v.
United States
No. 12-382
(Filed: 19 January 2021)
***************************************
BILOXI MARSH LANDS *
CORPORATION, et al., *
* Motion for Summary Judgment; Cross-
Plaintiff, * Motion for Summary Judgment; Statute * of Limitations; Fifth Amendment Taking; v. * Stabilization Doctrine; Justifiable * Uncertainty; Erosion. THE UNITED STATES, * * Defendant. * * ***************************************
Camilo K. Salas, III, Salas & Co., L.C., of New Orleans, LA, for plaintiff.
Joshua P. Wilson, Trial Attorney, with whom were Elizabeth McGurk, Trial Attorney, and Jean E. Williams, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Natural Resources Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice, all of Washington, DC.
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLTE, Judge.
Plaintiffs Biloxi Marsh Lands Corporation (“Biloxi”), Lake Eugenie Land & Development, Inc. (“Lake Eugenie”), Borgnemouth Realty Co., Limited (“Borgnemouth”), The Livaudais Company, LLC (“Livaudais”), Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co., Inc. (“Terre Aux Boeufs”), and Vincent Marshlands, LLC (“Vincent Marshlands”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”), allege the United States permanently took their properties for public use through inverse condemnation, without providing them just compensation, in violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and certain servitudes granted by plaintiffs and assigned to the United States. The government filed its motion for summary judgment on 28 September 2018, arguing plaintiffs’ takings claims are barred by a six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed a response to the government’s motion for summary judgment on 7 January 2019 and filed a cross- motion for partial summary judgment on the same issue 8 January 2019. This case was reassigned to the undersigned Judge on 29 July 2019. The Court conducted a site visit of the alleged takings and the parties presented evidence relating to the physical characteristics of the sites on 3 and 4 March 2020. On 21 April 2020, the Court held a status conference and directed plaintiffs to file supplemental papers listing various items in the record relating to subcategories of the allegedly taken land. Plaintiffs provided their list of facts in the record relating to each subcategory of land on 15 June 2020, and the government filed a response to plaintiffs’ list on 22
June 2020. The Court held oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment on 29 June 2020. Plaintiffs submitted an additional supplemental paper on the evidence in the record affecting a justifiable uncertainty analysis on 31 July 2020, and the government filed a supplemental paper in response on 25 August 2020. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the government’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual History1
A. The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
In the 1940s there were three primary water navigation routes in southeast Louisiana: the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (“IHNC”), the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (“GIWW”), and the Mississippi River. Pls.’ Corrected Mem. Submitted (1) in Opp. to the U.S.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Timeliness of Pls.’ Takings Claims; and (2) in Supp. of Pls.’ Cross- Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Same Issue, ECF No. 110, (“Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J.”), Ex. 39 at 3-40 (Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MGRO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement (June 2012)). In 1956, Congress authorized construction of a fourth route—the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (“MRGO”). Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. [2] at 1 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Design Memorandum No. 1-B). The 76-mile- long, 36-foot-deep, 650-foot surface width, and 500-foot bottom width channel would soon connect the INHC and the 38-foot depth contour in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 1–3. The purpose of the MRGO “was to increase commerce by providing a direct connection between the port of New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico.” St. Bernard Parish Gov. v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In March of 1956, the Port of New Orleans (“the Port”) became the designated non- federal sponsor of the MRGO. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. [2] at 1 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Design Memorandum No. 1-B). As such, Port Commissioners pursued acquisition of lands and obtained acts of assurance of local cooperation, which included the furnishing of all lands, easements, rights-of-way, and spoil disposal areas by the State of Louisiana. Id. at 6.
In April of 1958, the Department of the Interior, in a draft preliminary report prepared for the Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE” or “the Corps”), predicted ecological damage would result from the construction and operation of the MRGO. See United States Mot. for Summary Judgment and Supporting Mem., ECF No. 99, (“Gov. Mot. Summ. J.”), Ex. 1, at 8 (citing U.S. Department of the Interior, An Interim Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources as Related to Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Project, Louisiana and an Outline of Proposed Fish and Wildlife Studies (1958)). In the report, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior wrote the Secretary of the Army, noting “the project is of great concern to fish and wildlife conservationists” and
1 All facts in this section are undisputed, unless stated otherwise. See RCFC 56(a) (requiring a movant for summary judgment to show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”). The Court draws all inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).
[*2]“the project plans had not been investigated by fish and wildlife conservation agencies, as contemplated in Wildlife Coordination Act of August 14, 1946.” Id. (emphasis added in the government’s brief).
Without further agency investigation, the Corps began construction of the outlet in 1958, dredging shallow bays, coastal marshes, and cypress swamps. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 51 at 2 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Deep Draft De-authorization Study: Executive Summary). Construction of the MRGO cut through Bayous Bienvenue, Dupre, La Loutre, and the Bayou La Loutre Ridge and resulted in the direct connection of Lake Borgne to the Gulf of Mexico through Breton Sound. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 39 at 3-40 (Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MGRO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement (June 2012)). In 1965, Congress authorized construction of a hurricane protection levee along the south bank of the MRGO. Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (Oct. 27, 1965).
