Nadkos, Inc. v. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention Grp. (NY 2019). · Go Syfert
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Nadkos, Inc.
v.
Preferred Contractors Insurance Company Risk Retention Group
37.
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 11, 2019.
Published

State of New York OPINION Court of Appeals This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

No. 37 Nadkos, Inc., Appellant, v. Preferred Contractors Insurance Company Risk Retention Group LLC, Respondent, et al., Defendant. S. Dwight Stephens, for appellant. Diane Bucci, for respondent. RIVERA, J.: On this appeal, we conclude that a general business practice of failing to promptly disclose coverage within the meaning of Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6) does not include violations of the timely liability disclaimer requirement of Insurance Law § 3420 (d) (2).

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-2- No. 37

The genesis of this appeal is in an insurance coverage dispute between plaintiff

Nadkos, Inc., the general contractor in an underlying personal injury action by an employee of Nadkos’s subcontractor, and defendant Preferred Contractors Insurance Company Risk

Retention Group LLC (PCIC), the subcontractor’s general liability insurer. PCIC is a risk retention group (RRG) charted in Montana and doing business in New York. An RRG is

an issuer of insurance owned and operated by insureds who work in the same industry and are exposed to similar liability risks (Wadsworth v Allied Professionals Ins. Co., 748 F3d

100, 102 n 1 [2d Cir 2014]; 15 USC § 3901 [a] [4]).

The PCIC policy named Nadkos as an additional insured, extending coverage to

Nadkos for liability related to the “ongoing operations” of the subcontractor and other

members of the risk retention group. After PCIC disclaimed coverage based on certain exclusions in the policy,1 Nadkos sought a declaratory judgment that the policy obligated

PCIC to defend and indemnify Nadkos in the employee’s personal injury action. Nadkos

also maintained—without objection from PCIC—that the disclaimer was untimely. Thus, according to Nadkos’s interpretation of Insurance Law § 3420 (d) (2), the disclaimer was void.

PCIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 3420 (d) (2) is inapplicable to a nondomiciliary RRG. Nadkos then cross-moved for summary judgment, -3- No. 37

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asserting that Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6), which undisputedly applies to foreign RRGs, cross-references section 3420 (d) and therefore subjects PCIC to the timely disclaimer requirements of section 3420 (d) (2). As such, PCIC is barred from asserting all coverage defenses as applied to Nadkos. Supreme Court granted PCIC summary judgment dismissing the complaint, denied Nadkos’s cross-motion and made a declaration in favor of PCIC.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that an insurance coverage disclaimer is

not a disclosure of coverage within the meaning of Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6), and therefore section 3420 (d) (2) does not apply to nondomiciliary PCIC (Nadkos, Inc. v

Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group LLC, 162 AD3d 7, 11-12 [1st Dept 2018]).

We granted Nadkos leave to appeal (32 NY3d 905 [2018]).2

We begin our analysis with the applicable insurance provisions of the state’s statutory and regulatory framework.3 The Legislature promulgated the Risk Retention -4- No. 37

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Groups and Purchasing Groups Act, codified in Article 59 of the Insurance Law, “to regulate the formation and/or operation in this state of risk retention groups” (Insurance

Law § 5901). As relevant to this appeal, Insurance Law § 5904 provides that nondomiciliary RRGs doing business in New York “shall comply with the unfair claims settlement practices provisions as set forth in [section 2601] of this chapter, and any regulations promulgated thereunder” (Insurance Law § 5904 [d]).4

In turn, Insurance Law § 2601 (a) lists acts by insurers that, “if committed without

just cause and performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, shall constitute unfair settlement practices.” Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6) includes, “failing to promptly disclose coverage pursuant to” Insurance Law §§ 3420 (d) or (f) (2)

(A) (Insurance Law § 2601 [a] [6]).

Insurance Law § 3420 (d) contains two paragraphs. The first, paragraph (d) (1), requires insurers to respond to requests for information by insureds or injured individuals.

Specifically, it mandates that insurers inform the requesting party, within firm statutory

deadlines, whether the insured has a particular policy, the coverage limits of that policy, and whether additional information is needed to identify the policy (see Insurance Law

§ 3420 [d] [1]). The second, paragraph (d) (2), provides that if “an insurer shall disclaim liability or deny coverage . . . it shall give written notice as soon as is reasonably possible” -5- No. 37

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(Insurance Law § 3420 [d] [2]). Like section 3420 (d) (1), section 3420 (f) (2) (A) requires insurers to inform insureds of the limits of coverage for uninsured/underinsured motorist claims (see Insurance Law § 3420 [f] [2] [A]).

