Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in new york, article 78 is a method for challenging state administrative action.”
50 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sylvester v. Annucci (nywd, 2025-09-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Sylvester v. Annucci
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in new york, article 78 is a method for challenging state administrative action.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Whitfield v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2024 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
article 78 is a method for challenging state administrative action.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schachtler Stone Products, LLC v. Town of Marshall
N.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
Indeed, binding precedent requires that “[a] New York plaintiff is not barred from seeking damages in federal court, on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment on the same underlying facts in an Article 78 proceeding requesting injunctive or affirmative relief.” Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Russo v. City of New York
2d Cir. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that Section 1983 plaintiffs may seek damages despite prior Article 78 Proceedings requesting in-junctive or affirmative relief).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marina Development, Inc. v. Algonquin Power Corp. (In re Franklin Industrial Complex, Inc.)
Bankr. N.D.N.Y. · 2015 · confidence medium
Generally, collateral estoppel applies when four elements are met: “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was ‘actually litigated and decided’ in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was ‘necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.’ ” 12 Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Davis v. Halpern…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anghel v. New York State Department of Health
E.D.N.Y · 2013 · confidence medium
Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500 , 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 , 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984); Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987) (while res judicata does not apply to requests for monetary damages on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment in an Article 78 proceeding, collateral estoppel applies).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Borum v. Village of Hempstead
E.D.N.Y · 2008 · confidence medium
See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 870 (2d Cir.1995); Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 37 (2d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tewksbury v. Dowling
E.D.N.Y · 2001 · confidence medium
Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Word v. Croce
S.D.N.Y. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 365 (2d Cir.1992); Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Resource N.E. of Long Island, Inc. v. Town of Babylon
E.D.N.Y · 1998 · confidence medium
With respect to the civil rights cause of action, “[c]laim preclusion generally does not operate to bar a § 1983 suit following the resolution of an Article 78 proceeding, since the full measure of relief available in the former action is not available in the latter.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 , 870 n. 3 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 [2d Cir.1987]; Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278-82 [2d Cir.1986]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Polite v. Button
N.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Umhey v. County of Orange, NY (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights [suit] Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Moccio v. N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thaler v. Casella
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights [suit] Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Moccio, 95 F.3d at 200 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carlen v. Department of Health Services
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969)). 13 In Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987), we held that although a judgment in a prior Article 78 proceeding is not a bar to a subsequent federal civil rights action under the doctrine of claim preclusion, federal plaintiffs are precluded from relitigating issues that were fully and fairly litigated and necessarily determined in the Article 78 proceeding. 813 F.2d at 39 ; see also Rameau, 741 F.Supp. at 70-71 . 14 As the district court opinion makes clear, Carlen's substantive due process, First Amendment, and Equal Protection cl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carlen v. Department of Health Services of Suffolk County
E.D.N.Y · 1996 · confidence medium
For issue preclusion to apply, the following requirements must be met: (1) “there must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action,” and (2) “there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.” Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 , 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969)); Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Rameau v. New *40 York State Dep’t of Health, 741 F.Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Feldstein v. New York State Office of Mental Health, Bronx Psychiatric Center (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 1994 · confidence medium
“The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights suit such as this one.” Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir.1987) (Sections 1983 and 1985 and Title VI action not barred by prior adverse determination in Article. 78 proceeding).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cepeda v. Coughlin (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · confidence medium
For collateral estoppel to apply, “an issue in the present proceeding [must] be identical to that necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and ... in the prior proceeding the party against whom preclusion is sought [must have been] accorded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue.” Allied Chemical v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 271, 276 , 532 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 , 528 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 , 109 S.Ct. 785 , 102 L.Ed.2d 777 (1989); see also Owens v. Tre-der, 873 F.2d 604, 607 (2d Cir.1989); Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 385 (2d Cir.1986) …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weissman v. Fruchtman
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · confidence medium
Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987) (Davis, J.). 1 *549 Collateral Estoppel Collateral estoppel is a particular type of res judicata that precludes the relitigation of certain issues.
cited Cited "see" Robbins v. Candy Digital, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited "see" Colella v. Starpoint Central School District
W.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Goe, 43 F.4th at 34 (“if a medical exemption is denied by school 16 authorities, a parent has the right to .. . seek judicial review in state court through an Article 78 proceeding”).4 14 Article 78 “is a method for challenging state administrative action.” Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1986)).
cited Cited "see" Bruker v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987).
cited Cited "see" Colon v. Coughlin
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278-82 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Colon v. Coughlin
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278-82 (2d Cir.1986) We do, however, note one additional, related question, which has neither been briefed by the parties nor addressed by the district court: the issue of whether Colon, a prisoner in state court, is required to raise his retaliation claim in state court before he may do so in federal court.
discussed Cited "see" Burgos v. Hopkins (2×)
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 , 39 n. 2 (2d Cir.1987). 24 We therefore conclude that the state court deciding Burgos's petition for habeas corpus was not empowered to award him damages, and, consequently, a New York court would not find the instant Sec. 1983 action barred by res judicata.
discussed Cited "see" Burgos v. Hopkins (2×)
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 , 39 n. 2 (2d Cir.1987).
cited Cited "see" Rameau v. New York State Dept. of Health
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Halyalkar v. Board of Regents, 72 N.Y.2d 261, 266 , 527 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 , 532 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" O'MALLEY v. Nassau County Medical Center (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987); Giano v. Flood, 803 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1986); Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Toussie v. County of Suffolk
E.D.N.Y · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Davis v. *573 Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1987) (no identity of issues between Article 78 proceeding and current civil rights litigation when “state proceeding dealt only with Davis’ second [allegation of discrimination], not with his first (which was barred by the four-month statute of limitations in Article 78 proceedings) or the third ... (which has not yet occurred)”); Ponterio v. Kaye, No. 06-CV-6289, 2007 WL 141053 , at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Verbeek v. Teller
E.D.N.Y · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
For issue preclusion to apply, the following requirements must be met: (1) “there must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the *278 present action,” and (2) “there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.” Id. (quoting Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 , 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969)); see also Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987); Rameau v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 741 F.Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y.1990).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Interoceanica Corporation and Turbana Corporation v. Sound Pilots, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Collateral estoppel operates as “issue preclusion.” A party is collaterally estopped from raising an issue in a proceeding if: (1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was “actually litigated and decided” in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was “necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1995); See also Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." University Club v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
“For it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies.” Expert Electric, supra, 554 F.2d at 1234 ; see also Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir.1986) cited in Davis v. Halpem, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.1987).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David Davis
v.
Charles Halpern, in His Official Capacity as Dean of the City University of Ny Law School at Queens College & in His Individual Capacity, John Farago in His Official Capacity as Assistant Dean of the City of Ny Law School Queens College & in His Individual Capacity, Joseph Murphy in His Official Capacity as Chancellor the City University of Ny & in His Individual Capacity, & Gordon Ambach in His Official Capacity as Chancellor of the State University of Ny & as Commissioner of Ed. Of the State of Ny
452.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 9, 1987.
813 F.2d 37
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #33,689 of 633,719
Citer courts: Second Circuit (1) · W.D. New York (1)

