⁵ In 2016, Dr. Rosenblum declined to conduct further evaluations of the family, testifying at the TPR hearing that he felt his views as to the family were not consistent with the outcome CYF was seeking. Because of the difference of opinion in how he and CYF viewed the case, he declined to conduct any further psychological evaluations of the family. Dr. Pepe therefore resumed working with the family, and conducted final psychological evaluations of Parents and the three children in 2016. In his Psychological Evaluation Report dated February 20, 2015, Dr. Rosenblum noted that “[t]his family continues to present as one of the most complex and challenged family units that I have ever evaluated” noting that “[a]ll three of the children … present with very concerning developmental impairments and mental health difficulties.” Dr. Rosenblum expressed the view - 11 - J-S34043-18 Based on the foregoing, on October 12, 2017, the orphans’ court denied CYF’s petitions as to J.R.R. and A.R.R. CYF timely filed notices of appeal, and both CYF and the orphans’ court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.8 On appeal, CYF claims the orphans’ court erred in denying its petitions. We begin with our standard of review and the applicable law. The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in [subs]ection 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of ____________________________________________ 8It is not clear why that order was not entered on the docket until January 10, 2018; however, due to the delayed entry of this order, the notices of appeal filed on February 6, 2018, are timely. - 12 - J-S34043-18 the analysis pursuant to [subs]ection 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Initially, the orphans’ court denied CYF’s petitions pursuant to both subsections 2511(a) and (b). However, in its opinion, the orphans’ court concedes that CYF satisfied subsection 2511(a) as to Children.9 As our Supreme Court has explained, “[i]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court ‘shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child’ [as outlined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)].” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Thus, on appeal, CYF argues only that the orphans’ court erred in concluding that it had not satisfied subsection 2511(b). That subsection provides as follows. (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, ____________________________________________ 9 With respect to J.R.R., the orphans’ court concluded that “[d]espite the numerous resources that Parents have been provided, they have been unable to internalize and implement parenting strategies over time to provide J.R.[R.] with the consistent structure and reinforcement he requires.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/2018, at 23. With respect to A.R.R., the orphans’ court credited CYF’s testimony that “over the course of time [] Parents have received various supporting services both in and out of parental care, and despite the efforts over many years to improve [the ability of Parents to parent A.R.R.,] they have failed to display significant improvement in their ability to provide her with parental care.” Id. at 25. - 13 - J-S34043-18 income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). [Subs]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [subs]ection 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best- interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child. In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “When examining the effect upon a child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer ‘extreme emotional - 14 - J-S34043-18 consequences.’” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484–85 (Pa. 1993)). “In the case of an unhealthy bond, ‘attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact.’” J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267). In its opinion, the orphans’ court concluded that this case was analogous to In re E.M, 908 A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. 2006). See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/2018, at 23. Conversely, CYF argues that this case is akin to T.S.M., supra. CYF’s Brief at 38. Thus, we examine both cases to provide background and context. E.M. involved brothers, R.M. and E.M. In 2003, when the boys were 12 and 11 years old respectively, the Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services (CYS) took emergency custody of them when their mother, P.F., was arrested for assaulting her 17-year-old stepson. Neither parent appeared at the dependency hearing, and R.M. and E.M. were adjudicated dependent. P.F. subsequently failed to comply with her family service plan by, inter alia, moving to Virginia without notifying CYS and attending only about half of the scheduled visits with R.M. and E.M. P.F. continued failing to comply with her objectives; thus, on February 7, 2005, CYS filed petitions to terminate involuntarily P.F.’s parental rights. Hearings were held in October 2005, when R.M. was fifteen years old and E.M. was fourteen years old. At that time, they resided in the same foster home, - 15 - J-S34043-18 which was not a pre-adoptive placement; however, their foster mother was willing to keep them until the age of majority. Both R.M. and E.M. expressed a desire to return to P.F. However, as the trial court pointed out, P.F. was residing in Mexico and had not visited the children since 2003. Moreover, her telephone contact was erratic, although they kept in touch via email. Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted the petitions filed by CYS. Both P.F. and E.M. appealed. On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court that CYS had satisfied its burden pursuant to subsection 2511(a). In analyzing subsection 2511(b), and considering whether termination would best serve the children’s needs and welfare, this Court offered the following, in relevant part. In analyzing this case, we must remain cognizant of our deferential standard of review—we must determine whether the decision is supported by competent evidence and, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Although competent evidence of record supports the court’s findings that severing the bond between mother and children will not harm the children, given the unique circumstances of this case, we find the court abused its discretion in finding that termination serves the needs and welfare of the children. If an adoptive placement were already identified for these children, our decision likely would be different. As this case has been pending, however, the children have continued to age. No adoptive placement has yet been identified for the children, and the reality is, it is not likely an adoptive family will be found at this late stage of their childhood. Although testimony indicates termination of parental rights will eliminate their false hope that they will reunite with [P.F.], R.M. seems to accept this reality already. In addition, termination may very well create a new false hope—that they will be adopted at this late stage of their childhood. - 16 - J-S34043-18 Further, the children need to consent to adoption at this point. Testimony indicates that R.M. is farther along in “the process” than E.M. This is evident particularly given the fact that R.M. did not appeal, but E.M. has. It would not benefit these children to separate them if one is willing to consent to adoption and the other is not. In his appellate brief, E.M. specifically emphasizes his consent to adoption is required. We note there have been two constants in the children’s lives since they have been in placement, their foster home in which they are very comfortable, and their relationship with each other. Both therapists agree there is a very strong bond between the children, and E.M.’s therapist felt it was very important for the children to remain together. … [Children] can also reunite with [P.F.] in the not too distant future, when they are eighteen and age out of the system. In sum, we are resigned to agree with [P.F.]—nothing will change whether [P.F.’s] rights are terminated or not, and the only thing that will be accomplished by termination is that the children will be true orphans. We further agree the children currently have permanency to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances. E.M., 908 A.2d at 309 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, this Court reversed the orders of the trial court under these circumstances. We now turn to our Supreme Court’s decision in T.S.M. T.M. was the natural mother of seven children. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Family (CYF) became involved with the family in 2001, and the oldest four children (the younger children had not yet been born) were removed from T.M.’s care and placed with their maternal grandmother. “The removal followed a life threatening injury to then-six month old Tai.M., requiring emergency neurosurgery…. By August 2003, the children were reunited with [T.M.], and the case seemingly closed.” T.S.M., - 17 - J-S34043-18 71 A.3d at 253-54. In 2006, after two more children were born, there were suspicious injuries to those two children. All six children were removed from T.M.’s care on July 19, 2006, and placed with maternal grandparents. Tae.M. was born in November 2006 and placed in a foster home upon discharge from the hospital. “By the summer of 2007, the six children in maternal grandmother’s custody were removed and placed in foster homes. The oldest child, daughter Tad.M., then eight years old, was returned to Mother’s care prior to November 2007, while the other six remained in foster care.” Id. at 254. Children were moved in and out of foster care, T.M.’s care, and group homes over the next several years. The children disclosed that when they were in T.M.’s care, she “whoops them with belts and hangers, smokes weed and [they] had witnessed [T.M.] and paramour having sexual relations.” Id. at 254. In addition, T.M. “failed or refused to obtain necessary education, medical, and mental health care for [the children], which was especially concerning given that several of them suffered from mental health disorders.” Id. at 255. In addition, T.M. continued using drugs, and T.M.’s paramour was being investigated for sexually abusing Tad.M. In August 2010, CYF filed petitions to terminate T.M.’s parental rights to all seven children. Hearings on the petitions began in April 2011 and concluded in November 2011. The orphans’ court denied the petitions in January 2012. Specifically, the orphans’ court found that CYF had established - 18 - J-S34043-18 grounds under subsection 2511(a), but concluded that termination did not serve the needs and welfare of the children pursuant to subsection 2511(b). At issue was the nature of the bond between T.M. and the children, which Dr. Pepe characterized as pathological and unhealthy. Specifically, Dr. Pepe “observed in her testimony [that children are conflicted] between loyalty to a biological parent and loyalty to a foster parent, pre-adoptive parent, adoptive parent.” Id. at 270 (quotation marks omitted). In declining to terminate T.M.’s parental