The Corps completed construction of the MRGO in 1968. St. Bernard Parish Gov., 887 F.3d at 1357. From 1968 to 2009, the MRGO provided deep water vessels direct access from the Gulf of Mexico to the Port of New Orleans. Pls.’ Resp./Opp. to the U.S.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. for Lack of Jurisdiction, ECF No. 14 (“Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss”), Ex. [2], pt. 1 at iv (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the MRGO Deep-Draft De-authorization Study (November 2007)); Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 51 at 2 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Deep Draft De-authorization Study: Executive Summary). The MRGO extended approximately 70 miles from Breton Sound to eastern New Orleans, traversing wetlands and marshes in Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and eastern Orleans Parishes. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 39 at 3-28 (Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MGRO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement (June 2012)). The MRGO provided a pathway for large ships to do business at the Port and created jobs reliant on the channel. Id. at 3-40–3-41. With those ships and jobs, however, came saltwater and damaging ecological change to the area surrounding the MRGO. Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. [2], pt. 1, at iv (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the MRGO Deep-Draft De-authorization Study (November 2007)).
B. Environmental Damage and Restoration: Reports and Legislation
Construction of the MRGO converted and eliminated thousands of acres of wetlands. Id. at iv. The “[m]ost significant environmental effects occurred in the first 20 years after the MRGO [was] constructed.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 56 at 43 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Studies). In the first 20 years, construction destroyed 2,500 acres of wetlands and erosion along the banks of the newly constructed MRGO destroyed an additional 4,220 acres. Id.
In October 1972, Coastal Environments, Inc., prepared an Environmental Baseline Study for the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury. See Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 19 (St. Bernard Parish Policy Jury, Environmental Baseline Study (October 1972)). The purpose of the study was “to provide an environmental baseline of [St. Bernard] parish as it currently exists, taking into consideration cultural and natural factors that have modified the landscape . . . [and] to set management guidelines for the system and provide a basis upon which future modifications to the environment can be judged with a high degree of predictability concerning probable impact.” Id. at 2. In relation to the MRGO, the study stated:
[*3]Of all navigation channels in coastal Louisiana, the [MRGO] has probably had the greatest environmental impact. . . . Construction of the channel destroyed 23,606 acres of marsh and shallow nursery areas—17,058 acres of spoil deposition and 6,548 acres by deepening.
Secondary effects are equally serious. The channel has greatly altered the hydrology and water chemistry of adjacent estuarine areas. The large cross- section of the area provides an avenue of ingress and egress for runoff tidal waters. Changes in salinity are well-documented. Recording stations in the vicinity of the channel show significant changes after the canal was opened (about 1959) and completed (1962).
. . . The thick sequence of poorly consolidated sediment through which the channel was excavated has created highly unstable bank conditions and massive slumping is common. . . . The result of this condition has been a continuous and costly program of maintenance dredging. Undesirable effects of this dredging include increased turbidity and the impact on fauna and flora of spoil disposal.
Id. at 86–88, 93 (internal citation omitted). According to the 1972 study, “signs of deterioration [were] evident in the death of trees and opening up of water bodies” and the “change in water regime seems to be the main cause of deterioration.” Id. at 65–66. The study states, “[t]he MRGO has introduced higher salinities into the study area” and cites drastic changes in parts per thousand at Lake Borgne stations BDL and I-3 “from an average surface salinity of 3.0 ppt in 1959–61 to 10.4 ppt in 1962–64, an increase of over three times.” Id. at 66.
In 1982, Coastal Environments, Inc., prepared an additional study. See Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 18 (St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, St. Bernard Parish: A Study in Wetland Management (1982)). The study explains, “[o]ne of the major causes of wetland deterioration in St. Bernard Parish appears to be closely related to the proliferation of deep navigation and drainage canals connecting the Gulf and interior wetlands.” Id. at 117. The study continues, “[s]ome of the more noticeable primary and secondary environmental impacts often attributable to canals [include] . . . saltwater intrusion, . . . erosion . . . and consequent loss of marshlands, . . . loss of stable, lower salinity estuarine nursery areas, [and] loss of biological diversity as nonsalt- tolerant [sic] species are squeezed out by higher salinities.” Id.
In November 1984, the Corps prepared a study of the area. See Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 40 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area, Louisiana—Land Loss and Marsh Creation—Initial Evaluation Report (November 1984)) (“1984 Initial Evaluation Study”). Therein, the Corps stated “[t]he marshes are disappearing at the alarming rate of 39.6 square miles per year due to compaction, subsidence, sea level rise, erosion, saltwater intrusion, and man’s activities. The land loss trend is expected to continue and, by year 2040, about 1,000,000 acres of wetlands could disappear beneath the gulf.” Id. at Syllabus. The study presented “the findings of the initial evaluation study of plans to reduce land loss and create marsh in the coastal area of Louisiana.” Id. at 1. The Corps noted “[a]s a result of the analysis of changing conditions, the needs and opportunities and concerns of Federal, state, and local interests, . . . objectives were established.” Id. at 62. These objectives included: “Create marsh to offset losses”; “[e]nhance marsh vegetative growth to reduce marsh losses and increase the nutrient and detritus supply for fish and wildlife production”; and “[r]educe subsidence, erosion, and saltwater intrusion to reduce marsh losses.” Id.
[*4]In 1986 Congress enacted the Water Resources and Development Act (“WRDA”), which in part instructs the “Secretary of USACE to determine the need for modifications in the structure and operations of [the MRGO] for the purpose of improving the quality of the environment . . . .” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 25. In 1988, the Corps conducted a reconnaissance study of the MRGO’s bank erosion and erosion-related problems in Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes, Louisiana. Id. at 8–9. The purpose of the study was to:
[D]efine the extent of erosion and erosion-related problems projected to occur in the study area; identify opportunities to implement potential solutions to the defined problems; appraise Federal interest in potential solutions[;] . . . determine, based on the appraisal, whether planning should proceed beyond the reconnaissance phase into more detailed feasibility phase considerations; estimate the time and cost required to complete feasibility phase studies if Federal interest is indicated; and assess the level of interest and support of non-Federal interests in the identified potential solutions to defined problems.
