition is styled ''PlaintifPs Original Petition for Breach of Contract." The petition was signed by Tedde R. Blunck as attorney for Paulette M. Blunck. as Trustee of the TeddeR. Blunck Living Trust." There was no allegation in the petition relating to the receivership in this case nor is there a request for issuance of a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction or permanent injunction. After consultation with Ms. Blunck and Mr. Hays it was decided that Ms. Blunck and I would still go to Pittsburg the next day and that in the event any type of injunction was issued and served on me or Ms. Blunck that I would try to deal with the situation in person. 1 then advised the Court of the situation and that in the event anything was served upon me the next day I might need to contact the Court.

6. On December 19.2014, I left my house promptly at 4:00a.m. to begin the drive to Pittsburg. Texas. Ms. Blunck had agreed to meet me at a shopping center right on 1-35 in Desoto. Texas, so I could pick her up there and we could drive from there to Pittsburg with minimal delay. I anticipated being able to make good time through use of state highway 130 to Georgetown, Texas, and U1ereafter because of the early hour. Unfortunately T encountered heavy rainstorms from just north of Georgetown to just nmth of Waco, with speeds reduced to a Page 28 of 207 000028 maximum of 60 mph and often Jess than that for long stretches. I arrived in DeSoto right at 8 am and picked up Ms. Blunck and we arrived in Pittsburg at approximately 10:15.

We went first to Pilgrim Bank. TI1e lady we were directed to was not anyone I had dealt with before but she seemed to know about the situation and went to work immediately. She called the bank's lRA department and the legal department and then advised us that everything was good and she would have the paperwork done shortly. Based on her questions and statements while preparing the paperwork it became apparent to me that the transactions the bank had in mind were not what should happen. The bank intended to issue me a cashier's check for the amount of the account, then have me deposit the check into an account in Ms. Blunck's name. Tlus was not appropriate for several reasons, one being that I as receiver had no ownership interest in the accOLmt and should not receive any proceeds from the account, and another being that such a transaction would presumably destroy the status of the IRA accow1ts under federal Jaw and incur taxes that should not be incurred. After lengthy discussions with the bank representative, the IRA department and the legal department, I finally got across that the transaction should be handled as if lhere were no receiver and the bank should simply close out the account in Mr. Blunck's name and transfer lhe funds to an IRA account in Ms. Blunk's name.

We finished at Pilgrim Bank at approximately 2:15 p.m. and went across the street to Capital One Bank. The lady 1 had dealt with previously there was not in and the employee dealing with IRA accounts that day was from another branch but after conferring with the woman 1 had dealt with previously, and senior bank official on hand, and conferences with IRA and legal department, they agreed to handle the transaction the same way Pilgrim's Bank had. 1l1ey had a lot of paperwork to get approved so while they worked on that we went to Fi1·st National Bank of Page 29 of 207 000029 Pittsburg. The bank president I had dealt with before was present and after quick conferences with his departments, we got the paperworJ... started there. We then went back to Capital One and finjshed up and then back to First National to do the same. We walked out of First National Bank right at 5:30 p.m. Had we not gone on a Friday \\ben bank hours are extended untiJ 6:00p.m. there is no way we could have finished all 3 accounts.

When we left First National Bank of Pittsburg. the 3 IRA accounts had been transferred to Ms. Blunck in an aggregate amount of approximately $656,616.01 .

We then went to dinner. not having had a meal all day. We left Pittsburg at approximately 6:30 p.m. Ms. Blunck drove back to DeSoto so I could get some sleep before my drive back home. We arrived in DeSoto at approximately 8:20. r then drove back to San Marcos and arrived home at 12:30 a.m. Total distance traveled was 765 miles.

8. Ms. Blunck subsequently sent me a cashier's check in the amount of$9,037.50 for payment of the remainder of my fees which had preYiously been approved by the Court.

Page 30 of 207 000030 accounts that my time would be better spent in dealing with the LRA accounts. ln my humble opinion the 401 (k) account should be governed by a QDRO rather than a receiver.

REQUEST FOR PAY1\1ENT OF FEES AND EXPENSES

The Court has previously approved my hourly rate of $300.00 per hour. Time spent on this matter is detailed below.

1. December 11, 2014 -telephone conference with Mr. I lays .5

2. December 12. 2014- review of motion and emails to 3 banks .5

3. December 18.2014- attending hearing and research on case in Pittsburg 2.5

4. December 19.2014- total travel and meal time 13 .25

5. December 19, 2014- time spent at banks getting accounts transferred 7.25

6. January 7, 2015 - review of file and preparation of tllis report 2.0

Total time through preparation of this repon 18.75

Fees requested

3.5 hours @ $300.00 per hour for December I 1 - December 1~ $1,050.00

13.25 hours for travel on Decemb~.:r 191? $300.00 per hour $3,975.00

7.25 hours for time spent at banks on December 19 @ $300.00 per hour $2.175.00

2 hours for time spent preparing this report on January 7 @J $300.00 per hour $ 600.00

Total fees requested if no hearing on thi s motion $7,800.00

Ms. Blunck bas indjcated Lhat she will pay the fees approved by the Court. The allocation of my fees as between the parties is to be determined by the Court and is outside the scope of my role as Receiver. Should a hearing be required on this matter. t request that the Court award additional fees for time expended at the hourly rate of $300.00 per hour.

Page 31 of 207 000031

WHEREFORE. J request that the Court approve my final report, approve payment of my fees, and discharge me from my role as Receiver in lhis case.

Respectfully submitted.

Page 32 of 207 000032

FILED 1/30/2015 3:32:47 PM Beverly Crumley District Clerk Hays County, Texas CAUSE NUMBER 11-1217 IN THE MATTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE MARRIAGE OF § § TEDDER. BLUNCK § 22"n JUDICIAL DISTRICT AND § CATHY A. BLUNCK § HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION FOR POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP PURSUANT TO SECTION 31.002, CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE 1. Cathy A. Blunck has obtained a judgment against Tcddc R. Blunck in this cause. The judgment is dated 24 Octo her 2012, and is in the amount of approximately $242,532.00. The judgment is final and not appealable and remains fully payable. A copy of the judgment is attached as Exhibit "A." Attached as Exhibit "B" is a copy of Section 31.002, Civil Practice and Remedies Code (herein §31.002) upon which this motion is based. ^[2]. §31.002(a) specifically provides that, "A judgment creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction ... " and §31.002( a)(3) provides f(x the appointment of a receiver to collect the debt. Tedde R. Blunck has not paid the judgment Tcdde R. l3lunck owns property, including present or future rights to property that cannot he readily attached or levied on by ordinary legal process; and the property is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities. ^[3]. Accordingly, Cathy A. Blunck requests the Court order TeddeR. Blunck to turn over all non- exempt property that is in TeddeR. Blunck's possession or subject to his control, including, but not limited to, (I) all financial accounts (bank account), certificates of deposit, money market accounts, accounts held by any third party; (2) all securities; (3) all real property, equipment, vehicles, boats, for comer in said creek. : I

1.I. North 08 degrees SO minutes 00 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 112.06 feet to a point for corner in said creek; 12. South 66 degrees 39 minutes 07 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and · Nolen tracts for a distance of 201.50 feet to a point for comer in said cree~ 13. North 85 degrees 46 minutes 22 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 21.50 feet to a point for corner in said creek, same being a point in the West line of a tract of land in the pame of H. Stephens, (no recording data). '. TIIBNCE South 19 degrees 48 minutes 58 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Stephens tracts and generally along a. wire fence, passing the following tracts along the East line of McCaslin tract: : Annie Reynolds, (no recording data), Hartwell Stephens, (no recording data), and a tract of land conveyed to E. R. McCaslin and Myrtle McCaslin by· deed recorded in volume 59 page 43 Deed Records camp County, Texas and continuing for a total distance of 5101.23 feet to a fence post found for comer. TimNCE North 70 degrees 11 minutes 31 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin tracts and generally along a wire fence, passing a ~ inch capped (yellow plastic stamped Dewey 1641) steel rod set on the West line of County Road no. 4510 at 1704.66 feet and continuing for a total distance of 1724.66 feet to a point for comer on the centerline of said road. . TiffiNCE the following calls along the centerline of County Road No. 4510: I. South 08 degrees 28 minutes 17 seconds West 164.1 0 feet to a point for comer. ^[2]. South 03 degrees 48 minutes 48 seconds West 93.76 feet to a po~t for comer. ^[3]. South 03 degrees 18 minutes 05 seconds East 89.55 feet to a point for cotner. ^[4]. South 07 degrees 16 minutes 56 seconds East 1079.09 feet to a P?~t for comer. ^[5]. South 11 degrees 27 minutes 19 seconds East 78.79 feet to a point for comer. ^[6]. South 02 degrees 34 minutes 16 seconds West 258.83 feet to a point for comer. ^[7]. South 06 degrees 55 minutes 55 seconds West 1230.11 feet to a point for comer, same being the Northeast comer of a tract of land conveyed to 1. B. Cravey et ux by deed recorded in volwne 53 page 286 Deed Records Gam.p County, Texas.

IMMO Bl11nck Final DeCI'ee ofDivorce PageS for a distance of 420.00 feet to a ~ inch capped (yellow plastic stamped Dewey 1641) steel rod set for comer. 1 insurance, utility deposits, keys, house plans, home security access and code, keys and garage door opener, warranties and service contracts, and title and closing documents related to the property. which is :more particularly described as:

.52 acre Nancy Glass Survey, Abstract No. 073. A-43 (aka Lot 08, E Pt. City Block 48 per CCAD), City of Pittsburg, Camp Comty, Texas

Being a lot, tract, or parcel of land situated in the Nancy Glass Survey, Abstract No. 073, Camp County, Texas, and being all of that certain trnct of land conveyed from Zeliah Heath et vir to Dr. Manuel Guerra. by Wananty deed, as recorded in Volume 141, page 342, Deed Records, Camp CoWlty, Texas, and being more particularly described .bY metes and bounps as ~~; : I

i BEGINNING at a 60d nail set in asphalt at the Northeast comer of the remainder of a called 0.623 acre tract conveyed to Carolyn Ra~. by Warranty Deed, as recorded in Volume 041, page 106, Real Pr~perty Records, Camp CoWlty, Texas, said point being in the South line of! State Highway No. 11 (a.k.a. Quitman Street), from said point, a Ya inch i~n rod found, bears North 69 Degrees 03 Minutes 27 Seconds West, a dis~e of IMMO 'B!IUick Final Decrae of Divorce 'Page 7 Oct .. 24. ~012 9:22AM Barrett & Coble No. 0865 P. 13 Oct._24. 2012 9:25AM Barrett & Coble No. 0865 · P. 26 • ,Oc!./4. 2012 9:27AM Barrett & Coble No. 0865 P. 34 I! _. 9c~~· 2012 9:27AM Barrett & Coble No. 0665 • P. 35 the claim or demand.