813 F.2d 37

38 Ed. Law Rep. 77

David DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Charles HALPERN, in his official capacity as Dean of the
City University of NY Law School at Queens College & in his
individual capacity, John Farago in his official capacity as
Assistant Dean of the City of NY Law School Queens College &
in his individual capacity, Joseph Murphy in his official
capacity as Chancellor the City University of NY & in his
individual capacity, & Gordon Ambach in his official
capacity as Chancellor of the State University of NY & as
Commissioner of Ed. of the State of NY, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 452, Docket 86-7621.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 1986.
Decided March 9, 1987.

David Davis, pro se.

Stephen M. Jacoby, Asst. Atty. Gen. of State of N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of State of N.Y., New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before OAKES, CARDAMONE and DAVIS,[*] Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

1

The sole issue before us is whether the District Court correctly held that appellant Davis' federal action was barred, under the principles of former adjudication, by a previous suit he had brought in a New York state court. We hold that the federal action was not so barred.

I.

Background

2

David Davis, a white male in his '40s, desires to attend law school. He applied to enter the 1983-84 class of the City University of New York Law School at Queens College, was placed on the waiting list, but was not admitted. He applied again for the next year (1984-85) but was rejected. He applied unsuccessfully a third time for 1985-86. After his second rejection (which occurred on July 30, 1984), Davis brought a proceeding under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act and Rules[1] in New York State Supreme Court challenging the law school's rejection of his application for the 1984-85 term and also seeking a preliminary injunction compelling his admittance for that school year. The state court's action in that proceeding--which is far from clear--formed the basis of the District Court's ruling of preclusion by former adjudication. Suffice it at this point that state justices determined (in September 1984 and February 1985) that no factual issues remained for trial. Davis filed a notice of appeal but never pursued it.

3

On June 3, 1985, appellant instituted this suit in the District Court below, asking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d et seq. The complaint initially alleged improper rejection by the Law School for the 1984-85 term but was amended also to cover the 1985-86 term. Davis' contention is that the school discriminated against white males, particularly of his age group. Appellees moved to dismiss on several grounds, including res judicata (former adjudication) on the basis of the prior Article 78 proceeding in the New York court. On July 14, 1980, the District Court, relying solely on the bar of res judicata, granted appellee's motion and dismissed the federal action.