The penalties for violations of the disclosure mandates in sections 3420 (d) (1) and 3420 (f) (2) (A) differ from those imposed for violations of the disclaimer requirements in section 3420 (d) (2). While an insurer is subject to a monetary penalty for failure to timely disclose in accordance with section 3420 (d) (1) (Insurance Law § 2601 [c]), its failure to timely disclaim liability or deny coverage is considered an unduly delayed notice that results in per se prejudice to the insured and limits the defenses an insurer could raise against an insured’s claim (see KeySpan Gas E. Corp. v Munich Reins. Am., Inc., 23 NY3d

583, 590 [2014]).

Whether PCIC’s disclaimer is regulated by the Insurance Law turns on whether the reference to an insurer’s failure “to promptly disclose coverage” in section 2601 (a) (6) includes the timely disclaimer requirement of section 3420 (d) (2). Nadkos argues that section 2601 (a) (6) cites to section 3420 (d) without limitation, and thus encompasses both paragraphs (d) (1) and (d) (2). According to Nadkos, if the Legislature intended to limit

section 2601 (a) (6) to a specific subparagraph of section 3420 (d), it knew how to do so, as demonstrated by the cross-reference in section 2601 (a) (6) to a specific subparagraph of another provision—3420 (f) (2) (A). PCIC responds that section 2601 (a) (6) is intended to impose the disclosure requirements of sections 3420 (d) (1) and 3420 (f) (2) (A). Section -6- No. 37

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3420 (d) (2) is distinguishable as it requires insurers to timely disclaim liability or deny coverage.

We reject the interpretation advocated by Nadkos, and adopted by the dissent, because the prohibition on an unfair claim settlement practice based on a failure to promptly disclose coverage encompasses the mandates of section 3420 (d) (1), not (d) (2).5

“When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, a court’s primary consideration ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 31 NY3d 523, 528 [2018], quoting

Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000]). We have long held that “[t]he statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent” and that a court “should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp.

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-7- No. 37 v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006]). “In the absence of a statutory definition, ‘we construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonly understood meaning, and in that

connection have regarded dictionary definitions as useful guideposts in determining the meaning of a word or phrase’ ” (Yaniveth R. v LTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186, 192 [2016], quoting Rosner v Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 96 NY2d 475, 479-480 [2001]). It is also our well-established rule that “statutory language should be harmonized, giving effect to each component and avoiding a construction that treats a word or phrase as superfluous” (Lemma, 31 NY3d at 528).

The text of Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6) plainly qualifies its reference to Insurance

Law § 3420, limiting it to an insurer’s failure “to promptly disclose coverage pursuant to” sections 3420 (d) and (f) (2) (A). In other words, section 2601 (a) (6) applies solely to those portions of subsections 3420 (d) and (f) that require a prompt disclosure of coverage- specific information. The term “disclose” is not defined in the Insurance Law, nor is it mentioned in sections 2601 and 3420 (d), but that does not render, as the dissent maintains

(dissenting op at 17-20), these two sections ambiguous or their interplay unclear.

The term “disclose” generally means “[t]o make (something) known or public; to show (something) after a period of inaccessibility or of being unknown; to reveal” (Black’s

Law Dictionary [10th ed 2014], disclose). To “disclaim,” on the other hand, is “[t]o state, usually formally, that one has no responsibility for, knowledge of, or involvement with

(something); to make a disclaimer about . . . [t]o renounce or disavow a legal claim to” -8- No. 37

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(Black’s Law Dictionary [10th ed 2014], disclaim).6 Section 3420 (d) (1) is comprised of three subparagraphs that outline an insurer’s requirement to disclose coverage information upon request. Section 3420 (d) (1) (A) provides that the subsequent subparagraphs apply only to certain policies (Insurance Law § 3420 [d] [1] [A]).7 In turn, subparagraph (B)

requires an insurer to confirm the existence and limits of coverage for an applicable policy, when such information is requested by an injured person or claimant (Insurance Law

§ 3420 [d] [1] [B]). In furtherance of this goal to reveal an existing policy’s coverage, subparagraph (C) requires the insurer to request additional information from the injured person, or claimant, if necessary to identify an applicable policy (Insurance Law § 3420 -9- No. 37

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[d] [1] [C]). By requiring insurers to confirm the existence of an applicable liability policy

and to specify the limits of its coverage, the requirement in section 3420 (d) (1) falls within the general meaning of a disclosure. Conversely, an insurer does not disclose coverage by merely notifying the insured that it is not liable or will not provide coverage—a notification required by section 3420 (d) (2).8

The dissent’s embellished version of Nadkos’s claim is as unpersuasive as the original (dissenting op at 17-20). To disclose coverage is to make known the existence of a policy, which once disclosed may lead to litigation regarding whether the insured or other claimant is entitled to a payout under the terms of the policy. Indeed, Insurance Law

§§ 3420 (d) (1) (B) and (C) respectively impose 60 and 45-day deadlines for notification, which promotes expeditious resolution of potential claims. While it is also useful for the insured and other claimant to know “as soon as reasonably possible” whether the insurer will disclaim liability or deny coverage in accordance with (d) (2), the dissent is incorrect that there is no benefit to the claimant from timely notice under (d) (1) that the insurer has

“identif[ied] a liability insurance policy that may be relevant to the claim” (Insurance Law

§ 3420 [d] [1] [C]).