Damages, as used in this provisioi~t includes any reasonable loss, cost, expense, I ' penalty, and other damage, including without limitation attorney's fees and other [costs

and expenses reasonably and necessarily inCUlTed in enforcing this indemnity. i IT IS ORDERED that the indemnifying party will reimburse the inde~ified

party. on demand, for any payment made by the in~~ified party at any time aftL the I entry of the divorce decree to satisfy any judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction

or in accordance with a bona tide compromise or settlement of claims, demands, or actions for any damages to which this indemnity relates.

Clarifying Orden

Without affecting the finality of this Final Decree ofDivorce, this Court expressly reserves the right to make orders necessary to clarify and enforce this decree.

RelkfNot Grated

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is denied. This is a final judgmen~ for which let execution and all writs and processes necessary to enforce this judgment issue. This judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties and is appealable.

• .0ct.... ~. 2012 9: 27AM Ba rr et t & Cobl e No. 0865 P. 36 _...oc~./4. 2012 9:27AM Barrett & Coble No. 0865 P. 37 ".P( (t" ~ Judgment Debtor is ORDERED to turnover to the Receiver1.vithin five (5) from Judgment Debtor's receipt of a copy of this Order: 1) the documents contained on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together with all documents and financial records which may be requested by the Receiver; 2) all checks, cash, securities (stocks and bonds), promissory notes, documents of title, and contracts owned by or in the name of Judgment Debtor. . r/' £AA~rl ,a- i f 0 +-~<:..~ Judgment Debtor is ORDERED to identify and tum over to the Receiver1tll interests of PJ. Judgment Debtor's in any business or venture and all agreements, stock certificates and other documents pertaining to the Judgment Debtor's ownership in the business or venture within five (5) days from Judgment Debtor's receipt of a copy of this order.

This Order constitutes a Charging Order under the Texas Business Organizations Code. This Order constitutes a lien upon the Judgment Debtor's partnership interest in a partnership and the Judgment Debtor's membership interest in a limited liability company. The Receiver has the right to receive any distribution to which the Judgment Debtor would be entitled from the Judgment

In the Matter ofthe Marriage of Blunck Order on Motion for Post-Judgment Receivership Page2 1 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 3 2 CAUSE NO. 11-1217

3 IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT ) 4 OF ) 428TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ) 5 TEDDE R. BLUNCK AND ) CATHY A. BLUNCK ) HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS 6 -------------------------------------------------------- 7 MASTER INDEX 8 FEBRUARY 9, 2015 9 -------------------------------------------------------- 10 On the 9th day of February, 2015, the 11 following proceedings came on to be heard in the above- 12 entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable William 13 Henry, judge presiding, held in San Marcos, Hays County, 14 Texas. 15 Proceedings reported by machine shorthand.

1 APPEARANCES

2 FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr. Karl E. Hays 3 LAW OFFICES OF KARL E. HAYS 2101 South IH-35, Suite 210 4 Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: 512-476-1911 5 State Bar No. 09307050

6 FOR THE RECEIVER: Mr. Leon Breeden 7 Attorney at Law 120 W. Hopkins St., Suite 102 8 San Marcos, TX 78666 Telephone: 512-396-2199 State Bar No. 02940750 1 VOLUME 2

2 RECEIVER'S MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, 3 AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER; RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S MOTION FOR 4 POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP

5 FEBRUARY 9, 2015 PAGE VOL. Reciever's Motion to Approve Final Report 6 of Receiver, For Payment of Reciever's Fees and Expenses, and to Discharge Reciever.... 6 2 7 Respondent's/Movant's Motion for 8 Post-Judgment Receivership................. 11 2

9 Court's Rulings.............................. 23 2

10 Adjournment.................................. 24 2

11 Court Reporter's Certificate................. 25 2

12 EXHIBIT INDEX RECEIVER'S NO. OFFERED ADMITTED VOL. 13 1 Receiver's File-stamped 6 6 2 Motion 14 RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S 15 NO. 1 Living Trust 15 16 2 16 2 Schedules 19 19 2 1 VOLUME 3

2 EXHIBIT INDEX

3 RECEIVER'S NO. OFFERED ADMITTED VOL. 1 Receiver's File-stamped 6 6 2 4 Motion

5 RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S NO. 1 Living Trust 15 16 2

2 Schedules 19 19 2

STATE OF TEXAS ) COUNTY OF HAYS)

I, Diana Vargas, Deputy Official Court Reporter in and for the 428th Judicial District Court of Hays County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcript of all portions of evidence and other proceedings, requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 11th day of March, 2015.

1 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 2 OF 3 2 CAUSE NO. 11-1217

3 IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT ) 4 OF ) 428TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ) 5 TEDDE R. BLUNCK AND ) CATHY A. BLUNCK ) HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS 6 -------------------------------------------------------- 7 RECEIVER'S MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, 8 FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER; 9 RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S MOTION FOR POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP 10 FEBRUARY 9, 2015 11 -------------------------------------------------------- 12 On the 9th day of February, 2015, the 13 following proceedings came on to be heard in the above- 14 entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable William 15 Henry, judge presiding, held in San Marcos, Hays County, 16 Texas. 17 Proceedings reported by machine shorthand.

1 APPEARANCES

2 FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr. Karl E. Hays 3 LAW OFFICES OF KARL E. HAYS 2101 South IH-35, Suite 210 4 Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: 512-476-1911 5 State Bar No. 09307050

6 FOR THE RECEIVER: Mr. Leon Breeden 7 Attorney at Law 120 W. Hopkins St., Suite 102 8 San Marcos, TX 78666 Telephone: 512-396-2199 State Bar No. 02940750 1 VOLUME 2

2 RECEIVER'S MOTION TO APPROVE FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, FOR PAYMENT OF RECEIVER'S FEES AND EXPENSES, 3 AND TO DISCHARGE RECEIVER; RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S MOTION FOR 4 POST-JUDGMENT RECEIVERSHIP

5 FEBRUARY 9, 2015 PAGE VOL. Reciever's Motion to Approve Final Report 6 of Receiver, For Payment of Reciever's Fees and Expenses, and to Discharge Reciever.... 6 2 7 Respondent's/Movant's Motion for 8 Post-Judgment Receivership................. 11 2

9 Court's Rulings.............................. 23 2

10 Adjournment.................................. 24 2

11 Court Reporter's Certificate................. 25 2

12 EXHIBIT INDEX RECEIVER'S NO. OFFERED ADMITTED VOL. 13 1 Receiver's File-stamped 6 6 2 Motion 14 RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S 15 NO. 1 Living Trust 15 16 2 16 2 Schedules 19 19 2 (Proceedings commencing at 9:00 a.m. in open court)

THE BAILIFF: Please rise. The 428th District Court is now in session, the Honorable Bill Henry presiding. God bless these United States of America, this great state of Texas, and this honorable court.

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. I'll call the docket, let me know whether or not you're ready and how much time you anticipate.

In the Matter of the Marriage of Blunck.

MR. HAYS: Mr. Breeden and I are here, Judge, and probably just 10 minutes of the court's time.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Other matters were before the court)

THE COURT: At this time we'll call Cause No. 11-1217. That's styled In the Matter of the Marriage of Tedde R. Blunck and Cathy A. Blunck.

Go ahead and make your announcements for the record.

MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, Leon Breeden as Receiver. And I filed the first pleading that was set for hearing this morning, which was my final report and request to be discharged.

And Mr. Hays has filed another pleading.

MR. HAYS: That's correct, Your Honor. Karl Hays on behalf of Cathy Blunck.

Subsequent to Mr. Breeden filing his motion, I have filed a motion for appointment of a receiver pursuant to the turnover statute, asking for Mr. Breeden, since he's now getting out of the case as the original Receiver, to be reappointed as a turnover receiver for purposes of collecting the judgment.

THE COURT: Is anyone here on behalf of Tedde R. Blunck? It is now ten after nine, 9:10; I hear no answer. Has counsel heard from him in any way, shape, or form?

MR. HAYS: Yes, your Honor. Well, I received two motions, Mr. Breeden only received one yesterday. Sometime in the afternoon Mr. Blunck faxed through an objection to my motion for appointment of a receiver and then also an objection to Mr. Breeden's --

I don't want to speak for Mr. Breeden, but he did not get the one that dealt with him. He only got the one that dealt with me. But that's it. No indication of whether Mr. Blunck intended to show up today or not. But that's the last that I've heard from him.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me take a look at his objections.

THE CLERK: They are in the computer.

MR. HAYS: I have the two. Those are my only copies, but you're more than welcome to go through them.

THE COURT: They were sent through on Sunday?

MR. BREEDEN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. HAYS: And I know Mr. Breeden has a response to his, and then I can briefly tell you the response to mine.

THE COURT: Okay. In order for the court to consider the issues related to the final report and payment of Receiver's fees, I'll go ahead and hear the report from Receiver at this time and I'll waive the reading of this.

MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, I would offer into evidence Receiver's Exhibit 1, which is a file- marked copy of my motion.

MR. HAYS: No objection.

THE COURT: Receiver's Exhibit No. 1 is admitted into evidence.

MR. BREEDEN: That, Your Honor, contains my written report and a description of my activities since the last hearing in this case in March of 2014. Nothing much happened at all because of Mr. Blunck's bankruptcy filing and his appeal. Until those were both disposed of -- and I received notice in early December from Mr. Hays that the appeal had been dismissed and a mandate had been issued and that he was going to be setting a hearing regarding the disposition of the three IRA accounts that I was in charge of. And as the court knows, he had a hearing with regard to that matter in December.

