No. 84-7366, 769 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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No. 84-7366, 769 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lay v. Local Union 689 of the Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO (mdd, 2019-07-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lay v. Local Union 689 of the Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO
D. Maryland · 2019 · confidence medium
It is only at this point that the employee is cognizant of any alleged breach of the duty owed him by the union.’” Id. at 460 . (quoting Haynes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hudson v. City of Riviera Beach
S.D. Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Of course, as Defendants suggest, “judicial review of the decision rendered by [a] grievance procedure is quite narrow” and that “ordinarily the worker will be bound by the result.” Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Capo v. Florida Public Employees Council 79
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Therefore, “a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation accrues at the point where the grievance procedure has been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee’s disadvantage.” Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coppage v. United States Postal Service
M.D. Ga. · 2000 · confidence medium
Similarly, in Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., an employee “was notified by letter dated June 17, 1982, that the union would not take his claim to arbitration.” Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ryder v. Philip Morris, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 1996 · confidence medium
There is some support in the Fourth Circuit for Ryder’s claim that a “ ‘cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation accrues at the point where the grievance procedure has been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee’s disadvantage.’ ” Dement, 845 F.2d at 460 6 (quoting Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Keller v. District Lodge No. 19, International Ass'n of MacHinists Workers
S.D.W. Va · 1995 · confidence medium
It is only as this point that the employee is cognizant of any alleged breach of the duty owed him by the union.’ Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rasheed v. International Paper Co.
S.D. Ala. · 1993 · confidence medium
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 , 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059 , 47 L.Ed.2d 231, 245 (1976); Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985), reh’g den., 782 F.2d 180 (1986); Diaz v, Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McLinn v. Boeing Co.
D. Kan. · 1989 · confidence medium
Local 618, 754 F.2d 800, 803 (8th Cir.1985) (Hybrid claims “accrue on the date the employee’s grievance is finally rejected and his contractual remedies are exhausted.”); Hayes v. Reynold Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (“[A] cause of action for the breach of the duty of fair representation accrues at the point where the grievance procedure has been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee’s disadvantage.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Teamsters Local 71
W.D.N.C. · 1989 · confidence medium
It is only at this point that the employee is cognizant of any alleged breach of the duty owed him by the union.” Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fajardo v. Foodtown Supermarkets
D.N.J. · 1988 · confidence medium
Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R. Dement J.H. Hines V.N. Meekins L.A. Koenig v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company United Transportation Union (2×)
4th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
It is only at this point that the employee is cognizant of any alleged breach of the duty owed him by the union." Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Galindo v. Stoody Co.
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
See also Proudfoot v. Seafarer’s International Union, 779 F.2d 1558, 1559 (11th Cir.1986) ("hybrid" action against union and employer accrues when employee learns that the “grievance procedure was exhausted or otherwise broke down to the employee’s disadvantage.”); Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (duty of fair representation claim based on merger of seniority rosters did not accrue until "grievance procedure has been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee’s disadvantage.”); cf. International Association of Machinists and Ae…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcus Galindo v. Stoody Company, and Local 803, Allied Industrial Workers of America, Afl-Cio, Defendant- Marcus Galindo v. Stoody Company, and International Union of Allied Industrial Workers of America, Afl-Cio
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
This cut-off date is not challenged on appeal 2 But cf. Barina v. Gulf Trading and Transportation Co., 726 F.2d 560 , 562 n. 2 (9th Cir.1984) (suggesting that a claim does not accrue until the last date at which the union could have brought the grievance under the collective bargaining agreement) 3 See also Proudfoot v. Seafarer's International Union, 779 F.2d 1558, 1559 (11th Cir.1986) ("hybrid" action against union and employer accrues when employee learns that the "grievance procedure was exhausted or otherwise broke down to the employee's disadvantage."); Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Patricia Joyce Coppage v. U.S. Postal Service
11th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 , 887 n. 7 (11th *1206 Cir.1985) (“Because questions as to the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation usually arise in an action to overturn an unfavorable arbitration award, knowledge of the union’s breach can normally be attributed to the employee at the moment when he learns of the unfavorable award.”); see also Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that the grievance process came to a halt when an employee “was notified by letter dated June 17, 1982, that the union would not take h…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Humphress v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
W.D. Ky. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hill v. Georgia Power Co.
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1985), rev’ing 585 F.Supp. 508 (N.D.Ala.1984); Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ralph Hill v. Georgia Power Company United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 144 Afl-Cio and Superior Electric Company, Walter Wadley v. Georgia Power Company Construction Production & Maintenance Workers, Local No. 1210, Afl-Cio and Superior Electric Company
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1985), rev'ing 585 F.Supp. 508 (N.D.Ala.1984); Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.1985). 16 When the cause of action accrued is normally a question of fact, Samples, supra at 887 , though in certain instances the issue can be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
No. 84-7366
1520.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 3, 1985.
769 F.2d 1520
Published

769 F.2d 1520

120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,709

Donald W. HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Sheffield, Alabama, and
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
Union 320 and 320 A, B, C, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-7366.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 3, 1985.

Stanley E. Munsey, Rosser & Munsey, Tuscumbia, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

Rhea Boyd & Rhea, Donald H. Rhea, Gadsden, Ala., for Local 320.

Vincent McAlister, Almon McAlister Ashe Baccus & Smith, Tuscumbia, Ala., for Reynolds.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before TJOFLAT and VANCE, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS[*], District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

BACKGROUND

1

Appellant Donald Hayes was employed at the Reynolds Metals plant ("Reynolds") in Listerhill, Alabama and was a member of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 320 ("Union"). On February 26, 1982 unit employees voted to combine two job classifications on the seniority roster governing Hayes' employment. Hayes alleges that this consolidation adversely affected his seniority status in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Reynolds. On March 4, 1982 Hayes was laid off by Reynolds. On the same date, Hayes filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Hayes pursued his grievance through the preliminary stages of the grievance mechanism. At each stage, the Union and Reynolds failed to reach an agreement satisfactory to Hayes. Finally, Hayes requested the Union to take his grievance to the final stage--arbitration. The Union executive board voted unanimously not to process Hayes' grievance in arbitration and notified him in a letter dated June 17, 1982.