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 7 (Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet St. Bernard Parish, La.— Bank Erosion—Reconnaissance Report, February 1988) (“1988 Reconnaissance Report”) at 2–3. The Corps warned of erosion if there were no remedial actions:
The unleveed banks of the MRGO will continue to erode in the absence of remedial action. Currently, banks of the unleveed reached are retreating at rates from five to over 40 feet per year. The average rate of retreat of the north bank in the 41-mile land cut portion of the waterway is 15 ft per year. Failure to reduce bank erosion will result in a significant increase in the required maintenance dredging of the waterway in the future. Annual average maintenance dredging requirements are projected to increase six-fold within the next 15 years (by the year 2002).
Id. at 30–31.
In 1990, Congress passed the Water Resource Development Act of 1990, directing the Secretary of the Army to “include environmental protection as one of the primary missions of the Corps of Engineers in planning, designing, construction, operating, and maintaining water resources projects” and stating the Corps shall have “an interim goal of no overall net loss of the Nation’s remaining wetlands base, as defined by acreage and function, and a long-term goal to increase the quality and quantity of the Nation’s wetlands, as defined by acreage and function.”
[*5]Water Resource Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-640, tit. III, § 307(a), 104 Stat. 4604 (1990) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2317) (“1990 WRDA”). Additional legislation in 1990 included the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (the “Breaux Act”), which directed the Corps to establish a comprehensive plan to restore Louisiana wetlands and called for the development of annual lists of “priority projects” which would “provide for the long-term conservation of [Louisiana’s] wetlands . . . .” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 42 at 3–4 (1994 MRGO Bank Erosion Reconnaissance Report). In 1993, a task force submitted a plan to restore and prevent further loss of Louisiana wetlands by “increas[ing] sediment and freshwater input into coastal estuaries” so as to “restart the natural processes of land building and maintenance.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 41 at 9 (1993 Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration Plan). The task force behind the 1993 Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Restoration Plan developed a “comprehensive approach to restore and prevent the loss of coastal wetlands in Louisiana” by using hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, marsh creation with dredged materials, and marsh management. Id. at 4, 9.
The Breaux Act required the Corps to establish a comprehensive plan to restore Louisiana wetlands exclusively. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 39. The act authorized 143 projects to “create, protect, or restore over 120,000 acres of wetlands in coastal Louisiana” and dedicated $40 million annually to restoring wetlands in Louisiana and was still being implemented through 2001 or later. Id.
In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) suggested closure of the MRGO at the Bayou LaLoutre Ridge and offered a 10-year program to restore and manage wetland resources, including freshwater diversions into the Central Wetlands area. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 45 at 2–3 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA), Louisiana, Ecosystem Restoration Study (November 2004)). The report recognized the substantial land erosion caused by the MRGO and declared “[a]s long as the MRGO remains authorized to provide deep-draft navigation, ecosystem protection measures are critically needed to minimize further wetland loss and preserve the opportunities for future restoration.” Id. at 2. Recommendations by the report included construction of rock breakwaters along the shores of the MRGO, the beneficial use of dredged material for marsh creation, freshwater introduction, barrier island restoration, and “channel modification to develop a suite of measures to stabilize and maintain important estuarine components. Id. at 3.
Four years later, the Corps’ “Louisiana Coastal Area, Ecosystem Restoration Study” disclosed the “rate of wetland loss in the area is accelerating” and “rapid action is required to protect the integrity of the southern Lake Borgne shoreline and to prevent continued erosion of the MRGO channel banks from ocean going vessel wakes.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 45 at 32 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA), Louisiana, Ecosystem Restoration Study (November 2004)). In the same 2004 study, the Corps proposed building “38 miles of rock breakwaters to prevent the merger of the MRGO into Lake Borgne, facilitating wetland creation by using dedicated dredging and/or beneficial use of dredged materials behind the breakwaters, and freshwater introduction into the marsh through Mississippi River diversions.” Id. The Corps’ “Operations and Maintenance Bank Protection” program completed, scheduled, or proposed installation of foreshore protection, dredged material retention, and articulated mattress along over 90 percent of the length of the MRGO. Pls.’ Reply Br. Submitted (1) in Opp. to the U.S.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Timeliness of the Pls.’ Takings Claims and (2) in Supp. of Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Same Issue, ECF No. 135, (“Pls.’ Reply Br. Opp’n”), Ex. 57 at 1.
[*6]C. The MRGO After Hurricane Katrina
“Hurricane Katrina was ‘one of the most devastating hurricanes that has ever hit the United States, generating the largest storm surge elevations in the history of the United States.’” St. Bernard Parish Gov., 887 F.3d at 1358 (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644, 678 (E.D. La. 2009)). Katrina caused severe shoaling in the MRGO, which in turn drastically changed the channel depth of the outlet. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 51 at 3 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Deep Draft De-authorization Study: Executive Summary). After the 2005 Hurricane season, the MRGO was not navigable as a deep draft waterway. Id. Dredging to restore the outlet to its originally authorized dimensions would have cost over $133 million. Id. To avoid re-dredging, the Corps limited its maintenance of the outlet to provide for only one-way traffic. Id. at 7. The Corps thereafter stopped all maintenance dredging of the MRGO in 2006, thereby halting the beneficial use of dredged materials programs. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 3. In light of the damage to the MRGO and the high cost of fixing the damage, the Corps recommended total closure of the MRGO by erection of a rock dike across its entire width and the construction of other “rock dikes that protect wetlands along the MRGO.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 51 at 13 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Deep Draft De-authorization Study: Executive Summary).