II.

Claim Preclusion

4

The District Court did not indicate which aspect of the doctrine of res judicata (or former adjudication) it applied--claim preclusion or issue preclusion (which used to be called collateral estoppel) or both. The recent decisions in Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.1986), and Giano v. Flood, 803 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1986), demonstrate that claim preclusion is inapplicable here. Both Davidson and Giano expressly held that a New York plaintiff is not barred from seeking damages, in federal court, on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment on the same underlying facts in an Article 78 proceeding requesting injunctive or affirmative relief. The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights suits such as this one. Davidson, 792 F.2d at 278-82; Giano, 803 F.2d at 770-71.[2] That is the very claim preclusion rule applied in these circumstances by the New York courts, a rule which is, of course, binding on the federal courts in this case. Davidson, 792 F.2d at 282. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). We therefore put claim preclusion wholly aside.

III.

Issue Preclusion

5

In New York, issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) can be applied in a later case only if (1) there has been a final determination on the merits of the issue sought to be precluded; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision invoked as dispositive in the later controversy; and (3) the issue sought to be precluded by the earlier suit is the same issue involved in the later action. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979). There are problems in this case with each of these requirements but we need dispose only of the third.[3]

6

We are convinced that there is an absence of identity of issues between the Article 78 proceeding and the current civil rights litigation. For one thing, the state proceeding dealt only with Davis' second rejection, not with his first (which was barred by the four-month statute of limitations in Article 78 proceedings) or the third rejection (which had not yet occurred). A different applicant pool each year necessarily provides different facts upon which an argument of discrimination, as well as of the particular wrongful treatment given to appellant's application, could now be based.[4] Second, the Article 78 proceeding was directed, under that statute, to the consideration given to Davis' individual and particular application in order to determine whether the denial of his admission was arbitrary or capricious. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. Sec. 7803. No review of the entire applicant pool or the Law School's overall admission policies seems to have been made. Third, in this federal action appellant also alleges retaliatory discrimination because of his bringing the Article 78 proceeding; this question was obviously not before the state court.

7

For these reasons, we conclude that this District Court suit is not barred by the result of the Article 78 proceedings and the case must be remanded for further proceedings.

8

REVERSED and REMANDED.

*

Honorable Oscar H. Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation

1

In New York, Article 78 is a method for challenging state administrative action. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.1986)

2

The Davidson plaintiff had prevailed in his Article 78 proceeding while current appellant was there denied relief, but this difference has no effect on the application of claim preclusion to this case

3

On the question of the existence of a final determination in the Article 78 proceeding, the District Court said that there was one, but the matter is not so clear to us. The difficulty is that Davis' Article 78 proceeding was handled by three separate justices of the New York Supreme Court. One justice (in an order of September 20, 1984) denied Davis' request for a preliminary injunction (commenting that the school's action was not arbitrary or in bad faith) but at the same time ordered the defendants to comply with a subpoena (sought by Davis) for production of certain Law School records, a subpoena previously issued by another justice. The issuing justice later ordered production again. After Davis received that information, he moved for a trial preference. A third justice (in an order of February 20, 1985) denied that motion on the ground that the second justice had held (in his order of September 20, 1984) that no factual issues remained. In the current case, the District Court ruled that the order of February 20, 1985--which accepted as conclusive the prior order of September 20, 1984--constituted the final determination. The earlier order was understood as being without prejudice to renewal, and the later order as somehow deciding summarily, after discovery, that insufficient proof had been made. Our major difficulties center (a) around the fact that the very same order of September 20, 1984 specifically required compliance with the subpoena and it is hard to see how the proceedings could have been dismissed and simultaneously kept alive for enforcement of the subpoena and the consequent discovery, and (b) the later order of February 20, 1985 relied solely on the earlier order of September 20, 1984 (which preceded discovery) without making any further determination

Similarly for the prerequisite of a full and fair opportunity to contest. The pre-discovery September 20th order seemed to contemplate further proceedings but the post-discovery February 20th order appears to have looked only to the order of September 20th as deciding the matter. In these circumstances it is certainly questionable whether appellant had a proper hearing and determination in his Article 78 proceeding.

4

Davis contends before us that there is an increasing degree of discrimination by the Law School against white males, and that the school's continuing policy is unduly to favor women and minorities. Such a continuing course of conduct, if true, often creates a new and separate claim, not barred by the decision in a single prior suit. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327-28, 75 S.Ct. 865, 868, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955)