rights, the trial court specifically “minimized Dr. Pepe’s assertion that the bonds [between T.M. and the children] in this case were pathological….” Id. at 260. “It concluded that the children’s bonds to [T.M.] and each other counseled in favor of not terminating parental rights and instead for providing open adoptions or subsidized permanent legal custody.” Id. The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) appealed. On appeal, this Court, in a divided opinion, affirmed the orders of the orphans’ court, and the GAL sought allowance of appeal which was granted by our Supreme Court.10 Our Supreme Court offered the following, in relevant part. [C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has a strong but unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre- adoptive family. As with dependency determinations, we emphasize that the law regarding termination of parental rights ____________________________________________ 10By this point, the GAL was appealing only the orders as to the five youngest children. The older two children were over the age of 12. - 19 - J-S34043-18 should not be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. Obviously, attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact. Similarly, while termination of parental rights generally should not be granted unless adoptive parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and loving home, termination may be necessary for the child’s needs and welfare in cases where the child’s parental bond is impeding the search and placement with a permanent adoptive home. In weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail, as we have in this case, the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children. In recognition of this reality, over the past fifteen years, a substantial shift has occurred in our society’s approach to dependent children, requiring vigilance to the need to expedite children’s placement in permanent, safe, stable, and loving homes. ASFA[11] was enacted to combat the problem of foster care drift, where children, like the children in this case, are shuttled from one foster home to another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate their ability to care for the children. This drift was the unfortunate byproduct of the system’s focus on reuniting children with their biological parents, even in situations where it was clear that the parents would be unable to parent in any reasonable period of time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania adopted a dual focus of reunification and adoption, with the goal of finding permanency for children in less than two years, absent compelling reasons. *** In this case, the children have unhealthy bonds to [T.M.], who is seemingly the root of their manifold psychological and behavioral conditions. Moreover, [T.M.] appears to be interfering with the children’s bonding to their foster families, resulting in ____________________________________________ 11 Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq. - 20 - J-S34043-18 confusion for the children and further delay in permanency for the children. *** In relying upon the mere existence of the bond between [T.M.] and the children, the trial court failed to recognize the substantial, possibly permanent, damage done to these children by the prolonged, unhealthy, pathological bond with [T.M.], especially as it affected the children’s ability to form attachments to foster families who could have provided the necessary love, care and stability that these children have so needed for the past decade. We conclude without hesitation that it best serves their needs and welfare to sever their bond with [T.M.] permanently, in order to permit them to be placed forthwith into healthy, permanent homes. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-71 (internal citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, our Supreme Court reversed the orders of this Court and the orphans’ court. With this backdrop in mind, we turn to analysis of subsection 2511(b) as it relates to J.R.R. and A.R.R. J.R.R.’s Needs and Welfare With respect to J.R.R., the orphans’ court offered the following in reaching its conclusion that termination would not serve J.R.R.’s best interests: [A]t the time of the TPR hearings, J.R.[R.] was fifteen years of age and stated a preference not to have [P]arents’ rights terminated. Although J.R.[R.] was residing in a suitable foster home identified as a long-term placement, his foster mother expressed no intent to adopt him, and no other adoptive home had been identified. Given J.R.[R.]’s age, he would be required to consent to adoption but has stated a preference to have Parents retain their rights. It is therefore questionable whether J.R.[R.] would even consent to adoption, if the opportunity arose. Moreover, at the age of fifteen, and as J.R.[R.] continues to age, the likelihood of adoption continues to diminish and J.R.[R.] can reunite with Parents when he reaches the age of majority. J.R.[R.] continues to visit with - 21 - J-S34043-18 Parents, and without any negative effect. Under these particular circumstances, termination would have little to no effect on his circumstances, and the only thing it would accomplish would be to make J.R.[R.] a true orphan. This [c]ourt conclude[s] therefore that termination of parental rights would not serve his needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/2018, at 25 (citations omitted). Instantly, J.R.R. will be sixteen years old in August of 2018; thus, as correctly pointed out by the orphans’ court, it is necessary that he consent to adoption. