¹ RCW 19.86.020. 2 Ch. 7.24. RCW Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 80508-8-I/2 FACTS 3 Khalid is a software engineer who has worked for either Microsoft or its vendors since 1998. He is also an inventor. He has published 14 research papers in journals and conference proceedings and has been named inventor in 20 patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). He is an expert in computer software, operating systems, cloud computing, and virtualization. In October 2012, the USPTO issued patent no. 8,286,219 (the ‘219 Patent) for computer systems security software entitled “Safe and Secure Program Execution Framework.” This invention began in 2005, while Khalid was working with friends and a partner to protect computer systems from viruses and spyware. Khalid initially applied for the patent in 2005, allowed that patent application to lapse, but then reapplied for patent protection in February 2008, after months of efforts to commercialize the subject matter. Khalid began a startup company to market the invention. In 2014, the USPTO issued patent no. 8,782,637 (the ‘637 Patent) for what Khalid calls a “mini-cloud” invention. The ‘637 Patent is based on ideas Khalid first developed while in graduate school in 1996 and 1997. The ideas evolved to form cloud computing for residential users using a mini-cloud host and “thin terminals.” The invention comprises several components: (a) a thin terminal, 3 Because the trial court dismissed this case on Microsoft’s CR 12(b)(6) motion, we assume the truth of Khalid’s factual allegations. See Lawson v. State, 107 Wn. 2d 444, 448, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986). The facts set out here are taken from allegations in Khalid’s complaint, documents Microsoft submitted with its motion, and a declaration Khalid submitted in opposition to Microsoft’s motion.

⁶ RCW 49.44.140 provides in part: [a] provision in an employment agreement which provides that an employee shall assign or offer to assign any of the employee's rights in an - 11 - No. 80508-8-I/12 concealed Khalid’s invention exclusion list in order to gain access to his patents, conduct he claims is allegedly unfair and deceptive under RCW 19.86.020. 7 Restraint of Trade Claim under RCW 19.86.030 (Count 2) In count 2, Khalid alleges that the Employee Agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade under RCW 19.86.030 because sections 5 and 6 contain overbroad invention assignment provisions. Microsoft argues this claim was correctly dismissed because it is time-barred. We agree. RCW 19.86.030 provides that “[e]very contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared unlawful.” The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted RCW 19.86.030 as Washington’s equivalent of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1. State v. Black, 100 Wn.2d 793, 799, 676 P.2d 963 (1984). Claims under RCW 19.86.030 are also governed by a four-year statute of limitations. RCW 19.86.120. Khalid argues this claim accrued in May 2016, when he received the M&G letter. We disagree. Khalid’s claim under RCW 19.86.030 accrued on December 19, 2011, when Khalid signed the contract he contends is unlawful. At that point, Khalid had knowledge of all elements of this cause of action. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim under RCW 19.86.120.

⁷ Microsoft did not seek dismissal of the CPA claim based on a failure to plead or inability to prove a public interest impact. We therefore do not address that issue here. - 12 - No. 80508-8-I/13 Breach of Contract (Count 3) Khalid argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract claim when it concluded that he had not properly alleged breach. We agree. To prevail on a breach of contract action, a plaintiff must allege and prove a valid contract existed between the parties, this contract was breached, and the plaintiff was damaged by that breach. Univ. of Washington v. Gov't Emps Ins. Co., 200 Wn. App. 455, 467, 404 P.3d 559 (2017). Khalid has properly alleged each of these elements here. The trial court dismissed Khalid’s breach of contract claim because “the employment contract says he assigned all inventions unless they did not relate to Microsoft” and “there’s been no allegation that Microsoft has no right to the patents on that or that Microsoft breached the employment agreement.” But in his amended complaint, Khalid alleged that he developed the inventions in the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents before his employment with Microsoft, that he explicitly excluded these inventions from the assignment provision of the Employee Agreement, and that Microsoft breached the Employee Agreement by claiming he had failed to submit an invention exclusion list and by subsequently claiming rights to Khalid’s ‘219 and ‘637 Patents. Khalid also pleaded that he “suffered damages caused and proximately caused by the actions of the Defendant.” The trial court erred in concluding that Khalid failed to adequately plead facts to establish the existence of an agreement, its breach, and his damage. Microsoft argues that the act of claiming that Khalid failed to submit an invention exclusion list cannot constitute a breach of the Employee Agreement - 13 - No. 80508-8-I/14 because it was merely an assertion of fact. This argument mischaracterizes Khalid’s allegations. Section 5 provides that, subject to some exceptions, Microsoft would have no ownership of, or assignment rights to, any independently developed inventions. Khalid clearly alleges he excluded the ‘219 and ’637 Patents from the scope of section 5 by submitting an invention exclusion list to both the Microsoft recruiter and subsequently directly to Microsoft. Microsoft’s breach, as alleged