And the next day -- well, I drove to Dallas and picked up Ms. Blunck and we went up to Pittsburg and we went to each of the three banks; had a very difficult time with the first bank, convincing them of the proper manner of disposing of these accounts, took us about four hours to finally get them convinced that the appropriate way to do this was to set up an IRA account for Ms. Blunck and to simply transfer the account, or the proceeds, to her name under an IRA.

They initially proposed a couple of different methods of attempting to do this that would have cost her significantly with regards to tax dollars, to the federal government, and, in my opinion, would have destroyed the protective nature of the IRA itself.

So once we got the first bank on line, after conferring multiple times with their legal department and their IRA department, the second two were a little faster.

But the paperwork involved with doing this, Your Honor, quite frankly, astonished me. And the fact that the banks, at least one bank, CitiBank, surprisingly, the biggest one of all, had their system set up where any typographical error or missed answer to a question required reprinting the entire document- ation. And they accumulated several reams of incorrect sets of documents before we finally got it all corrected and printed out. And all of that is detailed in my report.

We arrived in Pittsburg at about 10:15 in the morning and we walked out of the last bank at a 5:30. If we had not gone on a Friday, we wouldn't have gotten it all done. We had not eaten all day, and then had a meal and then drove back. I left at four o'clock in the morning, I arrived back at my house at 12:30 in the morning.

Mr. Blunck apparently continues to object to my hourly rate of $300 an hour, which the court has previously approved, which I can assure the court is a reasonable fee for my services as an attorney with 31 years of experience and being board certified in consumer and commercial law. And that was very helpful and useful and necessary in dealing with these banks in regards to these accounts.

And had someone with my experience not been there, Ms. Blunck may very well have been put in a position of having the protective nature of IRAs destroyed, and possible tax implications that would have been very negative for her. So I don't have any problem with saying that $300 an hour for my time is a reasonable fee.

He also says a lot of my time is travel. Yeah, I had to get up there and get all this done, yeah. And I don't have any hesitation in asking for that either, primarily, Your Honor, on the basis that most receivers in any case are paid on a contingency basis. And when you look at the total of my fees on an hourly rate for all the work that I have done against a contingent fee, even at a low percentage of say 25 percent, my fees are still less than that. So I don't, again, have any problem with saying that all of my time was justified.

His assertion that anyone with a high school degree could have done this is simply laughable. And quite frankly, I was a bit surprised that I didn't run across Mr. Blunck or a constable or a sheriff's deputy given his comments at the last hearing that he was going to be seeking a restraining order against transferring the accounts.

So, Your Honor, I believe my fee is fully justified. And Ms. Blunck was with me and she's quite satisfied that I was necessary to get this done. And her attorney has signed off on the order and doesn't have an objection. And so I would ask the court to approve my fees. I believe they are very reasonable.

And had we not done this at the time that we did do it -- this lady has been waiting for a couple of years, more than that, to get any assets out of this divorce estate. And we accomplished in a day something that on her own just would not have been possible, not the way the banks were trying to structure this transaction.

So not only was my fee reasonable, but my services were very necessary, assuming that's the standard. Basically, I did as the court instructed me. In my mind, that's really the standard, that I do what I was instructed to do, which was to get those accounts transferred to her. And we got that accomplished.

MR. HAYS: And, Your Honor, I'd add two things to that. First, with respect to my client being happy about what happened, the order reflects that Ms. Blunck is going to actually front the fees, the remainder of the fees. That's because she is extremely happy with what happened. And, of course, the court is going to, in the order, reserves the right to reallocate those, hopefully against Mr. Blunck at some point.

The other thing I would mention to the court is the irony of Mr. Blunck's argument that Mr. Breeden had to travel long distance. He wouldn't have had to do that if Mr. Blunck hadn't violated the court order by basically stealing these funds and taking them and putting them in Pittsburg, Texas. Because if he had left them where they were at we wouldn't have had to have Mr. Breeden go up there and get these funds, to extricate them. The court has already held him in contempt for doing that.

And I just basically think that this is ridiculous that he would be alleging that a problem that he caused, that somehow Mr. Breeden shouldn't be paid for fixing it.

THE COURT: Let's change gears a little bit here. What's the issue behind Mr. Blunck's allegation that an appellate court has denied the respondent's request for attorney's fees? How does that play into it?

MR. HAYS: Your Honor, as is typical with what Mr. Blunck has done continuously in this case, and we sit there and we try to find nice words about attorneys misrepresenting things to the court and saying that they're being disingenuous. I will make no bones about the fact that I think Mr. Blunck is both dishonest and deceitful and violates at every turn the ethical rules that lawyers are supposed to abide by because he is not advising the court with the level of candor that he needs to.

First and foremost, we filed for sanctions in the court of appeals because Mr. Blunck filed a frivolous appeal. The court dismissed his appeal, but then said in the order: We're not going to issue sanctions.

That has nothing to do with this court's award of appellate fees, and Mr. Blunck knows that. But he is representing to the court that, Oh, well, the court of appeals said no. No, they turned down my motion, under the appellate rules, for sanctions.

In addition -- and this is why every time I get something from Mr. Blunck, it's upsetting because Mr. Blunck complained about lack of notice. And what he says is that, Well, you didn't attach a copy of the exhibit.

We told him we were not attaching a copy of the divorce decree. In fact, I have the fax cover sheet where we said, "Please note: Exhibit A, the final decree of the divorce, is not being faxed to you." Because half the time he doesn't put his e-mail address on there, so we don't know whether to serve him by e-mail, and wanted to make sure we had confirmation that he got this because he's the type of person that will say, You didn't e-mail it to me. We didn't fax it because the volume of the document and because you already have a copy.

So now he files something, saying, Well, I don't know what you're talking about. Which is completely dishonest. He knows about the decree of divorce, he knows what's in the decree, he's appealed from the decree of divorce.

And so the bottom line is, we also, under the statute, don't even have to attach a copy of it. I just did that because that's what I ordinarily do when I file these motions. I even attached a copy of the statute itself, just for the court's own benefit, so you would have both the copy of the turnover statute and a copy of the decree.

But this is at its most fundamental level an ex parte proceeding, clearly. And I'll just tell the court the most recent citation for that. And I can give the court a copy of this case. It's Cantu v. Seeman. It's a May, 2012, court of appeals opinion. It was petition denied from the First District, Houston Court of Appeals, where the exact same argument was raised about "I didn't get notice, I didn't get an opportunity to argue."

And the court specifically says: Due process does not require that a complainant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and had his day in court should, after judgment, have further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings.

You don't give them, really, notice of writ of execution being issued. They don't get a chance to challenge that.

THE COURT: Or garnishment.

MR. HAYS: Or garnishment or anything like that. And they mention there's no statutory requirement. So they overruled his objections. You can keep a copy of that case, Judge, I have additional ones.

So what we're asking for in this case, Your Honor, is we now have a situation where there is no longer an appeal -- because that's what Mr. Blunck's original argument was: You can't do anything under 9.007(c) of the Texas Family Code. That says while an appeal is pending you can't do anything to enforce a judgment -- or to enforce the property division.

Mr. Breeden was appointed originally just to hold on to this property, make sure nothing else happened to it. Now we want Mr. Breeden appointed because of his background, his being board certified in consumer law, to be able to go collect on the judgment.

The judgment is in the amount of $242,000 and some change. There's interest attached to that because this judgment was basically done in October of 2012. So we've got, you know, at least two, two and a half years' worth of interest on this judgment.

I'm marking as an exhibit, Your Honor, as Movant's 1, a copy of Mr. Blunck's living trust. It's been marked by the court reporter. I'll tender that to the court.

I'm asking the court to do two things. One, is first take judicial notice of the file and the decree of divorce.

THE COURT: The request is granted.

MR. HAYS: And that, in and of itself, reflects the property that was awarded to Ms. Blunck. And it is that property, various items of property that we're asking for the court to appoint a receiver to be able to recover.

I'm moving for the admission of Movant's 1, which is the Living Trust in which Mr. Blunck transferred all of his property. We believe that that -- well, that does establish in Mr. Blunck certain contractual rights. Those rights are not subject to regular execution; we can't go have the sheriff execute on those.

But a receiver steps into the shoes of Mr. Blunck and can exercise the rights that are granted to Mr. Blunck under that agreement, under that trust agreement. And so that's why we need to have a receiver, because essentially the receiver is going to step into Mr. Blunck's shoes with respect to that living trust and be able to exercise Mr. Blunck's rights that he would have under the living trust.

THE COURT: Any objection to Movant's Exhibit No. 1?

MR. BREEDEN: I'm just standing here, Your Honor. I'm not a party.

MR. HAYS: He's not here yet.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. HAYS: He's not here yet, until you sign an order.

THE COURT: There being no objection, Movant's Exhibit No. 1 is admitted into evidence.

MR. HAYS: And I'll tender the court a copy of our proposed order on that, Your Honor. And it basically gives -- number one, it sets the same fee the court has previously recognized as a reasonable fee for Mr. Breeden.

Mr. Breeden and I discussed this and he felt that -- and I believe this to be true -- that it's fairer to do it on an hourly basis than a contingent fee basis. It certainly benefits my client to do that considering there's about $242,000. I appreciate Mr. Breeden not doing this on a contingent basis because the reasonable fee for that is a quarter, 25 percent. And certainly I believe his hourly rate is going to be much less than that. That's what it was in connection with the original receivership.

So we asking $300 an hour for Mr. Breeden. We are asking because the statute -- there's a difference between the Turnover Statute and the provisions for receiver under the other provisions of the law. Receivers routinely serve without bond. As a turnover receiver, we're asking that Mr. Breeden be allowed to do that.

He showed himself to be an exemplary receiver in the previous case, and so in this situation all he's going to be doing is executing on a judgment. I think there's very little chance of anything going wrong that we would need a bond for. So we're asking for it to be without bond.

And we're asking for certain rights to be afforded to him; namely, that property be turned over to him; that Mr. Blunck be required to turn over certain items to him. We don't believe that that's going to happen, but we still have it in the order, asking for that.

