Rose JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Appellee, 780 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Rose JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Appellee, 780 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: (PC) Develter v. Craven (caed, 2023-03-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" (PC) Develter v. Craven
E.D. Cal. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 26 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 27 (1989); see also Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2018) (pro se allegations that police officers “beat the crap out of” plaintiff and caused him severe injury 28 enough to support a legally cognizable claim under § 1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brown v. Miller
N.D. Cal. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id. at 255 . 22 Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a claim for which the plaintiff 23 bears the burden of proof, the defendant need only point to the plaintiff’s failure “to make a 24 showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the plaintiff’s] case.” 25 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 26 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that, “if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, 27 either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative de…
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unempl.ins.rep. Cch 16,549 Rose Johnson
v.
Margaret Heckler
85-5206.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mar 10, 1986.
780 F.2d 26
Ethel Schaen, St. Paul, Minn., for appellant., Mimi H. Leahy, Asst. Regional Atty. of the Dept. of Health and Human Services, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Arnold, Henley, Gibson.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Rose Johnson appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her petition for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982), as untimely. We reverse and remand.

On December 14, 1984, the district court reversed the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ denial of Johnson’s claim for supplemental security income and remanded to the Secretary for calculation of benefits. On January 31, 1985, no appeal having been filed by the government, Johnson filed for attorney’s fees under the EAJA. After the government objected on grounds of timeliness, the district court dismissed Johnson’s petition. Before this court, the government does not contest the timeliness issue.

In Feldpausch v. Heckler, 763 F.2d 229 (6th Cir.1985), and Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants v. Pierce, 755 F.2d 177 (D.C.Cir.1985), petitions for fees filed more than thirty days after judgment, but before the government’s time for appeal had elapsed, were held to be timely. We cited these cases with approval in Keas-ler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir.1985).

Whether Johnson is entitled to an attorney’s fee and all the issues arising from this request are for the district court to determine in the first instance.

We reverse the district court’s order dismissing the petition for fees and remand to the district court for consideration of the issues arising from Johnson’s petition for fees.