Indeed, if the Legislature intended Nadkos’s interpretation as adopted by the dissent, it would have used simpler, more direct language of this alleged more expansive construction. For example, the drafters could have described this type of unfair claim - 10 - No. 37 settlement practice in either of the following ways: “failing to promptly notify the insured pursuant to section 3420 (d) and section 3420 (f) (2) (A),” or “violating section 3420 (d) and section 3420 (f) (2) (A).”9

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The statutory structure also supports interpreting the confirmation requirements of section 3420 (d) (1) as distinct from the timely disclaimer of liability and denial of coverage mandated in section 3420 (d) (2). First, as the Appellate Division observed, if section 2601

(a) (6) both encompasses the disclosure requirement of paragraph (d) (1) and disclaimer requirement of (d) (2), then the use of the term “disclosure” in section 2601 (a) (6) would be superfluous. Such an interpretation violates the rule of construction that “words must be “harmonize[d]” and read together to avoid surplusage” (Andryeyeva v New York Health

Care, Inc., —NY3d—, —, 2019 WL 1333030 at *8 [2019]; Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386, 393 [2017] [“a statute should be construed to avoid rendering any of its provisions -2- No. 37 legislature has deemed it vitally important that your insurer answer that question right away. Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) includes the following “untimely disclaimer” rule:

If under a liability policy issued or delivered in this state, an insurer shall disclaim liability or deny coverage for death or bodily injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident or any other type of accident occurring within this state, it shall give written notice as soon as is reasonably possible of such disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage to the insured and the injured person or any other claimant.

Thus, when you ask your insurer whether you are covered, your insurer must answer you promptly in writing, yes or no. If your insurer does not answer “as soon as is reasonably

possible,” your insurer is stripped of most of the coverage exclusion clauses in the insurance policy that could otherwise have allowed it to deny you coverage (First Fin. Ins.

Co. v Jetco Contr. Corp., 1 NY3d 64, 68 [2003], accord Allstate Ins. Co. v Gross, 27 NY2d

263, 270 [1970]).

New York’s untimely disclaimer rule exists to promote fairness to policyholders and accident victims alike. Ordinary people cannot find out whether they are covered by their insurance policies without their insurer’s help, because most insurance policies are incomprehensible to nonlawyers (and some, even to lawyers). If policyholders do not know whether their insurer will provide coverage, they cannot know whether they must find their own lawyer, how much they can pay that lawyer, or how much they can offer to settle a

threatened or pending lawsuit. Victims of accidents are also stuck, because the policyholder’s entire response to a lawsuit—including whether anything beyond the assets -3- No. 37 of the defendant is available to satisfy a judgment and what lawyer will defend the suit— depends on whether the policyholder is covered.[1]

Because insurer prevarication is unfair to both victims and policyholders, almost every jurisdiction in the United States provides by statute that an insurance company’s regular failure promptly to affirm or deny coverage is an “unfair claims settlement

practice.” I say “almost” because now New York is no longer among them. Today, the majority pulls New York out of the mainstream, and declares that contrary to the national consensus, common sense and the plain text of our insurance laws, the legislature intended to make an insurer’s refusal to confirm or deny coverage promptly not an unfair claims practice, all by adopting an amendment the text of which did exactly that.

Accordingly, every insurer operating in this State, foreign and domestic, risk retention group and multi-line casualty insurer, from Lloyds of London to the smallest captive local insurer, will not be liable for extra-contractual damages for unfair claims handling and/or bad faith practices because of late disclaimer, and damages for late disclaimer will be limited to policy limits—in New York and no other state. That anomalous result rests on the majority’s conclusion that when the legislature said

“subsection (d)” it did not mean “subsection (d).” The majority reaches that conclusion by misreading the surrounding words based on a flimsy legislative history—causing it to -4- No. 37 undermine a 2008 law whose very purpose was to eliminate judicially-imposed pro-insurer spin on New York insurance laws.

Further, the majority’s decision unsettles New York’s insurance law. Even if an insurer’s persistent failure timely to confirm or deny coverage is not an unfair claims practice, Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to every “liability policy issued or delivered in this state.” The policy in this case is a “liability policy . . . delivered in this state.” It is also uncontested—at least for our purposes—that the insurance company, PCIC, did not deny coverage to Nadkos within a reasonable time. Therefore, PCIC cannot rely on a policy exclusion to deny Nadkos coverage.

This case should end there. However, the majority ignores the statutory text and declares that Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) does not apply to foreign risk retention groups.