In 2007, the Corps stated in a report to Congress “habitat shifts caused by saline waters brought in by the MRGO might have caused . . . 3,350 acres of fresh/intermediate marsh and 8,000 acres of cypress swamp [to be] converted to brackish marsh and 19,170 acres of brackish marsh and swamp [to] become saline marsh.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 52 at iv (Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Deep-Draft De-authorization Study). In addition, the Corps noted “[b]ank erosion along the MRGO has been estimated to occur at rates of between 27 and 38 feet per year” and “[b]etween 1964 and 1996, 5,324 acres of marsh have been lost adjacent to the MRGO channel . . . .” Id. The Corps announced a plan in 2007 to close the MRGO by 9 July 2009 because of the cost associated with repair and the potential for great ecological harm. Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. [2], pt. 1 at 3 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the MRGO Deep-Draft De-authorization Study (November 2007)). The Corps further published plans outlining ongoing, scheduled, and proposed restoration efforts to bolster the wetlands areas affected by the MRGO. Id. at 6–7. Congress again passed the WRDA in 2007 and authorized restoration projects paired with a federally funded study. The projects required a non-federal partner to agree to bear costs alongside the federal government, but no such partner came forward. Id.
On 2 October 2008 the Corps announced it was developing a “comprehensive ecosystem restoration plan to restore the areas affected by the MRGO navigation channel.” Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Ecosystem Restoration Feasibility Study, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,340, 57,341 (Sep. 23, 2008). The announcement included the following goals:
[*7](1) Physically modifying the MRGO channel and restoring areas affected by the channel; (2) restoring natural ecosystem features to reduce damage from storm surge; (3) measures preventing saltwater intrusion into the waterway; (4) measures protecting, restoring or increasing wetlands to prevent saltwater intrusion or storm surge; (5) measures reducing risk of storm damage to communities by preventing or reducing wetland losses or restoring wetlands.
Id. The Corps officially de-authorized the MRGO from the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway to the Gulf of Mexico in accordance with the 2007 WRDA on 5 June 2008. Amended Compl., ECF No. 37 (“Am. Compl.”), Ex. [2] at xvii–xviii. The outlet officially closed on 9 July 2009. Id.
Congress and the President directed the Corps to develop a full range of flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane protection measures exclusive of normal policy considerations for South Louisiana through the Coast 2050 Plan, the 2004 LCA Plan, the Breaux Act, and the 2007 WRDA. See Pls.’ List of Citations and Excerpts in Chronological Order Which Correspond to Each of the Agreed Subunits in a “Justifiable Uncertainty” Analysis, ECF No. 165 (“Pls.’ Supp. Paper”) at 8–9, 27–28. These directions included the creation of a long-term, comprehensive plan “for protecting, preserving, and restoring Coastal Louisiana ecosystem.” Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 49 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Lake Borgne – Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Shoreline Protection (PO-32), St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, Final Design Report (December 2004)).
The Corps separated project goals into two categories in its 2012 Final Feasibility Report: “geomorphic” and “habitat specific.” Pls.’ Reply Br. Opp’n, Ex. 55 at S-12 and S-13 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan: Final Feasibility Report (June 2012)) (“2012 Feasibility Report”); see also Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Ex. 39, at ES-1 (Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MGRO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan, Final Environmental Impact Statement (June 2012)). In the category dedicated to habitat- specific goals, the Corps stated one goal is “to restore historic salinity conditions in the study area, restore native habitat acreages impacted by the MRGO and their ecosystem functions, and increase the year-round spatial coverage of critical landscape features that provide hurricane and storm surge damage risk reduction in the study area.” 2012 Feasibility Report at S-12 and S-13.
D. Plaintiffs’ Land Ownership
Property owners collectively lost thousands of acres of land since construction of the MRGO. Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss., Ex. [2], pt. 1 at iv (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the MRGO Deep-Draft De-authorization Study (November 2007)). Plaintiffs are six property owners with land in the area around the MRGO who allege the Corps, through the construction and maintenance of the MRGO, took their land “for public use without exercising the power of eminent domain and without providing plaintiffs just compensation in violation of the U.S. Constitution.” Am. Compl. at 1.
[*8]The United States obtained servitudes from landowners, including plaintiffs, which permitted use of land within 1,500 feet from the channel’s original centerline. Id. at 4. Specifically, plaintiff Biloxi granted to the United States “a right of entry in and to any and all lands [it] owned . . . in that portion of the Parish of St. Bernard, State of Louisiana, lying south and east of Bayou La Loutre, for the purpose of such dredging and spoil disposal operations.” Id. at 5–6. At about the same time—the exact date being unknown at this time due to the destruction of records at the St. Bernard Parish Court House caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005—plaintiffs Lake Eugenie, Borgnemouth, Livaudais, and Vincent Marshland granted to the Port similar 1,500-foot-wide servitudes, on land owned by these companies, for the construction and maintenance of the MRGO. Id. at 6; see also Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Exs. 1–4 (four plaintiffs’ complaints, later consolidated as the present case). Each plaintiff also granted to the Port a right of entry and temporary spoil disposal servitudes, which the Port assigned to the United States through the Corps. Id.