And with that, Your Honor, I'd simply ask that the court approve the receivership. This has been a long and arduous path to get to this point. My client sat for over two years without having any benefit -- she still hasn't gotten -- she can't transfer title, she can't sell her car, transfer title to any of the vehicles because he hasn't signed off on any of it. He hasn't done any of that. And she's basically been sitting without any of this property.

We finally got the 600,000 that she should have gotten two years ago to her. But this is the end of the road for Mr. Blunck. And we need to start collecting on this judgment.

Your Honor, I have one additional thing that I wanted to provide to the court. I have marked as Movant's 2 -- Mr. Breeden already mentioned this and the court knows it. Mr. Blunck declared bankruptcy. And as the court knows, you specifically asked the bankruptcy court for permission to be able to go against Mr. Blunck, and the bankruptcy court has granted you that permission.

They have also -- these particular debts are outside of the bankruptcy. There's a court order that says specifically we can collect these. He's in a Chapter 13 plan. These reason why I'm presenting -- these are the schedules that Mr. Blunck submitted. And in those schedules Mr. Blunck represented to the bankruptcy court that he had exempt property, in addition to what we showed you with the trust and the contract rights that can be executed pursuant to the turnover order.

There is also exempt properties in terms that there's a number of firearms that he lists in here as being exempt property. There's equity interest in properties. And I would tender that to the court and move for its admission because it's a representation by him that he had over $200,000 of nonexempt property that he is still in possession of, that we want. Because if it's over $200,000, it will go a long way toward settling this judgment of 242,000.

THE COURT: Movant's Exhibit No. 2 is admitted into evidence.

I want to go through the basics of receivership a bit here. Prior to this, the court appointed Mr. Breeden to hold and protect the property; is that basically --

MR. HAYS: Correct.

THE COURT: Now you're asking the court to appoint him on behalf of a party to collect, and as a subset of that to -- for lack of a better word, step into the shoes of Mr. Blunck as Mr. Blunck's fiduciary responsibility to the trust?

MR. HAYS: Correct. I'll be candid with the court. Mr. Blunck attempted to avoid the application of any of our efforts to collect by transferring. He has transferred all of his property into the living trust. He represented to the court of appeals that was his poor man's attempt to a supersedeas bond. That ended backfiring on him because the court of appeals said, You transferred it to a third-party, therefore you've accepted the benefits under the judgment by that transfer; your appeal is dismissed.

Under the trust agreement, Mr. Blunck has the right to revoke that trust. Also under the trust agreement, Mr. Blunck has the right to appoint a substitute trustee. Whomever is appointed as receiver will step into Mr. Blunck's shoes and have the right to either revoke the trust or appoint a substitute trustee to transfer property.

It is clearly in there that Mr. Blunck right now can tell his trustee "Do this with the property." He maintains full control over it. So those rights, those contract rights, the turnover order would authorize the receiver to execute those contract rights because those are rights that are subject to basically being -- they're subject to a receiver taking control of under the turnover order. They're not readily leviable because you can't have the sheriff go out and do that. And so that's why we're asking the receiver to do that.

I fully believe that Mr. Breeden will then either cause a new trustee to be appointed and have that trustee transfer property pursuant to his request, or he's going revoke the trust. One of the two. And that primarily is the focus of our turnover proceeding.

Originally, we tried the turnover, we filed for a turnover, but Mr. Blunck said, Wait a minute, under the Family Code, 9.007(c) says you can't do that. And there's a specific case. They did a turnover order and the court of appeals said you can't do that because you're attempting to enforce the judgment, and while there's an appeal you can't enforce the judgment.

So we were stymied. The most we could do is just have it held so that Mr. Blunck didn't run out and put it in a bank in South Africa or do something else with it. And so the court just basically said, We're holding all of, you know -- and we agreed. We even said that Mr. Breeden didn't have to invest it or do anything with it. He just basically was going to hold title to it. And we were perfectly fine with that because we just didn't want Mr. Blunck to do anything with it.

But now all the appeals have been discharged. There's nothing else he can do, at all, to try and prevent the collection, as far as we see. And so now we're moving to start to collect the judgment because we're entitled to do it. And my client is entitled to get -- you granted her $240,000 worth of judgments to equalize the division of the estate. Some of it is attorneys' fees. I think over sixty grand of it is attorney's fees to Mr. Barrett.

Thankfully, Ms. Blunck has paid part of my attorney's fees out of the money she got. She also had paid Mr. Breeden some, but not all, of his fees. She still owes him I think the 7,000 or 7,500 that the court awarded today.

But she needs to be able to collect this and move on and kind of put a little bow on this and bring closure to it.

THE COURT: The concept of having the same person be receiver under both hats is not an issue, is it? Because, conceivably, Mr. Breeden was representing the court in the prior situation and would be representing a party. So there's no conflict there, is there?

MR. HAYS: No, sir. And he is actually still also an arm of the court in terms -- because it's an executive function that he's going to be performing. And I actually think it is better to have the continuity there because he's familiar with this situation, as opposed to someone who would be coming in brand new, who wouldn't be familiar.

I mean, he's been through a lot of dealings with Mr. Blunck so far. And although he's not going to have to deal with the same institutions again -- I mean, he has been up to Pittsburg. And if there is an issue, I think the way that he handled the banks previously, he did a good job.

THE COURT: The final report from Receiver is approved, the motion to pay the fees in the amount of $7,800 is approved. Mr. Breeden is appointed as the Receiver. That order is signed; that is, the Receiver related to the collection under the living will -- living trust, excuse me.

MR. HAYS: Your Honor, the court reporter is telling me you may not have officially admitted my Exhibit 2.

THE COURT: Movant's Exhibit 2 is admitted. It's my understanding that was officially admitted.

And the amount of $300 per hour is approved as being probably under the fair market value of what receivers are paid in these types of matters.

Anything else?

MR. HAYS: No, sir.

MR. BREEDEN: Your Honor, I'm going to be signing up as Receiver, and he's ordered to produce stuff at my office, is my understanding. I haven't seen the latest version of the order. I mean --

(Sotto voce discussion between counsel)

MR. HAYS: May we be excused?

THE COURT: You bet.

(Proceedings adjourned)

STATE OF TEXAS ) COUNTY OF HAYS)

I, Diana Vargas, Deputy Official Court Reporter in and for the 428th Judicial District Court of Hays County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcript of all portions of evidence and other proceedings, requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record, in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 11th day of March, 2015.

1 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 3 OF 3 2 CAUSE NO. 11-1217

3 IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT ) 4 OF ) 428TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ) 5 TEDDE R. BLUNCK AND ) CATHY A. BLUNCK ) HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS 6 ________________________________________________________ 7 EXHIBITS ________________________________________________________

I, Diana Vargas, Deputy Official Court Reporter in and for the 428th Judicial District Court of Hays County, Texas, do hereby certify that the following exhibits constitute true and complete duplicates of the original exhibits, excluding physical evidence, offered into evidence during the proceedings in the above- entitled and numbered cause as set out herein before the Honorable William Henry, judge presiding, on February 9th, 2015.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is $360.95 and was paid/will be paid by Petitioner Tedde R. Blunck.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 11th day of February, 1 2015.

3 /s/ Diana Vargas Diana Vargas, Texas CSR 5872 4 Expiration Date: 12/31/16 P.O. Box 404 5 Schertz, TX 78154 Telephone: 210-827-4164 1 VOLUME 3

2 EXHIBIT INDEX

3 RECEIVER'S NO. OFFERED ADMITTED VOL. 1 Receiver's File-stamped 6 6 2 4 Motion

5 RESPONDENT'S/MOVANT'S NO. 1 Living Trust 15 16 2

2 Schedules 19 19 2 Page 134 of 207

3. On December 11, 2014, Mr. Hays called me and advised that he had received the mandate from the Court of Appeals tinalizing the dismissal of Mr. Blunck's appeal and that he planned to file a motion requesting that I be discharged as receiver and that the 3 IRA accounts in the banks in Pittsburg, Texas be transferred to Cathy Blunck. I advised Mr. Hays that based on my knowledge of how banks operate that I felt strongly that no matter how his motion and order were actually worded that the banks would require some kind of signature from both Ms. Blunck and me in order to process transferring the accounts to her name and that it would be best, in my opinion, for the court to order me to transfer the accounts to Ms. Blunck rather than having me discharged and the order directing the non-party banks to transfer the accounts to Ms. Blunck. Mr. Hays agreed with my position on how the order should be worded and advised that he would file the motion the next day and request a hearing the following week.

4. On December 12, 2014, I received and reviewed the Motion to Release and Transfer Property in Possession of Receiver and to Authorize Receiver to Submit Final Report. I then sent an email to each of the 3 banks advising them that a hearing was scheduled for the following week and that I anticipated that the Court would be ordering the accounts to be transferred to Ms. Blunck.

5. On December 18, 2014, I appeared at the hearing on Cathy Blunck's Motion to Release and Transfer Property in Possession of Receiver tmd to Authorize Receiver to Submit Final Report. After hearing, the Court signed an order granting that motion and directing me to transfer the 3 IRA accounts in various banks in Pittsburg, Texas to Ms. Blunck. I had previously advised Mr. Hays, and advised the Court at the hearing, that I was available to go with Ms. Blunck to Pittsburg, Texas the next day, Friday, December 19, to try to get all of the accounts Page 135 of 207 transferred to Ms. Blunck as quickly as possible.

At the conclusion of the hearing I contacted the district clerk in Pittsburg to inquire about a suit which Mr. Blunck advised during the hearing that he had filed in District Court in Camp County and in which he anticipated seeking a temporary restraining against me transferring the accounts to Ms. Blunck. The clerk sent me a copy of the petition which had been filed on December 17 in Cause No. CV -14-2462 styled "Paulette M. Blunck, as Trustee of the Ted de R. Blunck Living Trust v. Cathy A. Blunck." The original petition is styled ''Plaintiffs Original Petition for Breach of Contract." The petition was signed by Tedde R. Blunck as attorney for Paulette M. Blunck, as Trustee of the Tedde R. Blunck Living Trust." TI1ere was no allegation in the petition relating to the receivership in this case nor is there a request for issuance of a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction or pem1anent injunction. After consultation with Ms. Blunck and Mr. Hays it was decided that Ms. Blunck and I would still go to Pittsburg the next day and that in the event any type of injunction was issued and served on me or Ms. Blunck that I would try to deal with the situation in person. I then advised the Court of the situation and that in the event anyihing was served upon me the next day I might need to contact the Court.

