Robert Skagerberg v. State of Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Robert Skagerberg v. State of Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“egardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under fed. r. civ. p. 59(e).”
50 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: PYC, LLC v. Carrier Marine Services (kywd, 2025-09-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) PYC, LLC v. Carrier Marine Services
W.D. Ky. · 2025 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
egardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under fed. r. civ. p. 59(e).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Slim Ventures v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Slim Ventures v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bishop v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Slim Ventures v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bishop v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Slim Ventures v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bishop v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bishop v. USA
D. Utah · 2023 · confidence medium
In Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, cited by Respondents, the movant sought relief under Rule 60 only. 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blake v. JPay (2×)
D. Kan. · 2022 · confidence medium
Plaintiff’s request is more properly construed as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b), which states that “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”7 Other courts in this circuit have held that “[a]uthority to reconsider an interlocutory order . . . exists solely under 3 Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Griggs v. Pro…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc.
1st Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Irrespective of how a party titles his motion, “ ‘a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).’ ” Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10 , 14 n. 3 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Although appellants did not label this a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, "regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).” Skagerberg v. State of Okla., 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986); see Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 390 (1st Cir.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
P. 59(e)." Skagerberg v. State __________ _____ of Okla., 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986); see Acevedo- _________ ___ ________ Villalobos v. Hernandez, 22 F.3d 384, 390 (1st Cir. 1994). __________ _________ The motion was timely because Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." See also ___ ____ Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Garcia
10th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Skagerberg v. State of Okla., 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sue C. Wagoner, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Robert J. Wagoner, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Martinez, 874 F.2d at 753 ; Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Webster Flanagan v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
That motion has not been ruled on by the district court. 4 This court has held that, "regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)." Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986). "[A] timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal from a district court judgment....
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carl S. Melton v. Robert W. Fisher
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James R. Taumby v. United States
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Co., 788 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 948 , 107 S.Ct. 433 , 93 L.Ed.2d 383 (1986); Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (re-characterizing motion labeled “Rule 60” as a Rule 59(e) motion and consequently dismissing appeal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guardian State Bank v. Stangl
Utah · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 , 103 S.Ct. 400, 403 , 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal filed while a post-trial motion is pending is “a nullity” and the effect “is as if no notice of appeal were filed at all”); Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see" Schreiber v. Emerson (In Re Emerson)
Bankr. D.N.H. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, n. 3 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Skagerberg v. State of Okla., 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986)).
cited Cited "see" Luigi and Iole B. Puccini Testamentary Trust v. John R. Gardner, of the Estate of Hubert R. Gardner, Deceased Howard G. Hall
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 882-83 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Willie Stevenson v. The City of Kansas City, Kansas (2×)
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986)("when a timely Rule 59(e) motion and a notice of appeal are combined in one document the notice of appeal is premature and has no effect").
cited Cited "see" William J. Osterhoudt and Gary T. Osterhoudt, and Oz-T Ltd., a Delaware Corporation v. Marmon Motor Company, a Texas Corporation
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Aberra Molla v. Colorado Serum Company
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986) ("regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)," which will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal). 4 In order to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, a tolling motion must be served, on all opposing parties, see 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.
discussed Cited "see" Jackson v. Integra, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.1986) ("regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion ... under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)"); see also Martinez v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir.1989).
cited Cited "see" Security National Bank of Enid, Oklahoma v. John Deere Company, a Corporation
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 882-83 (10th Cir.1986); see also Miller v. Leavenworth-Jefferson Elec.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Banister v. Davis
SCOTUS · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Oklahoma , 797 F.2d 881 , 882-883 (CA10 1986) ( per curiam ) ("A post-judgment motion made within [28] days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment," however denominated, "is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under [Rule] 59(e)"); see also Fed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bobby Battle, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor v. Park Anderson, and Simon Toppah, Applicant-In-Intervention-Appellant. Bobby Battle, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor v. Park Anderson, and His Successor, and Jean L'aquarius, Applicant-In-Intervention-Appellant
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
On May 5, 1992, Toppah served a motion to reconsider. 2 This motion was served within ten days of the entry of the district court's order, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (when period of time to perform a prescribed act is less than eleven days, intermediate weekends and holidays shall be excluded in computation); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) (when party must perform act within prescribed period and notice is served upon party by mail, three days shall be added to prescribed period), and tolled the time for taking an appeal, see Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); see also Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir.198…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert SKAGERBERG, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent-Appellee
86-1293.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Jul 25, 1986.
797 F.2d 881
Robert Skagerberg, pro se.
McKAY, Per Curiam, Seth, Tacha.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

In accordance with 10th Cir.R. 9(e) and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), this appeal came on for consideration on the briefs and record on appeal.

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denying petitioner a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for failure to exhaust his claims. We conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The district court entered its order denying § 2254 relief on January 8, 1986. On January 15, 1986, petitioner filed a single document which he denominated as a “Motion for Rule 60 Relief, or Appeal.” In one order, the district court denied relief, acknowledged the notice of appeal, denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and granted a certificate of probable cause.

This case presents the problem of how to construe a combined motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal. This problem frequently recurs in pro se actions. In order to resolve the confusion created by this combination document we grant leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and address the issue of how we must construe the combination document under the standards set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a).

Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) requires a party to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) further provides that “if a timely motion ... is filed in the district court under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 50(b) ..., 52(b) ..., or 59 ... the time for appeal ... shall run from the entry of the order granting or denying ... such motion.” A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect, and a new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion. Id.

Although petitioner stated in his alternative motion/notice of appeal document that he sought Rule 60 relief, petitioner’s characterization is not controlling. Rather,[*883] regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir.1983); Miller v. Leavenworth-Jefferson Electric Cooperative, Inc., 653 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1981); Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 668 (5th Cir.1986). Petitioner’s motion/notice of appeal, which was served within ten days of the district court’s denial of the § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, questioned the correctness of the district court’s dismissal of his action. Consequently, petitioner’s mischaracterized motion for Rule 60 relief should have been construed as a timely Rule 59(e) motion. Venable, 721 F.2d at 299.

Under Rule 4(a)(4), a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal from a district court judgment. Clayton v. Douglas, 670 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 2911, 73 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1982). A notice of appeal filed while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pending is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on a court of appeals. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). Likewise, a notice of appeal filed before a timely Rule 59(e) motion is also ineffective to confer jurisdiction. Id.

Accordingly, we conclude that when a timely Rule 59(e) motion and a notice of appeal are combined in one document the notice of appeal is premature and has no effect. See Portis v. Harris County, Texas, 632 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.1980) (Rule 59 motion and notice of appeal were filed in the same document). After receiving a ruling on the timely motion, the appellant is required to file a new notice of appeal in accordance with Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1).

In this case, the district court’s judgment became final for appeal purposes only after the district court’s disposition of the Rule 59(e) motion. Because petitioner failed to file a new notice of appeal after disposition of the Rule 59(e) motion, we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional).

The appeal is DISMISSED.

The mandate shall issue forthwith.