Plaintiffs own separate pieces of land throughout the affected region. See, e.g., Am. Compl. at 3–7. Plaintiffs Biloxi and Lake Eugenie own property in the Biloxi Marsh and have their principal places of business in Metairie, Louisiana. Am. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff Terre Aux Boeufs also owns property in Biloxi Marsh complex, plus a separate plot south of the MRGO. Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 3 at 4 (Compl., Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co., Inc., 15-710, ECF No. 1 (July 8, 2015). Terre Aux Boeufs’s business operates out of New Orleans, Louisiana. Id. at 3. The property Borgnemouth owns consists of around 7,000 acres and includes Proctor’s Point, the coastline peninsula landmark cutting into Lake Borgne. Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. [2] (Compl., The Borgnemouth Realty Co., Limited and The Livaudais Company, L.L.C. v. U.S. 14-3, ECF No. 1 (January 2, 2014). Borgnemouth’s two tracts of land span from Proctor’s Point to the MRGO and southwest of the MRGO. Id. at 9. The land Livaudais owns consists of two tracts “located just north of and adjacent to” the land Borgnemouth owns. Id. at 5. Livaudais also owns an undivided one-sixth interest in the area known as the Golden Triangle. Id. Borgnemouth and Livaudais operate out of Meraux, Louisiana. Id. at 3. Vincent Marshlands is based in Harahan, Louisiana. Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 4. Vincent Marshlands owns an undivided one-half interest in the Chalmette Meadows Property the MRGO touches. Id. Trinity Church, a Louisiana nonprofit corporation (“Trinity Church”); the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, a Virginia public corporation (“University of Virginia”); and the Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, a Louisiana nonprofit corporation (“Tulane University”) formed Vincent Marshlands in October 2008 to manage their respective one-third shares of an undivided one-half interest in the Chalmette Meadows Property. Id. Hugh E. Vincent and Frank B. Hayne, Sr. acquired the Chalmette Meadows Property in December 1916. Id. Upon his death, Hugh E. Vincent left his undivided interest to these three entities. Id.
II. Procedural Background
On 15 June 2012, plaintiffs Biloxi and Lake Eugenie filed a complaint alleging the government’s permanent taking of plaintiffs’ property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The government filed a motion to dismiss on 31 August 2012. See United States’ Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Support Mem., ECF No. 9 (“Gov.’s Mot. to Dismiss”). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on 2 November 2012, and the government filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss on 30 November 2012. See Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss; Reply Mem. of Law in Support of the U.S.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. for Lack of Jurisdiction, ECF No. 17. On 24 June 2013, the then undersigned judge denied the government’s motion to dismiss, stating “[p]laintiffs are not clearly without our jurisdiction” as “whether the statute of limitations has run depends on questions of predictability and mitigation” not well addressed at the motion to dismiss stage. Order and Opinion, ECF No. 18 at 3.
[*9]Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on 29 October 2013. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 37. This case was consolidated with Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. United States on 22 July 2015 and was further consolidated with Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co., Inc. v. United States on 30 January 2018. See Order, ECF No. 59; Order Consolidating Related Matters, Granting-in-Part the Gov.’s Mot. to Vacate, and Pre-Trial Scheduling Order, ECF No. 91. The government filed its motion for summary judgment on 28 September 2018, arguing plaintiffs’ takings claims are barred by a six-year statute of limitations and the court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider them. See Gov’t Mot. for Summ. J. Plaintiffs filed their response to the government’s motion for summary judgment on 7 January 2019 and their cross-motion for partial summary judgment on 8 January 2019. See Pls.’ Mem. Submitted (1) in Opp. to the U.S.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Timeliness of Pls.’ Takings Claims; and (2) in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Same Issue, ECF No. 104; Pls.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Timeliness of the Pls.’ Takings Claims, ECF No. 105. Plaintiffs corrected their response to the government’s motion for summary judgment and their cross-motion for partial summary judgment on 12 February 2019. See Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. The government filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment and response to plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment on 16 April 2019. See U.S.’ Reply. Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for Summary Judgment and Resp. to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 132 (“Gov.’s Reply”). Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in support of its cross- motion for partial summary judgment on 29 May 2019. See Pls.’ Reply Br. Opp’n.
On 29 July 2019, this case was reassigned to the undersigned Judge. See Order, ECF No. 136. The Court scheduled a site visit and oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in New Orleans, Louisiana. See Order, ECF No. 147. The Court conducted a visit of the sites of the alleged takings on 3 March and 4 March 2020. Id. An emergency involving inclement weather prevented the Court from hearing oral argument on the cross- motions for summary judgment on 5 March 2020. On 21 April 2020, the Court held a telephonic status conference in this matter and, pursuant to agreement during the conference, directed plaintiffs’ counsel to “submit a list of details in the record which correspond to each of the divisions of property as plaintiffs’ arguments allege in pleadings and exhibits.” Order, ECF No. 152. Plaintiffs filed their “list of details thus far found in the record” on 15 June 2020, and the government filed a response to plaintiffs’ “list of details thus far found in the record” on 22 June 2020. See Pls.’ List of Details Found in the Record that Correspond to Each of the General Geographic Divisions of Properties Adopted for Purposes of Oral Argument, ECF No. 157 (“Pls.’ Paper”); U.S.’ Response to Pls.’ List of Record Details Corresponding to the Parties’ Agreed General Geographic Divisions, ECF No. 158. The Court held oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment in Washington, DC, on 29 June 2020. See Order, ECF No.
- 10 -
159. As agreed to by all counsel during the 29 June oral argument, the Court ordered both parties to submit additional supplemental papers “containing description[s] of items in the summary judgment record currently before the Court that apply to a ‘justifiable uncertainty’ analysis corresponding to each of the agreed subunits.” Order, ECF No. 160. Plaintiffs filed their supplemental paper on 31 July 2020, and the government filed its supplemental paper on 25 August 2020. See Pls.’ Supp. Paper; U.S.’ Response to Pls.’ “List of Citations and Excerpts” (ECF 165) and Memorandum (ECF 166) Regarding Pls.’ “Justifiable Uncertainty” Argument, ECF No. 167 (“Gov.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Supp. Paper”).
