v.
Primesites, Inc.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
SPG ARTIST MEDIA, LLC, D/B/A No. 69078 ARTIST PR; AND JOHN MAHONEY, Appellants, vs. PRIMESITES, INC., FILE Respondent. FEB 2 8 2017 ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a district court order denying a special motion to dismiss based on NRS 41.660 and NRS 41.637. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge. 1 This court reviews a district court's order denying a special motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 6, P.3d , (2017). As this court explained in Shapiro, "the term 'good faith' does not operate independently, within the anti- SLAPP statute." Instead, the term "good faith" operates as part of the broader phrase defined by NRS 41.637. Id. To fit within the protections of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, the "action [must be] brought against a person based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of 'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A e public concern." NRS 41.660(1). NRS 41.637 enumerates four types of communications that fall under the definition of a Idood faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." The communication at issue here was appellant John Mahoney's private conversation with a friend in which Mahoney referred his friend to an attorney. Appellants SPG Artist Media, LLC, and John Mahoney (collectively, SPG) argue that this speech was protected pursuant to NRS 41.637(1), 2 which defines a "Mood faith communication" as including a "[c]ommunication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome." The parties disagree as to whether filing a lawsuit procures governmental action. The United States Supreme Court has definitively established that the right to petition government includes all forms of government, including the judicial branch. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 896-897 (1984) ("[T]he right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government."); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition."). Thus, we (0) 1947A a<itto
[*2]reiterate that filing a lawsuit does procure government action. However, whether the communication at issue here should be afforded the protections of NRS 41.660 depends upon whether the form of communication was such that it would procure action from the judiciary. [3] Unquestionably, there are very specific procedures required in order to invoke a court to take action. See, e.g., NRCP 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."); NRAP 3 (instructing on how to commence an appeal); NRAP 21 (instructing on how to petition for appellate writ relief). Merely referring a friend to an attorney cannot be viewed as a communication "aimed at procuring any governmental . . . action," because it is not a formal request to a court to take action. NRS 41.637(1). Nor does SPG's communication fall within any of the other definitions enumerated in NRS 41.637 for a "good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." Therefore, we conclude that SPG's communication is not protected by NRS 41.660, and we (0) 1947A e
[*3]ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. [4] (0) 1947A
[*4]