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(a)(1) (“[C]onsent to adoption shall be required of … [t]he adoptee, if over 12 years of age.”). However, according to his CYF caseworker, Wanda Beasley, J.R.R. has “always state[d] that he would like to go home.” N.T., 9/25/2017, at 61. Moreover, J.R.R. testified to that desire as well: “I want to keep my mom and dad’s rights. I want them to keep their medical rights and guardian rights. I want to have more contact with them, more visits, including home visits. I want to move back home. I want my family to work as a team.” N.T., 1/13/2017, at 32. Furthermore, although J.R.R. is doing well in his current foster home, it is a long-term placement, not a pre-adoptive home, and CYF has not identified a pre-adoptive home for J.R.R. See N.T., 9/14/2017, at 108-109; N.T., 9/25/2017, at 64. Moreover, Dr. Rosenblum testified that “there is certainly evidence of positive dimension of interaction between [C]hildren and [P]arents.” N.T., 10/12/2017, at 11. He opined further that he does “believe [] quite strongly that there is a positive bond and attachment.” Id. CYF points out that “having an adoptive home is not a prerequisite to the termination of parental rights.” CYF’s Brief at 39. That is a correct - 22 - J-S34043-18 statement of the law. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b) (“If the petitioner is an agency it shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt exists.”). However, as our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. In addition, the well-regarded Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook provides that “[w]hile having an identified adoptive resource is not a prerequisite for [termination of parental rights], ideally there should be a strong likelihood of eventual adoption.” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts Office of Children and Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook § 12.1 at 126 (2010). Based on the foregoing, we conclude the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the record, and it did not err or abuse its discretion in denying CYF’s petition as to J.R.R. J.R.R. may never return to the care of his parents, but we see no advantage in making J.R.R. an orphan. Dr. Rosenblum testified that J.R.R. derived benefit from his bond with Parents. Further, even if the bond between J.R.R. and Parents were pathological or toxic as Dr. Pepe suggests,12 we agree with the orphans’ court that the bond ____________________________________________ 12We also point out that Dr. Pepe testified that between seeing J.R.R. in 2013 and evaluating him again in 2016, J.R.R. had made “significant progress,” and she was “impressed with his maturity and growth.” N.T., 9/14/2017, at 48. During this time, J.R.R. had regular contact with Parents. - 23 - J-S34043-18 is not what is keeping J.R.R. from finding permanency. Instead, it is his age and the fact that he does not wish to be adopted that make termination of parental rights not in his best interests. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (“[E]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”). Based on the foregoing, we agree with the orphans’ court that this situation is more analogous to E.M. than T.S.M.13 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the orphans’ court as to J.R.R. A.R.R.’s Needs and Welfare With respect to A.R.R., the orphans’ court offered the following in reaching its conclusion that termination of parental rights is not in her best interests at this juncture. A.R.[R.] continues to suffer from significant developmental and mental health problems. She continues to display aggressive and volatile behaviors, even in a specialized setting with providers trained to manage her condition. This [c]ourt additionally noted that in her current placement, other than her bi-weekly visits with Parents, which A.R.[R.] enjoys and which are going well, outside ____________________________________________ 13 As pointed out supra, in T.S.M., the GAL was not seeking reversal for the oldest two children, who were ages fourteen and thirteen at the time of the Supreme Court decision. - 24 - J-S34043-18 of school A.R.[R.] has little to no contact with other children, friends or family. Her only other regular personal contact is with her paid caregivers. Although CYF [] identified a “possible” pre[- ] adoptive home a few days before the TPR hearing, CYF had not taken further steps towards securing or placing A.R.[R.] in such a home. Although discharge locations for A.R.[R.] had been identified for consideration, none had been selected or pursued with any certainty at the time of the TPR hearings. Moreover, testimony elicited at the TPR hearing indicated that A.R.[R.] was not ready for discharge, and still required institutional care. Furthermore, even if such an adoptive home [were] available, any potential caregiver would require significant training in order to be able to support A.R.[R.] and manage her needs. … A.R.[R.] continues to have complex medical and psychological needs that preclude her from leaving therapeutic care at the RESPOND facility and being placed in a foster home family setting, or pre-adoptive home. At the time of the TPR hearings, A.R.[R.] was not ready to be discharged, and the possibility of a discharge date remained indefinite, particularly in light of A.R.[R.] having experienced a recent regression.[14] Thus, it appears that A.R.[R.] would continue to reside at RESPOND for the immediately foreseeable future, although RESPOND maintains a goal of, and continues to work towards discharge. While at treatment at RESPOND other than the regular interaction of her paid caregivers, outside of school A.R.