III. Jurisdiction
“The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1), provides the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over takings claims brought against the United States.” Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3). “Because the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 862 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
“A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and evidentiary materials filed in a case reveal that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Lippmann v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 238, 244 (2016) (citing RCFC 56(a)). A “genuine” dispute occurs when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” when it could “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. The Court draws all inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986). These “standard[s] also appl[y] when the Court considers cross-motions for summary judgment.” Lippmann, 127 Fed. Cl. at 244.
IV. Parties’ Arguments
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the government argues: (1) plaintiffs’ takings claims are based upon effects of the MRGO which have been well documented since the 1960s and plaintiffs “knew or should have been aware of the facts that underline its claim since at least the 1980s,” making its claims barred by the six year statute of limitations; (2) the government “never promised, or undertook any action to restore Plaintiffs’ land to its pre-MRGO condition” and continuously operated it “in precisely the same activities—i.e., maintaining, operating, and dredging the MRGO—that Plaintiffs contend cause[d] the alleged taking of their property”; and (3) “information and data available to Plaintiffs during [the] 1970’s and 1980’s was sufficient to allow Plaintiffs to understand and pursue a takings claim,” but plaintiffs could have filed their claims as late as 2005 when similar plaintiffs filed claims in St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 887 F. 3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), alleging “the MRGO caused
- 11 -
erosion and habitat change on the wetlands surrounding the MRGO . . . [and] that those environmental changes exacerbated storm surge during Hurricane Katrina, which, in turn, caused the levees to overtop, and led to flooding on their properties.” See Gov. Mot. for Summ. J. at 26–43.
Plaintiffs argue in response: (1) plaintiffs’ takings claims did not accrue in the 1980s because plaintiffs allege a gradual takings claim, which “does not reach a stabilized condition, and hence . . . has not accrued, if the property owner has ‘justifiable uncertainty’ about whether his or her loss is permanent or reversible,” and here, plaintiffs’ claims have not stabilized as the MRGO’s effects are continuing and ongoing; (2) the “Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies have for many years undertaken enormous projects to mitigate” damage caused by the MRGO and “[t]hese mitigation efforts created uncertainty about the fate of plaintiffs’ properties and thereby delayed the running of the [statute of limitations]”; (3) the government itself did not know in the 1980s “what was the cause or extent of the erosion around the MRGO[;] [therefore,] . . . the House of Representatives requested in 1982 that the Corps prepare a report providing information about the cause of the erosion. The Corps did not complete the report until . . . 1988.” This report “recommended . . . additional studies be made . . . [which] were re-started in 1992 and a new report . . . issued in 1994”; (4) “[t]he government has mitigated the effects of the MRGO through marsh creation and foreshore protection since at least 1980[,] . . . [and t]he government has issued many reports regarding the effects of the MRGO, but has never stated that the damage was irreversible”; and (5) in St. Bernard, “the Court held that the MRGO did not stabilize until its closing in 2009, which is the same position plaintiffs take her [sic],” therefore making their claims timely. Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 40–56 (emphasis in original).
After oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental papers containing a list of citations in the summary judgment record detailing proposed or completed projects applying a “justifiable uncertainty” analysis to each of the agreed geographical subunits. See Order, ECF No. 160. On 31 July 2020, plaintiffs submitted their supplemental paper, arguing: (1) “Subunit 13 was directly and indirectly impacted by the MRGO”; (2) “Subunit[] 21 . . . [was] indirectly impacted by the MRGO through the placement of spoil material and hydrologic changes”; (3) “Subunit 06 is adjacent to the Lake Borgne ecosystem and the offshore portion of the MRGO was dredged in the vicinity [sic]”; (4) “Subunits 07 and 18 were directly and indirectly impacted by the MRGO”; (5) “Subunit 32 was directly affected by the dredging and placement of material during construction of the channel”; and (6) “Subunit 40 was directly and indirectly impacted by the MRGO.” Pls.’ Supp. Paper at 1–2.
On 25 August 2020, the government filed its reply to plaintiffs’ supplemental paper, arguing “[p]laintiffs’ further citations to the record do not support their argument that [p]laintiffs were ‘justified’ in delaying their takings claims” because “[p]laintiffs continue to rely upon a scattershot of local, state, and federal projects proposed at various times, for various reasons and with varying results over the course of 60 years.” See Gov.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Supp. Paper. Specifically, the government claims “[m]any of these proposals were never implemented and most were unrelated to any genuine effort to remediate the specific physical changes to property underlying [p]laintiffs’ taking claims.” Id.
