Vernon Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Vernon Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Jackie Donnell Hollingsworth (ca4, 1989-08-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jackie Donnell Hollingsworth
4th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In order to state a claim of deficient attorney conduct under Strickland, Hollingworth must allege: who the witnesses are and to what they would testify, see United States v. Castillo, 814 F.2d 352 , 356 (7th Cir.1986); how the witnesses' testimony would aid the defense, see Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521, 1522 (11th Cir.1986); that the witnesses are willing to testify on behalf of petitioner, see United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-1232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988) (No. 88-5104); and that defense counsel was informed of the witnesses' testimon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert Leon McCarty
7th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
In Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521, 1522 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit rejected as “frivolous” a contention that an indictment charging receipt of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (h) was insufficient where the indictment tracked the statute, and stated the date, time, place, and participants involved. 1 And most recently, this circuit, in *146 United States v. Lowe, supra, held that an indictment charging that the defendant possessed a firearm “that had previously-traveled in interstate commerce” sufficiently charged the interstate commerce element…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Monte Dale Thompson
11th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See 789 F.2d 1521 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gerard J. Vanhoorelbeke
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521, 1522 (11th Cir.1986) (undercover participation by felon in purchasing burglarized guns not a defense to felon in possession of firearms charge).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Sistrunk v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dees v. United States , 789 F.2d 1521 , 1522 (11th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Carl William Montgomery v. Dale Petersen
7th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521, 1522 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Debango, 780 F.2d 81, 86 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Giangrosso, 779 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 , 106 S.Ct. 1237 , 89 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986); Keys v. Duckworth, 761 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 602 (5th Cir.1985). 6 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Vernon DEES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee
85-7604.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
May 23, 1986.
789 F.2d 1521
Cheryl L.P. Crisona, Asst. U.S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., for respondent-appellee.
Godbold, Hill, Anderson.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

Dees contends that his indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1) and 924(a) violated his right to Fifth Amendment due process because it mentioned the prior offense that was the predicate for these violations. This is frivolous, since the prior conviction is an element of the offense charged and must be revealed to fairly inform the person charged of the offense.

For the same reasons, proof at trial of the prior offense does not constitute double jeopardy.

The argument that the indictment is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, or so vague and ambiguous that it requires a hearing to determine its content, is frivolous. The indictment tracks the statute and states date, time, place and participants involved.

Counsel was not ineffective in refusing to call a state sheriff and a notary public to testify that Dees had been issued gun license and a deputy sheriff’s card and that he had worked undercover trying to make buys on guns that had been previously taken in a burglary. A convicted felon may lift his firearms disability if he receives a pardon expressly permitting him to possess a firearm, or gets the predicate conviction vacated before obtaining a weapon, or secures the consent of the secretary of the treasury. Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114 N. 10, 103 S.Ct. 986, 993 N. 10, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983). Dees does not suggest, and we do not find, any precedent to support the proposition that the issue of a $5.00 pistol license and a deputy sheriff's card, or participation in making buys of burglarized guns, is a defense to the charges made in this case. Counsel did not err in declining to call these witnesses for the purposes indicated. Further, with respect to the notary public, Dees contends that the notary’s testimony would have disputed that of a government witness concerning “certain business transactions with the defendant.” There was not a sufficient presentation of how the notary’s testimony would have disputed the government witness’s testimony or of what the business transactions were. The district court did not err in concluding that no prejudice was demonstrated.

AFFIRMED.