by Khalid, occurred when Microsoft refused to honor Khalid’s invention exclusion list and subsequently claimed rights in the very patents he had disclosed in that list. Assuming these alleged facts to be true, Khalid alleged Microsoft breached sections 5 and 6 of the Employee Agreement sufficient to survive a CR 12(b)(6) motion. Microsoft next argues that its insistence on a royalty-free license to these patents cannot be a breach of the Employee Agreement because section 6 granted this license for any independently developed invention that was incorporated into a Microsoft product. Microsoft maintains that, if as Khalid alleges, Microsoft incorporated components of the ‘637 patent into Xbox One, it could not have breached section 6. This argument lacks merit. Section 6 explicitly provides Microsoft with a license to use an employee’s independent inventions only if the employee used them in a Microsoft product or permitted Microsoft to use them. Khalid alleged in his complaint that Microsoft neither owned nor had any right to the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents. This contention obviously conflicts with any assertion that Khalid voluntarily authorized Microsoft to incorporate his technology into one of its products. And while the M&G letter asserts numerous other - 14 - No. 80508-8-I/15 defenses in relation to this claim of patent infringement, it never asserted that he had granted Microsoft permission to use the technology under section 6. These allegations support the proposition that Khalid neither incorporated the inventions into a Microsoft project nor permitted Microsoft to do so. The trial court erred in dismissing Khalid’s breach of contract claim. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count 4). Khalid argues the trial court also erred in concluding that his claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is time-barred under a three-year statute of limitations. Khalid contends the six-year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts under RCW 4.16.040(1) applies to this claim. We agree. RCW 4.16.040(1) applies a six-year statute of limitations to “action[s] upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement.” Under RCW 4.16.080(3), a three-year statute of limitations applies to any “action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument.” Every Washington contract includes an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that obligates the parties to cooperate with each other so that each may obtain the full benefit of performance. Badgett v. Security State Bank, 116 Wn.2d 563, 569, 807 P.2d 356 (1991). Khalid alleges Microsoft breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of his written Employee Agreement by claiming the invention exclusion list he submitted did not exist. He does not contend there was an oral agreement between the parties and the implied - 15 - No. 80508-8-I/16 covenant springs from this oral agreement. Thus, by its clear terms, RCW 4.16.040(1) applies to this claim. Microsoft argues that under Rekhter v. State Dep’t of Social and Health Services, 180 Wn.2d 102, 112, 323 P.3d 1036 (2014), a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith is distinct from a claim for breach of contract and that a breach of an express contract term is not a prerequisite to a claim for breach of the duty of good faith. We do not disagree with Microsoft’s reading of Rekhter. That case, however, does not apply here. In Rekhter, a class of in-home healthcare providers, who had contracted with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to provide services to DSHS clients, sued the DSHS for breach of the duty of good faith after the agency passed a rule which resulted in DSHS paying live-in healthcare providers at a lower rate than providers who did not live with their clients, while requiring live-in providers to render the same services. Id. at 108-09. The jury found for the healthcare providers and, on appeal, DSHS argued that the jury could not have found a breach of the duty of good faith where it also found that DSHS did not breach a contract term. Id. at 111. The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that DSHS’s argument would render the good faith and fair dealing doctrine superfluous and that the duty can arise when there is no breach of an express term of the contract. Id. at 111-12. But Rekhter does not stand for the proposition that an action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be, in certain cases, an action “arising out of a written agreement” as required by RCW 4.16.040(1). To the contrary, - 16 - No. 80508-8-I/17 Rekhter held that “[t]he implied duty of good faith is derivative, in that it applies to the performance of specific contract obligations. If there is no contractual duty, there is nothing that must be performed in good faith.” Id. at 113. Contrary to Microsoft’s argument, if it had an implied duty not to cloud Khalid’s title to his independent inventions under section 5, and it breached that duty of good faith and fair dealing by concealing or denying the existence of Khalid’s invention exclusion list, a jury could conclude this act interfered with Khalid’s rights to the full benefit of performance under the Employee Agreement. Microsoft correctly notes that in a footnote in Steinberg v. Seattle-First National Bank, 66 Wn. App. 402, n. 4, 832 P.2d 124 (1992), the court of appeals applied a three-year statute of limitations to a claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But Steinberg contained no analysis on the issue and it appears not to have been challenged. In cases where a legal theory is not discussed in the opinion, that case is not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is properly raised. Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wn. 2d 816, 824, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). The issue is squarely presented to this court and, under the facts as Khalid alleges here, the implied duty arises out of a written agreement, not an oral one, and, as a result, RCW 4.16.040(1) applies. Finally, Khalid adequately alleges a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to survive a CR 12(b)(6) motion. He alleges Microsoft had a duty not to assert ownership rights to Khalid’s personal inventions under sections 5 and 6 of the Employment Agreement and it breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by continuing to claim rights to the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents even - 17 - No. 80508-8-I/18 after Khalid produced evidence that he had properly excluded these inventions from the scope of that agreement. The trial court erred in dismissing this claim. Tortious Interference with Business Expectancy (Count 5) and Tort “Impacting Full Damage Recovery” (Count 6) In count five, Khalid alleged that Microsoft tortiously interfered with a business expectancy “by clouding the title of patents 219 and 637 in 2015.” Tortious interference with a business expectancy is a common law tort, subject to the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(3). City of Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wn. 2d 243, 251, 947 P.2d 223 (1997); Westmark Dev. Corp. v. City of Burien, 140 Wn. App. 540, 549, 166 P.3d 813 (2007). Khalid alleges he became aware of the cloud on the title of his patents in February 2015. Because Khalid did not bring this claim until January 2019, the trial court correctly concluded this claim is time- barred. In count six, Khalid alleged that Microsoft’s actions in sending the M&G letter in 2016 impacted his ability to fully recover in his suit against Citrix. Khalid suggests Microsoft timed the issuance of the M&G letter for the purpose of undermining his recovery against one of its business partners, Citrix. But if Microsoft’s assertion of rights to Khalid’s ‘219 and ‘637 Patents was tortious, that act occurred in February 2015, and not in 2016. The fact that Microsoft asserted a legal right to Khalid’s inventions on two separate occasions does not delay the accrual of the cause of action even if he sustained emotional distress damages with the second act that he did not sustain with the first. Because Khalid admittedly - 18 - No. 80508-8-I/19 knew of Microsoft’s claim to ownership of the patents no later than February 2015, this tort claim is also time-barred. Wrongful Withholding of Wages (Count 7) Khalid alleges two separate wage statute violations. First, Khalid claims Microsoft wrongfully withheld wages when it did not pay him wages or benefits for inventive services between December 19, 2011, when he signed the Employee Agreement, and January 9, 2012, when he began working for Microsoft, in violation of chs. 49.52 and 49.48 RCW. Second, Khalid claims that after his termination, Microsoft delayed paying two weeks of accrued vacation pay for six months in violation of ch. 49.52 RCW. The trial court applied a three-year statute of limitations and dismissed both claims as untimely. We conclude the trial court did not err in doing so. RCW 49.52.050(2) makes it a misdemeanor for any employer to “[w]illfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages” or pay that employee “a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract.” RCW 49.52.070 states that “[a]ny employer . . . who shall violate any of the provisions of RCW 49.52.050 (1) and (2) shall be liable in a civil action by the aggrieved employee . . . to judgment for twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld by way of exemplary damages, together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.48.010 provides: - 19 - No. 80508-8-I/20 When any employee shall cease to work for an employer, whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal, the wages due him or her on account of his or her employment shall be paid to him or her at the end of the established pay period …. It shall be unlawful for any employer to withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless the deduction is: (1) Required by state or federal law; or (2) Except as prohibited under RCW 49.48.160, specifically agreed upon orally or in writing by the employee and employer; or (3) For medical, surgical, or hospital care or service . . . . RCW 49.48.030 further provides “In any action in which any person is successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary owed to him or her, reasonable attorney’s fees . . . shall be assessed against said employer or former employer.” As to Khalid’s first statutory wage claim, because the Employee Agreement did not confer any rights to Khalid’s “inventive services,” before January 9, 2012, he fails to state a claim for wrongful withholding of wages for the December 19, 2011 to January 9, 2012 time period. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim, even though we do so on alternative grounds. As to Khalid’s second statutory wage claim, he argues his salary was set by written agreement and the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims under RCW 4.16.040(1) should apply. Khalid relies on Kloss v. Honeywell, Inc., 77 Wn. App. 294, 890 P.2d 480 (1995) for this argument. Although the plaintiff in Kloss recovered lost wages, and received an award of attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, id. at 304, his sole cause of action was breach of contract. Id. at 297- 98. Kloss did not allege separate statutory violations under ch. 49.52 RCW or ch. - 20 - No. 80508-8-I/21 49.48 RCW. Kloss is not clear precedent for the application of a six-year statute of limitations to the wrongful withholding of wages claim. The more analogous case is Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000), in which the Supreme Court held the three-year statute of limitation under RCW 4.16.080(3) applied to claims under the Washington Minimum Wage Act (“WMWA”), ch. 49.46 RCW. In that case, Boeing employees challenged the company’s requirement that they attend a “pre-employment” orientation session without pay. Id. at 827. The Supreme Court held that despite having no agreement to be paid for this time, the employees were entitled to minimum wages for the time spent in the orientation session. Id. at 835. Because Boeing’s legal obligation arose out of a statutory duty under the WMWA, and not out of a contractual one, the court held the three- year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.080(3) applied. Id. at 837. Although Khalid received a written employment offer from Microsoft, and he executed an Employee Agreement, neither sets out Khalid’s entitlement to vacation pay. We cannot conclude his statutory wage claim is an “action upon a contract in writing.” For this reason, the most appropriate statute of limitations is RCW 4.16.080(3) and Khalid’s wage statute claims were appropriately dismissed as time-barred. Fraudulent Inducement to Contract (Count 8) and Fraud (Count 14) In count eight, Khalid alleges Microsoft fraudulently induced him into signing the Employee Agreement by representing that Microsoft would have no interest in any inventions he disclosed and excluded pursuant to section 6 of the Employee - 21 - No. 80508-8-I/22 Agreement. In count fourteen, Khalid makes almost identical allegations. The trial court dismissed these two claims as time-barred. We conclude it did err in doing so. Microsoft and Khalid agree the three-year statute of limitation for torts in RCW 4.16.080(4) applies to his fraud claims. Under this statute, any action for relief based on fraud must be commenced within three years, but the cause of action is not “deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” The discovery rule therefore applies to claims of fraud. Shepard v. Holmes, 185 Wn. App. 730, 739, 345 P.3d 786 (2014). Khalid argues his fraud claims accrued in 2016 when he received the M&G letter because he discovered on that date that he had been damaged by Microsoft’s fraud. The allegations in Khalid’s complaint do not support this argument. Khalid contended that by August 29, 2015, he notified Microsoft’s counsel that the company’s claim to his inventions was “causing problems for Khalid” because he could not refile patent applications for inventions listed in the invention exclusion list without Microsoft relinquishing its claim to those inventions. his allegation discloses damage or injury before Khalid received the M&G letter. Where the discovery rule applies, “[t]he general rule in Washington is that when a plaintiff is placed on notice by some appreciable harm occasioned by another's wrongful conduct, the plaintiff must make further diligent inquiry to ascertain the scope of the actual harm.” Green v. A.P.C., 136 Wn. 2d 87, 96, 960 P.2d 912 (1998). Khalid was on notice of appreciable harm, based on his own - 22 - No. 80508-8-I/23 allegations, no later than August 2015. Under the three-year statute of limitations, Khalid’s fraud claims are time-barred. Infliction of Discomfort and Inconvenience by Interfering with Business Property Rights (Count 9) In count nine, Khalid alleges Microsoft inflicted discomfort and inconvenience by interfering with his right to the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents. The trial court held that the claim accrued in 2015 and was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. Khalid contends that the M&G letter “started the inconvenience of proper use of patent by creating a fresh continuing injury.” Once again, however, Khalid was aware of the cloud on his title, and therefore the limitations on the marketability of his patents, by February 2015. The trial court properly dismissed this tort-based claim under the statute of limitations. Racketeering through Extortion (Count 10) Khalid next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his criminal profiteering claims. Khalid alleges that Microsoft’s use of the overbroad employee agreement equates to “extortion” and “leading organized crime” in violation of the Criminal Profiteering Act. 8 Khalid seeks relief under RCW 9A.82.100. This statute provides a cause of action for any person who has been injured “by an act of criminal profiteering that is part of a pattern of criminal profiteering activity,” or by “leading organized 8On appeal, Khalid raises a number of new arguments relating to the criminal profiteering claim, including that Microsoft violated RCW 9A.82.080 (use of proceeds of criminal profiteering) and committed forgery in violation of RCW 9A.60.020 as a predicate act for a pattern of criminal profiteering. Because Khalid did not raise these arguments below, we refuse to evaluate them for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). - 23 - No. 80508-8-I/24 crime” under RCW 9A.82.060. Any such claim must be initiated “within three years after discovery of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity or after the pattern should reasonably have been discovered.” RCW 9A.82.100(7). Khalid’s criminal profiteering claims are predicated on Microsoft’s use of the “overbroad Agreement” to “extort[]” its employees’ intellectual property that it is not legally entitled to under RCW 49.44.140. But, by his own allegations, Khalid knew of the threats underlying this “extortion” by March 2015, when Microsoft contended it owned his intellectual property and demanded that he execute a patent assignment document. Khalid’s racketeering claims are thus time-barred. Declaratory Relief as to Ownership of the Patents (Count 11) and Enforceability of Microsoft’s Right of First Refusal (Count 12) Khalid seeks declaratory relief on (1) the ownership of the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents, and (2) the enforceability of Microsoft’s right of first refusal in section 5 of the Employee Agreement. 