- 12 - V. Applicable Law “A claim under the Tucker Act, including takings claims, ‘first accrues only when all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.’” Casitas Mut. Water Dist., 708 F.3d at 1359 (citing Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original)). “[T]he key date for accrual purposes is the date on which the plaintiff’s land has been clearly and permanently taken.” Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “However, in cases where the government leaves the taking of property to a gradual physical process, rather than utilizing the traditional condemnation procedure, determining the exact moment of claim accrual is difficult.” Id. When a taking occurs through gradual processes, two applicable doctrines assist in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run: stabilization and justifiable uncertainty. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947) (explaining the accrual of a claim through gradual processes is delayed until the taking has “stabilized”); see also Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing how government promises to restore land keep landowners “justifiably uncertain about the permanency of the erosion and the taking”). A. Stabilization Doctrine The Supreme Court first addressed the relationship between an alleged taking through intermittent flooding and the stabilization doctrine in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 746–47. In Dickenson, the alleged taking related to the government’s construction of a dam and the subsequent permanent flooding of nearby landowners’ property stemming from the rise in water levels. Id. at 746. To determine when the statute of limitations on a takings claim began to run, the Court defined a taking in the context of the Just Compensation Clause, stating “[p]roperty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner’s use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement in course of time.” Id. at 748. Acknowledging the difficulties facing a property owner in “determining the decisive moment in the process of acquisition by the United States” of property through a gradual taking process, the Court focused on the principles of fairness under the Fifth Amendment by specifically noting the Fifth Amendment does not operate as “a technical rule of procedure” regarding causes of action. See id. at 748 (“The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regarding ‘causes of action’—when they are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die.”); see also Etchegoinberry v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 437, 498 (2013) (“This court has, likewise, underscored the Supreme Court’s mandate in [Dickinson] that taking claims be enforced with an eye towards fairness.”) (internal citation omitted). Instead, the Court held, in cases of gradual taking, accrual of a claim for the purposes of triggering the statute of limitations is delayed until the taking has “stabilized” such that the “consequences of the inundation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck.” Id. at 749. The Supreme Court later clarified the “expressly limited holding” of Dickinson in United States v. Dow, stating: “the statute of limitations did not bar an action under the Tucker Act for a taking by flooding when it was uncertain at what stage in the flooding operation the land had become appropriated for a public use.” 357 U.S. 17, 27 (1958). In Dow, the Court was - 13 - presented with the issue of whether the taking occurred at the time of filing of a declaration of taking or when the government took possession. Id. at 24. In holding a taking occurs at the time the government takes possession, the Court explained “[b]ecause of the uncertainty when, if ever, a declaration would be filed after the Government’s entry, manipulations might be encouraged which could operate to the disadvantage of either the landowner or the United States.” Id. at 25. Distinguishing the case from Dickinson, the Court explained “there is no dispute over the fact that the United States appropriated Parcel 1 on the date it entered into physical possession under order of the District Court,” as compared to Dickinson, where “it was uncertain at what stage in the flooding operation the land had become appropriated to public use.” Id. at 27; see also Etchegoinberry, 114 Fed. Cl. at 498 (“[D]efendant’s inability to pinpoint a single accrual date, and defendant’s reliance on an entire decade as the time when plaintiff allegedly should have known that its claim had accrued, supports a conclusion that landowners . . . were justifiably uncertain about the permanent nature of the damage to their lands.”). The point at which a taking becomes “sufficiently certain to give rise to a claim for compensation varies in each case.” Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If an alleged takings claim stabilized more than six years prior to plaintiff filing suit, recovery for any damage from the taking is barred under the statute of limitations rather than only the damage which occurred more than six years prior. Boling, 220 F.3d at 1373 (rejecting plaintiffs’ assertion the six-year statute of limitations bar as applied to a takings claim “should be limited to exclude only damage that occurred greater than six years prior to the filing of the claim”). B. Justifiable Uncertainty Doctrine The Federal Circuit applies the holdings of Dickerson and Dow to toll the statute of limitations when government promises or actions to mitigate the damages stemming from the takings claim create adequate uncertainty to delay the filing of landowner claims. In Applegate, the Federal Circuit applied the statute of limitations bar to a gradual taking of land from “landowners [who] remain justifiably uncertain about the permanency of the erosion and taking.” 25 F.3d at 1583. In Applegate, the Corps constructed a deep-water harbor. Id. at 1580. “To maintain the channel’s entrance, the Corps constructed two jetties” on each side of the harbor, which interrupted the “natural southerly littoral flow of sand [which] replenished 41 miles of white sandy beaches” and caused “the shoreline north of the harbor to accrete and the shoreline to the south to recede.” Id. In 1962, “the River and Harbor Act . . . authorized over five million dollars for the construction of a sand transfer plant . . . [and] the Senate Public Works Committee and the Florida Department of Natural Resources approved a Corps plan to restore the beaches in 1968.” Id. The plans were delayed, and as of the date of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the plant was not yet built. Id. In 1992, “landowners filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims asking for damages under the Fifth Amendment and for an injunctive order requiring the Corps to build the transfer plant.” Id. at 1581. The United States moved to dismiss, alleging the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief and alleging the motion was untimely. Id. This court granted the government’s motion, and the landowners appealed the statute of limitations bar. Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of how the stabilization doctrine applied to the government’s promised mitigation efforts to restore plaintiffs’ land. Id. at - 14 - 1582. The court explained, “[t]he gradual character of the natural erosion process set in motion by the Corps, compounded by the Government’s promises of a sand transfer plant, have indeed made accrual of the landowners claim uncertain.” Id. at 1582. “[T]he almost imperceptible physical process has delayed detection of the full extent of destruction—a necessary precondition of striking a final account.” Id. The court held, “due to both the very gradual nature of this particular physical process and the Corps’ promises to restore the littoral flow of sand, this taking situation had not stabilized by 1986—six years before the landowners filed suit . . . [and] [t]he statute of limitations does not bar this action.” Id. at 1583; see also Prakhin v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 706, 714 (2017) (holding the government’s repeated promises to mitigate conditions rendered the permanency of the taking uncertain and plaintiff is not barred by the six-year limitations period). Therefore, “precisely because of the Government’s promises to build a sand transfer plant, the landowners remain[ed] justifiably uncertain about the permanency of the erosion and the taking,” and the statute of limitations did not bar their claims. Applegate, 25 F.3d at 1583 (emphasis added). This justifiable uncertainty on the part of the landowners in turn tolled the statute of limitations as to plaintiffs’ takings claims. Id. at 1584. The Federal Circuit further examined the effect of justifiable uncertainty on the statute of limitations for takings claims in Banks v. United States. 