Wilson, Judge. Appellant Gary Schmidt filed a declaration of candidacy for the office of State Senate, District 16, listing a Reno address as his physical residence, qualifying his sworn declaration of at least 30 days' prior residency at that address with the words "to the best of my knowledge and understanding." An elector submitted a written challenge to Schmidt's qualifications with the Secretary of State. After reviewing the challenge, the Attorney General found probable cause to petition the district court for an order requiring Schmidt to appear and show cause why the challenge should not be upheld. The petition pointed out that while Schmidt swore that he physically, as opposed to constructively, resided at the Reno address district for at least thirty days before the close of filing for candidacy."). 2 The term "actual residence" contemplates "the place of actual living, of physical presence—it does not require an intent to remain or return." Id.;

cf. NRS 281.050(8)(a) ("Actual residence' means the place of permanent habitation where a person actually resides and is legally domiciled."). The district court's findings that Schmidt did not actually reside at the Reno address listed on his declaration for 30 days preceding the deadline to file for candidacy are supported by substantial evidence. See Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Deu., LLC, 130 Nev. 834,

838, 335 P.3d 211, 214 (2014) ("Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") (internal quotations omitted). Schmidt admitted that he did not sleep at the residence and that there was no operating water or power at the property at the relevant time. Moreover, the evidence supports that he was on an extended trip to Alabama for part of the 30-day period. Although Schmidt argues that the evidence supports his residency for the reasons addressed below, his arguments do not overcome the district court's findings and conclusions to the contrary.

(0) 1947A se.

First, Schmidt argues that he was working on restoring the residence and his forced absences should not factor into a residency determination. The district court's lack-of-residency findings, however, are supported by the record, as the evidence does not show that Schmidt intended in good faith to return without delay. Thus, even if the limited exception to the definition of "actual residence" under NRS 281.050(2) applies here, 3 the district court found that Schmidt delayed, and while Schmidt may have been working on the property, none of the evidence before the court, aside from Schmidt's own testimony, which the district court found not credible, suggests that anything was done to try to make the residence habitable when Schmidt returned to Nevada in 2017, or that the work undertaken in winter 2017-18 was intended to help Schmidt return to that residence. Instead, the evidence suggests that Schmidt intended to sell the property without him returning to live there. Second, although Schmidt argues that the district court should have accepted his 2014 declaration of candidacy as establishing actual residence at the Reno address, the district court merely observed that Schmidt declared his actual residence to be outside of the jurisdiction in 2008, 2010; and 2012, when he filed for candidacy in three different Nevada cities. Thus, the declarations just illustrated the lack of information as to any fixed actual residence; the court did not find that those declarations affirmatively demonstrated residency elsewhere. Regardless, this argument appears to go to legal domicile, not to where Schmidt was actually residing. Finally, although Schmidt argued that the purpose of the 30-day residency requirement was met because the address he listed is not a sham residence and he knows his constituents, that argument does not overcome the fact that he did not live at the address for the 30 days preceding the filing of his declaration. We perceive no error in the district court's fact-based determination that Schmidt did not actually reside at the Reno address listed on his declaration for the requisite 30-day period. Because actually residing within the district is required regardless of legal domicile, we need not consider the district court's legal domicile findings, and we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.