The parties’ principal dispute on this appeal is that the above result is required by a federal law, the Liability Risk Retention Act (“LRRA”), which exempts foreign-chartered risk

retention groups from state laws that “make unlawful, or regulate, directly or indirectly, the operation of [such] risk retention groups” like PCIC (15 USC § 3902[a]). The majority expressly declines to consider this argument (majority op at 6 n 5) and instead finds that

Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) does not apply here because the phrase “liability policy issued or delivered in this state” (Insurance Law § 3420[d][2]) means only “liability policies issued or delivered by insurers other than foreign RRGs.” Section 3420(d)(2) by its terms applies to all liability insurers operating in this state. To conclude that all insurers means all insurers other than foreign RRGs, the majority turns to Article 59’s list of state laws -5- No. 37 applicable to foreign RRGs, even though that list does not exempt foreign RRGs from any other state insurance laws, does not purport to be an exclusive list of New York insurance laws applicable to RRGs, and could not reasonably be interpreted as such. The majority’s

refusal to address how to determine what New York insurance laws other than those in Article 59’s list apply to RRGs threatens to undermine New York’s ability to protect policyholders and victims and seriously undermines New York’s status as the nation’s premiere insurance law jurisdiction—all because the majority admittedly avoids the federal issue presented by the parties and relied on by the Appellate Division.

I

I agree with the majority’s recitation of the relevant facts, and briefly summarize them here to place them in the proper context by taking into account the LRRA. Partners

LLC, a property developer, hired Nadkos, Inc. as a general contractor to construct a building in Brooklyn. Nadkos hired Chesakl Enterprises Inc. as a subcontractor to perform steelwork. As is common in the construction industry, Nadkos’ contract with Chesakl required Chesakl to maintain general liability insurance naming Partners LLC and Nadkos

as additional insureds. Chesakl became a member of PCIC, a “risk retention group” of other construction subcontractors, and in that capacity bought from PCIC a general liability insurance policy.

A risk retention group (“RRG”) is a liability insurance company owned solely by its insureds. RRGs offer commercial liability insurance for the mutual benefit of those owner-insureds, as a form of collective self-insurance. They make up a relatively small -6- No. 37 fraction of the liability insurance market overall, and are largely employed in industries

with specialized risks that are not well-addressed by conventional liability insurers. The most common kind of RRG is formed by medical practitioners to provide medical malpractice liability insurance (see generally Government Accountability Office, Report

No. 12-16: Risk Retention Groups [December 2011], https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-

12-16). RRGs are strictly “self-insurance” groups, however; they are forbidden from insuring non-members (15 USC § 3901[a][4][G]; Insurance Law § 5902[n][7]).

RRGs are governed by a different regulatory structure than applies to other kinds of insurance providers. Ordinarily, each state regulates all insurers—both those chartered inside and out of the state—in the same way. The LRRA2 provides, however, that self- insurance groups meeting the federal criteria for being an RRG can, essentially, pick any state in the U.S. to be their home or “chartering” state and be subject to comprehensive regulation by that state only (here, PCIC chose Montana as its chartering state). Congress

exempted RRGs from certain insurance regulations issued by non-chartering states, in response to concerns that such regulations would make it impracticable for RRGs to -7- No. 37

operate across state lines.3 However, Congress then made an exception to that exemption, allowing states to impose certain categories of regulations on foreign RRGs. Most relevant

here, Congress provided that “any State may require [a foreign RRG] to comply with the unfair claims settlement practices law of the State” (15 USC § 3902[a][1][A]).

Although PCIC included Nadkos as an additional insured, PCIC’s liability policy

contains many exclusions from personal injury coverage, among them an exclusion for claims arising from bodily injury incurred on “employees . . . working directly or indirectly on the insureds behalf.” Mirkamel Vafaev, a Chesakl employee, was injured and sued

Chesakl, Nadkos, Partners LLC, and Nadkos’s principal, Oleksander Nad, for negligence.

Chesakl and Nadkos tendered the claim to PCIC on August 27, 2015. PCIC timely

disclaimed Chesakl’s coverage five days later (counting the weekend), on September 1, 2015. However, it waited a full 81 days before responding to Nadkos, disclaiming coverage on the same basis as it disclaimed to Chesakl (the two letters are almost identical), on

November 16, 2015.

Under Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), an unexcused delay of 48 days or more in disclaiming coverage is unreasonable as a matter of law (First Fin. Ins. Co. v Jetco Contr.

-8- No. 37

Corp., 1 NY3d 64, 68 [2003]), and such a delay “precludes effective disclaimer or denial”

of coverage (Hartford Ins. Co. v Nassau County, 46 NY2d 1028, 1029 [1979]). However, PCIC argued that even if its disclaimer was untimely, the LRRA preempted Insurance Law

§ 3420(d)(2) as applied to it because it was an RRG. PCIC’s preemption argument depended on the further conclusion that New York’s untimely disclaimer rules are not part of the “unfair claims settlement practices law of the State,” which are expressly exempt from preemption (15 USC § 3902[a][1][A]). The courts below held that the LRRA preempted Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) as applied to PCIC, and we granted leave.

