Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., Formerly Known as the First Nat'l Bank of Mason City, Iowa, 767 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., Formerly Known as the First Nat'l Bank of Mason City, Iowa, 767 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Exportal Ltda., Mario Fantuzzi, and Jesus Villasante v. United States of America and Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture (cadc, 1990-04-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Exportal Ltda., Mario Fantuzzi, and Jesus Villasante v. United States of America and Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Section 47.6(b) states that the bond requirement “shall be waived” if the foreign producer makes the requisite showing of reciprocity. “ ‘Shall’ is a term of legal significance, in that it is mandatory or imperative, not merely precatory.” Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1985); see, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 856 F.2d 209 , 216 (D.C.Cir.1988) (mandatory time limits for agency action); Weil v. Markowitz, 829 F.2d 166, 171 (D.C.Cir.1987) (mandatory sanctions for attorney misconduct); Association of American R.R. v. C…
cited Cited "see" Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Knop
Iowa Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see" Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Independent Fruit & Produce Co.
8th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conoco v. Norwest Bank, 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Independent Fruit and Produce Co., a Missouri Corporation, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Walter A. Rubin, D/B/A M.J.M. Produce Exchange, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Sugar Ripe Banana Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. N.E. Friedmeyer-Sellmeyer Distributing Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Salvatore Pupillo, D/B/A Pupillo Fruit Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. George A. Heimos Produce Company, Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. William Mantia Fruit Company, Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. St. Louis Banana and Tomato Company, Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Lamperson Fruit & Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Lombardo Fruit and Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. John Moon Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Stanley Produce, Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Robert Johnson, D/B/A J. Johnson, Fruit & Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Adolph A. Solomon and Irl S. Solomon, Statutory Trustees for Adolph & Ceresia Produce Co., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. United Fruit & Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Goldman Fruit & Produce Co., Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Jules J. Schwartz and Joseph F. Schwartz, D/B/A New Market Produce Company, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Franklin Produce Company, a Missouri Corporation, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. Marske Produce Company, Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. George A. Heimos Produce Co., Inc., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, and Howard McDougall Trustee v. N.E. Friedmeyer-Sellmeyer Distributing Company
8th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conoco v. Norwest Bank, 767 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1985). 35 Given that the provisions on casual employees in the pre-1982 agreements differ from those in the 1982 agreement, we must consider the agreements separately.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CONOCO, INC., Appellee,
v.
NORWEST BANK MASON CITY, N.A., Formerly Known as the First National Bank of Mason City, Iowa, Appellant
84-2565.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Jul 11, 1985.
767 F.2d 470
John L. Duffy, Mason City, Iowa, for appellant., Jean A. McNeil, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.
McMillian, Fagg, Woods.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
HENRY WOODS, District Judge.

This case involves the single issue of whether a letter of credit is revocable or irrevocable. The facts are simple. On July 6, 1981, the First National Bank of Mason City, now known as Norwest Bank Mason City, N.A., (Norwest) issued a letter of credit to Carl Hankenson, d/b/a Hank Oil Co., Inc., Clear Lake, Iowa. The letter of credit contained the following language:

This Commercial Letter of Credit shall remain in force for a period of six (6) months from August 5, 1981, and will be available to Conoco, Inc. on its sight draft for 100% invoice cost to be accompanied by a letter of demand from Conoco, Inc. and supported by commercial invoices.

In addition, the letter of credit incorporated the provisions of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision), International Chamber of Commerce Brochure No. 290, which provides that a letter of credit may be either revocable or irrevocable, and that absent clear indication of irrevocability, such credits are deemed revocable. The means by which irrevocability may be indicated are not spelled out in Brochure No. 290. The brochure does not require that the word “irrevocable” be used but only that the words “clearly indicate” that the letter is indeed irrevocable.

On November 12,1981, Norwest revoked the letter of credit issued to Hankenson. On November 13, 1981, Conoco presented its sight draft and supporting documents to the bank, and payment was refused. Cono[*471] co sued Norwest for wrongful dishonor. The district court [1] entered summary judgment in favor of Conoco, finding that the letter of credit was irrevocable. Norwest appeals that finding.

Neither party questions the incorporation of Brochure No. 290 into the letter of credit. What is questioned is whether the language above quoted from the letter of credit constitutes a clear indication of irrevocability as required by Brochure No. 290. Norwest argues that since letters of credit are required to state an expiration date, the quoted language designates an expiration date, and nothing more. Basing its position on Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F.Supp. 1133 (D.C.N.D.Ill.1976), Norwest contends that the same meaning is conveyed by the phrase “will expire” as is conveyed by the phrase “shall remain in force.” This cannot be the case. “Shall” is a term of legal significance, in that it is mandatory or imperative, not merely precatory. A requirement that a document “shall remain in force” is quite different from a requirement that a document “will expire.” Language such as “will expire” is an indication of the date on which the credit must expire, but does not require that the credit necessarily remain effective until that date. While the quoted language from the Hankenson letter of credit fulfills the requirement of an expiration date, it clearly also requires that the letter of credit remain effective until that date is reached. It is a matter of contract interpretation whether the language contained in the letter “clearly indicates” that the credit is irrevocable. The term “in force” is defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at page * 887 as meaning “... valid, operative, binding.” When the words “in force” are assigned this ordinary dictionary meaning, which is necessary in the interpretation of a contract, there is a clear indication of irrevocability which satisfies the requirements of Brochure No. 290. This indication is further strengthened by the succeeding language, that the credit “will be available to Conoco, Inc. ...” In a revocable letter of credit, such language would be meaningless. While scant legal precedent exists for determining whether the language at issue constitutes a clear indication of irrevocability, common sense dictates that it does. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Donald E. O’Brien, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.