2

On September 16, 1982, Hayes filed suit in the district court alleging a violation by Reynolds of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, and a violation by the Union of its "duty of fair representation." The district court dismissed Hayes' complaint against both Reynolds and the Union as barred by the statute of limitations. 585 F.Supp. 508 (N.D.Ala.1984), this appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

3

In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate statute of limitations for "hybrid" actions (i.e., cases involving both claims against the employer under section 301 and claims against the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation) is six months.[1] The district court reasoned that regardless of whether Hayes' cause of action had accrued on February 26, 1982 (the day Union members voted to consolidate the seniority lists), or March 4, 1982 (the day Hayes was laid off), six months had passed by the time Hayes filed his lawsuit on September 16, 1982. The court held, therefore, that DelCostello required the dismissal of Hayes' case. Because we believe that under DelCostello Hayes' cause of action accrued on June 17, 1982, when the Union notified Hayes that it would not arbitrate his grievance, we reverse the district court's ruling and remand for trial.

4

"To prevail against either the company or the Union, [Hayes] must show not only that [his] discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059-60, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Where, as here, the collective bargaining agreement contains a grievance procedure, the aggrieved worker also must ordinarily exhaust his contractual remedies before suing in federal court. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Judicial review of the decision rendered by the grievance procedure is quite narrow; ordinarily, the worker will be bound by the result. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The Supreme Court recognized the need for the hybrid cause of action, however, because the strict rule of limited judicial review "works an unacceptable injustice when the union representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. Hayes' hybrid action presents such a dual claim. He alleges both that Reynolds improperly discharged him and that the Union failed in its duty to represent him by refusing to take his complaint to arbitration with Reynolds.

5

The district court accurately understood DelCostello to hold that a "plaintiff must file his suit within six months from the date upon which his 'cause of action accrued' " (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294). The district court erred, however, when it stated that "[t]he accrual here took place when the merger of the seniority rosters became effective and certainly no later than plaintiff's termination." As explained above, a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation accrues at the point where the grievance procedure has been exhausted or otherwise breaks down to the employee's disadvantage. It is only at this point that the employee is cognizant of any alleged breach of the duty owed him by the union. This is, of course, fully consistent with the employee's obligation to make use of the grievance procedure provided by the agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85, 87 S.Ct. 903, 913-14, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653, 85 S.Ct. at 616. For Hayes, the grievance process ended on June 17, 1982, when the Union formally notified him of its decision not to arbitrate. He would have six months from that date to bring a hybrid claim.[2]

6

Our determination is consistent with the rule in this circuit. In Rogers v. LockheedGeorgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed.2d 227 (1984), this court held that the DelCostello statute of limitations applied retroactively to hybrid causes of action which had accrued prior to that decision date. After announcing its decision, the Rogers court went on to decide the six cases which had been consolidated for review. In all six cases, the court measured the six month statute of limitations from the date on which the employee's grievance was rejected (or not processed by the union) to the date on which the plaintiff had filed suit in district court. Rogers, 720 F.2d at 1250. See also Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 887 n. 4 (11th Cir.1985); Hand v. International Chemical Workers Union, 712 F.2d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir.1983), modifying 681 F.2d 1308 (11th Cir.1982) (amended in light of DelCostello).[3]

7

In light of the foregoing, the district court's judgment must be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits of Hayes' hybrid action.[4] Hayes was notified by letter dated June 17, 1982, that the union would not take his claim to arbitration. At that point, the grievance process came to a halt. He filed suit on September 16, 1982, three months later, well within the statute of limitations announced in DelCostello.

8

REVERSED and REMANDED.

*

Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation

1

The Court adopted the six month statute of limitations for hybrid actions from section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b), which provides complainants six months to bring charges of unfair labor practices before the NLRB. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2285, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)

2

Our decision is completely consistent with the factual outcome in DelCostello. DelCostello involved two consolidated cases. In the first, the Court dated petitioner DelCostello's claim from the time the union-management grievance committee rendered its decision, not from his date of discharge. The Court likewise calculated the accrual of the cause of action in the second case from the date that the arbitrator issued his award. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. It is thus clear that under DelCostello a hybrid cause of action under Sec. 301/duty of fair representation accrues at the point when the grievance procedure comes to a halt, not when the alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement occurred

3

Benson v. General Motors Corp., 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.1983), relied upon by the district court, does not require a contrary ruling. Benson recognized the six month limitations rule established in DelCostello, but considered only the question of when the employees knew or should have known of their loss of seniority. Id. at 863. The court never mentioned the existence of a grievance procedure nor discussed the employees' use of one. Id. at 863-64. The issue of a breakdown of the mandatory grievance process was not before the Benson court

4

The parties have briefed another issue: whether the collective bargaining agreement required the union to take Hayes' case to arbitration. After deciding that the statute of limitations barred Hayes' hybrid claim, the court discussed whether "plaintiff still has a distinct cause of action created by the Union's failure to take his grievance to arbitration." The district court strongly implied that the agreement did not require arbitration of all employee grievances, but dismissed Hayes' hybrid claim solely on statute of limitation grounds. The apparent conflict between the express language of the collective bargaining agreement and the defendants' contention presents a triable issue. Thus, we remand for adjudication of all the issues, including whether the Union breached its duty to Hayes because the collective bargaining agreement required it to take all grievances to arbitration