6. On December 19, 2014, I left my house promptly at 4:00a.m. to begin the drive to Pittsburg, Texas. Ms. Blunck had agreed to meet me at a shopping center right on 1-35 in Desoto, Texas, so I could pick her up there and we could drive from there to Pittsburg with minimal delay. I anticipated being able to make good time through use of state highway 130 to Georgetown, Texas, and thereafter because of the early hour. Unfortunately I encountered heavy rainstorms from just north of Georgetown to just north of Waco, with speeds reduced to a

.., J Page 137 of 207 Pittsburg. The bank president I had dealt with before was present and after quick conferences with his departments, we got the paperwork started there. We then went back to Capital One and finished up and then back to First National to do the same. We walked out of First National Bank right at 5:30p.m. Had we not gone on a Friday when bank hours are extended tmtil 6:00p.m. there is no way we could have finished all3 accounts.

When we left First National Bank of Pittsburg, the 3 IRA accounts had been transferred to Ms. Blunck in an aggregate amount of approximately $656,616.01.

We then went to dinner, not having had a meal all day. We left Pittsburg at approximately 6:30 p.m. Ms. Blunck drove back to DeSoto so I could get some sleep before my drive back home. We arrived in DeSoto at approximately 8:20. I then drove back to San Marcos and arrived home at 12:30 a.m. Total distance traveled was 765 miles.

Page 139 of 207

WHEREFORE, I request that the Court approve my final report, approve payment of my fees, and discharge me from my role as Receiver in this case.

Respectfully submitted, ~£? x2: ,., ~J~~~ LEON BREEDEN . 120 W. Hopkins, Suite 102 San Marcos, Texas 78666 Tel: 512-396-2199 Fax: 512-754-7163 leonifvJeonbreeden.com State Bar No. 02940750 Receiver

Certificate of Service

I certify that a true copy of this document was served on each attorney of record or party in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on January j ']/ , 2014.