9 The trial court dismissed both claims on the grounds that the requested relief was too vague. We disagree. Khalid’s complaint seeks declaratory relief. RCW 7.24.020, a provision within the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), provides: A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 9 Khalid’s complaint seeks declaratory relief associated with several other claims we have determined to be time-barred, such as alleged violations of RCW 19.86.020 and RCW 49.48.050. Because the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the request for declaratory relief under those statutes is similarly time-barred. - 24 - No. 80508-8-I/25 The UDJA requires (1) an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive. Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wn.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137 (1973). Khalid alleged sufficient facts to meet all four justiciability factors under Diversified. He alleges an actual, present dispute exists with Microsoft over the company’s ownership interest in or license rights to Khalid’s patents. The M&G letter demonstrates the parties have genuine and opposing interests. These interests, as alleged by Khalid, are direct and substantial because Microsoft’s cloud on Khalid’s title to the patents has interfered with his ability to file additional patents, and has led to lost profits. And a judicial determination of the parties’ contractual rights to this intellectual property would be both final and conclusive. The trial court thus erred in dismissing Khalid’s UDJA claim in count eleven. In count twelve, Khalid seeks a declaratory judgment that Microsoft’s right of first refusal, contained in section 5 of the Employee Agreement, violates RCW 19.86.020 and RCW 49.44.140. Khalid’s claim under RCW 19.86.020 is time- barred and this portion of count twelve was properly dismissed on that basis. But no such barrier exists as to Khalid’s claim that section 5 violates RCW 49.44.140. Microsoft correctly points out that nothing in the record indicates Microsoft seeks to enforce a right of first refusal against the ‘219 and ‘637 Patents. But Microsoft has not disclaimed the right to do so in the future and Khalid alleges that this right - 25 - No. 80508-8-I/26 of first refusal is preventing him from freely marketing his patents. Khalid alleged sufficient facts to survive a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on this claim. The trial court erred in dismissing this UDJA claim. Class Action Claims (Count 13) Finally, Khalid argues the trial court erred in dismissing his class action allegations. In his complaint, Khalid sought class certification for the declaratory relief he requested under count twelve. He contends that this action was not properly before the court until he filed an actual motion for class certification. But Microsoft moved to dismiss the class claims on the basis that a pro se plaintiff may not bring claims on behalf of a class. The trial court dismissed the claim because “[Khalid] agrees that this is not a class action and that he cannot lead a class action and has no intention of doing so.” We see no error in dismissing Khalid’s class claims. In Washington State Bar Ass’n v. Great Western Union Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 57, 586 P.2d 870 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a layperson may bring a lawsuit on his own behalf but may not do so as a self-represented litigant. Generally, pro se plaintiffs may not pursue claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the trial court could have dismissed the class claims without prejudice to allow Khalid to obtain counsel and to seek leave to add such claims to the case, the trial court confirmed that Khalid “just wanted to make sure that other people could be included if they wanted to” and he was not seeking to pursue - 26 - No. 80508-8-I/27 a class action. Dismissing the class claims with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. We affirm the dismissal of Khalid’s claims, with the exception of one claim arising under the CPA, his claims for breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and his UDJA requests for declaratory relief as it relates to the ownership of his patents and the contractual right of first refusal. We reverse the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 10 WE CONCUR:

¹⁰ We grant Khalid’s motion to strike the April 14, 2020 Statement of Supplemental Authority filed by Microsoft. RAP 10.8 clearly provides that such statements should contain no argument. Microsoft’s pleading violates this rule by arguing this court should affirm the trial court based on the preclusive effect of a federal court order dismissing claims Khalid filed against Microsoft on April 6, 2020. See Khalid v. Microsoft Corp., No. C19-130-RSA. And we will not consider on appeal legal arguments not presented to the trial court. Moreover, RAP 2.5(a) provides that a party “may present a ground for affirming a trial court decision which was not presented to the trial court if the record has been sufficiently developed to fairly consider the ground.” The record here is insufficient for this court to evaluate Microsoft’s res judicata argument. - 27 -