II

I begin with the question actually presented by this case: does Insurance Law §

3420(d)(2)—the untimely disclaimer rule—apply to liability insurance policies issued by

RRGs? The majority jumps to the separate question of whether violating Insurance Law §

3420(d)(2) is an unfair claims practice (majority op at 1), but that question is irrelevant if

Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to RRGs on its own terms.

It does. Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to every “liability policy issued or delivered in this state.” Note the disjunctive “or delivered,” which indicates that out-of- state insurance companies (those who “issue” the policies elsewhere) are subject to

Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) even if they merely “deliver” the policy “in this state,” as we held just last year (see Carlson v American Intern. Group, Inc., 30 NY3d 288, 305 [2017]).

All agree PCIC is an “insurer” and the policy in question is a “liability policy . . . delivered -9- No. 37 in this state.” Accordingly, Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to PCIC and to every insurer issuing or delivering insurance policies in New York.

The majority has no answer to the plain text of Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), which applies to RRGs on its own terms quite apart from its inclusion or non-inclusion as an unfair claims practice on the Insurance Law § 2601(a)(6) list (cf. majority op at 10 n 9).

The Appellate Division had an answer: because PCIC is an RRG chartered in another state, the LRRA (15 USC § 3902[a][1]) exempts it from Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) even though

non-RRGs must comply with that statute (162 AD3d 7, 12). I do not agree, as I explain later, but I acknowledge that the Appellate Division rested its holding on a ground that the majority ignores (majority op at 6 n 5). By affirming without explaining whether the Appellate Division’s preemption holding is right or wrong, the majority assumes away the plain language of Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), as well as the federal law that until now all

parties and courts agreed was determinative of the ultimate outcome, creating a chasm of uncertainty for RRGs, their policyholders and tort victims.

The majority chooses to avoid comment on the LRRA (majority op at 6 n 5) describing its decision as resting “solely on state law grounds” (id.). In another footnote, it appears to set out what those state law grounds are: declaring the matter “straightforward,” it begins by explaining that “Insurance Law Article 59 applies to [foreign] RRGs” (majority

op at 3 n 3). Presumably, the majority’s point is this: section 5904 contains a list of substantive provisions with which foreign RRGs must comply, whereas section 5903(a) provides that New York-chartered RRGs must comply with “all of the laws, regulations - 10 - No. 37 and orders applicable to property/casualty insurers organized and licensed in this state.”

The majority’s rationale, though not made explicit, must be that as a matter of state law all other insurance laws, including Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), do not apply to foreign RRGs unless those laws are listed in section 5904.4 That reasoning at least explains the majority’s

affirmance “solely on state law grounds” (majority op at 6 n 5). For at least two reasons, however, it cannot be the case that the list in section 5904 exempts foreign RRGs from all state insurance laws not on that list.

First, the conclusion that RRGs are exempt as a matter of state law from all state laws particularly regulating liability insurance except those on the Insurance Law § 5904

list creates tremendous uncertainty as to the applicability of a great many laws and regulations concerning liability insurance not on that list. That uncertainty is compounded by the majority’s express reservation of this question in a footnote (majority op at 4 n 4).

If Insurance Law § 5904 (or perhaps some other part of Article 59 not mentioned by the majority) exempts foreign RRGs from the otherwise-applicable Insurance Law §