~~€Ze#L Leon Breeden, Rece1ver Page 140 of 207

MOVANT'S EXHIBIT 1

02-09-15

Page 141 of 207 \lOt 3 34 PAGE 601 TUJS AGBEM£NT.•OF TRUST is made and·eKecu:ted at Pittsburg~ Calllp County. 1'e:&as. on this the t;t;4-~day of December. 2012, by and between T¢dde R. Blun~ hereinafter tefen:ed to as '1 Settlor~'1 and Pap:lette M. B.lu,nck, hereinafter referred to as 1'Trustee," ofthis trust known as tbe Te<Jde It Blunck .Uvmg Trust. WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, ·the SettlOr wisheS to ·eStablish a. revocable .trust by tratmerting the ·assets 9es~hed un··the attadled Sthedule A to the Trustee to bold an4 a:dmlnister upon the tenns and . . ... · cqn{lit\onssmforth in this Tm$t Agreement; and '\Y:Hlrt~AS•. $~m cqnte~npktttm that be·ruay} by inter vivos. document, transfer other a$sets and pro~ to the Ttustee. t<> be added to the trust estate; and WHEREAS. ®. Trtl$tee is Wilting ro hold and adntinister sucll pl'<}perty as she may ~ive.upcJn·the~s~ <»ttdfuQUS setfOrth mthls Trust Agretmem;. NOW~ 1~POJ't~ in comidetdort of the ·mutual covenants herein contained,. •me AltTlCLEI~ Ta~·lftate Settlor ha$ conveyed. transferred, and assigned and does by these presents convey, .. . n¢retcr and macie a part. ~f. Such assets and properties shall be heJd, administered. and ·~nuted as a r.e\•ooabte,. amendab1e trust. subject to the· provisions hereof, fnr the ·uses and purposes hereinafter set out. Settlor or any other person <1r peroons may by a written document Paget of32 Page 142 of 207 <}"34. ~)' '-.- PAGE .. or by ,a \VilJ~ or by naming the Trustee as beneficiary of life insurance or employee benefit plan proceeds, deliver to the Trustee at any time and from time to time additional assets and properties acceptable to the Trustee, which additional assets and properties shaH be held, admmistered, and distributed pursuant to this Trust Agreement; The Settlor shall have the right to use and occupy residential property owned by the trust created hereundet as the Settlor's principal residence rent free and without charge until the death of the Settlor or until this Trust Agreement is revoked or terminated, whichever occurs first~ Further, any such property {or any interest therein) shall b~ acqtlired by an instrument of title that describes the property with sufficient certainty to identify itand the interest acquired, and the instrument shallbe recorded in the real property records of the county in which the property is located, This s~ction shall be ¢0nstrued in accordance with the Setdor's imentions to ·qualify such property· as the Settlor's residential homestead for ad valorem tax purposes by causing the trust which owns such properly to be a "qualifYing trust" as defined and .described in Section ll. 13G) of the Texas Tax Code. This intention shall be overriding and shall control if it conflicts with the literal language ofthis section." ARTICLE II. Identification ofBeneticiarles The. prim(lry beneficiary ofthis trust is the Settlor~ TeddeR. Blunck. ARTICLE III. Revocability of Trust This truSt is revocable during Settlor's life. Settlor shall have the power and right to amend, modify or revoke. in whole or in part, this agreement or any terms or ptovisions thereof bynotic.e in '\<\'titingdelivered to the Truste-e. Such anwndment, modification or revocation shall Page 143 of 207 334 PAGE 603 be effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee, except that changes \\1th respect to the Ttusteeis duties. liabilities or compensation shall not be effective without the Trustee's written consent. Settlor shall further have the power and· right to require and direct the Trustee to distribute to Settlor or to any other person designated by Settlor any property or properties held by the Trustee. hereunder. ARTICLE IV. Distributions Whik Settlor IS Living . lf during the life of Settlor there shail be transferred to the Trustee~ to be held in accordance with the tenns of this Ttust Agreement, investment or income-producing assets, then · so lmtg tlS Settlqr shall live, there shall be distrib;nted to. or for the bel)efit of Settlor so much of the trust income and corpt:ISas Settlor shall from time to time direct in wdting. Initially and until further wdtten notice from Settlor to the Trustee, the Trustee shall distribute to Settlor the net ·.. trUst ineom¢; In the event of the .incapacity of Settlor, ·then·notwithstanding any prior written instructions to the contrary, the Trustee may distribute to or for the ben.efit of Settlor so much of the truSt:· income and corpus as the Trustee shall detemtine, in· her sole discretion, to be necessary · . and appropriatetoprovide forthe health; maintenanceandsupport·ofSettlor, Any·incomeuot so distributed shall be added to cdrplls. The Trustee shalt for the purpose ofthis Article fV. be the sole. judge. qf Settlor's incapacity; no judicial· detern1ination shall be required and the Trustee . . ·shall incur.u.·. ·o liability to·any person whomsoever for making distributions to or for the benefit of . . . Settlor~ upO.n tb:e Trustee's determination ofSettlor's· incapacity. ARTICLEV. DiSJ)OSJtion Upon Death. of Settlor Upon the .death of the Settlor, the Trust Agreement shall be tem1inated and the Trust Page 144 of 207 3 34 PA&E 60 11 dissolved and the entire trust estate shall be distributed; su~ject to the following provisions. conditions and limitations, outright and FREE FROM TRUST to the heirs as stated in the Settlor~$ Last.Will and Testament If Settlor does not have a Last WiH and Testament, the entire trust estate shall he distributed outright and FREE OF TRUST to the heirs~at-law of Settlor. The identity and respective shares of such heirs {as hereinafter defined in Article XI) shall be detennined in all respects as if the death ofthe Settlor had occurred immediately follo\ving the happening. of the event requiring such di~'tribution, and according to the laws of the State of .Texas thenitl force governing the distribution ofthe estate of an intestate . . ARTICLE VI. (lene~al Provisions. Relatitig·.toTrust All uf the provisions ofthis Article VI ate applicable to alttrusts and shares create-d by this Trust Agreement. A . Succession of Trustees~ The initial Trustee of the trust created by this Trust . Agteerl1ent sh(;l}l be Paulette M. Bltmck. lf Paulette M. Blunck should fail or cease to serve as ;'fruste¢ for any reason, then Pauline L. Murphy shall serve as successor Trustee. If both Paulette M. Bll.liick and Pauline L.. Murphy should fail or cease to serve as Trustee for any reason, then a . !fllccessor Trustee·shall ~·appointed in the n1anner and with the qualifications pursuant to the· tenn$ of this Trust Agreement set forth in the paragraph .below entitled ''APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESS,OR TRUSTEES''; B. Removal of TrtL<ttees. The Settlor (including the lei:,ral gUardian or legal representative of Settlor in the case that Settlor is under legal disability) shall have the power to .. tetl1ovcany.trustee and any successor trustees then serving and to appoint a successor trustee. If a trustee is removed, such trustee must be t•eplaced by another trustee in the manner and with the Page 145 of 207 PAGE 605 qualifications pursuant to the terms of this Trust Agreement set forth in the paragraph below entitled"APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES;', Such removal shall be by a written ·doetnnent~ duly·· executed and acknowledged by the removing parties· and by the successor trustee, and shall be filed in the Real Property Records of Camp County, Texas. The successor trustee shall promptly deliver a copy of such recorded document to the trustee being removed and then serving and the delivery of such recorded document shall immediately deprive the ·· .removed trustee of all powers .as trustee hereunder. No purchaser from or other person dealing with any trustee is obligated to examine the County records and any such person shall be .prote<:ted in all·transactions with any trustee, whether· or not any such replacement has taken plac.e~ C. Resignation of Trustees. Any Tn1stee is authorized to resign by filing a written · dooument, duly executed and acknowledged by the resigning. trustee, of record in the Real Property ReCords of Camp County •. Texas. which flUng shall immediately deprive the Trustee of aU powers as Trustee hereunder; provided1 nevertheles~, that at least thirty (30) days prior to filing such document. the. resigning. Trustee shall give written notice thereof to the Settlor (including the legal guardian or legal representative of Settlor; in the case that the Settlor is under ·· .legatdisability). D. Appointment of Successor Trustees. If any trustee appointed or serving pursuant to tbis Trust Agreement should fail or cea.se to serve as trustee for any reason and no trustee has ·been named h1 this document to serve as successor,·o:r ifau·successortrustees named.hereiu have failed or cease<ti to serve for ariy reason, thet1 the Settlor (including the legal guardian or legal representative of a Settlor in the case that Settlor is tmder legal disability) shall have the power to appoint,.as successor trustee, any national or state bank or trust company possessing trust powers '"' ''""'''''''"'-'•~~- '·,-·• '' < ''·'- ·~•••·-· -~~~-~--·- ' • > V' o A'~' • ''M-••·---~----~"''~~~>='•• M<-•••••••~ ....... -~----·• Page 5of32 Page 146 of 207 334 PAGE 606 and. having a capital, surplus and undivided profits of at least Twenty Million Dollars, or any individualregardlessofdomicUe. Such appointment shall be made by a written document, duly executed and acknowledged by the appointing parties. and by the successor trustee being apppinted, and shall be. filed for record' in the .Real Property Records of Camp County, Texas. If a successor trustee is not appointed as hereinabove provided, then a court of competent junsdiction shall be requested to appoint a successor trustee '-\-ith the qualifications set forth above. andthe costs associm~d with such a court proceeding shall be paid from the trust or trusts fur which the suecessor trustee is appointed. E. Rel~nguishment. of Powers. Any ·trustee may release or· relinquish any one or more of any powers, rights. or privileges which, in the trustee's judgment. unless released or relinquisbed,Jnight resultin adverse Consequences to the intst estate ot' any beneficiary because ofchanges in law or interpretation of the law. Any such release or relinquishment shall be made by a ~itten document, duly executed and acknowledged by said trustee, and shall be filed for record in the Real Property Records of Camp Count)'~ Texas. After any power has been so rel~ed ()f'Telinquishec!~ it shall never again be exercised by such trustee. F. Compensatio11 and J3ond. Any trustee serving hereunder shall be reimbursed for any and all expenses incurred while acting as trustee of the trust created pursuant to the provisions: hereof, and in addition any corporate trustee shall receive fair and reasonable cornpensatio!l· for services as .tn.tstee in·· accordance with the corporate trustee's regular fee schedules as published from time to time. No trustee serving hereunder shall be required to furnish bond or any other. security~ aild all rights, powers~ authorities; privileges and discretions herein coliferred up()n any trustee· aLtthorized to serve hereunder shall be· exercised without the su~rvision of any court, it being intended that so far as. cart he legally provided the trustee Page 147 of 207 PAGE 607 serving shall be completely free of all court supervision of any kind, including the requirements of any accounting; provided, however, that the then serving trustee shall furnish an accounting to any bene-ficiary or guardian of any benet'iciary ttpon reasonable demand made therefor . .G. Powers and Duties of Successor Trustees.. .On the appointment and qualification of any successor trustee, the same duties shall devolve on and the sanle rights, powers. authorities, privileges; and discretions shall inure to such successor trustee as to the Trustee . ori~inally designated h.eteunder. AU rights, powers, authorities, privileges and discretions shall be exercised without the supervision of any court. No successor trustee shall have any duty, responsibility, obligatiotr or liability whatsoever for the ·acts, defaults or omissions of any predecessor truste.e. Any successor·trustee nanled herein shall be responsible only for the assets d~livered by the preeerung tr:ustee, or his or her legal representative, and may accept as correct the statements of such predecessor, or his or her legal representative, that these constitute all of the assets of the trust estate, without any duty to in,quire into the administration or accounting by the preceding trustee. No successor trustee shall beheld responsible for.at)d by.reason of any act oroinission ofa pred.ece'ssor in trust H. Reorgm1i1.ation of anv Corporate Trustee. Any corporation or national or state banking association that shall succeed to ali or the greater part of the asset') of any corporate :. .. . . . . ·. · trustee $ervit\ghereunder by purchasei merger, consolidation, or otherwise, shall succeed to all the rights. duties, andftuictions ofsuch corporate trustee as trustee under all trusts governed by this TrustAgreement for which the corporate trustee is then serving or may serve as trustee. ARTICLE VII. .9eneral Provisions Relating .to the Trust A. Situs. of Trust. The trusts created herein shaU·be deemed Texas•trusts and shall, in Page 148 of 207 aU re$pects, be governed by the laws of the State of Texas. However, if the Trustee. in the Trl.lStee's sole discretion~ detennines that a change of situs would be beneficial to the purposes of any separate trust established by this Trust Agreement, the Trustee shall have the discretion and authority to change the situs of any such trust to another state. f'onnal notice of any change of ·situs :rp.ay be given by filing of record a ""Titten declaration in the Real Property Records of Camp C<nmty, Texas. If the situs.. of any such trust· is changed to another state, ·then the trust shaH, in all respects, be governed by the laws ·of the state which is the m:w situs. No such change of sitUs sball be authorized herein, however, which would resultin a termination ofthe trust for federal tax purposes. B. Sm.all Trust Provision. Any ptovision of this Trust Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, any trusteet oth.er thart a beneficiary hereof, shall have the discretionary power to terminate any separate trust created by this Trust Agreement whenever the continued manag~ent tllereofis no longer economical because of the small size of such trust. taking into .. consideration fmancial or other special advantages to the beneficiary or beneficiaries of co,ntilluhtg the trust estate. Upon the termination of any ttust.estate, the then remaining corpus cmd U1ldistributed jnc<>me shall be distributed outright and free of tn\St to tne Settlor, if living; otherwise to the beneficiaries thereof, or to a custodian named for a beneficiary urtder a Unifonn Transfers to Minors Act, or to the beneficiaries' legal representatives in proportion to their respective presu:t:nptive interests in the trust or share at the time ofsuch terr;uinatimi. Upon such ... distribution an(t.delivery, the sai4 ·trustor share shall terttiinate and the Trustee then serving shall . . not be liable or responsible to any person or persons whomsoever for so acting. The Trustee then serving shall not be liable for fai1irtg or refusing at any time to tenninate the trust or a share thereofas: authorized by this paragraph. Page 8 of3l Page 149 of 207 ~$ 34 PAGE 60!) C. ,Merger of Trusts. If any time the Trustee of any trust created pursuant to this ' ' TmstAgreementshall also be acting as Trustee of any other trust created hereby, or by a Will for the benefit of the same beneficiary or beneficiaries upon substantially the same terms and , (X)nditiow., the then serving Trustee is authorized and empowered, if in such IhiStee's discretion suchaction is in the best irrterestofthe beneficiary or beneficiaries of the trust created hereunder, to transfer and merge aU of tbe assets then held tmder such trust created pursuant to this Trust Agreemen~ to and with such ,other trust and there'\lpon:and thereby to terminate the trust created ,hereby; Sll<:'>h trustee is further authorized to accept the assets of the other trust which may be, , ,transfetre&to such trustee of the trust created hereunder and to administer and distribute such ,assets and properties so transferred in accordance with the provisions of this Trust Agreement. If the componenttrusts ditfer as to contijlgent beneficiaries and the contingency· occurs, the funds ·. may be diStributed in s.uch shares as the trustee~ in the Trustee's sole discretion. shall deem · necessary to create a fair ratio between the various sets of remaindermen. If any trust created in this Trust Agreement is merged with any trust created under any other document, such merged trust·. shall not continue lrey()nd the date. on which . the wliest rnaximurn tenn of the trusts . so .. merged would, without regard to such merger, have been requited to expire. Settlor further directs tha4 as to any property belonging to any trust estate at any time (inch.iding a merged trost) . . as to wh:icb under the laws of any state applicable to said property that trust is required to be terminated ~t any time prior to its nonnal termination date. the ttust as to that particular property .shall terminate at the time required by the laws of said. state. '.. .