Charles W. Kempe, Liquidator of Dover Ins. Co., Ltd., a Bermuda Corp. v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., the Crofton Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Charles W. Kempe, Liquidator of Dover Ins. Co., Ltd., a Bermuda Corp. v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., the Crofton Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Michael Licciardi (ca9, 1994-07-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Licciardi (2×)
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Deposit Insurance ex rel. American Diversified Savings Bank v. O'Melveny & Meyers
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
The holdings in Schacht (followed by this Circuit in Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986)), Cenco and Investors Funding, determine that there can be no attribution, and therefore no estoppel, when the insiders, rather than the corporation, benefit from the wrongdoing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver v. O'melveny & Meyers
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
The holdings in Schacht (followed by this Circuit in Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986)), Cenco and Investors Funding determine that there can be no attribution, and therefore no estoppel, when the insiders, rather than the corporation, benefit from the wrongdoing.
discussed Cited "see" Garcia v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp.
C.D. Cal. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (“The third ground, Kempe’s failure to incorporate mail and wire fraud allegations within the RICO count (although they were alleged separately) was readily correctable by amendment.”).
cited Cited "see" Churchill Village, L.L.C., Barbara Dorsett, and Al Dorsett Individually and on Behalf of the General Public Barbara Dorsett Al Dorsett Seymour Lazar Joan Chalmers Judith Saporta, Harriet Skurman Norman Hickman Phyllis Hickman Craig Rosenfield, Intervenors v. General Electric, Individual Consumer Dishwasher Litigation v. Beckwith Place Limited Partnership Susan E. Glatter Kamman, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellants. Churchill Village, L.L.C., Barbara Dorsett, and Al Dorsett Individually and on Behalf of the General Public Barbara Dorsett Al Dorsett Seymour Lazar Joan Chalmers Judith Saporta, Joseph Cooper Nina Kasprzak, and Harriet Skurman Norman Hickman Phyllis Hickman Craig Rosenfield, Intervenors v. General Electric, Individual Consumer Dishwasher Litigation v. Beckwith Place Limited Partnership, Plaintiff-Intervenor, and Susan E. Glatter Kamman, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant. In Re General Electric, Individual Consumer Dishwasher Litigation, Churchill Village, L.L.C., Barbara Dorsett Al Dorsett Seymour Lazar Joan Chalmers Judith Saporta, Harriet Skurman Norman Hickman Phyllis Hickman Craig Rosenfield, Intervenors-Appellants v. General Electric Company, a New York Corporation, Churchill Village, L.L.C., Barbara Dorsett, and Al Dorsett Individually and on Behalf of the General Public, and James Hoyer Newcomer & Smiljanich, P.A. Levin Tannenbaum Wolff Cauley Geller Bowman & Coates, LLP v. General Electric, a New York Corporation, Churchill Village, L.L.C., Barbara Dorsett, and Al Dorsett Individually and on Behalf of the General Public Barbara Dorsett Al Dorsett Seymour Lazar Joan Chalmers Judith Saporta, and James Hoyer Newcomer & Smiljanich, P.A. Levin Tannenbaum Wolff Cauley Geller Bowman & Coates, Llp, Claimants-Appellees v. General Electric, a New York Corporation
9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see" Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric
9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see" Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon
1st Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir.1986) (deficiency in RICO pleading readily correctable by amendment).
cited Cited "see" Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A.
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (deficiency in RICO pleading readily correctable by amendment).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles W. KEMPE, Liquidator of Dover Insurance Company, Ltd,, a Bermuda Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
MONITOR INTERMEDIARIES, INC., the Crofton Group, Inc., Et Al., Defendants/Appellees
85-1977.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Apr 2, 1986.
785 F.2d 1443
Michael J. Murphy, New York City, for plaintiff/ appellant., Walter S. Moeller, Long & Levit, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants/appellees.
Browning, Tang, Beezer.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff/appellant Kempe, liquidator of the Dover Insurance Company, Ltd., alleges a pattern of fraudulent transactions carried out by the defendants in a conspiracy “to defraud Dover and those with whom Dover dealt, including policyholders and insurance companies” in violation of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organiza[*1444] tions Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), and of various provisions of state law. The district court concluded that Kempe had failed to state a RICO claim and dismissed the action.

The district court found the complaint deficient in three respects: 1) failure to allege any racketeering enterprise injury distinct from the predicate mail and wire fraud acts; 2) failure to allege any link to organized crime on the part of the defendants; 3) failure to specifically allege the required RICO predicate acts of mail and wire fraud within the RICO count.

The first two grounds for dismissal were rejected by the Supreme Court in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3284-87, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), decided after the district court ruled.

The third ground, Kempe’s failure to incorporate mail and wire fraud allegations within the RICO count (although they were alleged separately) was readily correctable by amendment. See California Dump Truck Owners Association, Inc. v. Associated General Contractors of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., 562 F.2d 607, 614-15 (9th Cir.1977).

Defendant/appellee Monitor argues for the first time on appeal that Kempe, as the liquidator of Dover, lacks standing to bring this suit, in part because defendants are alleged to have controlled Dover and “one cannot deceive oneself.” Essentially the same argument was properly rejected in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1346-50 (7th Cir.1983), a case indistinguishable from this. Defendants also contend plaintiff seeks to, but may not, recover damages on behalf of Dover’s creditors and policyholders. As we read the complaint, plaintiff seeks damages only on behalf of Dover. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, IMf 2, 3; Prayer for Relief, H1Í A, B.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to permit plaintiff to amend the complaint.