[R.] appears to live in relative isolation in which her only significant contact other than her staff and occasional interactions with residents, is her visits with Parents. Given the evidence presented indicat[ing] a lack of foreseeable date for her discharge from RESPOND, termination of ____________________________________________ 14Dr. Hode testified that this regression was attributable to two factors. First, A.R.R. reported being sad about a change in staff. Second, A.R.R. was attending a Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) event where “a peer had informed her that [J.R.R.] was moving into foster care and she wouldn’t see her brother anymore.” N.T., 9/14/2017, at 85-86. We note that in other parts of the record, Dr. Hode states that A.R.R. regressed because she learned that J.R.R. would not “be” her brother anymore. Id. at 96. In addition, Tamryn Brown, A.R.R.’s therapist, testified that A.R.R. learned through a peer that J.R.R. “was moved to another place and [A.R.R.] felt that [J.R.R.] didn’t want [A.R.R.] to be his sister anymore.” N.T., 9/25/2017, at 20. - 25 - J-S34043-18 parental rights at this time would have no effect on A.R.[R.]’s circumstances but to render her a true orphan. A.R.[R.] would continue to reside at RESPOND, under the same circumstances, but would be deprived even of the limited supervised visitation she receives with her [P]arents, and which she reportedly enjoys. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/2017, at 26-27 (citations omitted). Here, at the time of the hearings, A.R.R. was 10 years old. Thus, unlike her brother, her consent to adoption is not a pre-requisite. However, like her brother, she is not in a pre-adoptive home. Moreover, it is unclear when, if ever, she will be in a pre-adoptive home. Leann Rendulic, a CYF caseworker, testified that as of September 14, 2017, she is “looking into an adoptive home for [A.R.R.].” N.T., 9/14/2017, at 111. However, Rendulic acknowledged that A.R.R. is not ready to leave RESPOND. In fact, A.R.R. still has a 2-to-1 staff- to-patient ratio during the day, and there are several steps between that and a pre-adoptive foster home. According to Dr. Hode, A.R.R. would need to do well for two to three months with a 1-to-1 staff-to-patient ratio. Id. at 99. Moreover, prior to discharge, a foster home would need to be identified and trained for A.R.R.’s needs. Id. at 99-100. Tamryn Brown, A.R.R.’s therapist since January of 2016, testified that A.R.R. had “made a lot of progress” since she began treating her, particularly between March and September of 2017, at the time of the testimony. With respect to visits with Parents, Brown testified that A.R.R. has said that the visits are “good.” N.T., 9/25/2017, at 21. In addition, Beasley also testified that these visits are going “well” and that A.R.R.’s behavior afterwards is “positive.” Id. at 68. - 26 - J-S34043-18 Thus, with respect to A.R.R., the record supports the conclusions reached by the orphans’ court. Despite the fact that A.R.R. is younger than her brother, she is not in a pre-adoptive home. A.R.R. is not being prevented from bonding with her foster family or pre-adoptive family because of her bond with Parents; rather, she still requires significant therapeutic intervention before she reaches that stage. Moreover, her visits with Parents have been characterized as going well. Thus, the concerns exhibited by our Supreme Court in T.S.M. are not present here. It simply does not make sense to terminate Parents’ parental rights under these circumstances. Of course, A.R.R.’s situation is bound to change; she cannot stay at RESPOND forever. However, at the time of the termination hearings, there was not a likelihood of eventual adoption, and Dr. Rosenblum testified that maintaining contact between Parents and Children while they were not in a pre-adoptive home was beneficial to them. See N.T., 10/12/2017, at 24. He further testified that A.R.R. “knows her family, she knows her parents, she loves her brothers, she loves her grandmother, she has had contact with … an aunt.” Id. at 30. Although Dr. Pepe disagreed with that conclusion, it was up to the trial court to assess the credibility of these expert witnesses. As this Court has explained, “a trial court has discretion to accept or reject a witness’ testimony, including that of an expert witness, and is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 456 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Thus, we will not disturb this finding. - 27 - J-S34043-18 In fact, the evidence demonstrates that severing this bond could cause A.R.R. to regress further, as demonstrated by her recent regression upon learning about J.R.R.’s status. See J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267) (“In the case of an unhealthy bond, ‘attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact.’”). In considering the arguments set forth by CYF, we bear in mind that there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observe[] that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27 (internal citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it is not in A.R.R.’s best interests to sever attachment with her current family at this time. Thus, the orphans’ court did not err in denying CYF’s petition as to A.R.R. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the orders of the orphans’ court. Orders affirmed. - 28 - J-S34043-18 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/16/2018 - 29 -