·p'rovts1on. ,Perpetmties .. Notwithstanding any other provisio11s of tllis Trust ····Agreement to the c<)ntr~y. any· trust herein .created, if· it has not previotisly terminated. shall terminate tWenty-one (21) years after the death of the lastto survive of the Settlor and all the Page 150 of 207 ,, ' ~Ut l) t_) ·4· 0 •) . nar:r fAu:;., s. .1'. ·o· lineal descendants of the Settlor living on the date of this Trust Agreement. Upon such tertnination~ the remaining assets and property of the tntst shall be delivered and distributed, .outright ~d free of trust. to the person or persons to. whom the. income of the particular trust may be distributed at that time. If the income of a particular trust may be distributed to more than one Pt'l':Son at that tim.~~ the then serving Trustee shall· divide the assets and properties between such persons in such proportioJ1S between them as said Trustee shall determine, in the Trustee's sole ·dlscretion,.to bt;st calTY out the Settlor's intentions. as expressed in this docuniellt. R ·Spendthrift ·Provision. No beneficiary shall have the right or power to anticipate, bY assigntttent or otherwise; any income or corpus given to such beneficiary or any portion thereof;.· nor~ in advance of actually receiving the same, shall any beneficiary have the right or power t{) sell. transfer, encumber or in anywise charge same; nor shall such inc-ome ot corpus. or any portion of s!Wle, be subject to any divorce, exectition, garnishment, attachment, insolvency, !:>ankruptqy or other Jegal proceeding of a1ry character, ot legal sequestration, levy or sale or in · any event or trullll1er be applicable or subject; voluntarily or involuntarily, to the payment of such ARTICLEVUI. Powersoftbe.'trustee The Trustee shall have and may exercise the foUowing rights, powers .and privileges with tespecno each trust created by this insttwnent, unless specifiealJy limited l:>y other provisions of this itistl'Ulllent: A. ·n• ·· .tstti·b··· uttons. ·• The Trustee shall have full powet and authority to make all p~itions. divisions and distributioits con~mplated by any of the provisions of this instrument. Any partitions, divisions or distributions may be tnade by allocating assets and property Page 151 of 207 L 334 PAG£ 611 proportionately in kind or by allocating undivided interests therein in kind. Any partition, division, or distribution made by the Trustee in good faith shall be binding and conclusive on all interested parties. .In the event that a beneficiary shall, in t.he opinion of the Trustee, be . . incapacitated by reason ofage,.illness, or any other cause at the time of a particular distribution, the.'frustee may apply the distribution for the benefit of such beneficiary in any manner that the Trustee may deem advisable, whether by payment of such beneficiary's expenses or to any such beneficiary, thelegat or natural guardian, the person having custOdy of such,beneficiary or any · other person deen1ed suitable by Jhe Trustee, Should any property be distributable hereunder to a minor person, the Trustee may make the distribution to a custodian for such person under the 'lJnifonl;l Transfers to Minors Act ofTexas or any other state. R Consewatiop, of Trust •Properties. The Trustee may hold~ manage and ~onserve ·····any an~ .all pr()perties transferred·. to the trust and may take any action that the Trustee .·may deem .necessary or appropriate, including the ·exercise of all rights .and powers that a prudent owner would exercise in managing and conserving properties of a like kind. C; wvestm¢ntin Secgritigs.. The Trustee may buy. sell or trade any security ofany mtmre(inclt:.t.ding stocks, . stock tights, warrants, bonds, debe11tures~ notes, certificates of interest, certificates of indebtedness and. options) or any other things· of value issued by any person, firm, ... association, trust. corporation or body politic whatsoever. D. · Securiti~ and Margin .Acc,ounts. The Trustee may buy. sell .and· trade in ·securities of any nature, including covered and uncovered options on margin and, for such purposes.. may maintain and operate margin accounts with brokers and may pledge any securities with broker$ as security for loans and advances made to the Truste.e. E. Investment in .Real Estate and Personal Property. The Trustee may, at such cost Page 152 of 207 334 PA6E 612 and llPOn S\lCh tem1s as the Trustee may deem advisable, purchase or otherwise acquire real estate and personal property of any kind and hold, manage i:lfid, conserve the same in whatever manner :the Trustee may deem best; lease such property under a lease or leases to commence at ·onceor in the future and for any period of time, even though such period may extend beyond the duration ofthe trust; renew and extend leases; partition, exchangt,\ release, convey or assign any dght, title or intetest of the trust in any real estate or personal property owned by the trust~ plat r{:al estat~ at1d lay outa11d dedicate streets; alleys and ways; and improve and erect. buildings on . . .. ~Y reaLproperty {in addition to or substitution for buildings at any time existing thereon). F. .Investment ill Oil. Gas· and Other Mineral Interests. The Trustee may purchase. or otherwise a.oquite oil~ gas ·and other mineral interests;, leases, royalties;, overriding royalties, produ"-'tion payments, oil payments. gas payments, net profit overriding royalties, and net prof1t ·. interestS; :gr~t, .make and release oil, ga<i and other uuneralleases. subleases and farmouts; enter into development and drilling contracts; operating contracts and utilization agreements; make artangeritents<f'orpresent or future pooling of any interest in oil, gas or other mineral properties and for secon~ry recovery projects, and exercise with respect to any and all oil, gas and other rnineral properties all rights and powers that a prudent owner woutti have with respect to pro~rties of alike 'kind. G. ltwestment in Undivided Interests. The Trustee may, tor any trusts created under this in~n.ent~ jointly hol4, manage and invest in one or more assets, properties or consolidated ·funds; in· whole or in· part, as the· Trustee ·may determirt.e. . As to each a.,o;se~, property or consoli<iawd fund. division into the appropriate shares need be made only on the 1rustee1s books ·· of account, in which each trust shall be allotted its proportionate part of the principal and income ofthe! asset, prope,ny or fund and .charged with its proportionate part of the expenses thereof. No Page l2 of32 Page 153 of 207 PAGE 6-1 u *_). such ho1ding shalt however, defer the vesting in possession of any estate created by this instrument; R Investment in Partnerships. The Trustee may purchase or otherwise acquire an interest in any partnership conductingca lawful business, transfer trust property to any partnership which will cortduct or is conducting. any lawful business, or become either a general or limited partner or any such partnership. I. Power to Organize .or Continue Business. The Trustee may continue any business (Wllether a proprietorship, corporation; partnership; liinited partnership or other business. etiti ty) whichthe.tntstmayown.orin which it may be financially interested for such: time as the Trustee may deem to be in the bestintei-ests ofthe trust; employ in the conduct of any such business such ca;:pitat out of trust as th~ Trustee may deem pn)pet; borrow money for use in any such business alone or with other persons financially interested in such busil'less, and secure loans by a mortgage~ pledge or any other manner of encumbrance of not only the tn1st's property and ·. inte~st in such business. bttt also such portion of the trust outside of such business as· the Trustee .may deem,proper;organize•. ·eitber alone orjointly with. others, new corporations, partnerships. ·litl1ited p$'tiierships or ot}J.er business entities and convey to .it or them trust property or any part thereof~ and generally exercise with respect to the continuance,. management, sale or liquidation ofa:ny busiQess which the trust niay own or in which it may be financially interested, or of any ... n~w htl$itl~s.Qt bU$iness i.nterest;all the rights and powers which a ,prudent.owner of any such ·business woUld have·. J. Selection and. Retention of Investme!1!JS. Any property acquired by the Trustee and •at any time constituting any part of the trust shall be deemed a proper investment, and the Tru~tee shall be under no obligation to dispose of or convert snell property. Investme.nts need Page 154 of 207 not be diversified, may be of a wasting natme. and may be made or retained with a view to possible increase in value. The Trustee may invest all funds available for investment at any time that the Trustee may deem advisable in such investments as the Trustee may be permitted to make pursitantto thetenns.heteof. The Trustee, unless otherwise herein specifically prohibited, shall have as wide a latitude in the selection, retention and making of investments as an individual would have in retaining or investing his own funds and shall not be limited to nor ·. bound<n:governed by any statute or regulation. respecting investments. K. Holding 1'itleto Investments. The Trustee may hold title to investments in the name.ofthe. Trustee or a nominee. If . the trusto\vns. asscts located in a jurisdiction in which the Trustee cannot be authorized to act, then the Trustee may appoint any national bank authorized to act in sueh jurisdiction as Trustee of such assets and confer on such Trustee any power as may be necessary in the premises. but, in any event, such Trustee shall account for all net income and/or netproceeds from the sale ofsuch assets to the Trustee acting hereunder. L. General Powers.. The Trustee may sell, exchange; alter. mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose oftru~i: propetty; borrow any sum believed by the Trustee to be necessary or desimble for Protecting the trust or any part thereo~ making any income or corpus payment or · distribution, or for any other purpose which in the Trustee's opinion may be appropriate; pay all i¢aso:tlable C"'-1Jef1Ses; ¢xecute ·obligations, negotiable and nonnegotiable; join in, by deposi1, pledge. or otherwise. any plan of reorganization or readjustment of any investments of the trust, and .vest in a protective committee or other legal entity such power as in the· Trustee's opinion may be· desirable; and sell for cash· and/or credit all or any part of the trust property. M. Power to Make Loans. The Trustee may make loans, secured or unsecured, in suckamctunts~ upon such tertns, at such reasonable rates ofinterest, and to such persons, fittris or Page 14 of31 Page 155 of 207 PAGE 615 COl}lorations as the Trustee may deem proper and appropriate; provided. however, that the . Trustee shaH n.ot be empowered to make· any loan to any person. or corporation then serving as ·TrQstee hereunder. N. Power to Vote Stock The Trustee may vote shares of stock in person or by proxy. with or \vitbout power of substitution; exercise and perform any and aU rights, privileges and powers inurmgto the holder of any .stock or security comprising at any time a part. of the trust, .and exerci$e by agent or attorney ..in~fact any right appurtenantto any property or matter in WhiCh the trust may be interested. Q. Protection of the Trust Estate. The Trustee may protect, perfect and defend the title to anytrust prOperty; sue and be sued; enfhrce any bonds, mortgages or other obligations or liens owned by the trust; compromise~ arbitrate, or otherWise adjust claims in favOr of or against tl1e trust; waive .or release. rigiJ.ts of any kind; and abandon .any property considered by the T:rtisteeto be wotthless. P* Notes•. Mortgages. and Foreclosures. The Trustee mayt at any time, reduce the r'4.te of interest payable on any bond, note_, or other security owned by the trust; continue .tnortgage& ttpon and after maturity, with or without renewal, or extend the sa.tne upon such term.s . . . . as seem advisable to the Trcistee without reference to the value of the security at the time of such ccmJmliMce; tnodify or release any guaranty or mortgage; as an incident to collection of any bond or note. foreclose and bid in the property at foreclosure sale, acquire· the property. by d~ed frol11 the Jliortg~g<lt ,or obligor withoutforeclosure and retain the property· so hid in or taken over without•foreclosuie. Q. Insurance. The Trustee may carry such insurance coverage (in stock companies or httlitttual companies),. including public Liability, pn)perty damage and life insurauce, for such Page 156 of 207 PAGE 616 hazarcis and· in such amounts as the Trustee may deem advisable. With respect to lite insurance. the Trustee may acquire life insurance on the life of any beneficiary or on the life of any person in whom a beneficiary has an· insurable interest from any company in such amotmt and type· as the Trustee may deem advisable, pay all premiums from either income or principal, and designate as beneficiary the Trustee ofthe trust. With respect to all insurance policies held in the trust estate~ unless the Trusti!e shall arrange for the automatic application of dividends in . reduction· ofpremium payments, dividends shall be·treated.as a return of corpus· and applied to the paylllentofst1ch preniiums. · R. Employ and Compensate Agents and Representatives. The Trustee may employ, appoint, remove and compensate, out pfincome or corpus or in such proportion between income and c.()1'pus as the Trustee may deem proper, agents or other representatives, including acc{)untants, brokers, attorneys..at;.law~ attomeys,.in.:fact, investment counsel, investn1ent btokers, · realtors, rental agents, geologists! engineers, and other assistants and advisers, as are deemed by the Tru5tee to be helpful in the proper administration· of the tmst, without liability tbr any . neglect, omissi()~ l11:isconduct; or default ofsuch agent or representative, provided such agent or representative was selected and retained by the Trustee with due care. S. Establishand Maintain Reserves. Out of rents, profits~ or other income received, the Tru$te~ n~ay s~t ~p reserves for taxes~ assessments, itis:urance pr~miums, repairs, improvements~ depletion, depreciation, obsolescence and general maintenance of buildings or other property~ T. ·Power to Dete1mine Income and Corpus. Stock dividends and·capital gains shall ·be·· treated as corpus. Except as herein otherwise· ·specifically provided, the Trustee shall detennine in accordance with general principles of federal tax law the manner in which expenses Page 157 of 207 are to be borne and receipts credited between corpus and income and what shall constitute incoroe5 net.incometllldcorpus. In determining such matters~ the Trustee may give consideration to~ butshail not be· bound by~ the provisions of the Texas Trust Code. U. Liability of 'Third Party. No purchaser at any sale made by the Trustee or person dealin,g ·with the Trusteeis obliged to see to the application of any m:oney or property paid or deliveredlQ the Trt.tstee. or to inquire into the expediency or propriety of~ or the authority of the Trustee to enter into and consummate! any transaction. V~ Documents. The Trustee may execute and deliver any deeds, conveyances. assigp,m~ts, leases, contracts, ~tock or security transfer powers, or any other written instrument · ofany character a.pptopriate to any of the powers or .duties herein conferred upon the Trustee. W. Trai}S!}Stions with Beneticiar.ies and Fiduciaries; The Trustee is authorized to .eritqr into· any transaction pennitted by this instrument,· even though the· other party to that transaction is a beneficiary;. the estate of a, beneficiary; a trust. created by. or for the benefit of a beneficiary, whether living or deceased; the estate of Settlor; a personal representative of any estate. including that of Settlor; or a Trustee ·Of any trust, including the Trustee w1.der this instrument acting individually; except to ·the· extent that the Texas Trust Code, as .amended, or any successor Sta~te may expressly prohibit Settlor from authorizing any corporate Trustee serving hereunder front engaging in any such transactioi1. The Trustee is authorized, but not directed, to lend trust f®ds to the persona) representatives of the Settlor's estate upon such .. s®urity and for such time and at such rate ofinterest as the Trustee, in its sole discretiol\ deems proper, and to purchase any assets from the personal representatives of the Settlor's estate for such sums and on such terms as the Trustee may deem appropriate or proper; provided, however, that th~ Tru,st¢e shaH be required to act in all such matters on the same basis as it would in Page 158 of 207 PAGE 619 other policies or any benefit plans which may be rnade payable to the Trustee heretmder, including, but not limited to, the following: L The power, as provided in Article I above, to add the proceeds of any other policies of insurance and any benefit plans to the operation of the trust by making such policies and benefit plans payable to the Trustee; .2. The tight to receive or· apply dividends or distributive shares of sut:plus. disability benefits, surrender values or the proceeds of matured endowments; 3. The power to obtain and receive from the respec:tive insurance companit.·s :Such advances or loans on account of policies as may be available; 4. The power to exercise any option, right or privilege granted in any policy :or benefit plan; 5. The power to borrow on~ sell, assign or pledge any policy or rights under •·I:Ulyhenefit plan; 6. The power to changethe beneficiary Of any policy or benefit plan; 7. The power to withdraw a policy or benefit plan from ~he operation of this ttust In ord~r to exercise a reserved power or for any other purpose;. g. The power .·tO· change the beneficiaries under this Trust Agreement, their ~ective shares and plans of distribution; and STATE OF TEXAS § § COUNTY:OF CAMP §