1 The PCIC policy specifically excluded coverage of bodily injuries to “[a]ny ‘employee’ of any insured or any contractor or subcontractor working directly or indirectly on any insured’s behalf arising out of and in the course of . . . employment by the insured.” It also excluded any bodily injuries caused by “the acts or omissions of any independent contractor(s) or subcontractor(s) whether or not hired by the insured.”
2 The Appellate Division also concluded as a threshold matter that, to the extent permitted by the federal Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986, Insurance Law § 5904 (d) governs regulation of nondomiciliary RRGs, like PCIC, and expressly requires compliance with Insurance Law § 2601. Since we hold on state statutory grounds that foreign RRGs are not subject to section 3420 (d) (2) we do not opine on the merits of the parties’ federal preemption arguments. 3 The dissent engenders confusion as to our reasoning (dissenting op at 9-10), which proceeds along straightforward analytic steps grounded in well-established rules of statutory construction: Insurance Law Article 59 applies to RRGs; section 5904 expressly subjects nondomiciliary RRGs, like PCIC, to section 2601 (a) (6); section 2601 (a) (6) cross-references those provisions of section 3420 (d) that concern an RRG’s failure to timely disclose coverage, meaning conduct addressed in subparagraph (d) (1), not an RRG’s disclaimer of liability, which is subject to the separate requirements found in subparagraph (d) (2).
4 Contrary to the dissent’s claim, we do not decide the outer limits of our state’s regulation of nondomiciliary RRGs, such as whether nondomiciliary RRGs are subject only to Insurance Law § 5904 (dissenting op at 9-10). That question is not presented by this appeal.
5 Despite the dissent’s characterization of this Court’s reasoning, we do not “expressly decline[] to consider” a dispositive issue or avoid legal reasoning essential to resolution of this appeal (dissenting op at 4). Nadkos asserts that Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6) is properly read as making both sections 3420 (d) (1) and (d) (2) unfair claims settlement practices such that a nondomiciliary RRG’s required compliance with paragraph (d) (2) is not preempted by the LRRA. Thus, the question presented here turns on the meaning of our state law—either section 2601 (a) (6) refers to section 3420 (d) (2) or it does not. The federal Liability Risk Retention Act (“LRRA”) does not shed light on the answer to that specific question. Put another way, we may not avoid deciding whether a violation of section 3420 (d) (2) is an unfair claims settlement practice within the meaning of section 2601 (a) (6). Although it is analytically sound to first determine whether a party’s action is subject to a rule (LRRA preemption) before deciding whether an exception applies, we need not do so here. Given the procedural posture of this case, the parties’ agreement that the LRRA applies to PCIC and the challenged disclaimer notification, and our interpretation of the relevant Insurance Law sections, we may resolve the appeal solely on state law grounds. Our approach avoids the path taken by the dissent, of possibly misconstruing the LRRA’s expansive text and intended purpose with an overly narrow reading of the statute and its legislative history, or by disputing federal decisions to the contrary.
6 The dissent contends that “disclose” and “disclaim” are “words of technical or special meaning,” i.e., terms of art, and thus should not be given their ordinary meaning (dissenting op at 19 n 7, citing McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 233). That prescription has limited application and is not universally deployed in service of the ultimate judicial task of determining legislative purpose. The commentary to the authority upon which the dissent relies clarifies that the “intent of the Legislature however, is the controlling consideration in the construction of statutes; and when necessary to effectuate such intent the courts may construe words of technical meaning according to their popular sense” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 233, Commentary). Thus, our reliance on dictionary definitions here is fully in accord with established canons of construction. The dissent’s view that we place undue emphasis (dissenting op at 18) on analyzing textual differences ignores this Court’s role when called upon to interpret a statute. Our task is to dig into the weeds, parse minute details, and consider whether a legislative choice of a specific word or phrase evinces a particular intent. In view of the text and structural placement of the subject provisions, as well as the legislative history, discussed infra, Insurance Law § 2601 (a) (6) is properly read as distinguishing denials of coverage from the disclosure of coverage, as those terms are commonly understood. 7 The applicable policies must provide coverage for claims “arising out of the death or bodily injury of any person,” and constitute “automobile insurance” or “personal lines insurance” as defined in Insurance Law § 3425, or “used to satisfy a financial responsibility requirement imposed by law or regulation” (Insurance Law § 3420 [d] [1] [A]).
8 Given our conclusion that section 3420 (d) (2) does not apply to PCIC, we have no occasion to consider its alternative ground to affirm the Appellate Division’s decision, which, in any event, is unpreserved.