BEFORE ME. the undersigned authority, in and for the State of Texas, on this day personallyf,!.ppeared Tedde R, Blunck, in his capacity as Settlor, known to me to be the person . w)lose nan1e issttbs.cribed>to the foregoing instrument; and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed and in the capacity therein stated.

GIVEN· UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE on this ·the· f~ ~. .day of December, 2012.

IV I;I"' Notary Public, State ofl'exas

STA1'E OF TEXAS § § ··· CQUNT\' OF CAMP §

. B·EFOQE ME; the undersigned authority, in and for the State of Texas, on this day . Jl¢J'sonally appe~ed Pal1lette M.. Blunck, in her capacity as Trustee, known to me to ~ the ·. person whose name. is subscribed to the for~going instrument, aiJ.d acknowledged to me that she executed the, same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed and in the capacity · .. therein . . . .stated. .. . . I

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE on this the {) L{ . day of OE$ember~ 20:12. · Page 24. of3.2

Page 164 of 207

PAGE 625 SCllEDULEA

To Tbe Tedde ,R. Blunck Living Trust

Dated: December~, 2012 lnitial Assets: AU ofSettlor's interest i.n and to the following described properties:

!mAL PROPERTY: ·Pa.rcel#l Address~ · 1347 County Road 4510, Pittsburg~ Texas 75~686 LegatDescription: ABS A060 Mary Hayes. Tra¢t, 41-5000, 406~93 (+ 1.55 AC in Rd;) acres, Camp County, Texas (containing a computed area of 408.48 acres with 1.55 acres in a public road, leaving a net area of 406.93 acres)

.· B};(NG :a tract of land situated in the MARY HAYS SURVEY ABSTRACT NO. 60, Camp County, Texas and beit1g the remainder of a tract of land eonveyed to E. B. McCaslin by deed recorded in volmne 191 Page 415 Deed Records Camp County, Texas, and being more particularly described by metes and bounds asfollows:

BEGINNING at a point fot the Southeast corner .of this tract on the centerline ofCouniy Roaq Nn. 4510! satue being the Northeast corner of a tract of land conveyed to F. M. · . . Jon~byaeedreeordedin volume 22 page 286 DeedRecordsCamp<Couttty, Texas. · THENCE South 89 4egrees 56 minutes 43 seconds West, passing a Y2 .inch capped (yellow plastic stamped Dewey 1641) steel rod set on the West line ofCotmty Road No; 4510 at 20.00 feet and continuing along the common line between said McCaslin and Jones tracts and generally along a wire fence for a total distance of 2443.60 teet to a: % inch capped {yellow plastic stamped Dewey 1641} stet.1l rod ,get for comer~ same being a pdint in the East line of a.:tract of tand in the name of Mrs. Hallie Reed, (no reCQrdingdata)~ . .. ·. THENCE North 20 ·degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds West along the common line bet\veel1 Sttid McCaslin and Reed tracts, passing the Southeast comer of a tract of land inthe name of J. W. Smith, (no recording data), also passing the Southeast comer of. a tract (}f land in the name of J.D. Pankhurst, (no recotdi11g data) and continuing generally along a wite fence ibr a tQtal distance of 6370.90 feet to a point tbr corner in PtairieCt:eek, THENCE the· following calls along the common line between said McCaslin and Pankhurst tracts and the meand.erings of said creek: 1. Notth 43 degrees 20 minutes 02 Seconds East 366. t 1 feet 2. North 14 degrees 19 minutes 43 seconds West, passing the Northeast corner of said Pankhursttract, same being a corner of a tract of land conveyed to PmitieCreek Ranch Partnership hy deed recorded in volume 255 page 407 Deed Records Camp County, ··---------·-·-----·-··-----·-·--·-------

Page 165 of 207

PAGE 626 Texas and continuing for a total distance of 2187.00 feet to a point for corner in said creek. same being the Southwest corner of a tract of land in the name of P. L. Nolen et al}(Q.o ·r~cording data)•. 3. North 48 .degrees 55 mi:outes 32 seconds F:.ast along the common line between said MpCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 61.73 feet to a point for comer in said creek. ^[4]. South 54 degrees 55 minutes 32 ·seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance ot2 34.56 feet to a point for corner in said creek; 5. North 55 degrees 17 minutes 22 seconds East along the common line between said. · Mc::Caslitl and Nolen tracts for a distance of 300.86 feet to a point for corner in· said creek. ···6~ THENCE South 87 degrees 51 minutes 39 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts fol' a distance of 121.10 feet to a point for cornet in said creek .1; THENCE North 60 degrees 17 minutes 00 seconds East along the common line ~tween said McCa;slin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 83.25 feet to a point for comer in saictcreek. · :8. North 73 ·degrees 43 ·minutes 49 seconds East along the· common line between said MeCasiin and · Nolen tractS tor a distance of 48.00 feet to point for corner in said creek,. .9. SoUth 64 degrees 21 minutes 04 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and ·· ··· Nolen tracts for a distance of218~71 feet to a point for comer in said creek. I 0. North 11 degrees 55 iminutes 04 seconds West along the commotdine between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 65.38 feet to a point for corner in said creek• .· TL North 08 degrees 50 minutes 00 seconds East along the oommort lirie between said McCaslin and · · Nobm tracts for a distance. of 112~06 feet to a point for corner in said creek. ··12... South 60 degrees 39 minutes 07 seconds East. along the common ·line. between said McCaslin and . .

. Nolen tracts fot a distcl.nce of 201.50 feet to a point for corner in said creek ···. lS. North 8S degrees 46 minutes 22 seconds East along the common line between said McCaslin and Nolen tracts for a distance of 21,50 feet to apoint fbr comer in said creek, saJjle being a point inthe\Vest line of a tract ofJandin the name of H. Stephens, (no recording data) . •tHENCE. South 19·.. degrees 48 minutes 58 seconds East along the common I ine between sttid McCaslin· and Stephens tracts ·and generally along a wire fence, passing the following tracts along the East line of McCaslin tract: Annie Reynolds, (no recording data), Hartwell Stephens, (no recotding data). and a tract of land. conveyed to E. R. McCaslin and Myrtle McCaslin by deed recotded in volume 59 page 43 Deed Records Camp County, Texas and continuing for a total distance of 5101.23 feet to a fence post found for comer. THENCE North 70 degrees 11 minutes 31 seconds East along· the common line UNITE8~y~lfW$'~AtJKWffi,ii~fc JiuRT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION IN RE: Tedde Robin Blunck CASE NO 13-20129

CHAPTER 13

EXHIBIT TO SCHEDULE J Continuation Sheet No. 1