9 Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, we do no more than interpret the Insurance Law as written and as required under our rules of statutory construction. Far from unsettling our state’s insurance law (dissenting op at 4), or ignoring the statutory text (id.), our analysis conforms to well-established interpretive standards familiar to the parties and the insurance industry generally. We may not ignore those standards in response to the dissent’s disapproval of the legislative choice not to include section 3420 (d) (2) within the prohibitions of section 2601 (a) (6). Though the dissent refers to a national consensus about the fairest way to address insurer misconduct, this is a consideration for the Legislature—the body constitutionally charged with weighing policy responses to societal problems. Notwithstanding the invitation by the dissent, we cannot read a statute to reflect a meaning other than what the text permits simply because of a judicial preference for a different policy choice (see Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 53 [1975] [“The judiciary, however, is not called on to weigh the relative worth of data or arguments which may be marshaled on either side as to the wisdom of determinations made by the Legislature in the realm of policy”]). - 10 - - 11 - No. 37 superfluous”]). Second, the cross-reference to section 3420 (f) (2) (A), which in turn addresses disclosures of supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance coverage limits, supports our reading that section 2601 (a) (6) refers only to an insurer’s divulgence of the existence and limits of a specified policy—required in paragraph (d) (1)—and not to a blanket statement disclaiming liability or denying coverage—mandated by paragraph (d) (2). Therefore, we reject the invitation of Nadkos and the dissent to ignore the simple fact that the cross-reference in section 2601 (a) (6) is limited to those parts of sections 3420 (d) and 3420 (f) (2) (A) violated by an insurer’s repeated “fail[ure] to promptly disclose coverage.”10 Although the text and structure of these sections render it unnecessary to consider the legislative history, here it lends further support to our construction (see Kimmel, 29 NY3d at 397, quoting Matter of Tompkins County Support Collection Unit v Chamberlin, 99 NY2d 328, 335 [2003] [“the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored”]). The disclosure requirements in section 3420 (d) (1) were enacted as part of amendments made to the Insurance Law in 2008. Prior to the 2008 amendments, section 3420 (d) included only the timely disclaimer requirement now set forth in section 3420 (d) (2) (see Insurance Law § 3420 [d] [2002]). At the time, Insurance
10 See generally Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 Fla St U L Rev 625 [1999]). - 30 - - 31 - No. 37 adopted an amendment to the Uniform Unfair Trade Practices Act listing examples of unfair claims settlement practices. That list of “unfair claims settlement practices” included, at Section 4(9), “failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed” (Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1972-4 NAIC Proc. 490, 496 [1971] [adopting the revised and restated Model Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act]). That part of the Uniform Act remained unchanged until 1990, when it was broken out into a separate proposed Uniform Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (see National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act [1997], https://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-900.pdf).11 The 1971 Uniform Act, as well as its successors and predecessors, was and remains the national standard: today, 45 states, including Montana, declare that “failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed” is an unfair claims practice—notwithstanding common law waiver or estoppel doctrines.12
11 I would not hold that only those unfair claims practices laws that are listed in the 1971 NAIC Model Act, or similarly situated laws, would fall under the federal definition of “unfair claims settlement practices.” However, it is reasonable to conclude that the NAIC Model Act set out commonly understood instances of conduct constituting “unfair claims settlement practices,” which common understanding should be imputed to Congress absent contrary evidence in the LRRA or its legislative history. 12 Alaska Stat § 21.36.125; Ariz Rev Stat § 20-461; Ark Code Ann § 23-66-206; Cal Ins Code § 790.03; Colo Rev Stat. § 10-3-1104; Conn Gen Stat § 38a-816; Del Code Ann tit 18, § 2304; Fla Stat Ann § 626.9541; Ga Code Ann § 33-6-34; Haw Rev Stat § 431:13- 103; Idaho Code § 41-1329; Ill Comp Stat § 5/154.6; Ind Code § 27-4-1-4.5; Iowa Code § 507B.4; Kan Stat Ann § 40-2404; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 304.12-230; La Rev Stat Ann - 31 - - 32 - No. 37 Congress deliberately provided that foreign RRGs would not be exempt from “the unfair claims settlement practices law of the state.” Congress presumably knew that virtually all states had an unfair claims settlement practice law that forbade “failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed.” Thus, Congress did not intend the LRRA to preempt Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2), which requires—in common with almost all other states—that an insurer must “give written notice as soon as is reasonably possible of such disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage to the insured.” New York has interpreted the language of its untimely disclaimer law as being stricter than similarly-worded statutes in some other states (see e.g. Liberty Ins. Corp. v Tinplate Purch. Corp., 643 F Supp 2d 406, 416–417 [D NJ 2010] [noting that under New Jersey law an insured must show prejudice arising from the unreasonable delay in disclaiming coverage]; Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v Insurance Co. of State of Pa., 231 Conn. 756, 777-778 [1995] [holding insurance company’s delayed denial of coverage did not waive exclusion defense, and rejecting insured’s reliance on New York’s statutory disclaimer requirements]), but Congress knew states would have § 22:1214; Md Code Ann, Ins § 27-304; Mass Gen Laws Ann 176D § 3; Mich Comp Laws § 500.2026; Minn. Stat. § 72A.20; Mo. Rev Stat § 375.936; Mont Code Ann § 33-18-201; Neb Rev Stat Ann § 44-1540; Nev Rev Stat § 686A.310; NH Rev Stat Ann § 417:4; NJ Stat Ann § 17:29B-4; NM Stat Ann § 59A-16-20; NC Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15; ND Cent Code Ann 26.1-04-03; Or Rev Stat § 746.230; 40 Pa Cons Stat § 1171.5; RI Gen Laws Ann § 27-9.1-4; SD Codified Law § 58-33-67; Tenn Code Ann § 56-8-105; Tex Ins Code Ann art 21.21; Utah Code Ann § 31A-26-303; Vt Stat Ann tit 8, § 4724; Va Code Ann § 38.2-510; Wash Admin Code 284-30-330; WVa Code § 33-11-4; Wyo Stat Ann. § 26-13- 124. In addition to 45 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have adopted substantially identical language in their unfair claims practices law (26 L.P.R.A. § 2716a; DC Code Ann § 31-2231.17). - 32 - - 33 - No. 37 heterogeneous unfair claims practices laws, or at least heterogeneous interpretations of unfair claims practices laws, and nonetheless exempted them wholesale from preemption. By adopting the exclusion in 15 USC § 3903(a)(1)(A), Congress decided that in the realm of unfair claims practices laws, the normal interplay of state law as enshrined in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 USC § 1011, et seq.) would apply to RRGs notwithstanding the burden divergent state regulation always places on interstate businesses (see generally Altria Group Inc v. Good, 555 US 70, 77 [2008] [“the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States” (internal citations omitted)]). Congress’s decision also made good policy sense. The point of RRGs is to allow the formation of entities to provide insurance coverage where conventional insurers had not offered coverage at reasonable prices, both so that coverage would be available and as a way to inject competition into markets increasingly marked by a small number of quasi- monopolistic carriers setting premiums with little relation to the underlying risk profile involved (see HR Rept 97-190 at 22; S Rept 97-172 at 2-3). That purpose is defeated if an RRG refuses to pay covered claims, or delays determining coverage, or otherwise deprives the insured of the full benefit of its liability insurance coverage. Congress had no interest in policing bad insurer behavior itself, and was keenly aware that (in 1981, when the unfair claims settlement practices exemption was adopted) most RRGs were chartered in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, which were not prepared to serve as general watchdogs - 33 - - 34 - No. 37 for the burgeoning RRG sector Congress hoped to create (HR Rept 97-190 at 5-6, 11; S Rept 97-172 at 9-10). Instead, Congress looked to the traditional enforcers of unfair claims practices law: the nonchartering states where claimants were based. Once we accept that the scope of federal preemption is determined by Congress’ intent and that Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) falls into the LRRA’s exemption as an “unfair claims settlement practices law of the State,” it becomes irrelevant to the analysis that New York has applied its unfair claims settlement practice law in a manner different from other states. Congress knew full well that different states had different ways of going about unfair claims settlement practice enforcement and was content to let them make that choice, provided that their enforcement stayed within the bounds of claims practices and did not extend to other areas of RRG operations, such as minimum capitalization and the like. Moreover, concerns about the burden of complying with different states’ rules appear to be at their lowest ebb in cases like these, where every state requires some form of diligence in issuing a disclaimer to an insured as a matter of statute law.13 That PCIC has no difficulty abiding by the rule of New York—which really is just a stricter time limit than other
13 In addition to the 45 states that have adopted the NAIC language (see note 14, above), a few other states have an untimely disclaimer rule worded somewhat differently from the NAIC language (Me Rev Stat T. 24-A § 2164-D [“(f)ailing to affirm coverage or deny coverage, reserving any appropriate defenses, within a reasonable time”]; Okla Stat Ann T. 36 § 1250.7 [setting out a complex set of rules on timeliness of disclaimer]; Wis Stat Ann 628.46 [same]; Ohio Admin Code 3901-1-54 [same]; SC Code Ann § 38-59-20 [requiring “prompt settlement”]). Only Alabama, Mississippi, and possibly Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands appear not to include substantially similar language in their codes. - 34 - - 35 - No. 37 states—is vividly illustrated by the ease with which PCIC disclaimed coverage to Chesakl, well within the New York time limits, and the striking resemblance Nadkos’s eventual denial letter bore to the Chesakl letter. PCIC itself, in the very letter denying coverage to Nadkos, did not refer Nadkos to the Montana Insurance Commissioner if it objected to disclaimer; it itself relied on the New York Insurance Department to field complaints. If New York is good enough for PCIC, it should be good enough for PCIC. VI In sum, then: (1) Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to the insurance policy here on its own terms; (2) even if Article 59 could be read to render Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) inapplicable to policies issued by foreign RRGs like PCIC, it would apply here because it is an “unfair claims settlement practice” law that Article 59 affirmatively obliges foreign RRGs to obey; (3) even if Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) is not an unfair claims settlement practice and therefore does not apply to foreign RRGs as a matter of state law, the Commissioner of Insurance has implemented the requirement by regulation, to which PCIC must adhere; (4) even if the regulation did not apply, Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) would still apply here because PCIC was never authorized to insure Nadkos, which means PCIC has operated outside of the sphere authorized by Congress or Article 59, so that it is not entitled to claim any federal or state exemption from the full panoply of New York laws applicable generally to liability insurers. Finally, having held that Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) applies to PCIC as a matter of state law, I would find that it is not preempted by the LRRA. - 35 - - 36 - No. 37 The majority now insists the legislature (or possibly the Insurance Commissioner) reclarify what is already clear. This case could have been decided in a way that provided clarity and advantages to all: yes you may have a cookie, or no you may not. Instead, the majority’s decision is confusing and damaging to policyholders and accident victims everywhere. I respectfully dissent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge Rivera. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Stein, Fahey, Garcia and Feinman concur. Judge Wilson dissents in an opinion. Decided June 11, 2019 - 36 -