314 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In Banks, the court explains the “Corps completed the construction of the St. Joseph harbor jetties in 1903[,] [and] [b]etween 1950 and 1989, the Corps installed sandtight steel sheet piling to the jetties.” Id. at 1306. Installation of the harbor jetties and steel sheet pilings “significantly increased the annual rate of shoreline erosion” along the eastern shoreline of Lake Michigan. Id. The Corps attempted to mitigate the damages for more “than fifteen years of beach nourishment with fine sand.” Id. at 1307. “When the Corps determined that fine sand did not fulfill the role of coarser sediment . . . the Corps deposited coarse material on the . . . shoreline on five different occasions between 1986 and 1993 . . . [and] [t]he mitigation efforts were expanded to placing barge-loads of large rocks into the lake in 1995.” Id. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims alleging takings claims after a “2000 FY–1999 Annual Report . . . emphasized the irreversible and potentially permanent nature of the erosion.” Id. The government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the timeliness of plaintiffs’ claims. Id. This court granted the government’s motion, finding the claims “arose no later than 1989—the date the Corps completed the steel sheet piling of the jetties.” Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit in Banks noted the “question is whether the ‘predictability [and permanence] of the extent of damage to the [plaintiffs’] land’ was made justifiably uncertain by the Corps’ mitigation efforts.” Id. at 1309 (citing Applegate, 25 F.3d at 1583). Applying this standard, the court held “even greater uncertainty was created by the Corps’ mitigation plan . . . [because] the Corps in this case actually performed its mitigation activities for several years before the filing of this action.” Id. at 1309–10. The Federal Circuit made clear justifiable uncertainty does not require “the presence of a legally binding promise or duty or a matter requiring a congressional appropriation.” Id. at 1309. “Because the Court of Federal Claims misapplied the standard for claim accrual under Applegate, and because plaintiffs remained uncertain as to the permanent nature of the taking until the Corps reported that the erosion was permanent and irreversible,” the Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that the claims were not time barred.” Id. at 1310. - 15 - In Boling v. United States, the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s limitation of Dickinson as expressed in Dow to eroded lands along a coastal waterway. 220 F.3d at 1370–81. The property owners in Boling brought suit alleging takings claims from erosion caused by a government-dredged channel. Id. at 1368–69. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed some of the landowners’ claims as time barred, holding “a takings claim accrued once any portion of the parcel at issue had suffered erosion damage.” Id. at 1369. On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the stabilization doctrine, explaining “stabilization . . . in Dickinson is not deferred until the progressive environmental damage stops, but occurs when the environmental forces have substantially and permanently invaded the private property such that the permanent nature of the taking is evident and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 1371 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs in Boling sought in the alternative to extend the time for filing their claims by relying on the doctrine of justifiable uncertainty, arguing authorized government plans to protect their property, which the government later rescinded, caused them to be justifiably uncertain about the extent of their taking. Id. at 1372. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and found plaintiffs were not aware of the government’s alleged mitigation plans until after filing suit, and the Corps denied a previous request for erosion protection. Id. The Federal Circuit therefore remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims to make factual determinations in the first instance about when “the permanent nature of the taking was evident such that a land owner should have known the land suffered erosion,” because “[g]iven the realities of the terrain and the difficulty of determining the exact boundary of the easement, it was virtually impossible for the landowner to discern the land had been taken.” Id. at 1372–73. To fall within the doctrine the Federal Circuit expressed in Applegate, Banks, and Boling, mitigation efforts must make landowners “justifiably uncertain” about the predictability and permanence of the damage caused by the erosion. In cases where no mitigation efforts are committed to or undertaken, there can be no justifiable uncertainty. See Mildenberger v. United States, 643 F.3d 938, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Mildenberger, landowners sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims “seeking compensation for the alleged taking of their riparian and upland property rights” stemming from government discharges of polluted water from a lake. Id. at 941. The government filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, arguing they were barred under the statute of limitations, and this court granted the government’s motion to dismiss under the doctrines of stabilization and justifiable uncertainty. Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained the release of polluted water had occurred “for almost eighty years and the environmental effects have been evident since the 1950.’” Id. at 946. Further, in the “1990’s, some Claimants formed the St. Lucie Initiative, Inc. to restore the health and productivity” of the river and produced a newsletter in 1996 “summarizing the history of the harm.” Id. The Federal Circuit therefore held the “environmental damage was foreseeable and manifested prior” to 2000. Id. Addressing the mitigation doctrine in Applegate and Banks, the Federal Circuit stated “[t]here is no justifiable uncertainty due to the Corps’ promises before the 1990s because the Corps neither undertook nor committed itself to any mitigation activities.” Id. at 947. An internal Corps memorandum addressing “one official’s views regarding a possible method of addressing the Corps’ public relations problem” and the “Corps’ consideration of potential projects to improve management of the waterways” were not, by themselves, sufficient to commit the Corps to any mitigation activities. Id. at 947–48. Plaintiffs’ claims had therefore stabilized more than six years before plaintiffs brought suit, barring them under the statute of limitations. Id. - 16 - VI. Analysis of Category One – Central Wetlands The Central Wetlands corresponds to geographical “Subunit 13” of Exhibit 1 contained in the 2012 Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan, Final Feasibility Report. Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 35 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) Ecosystem Restoration Plan: Final Feasibility Report (June 2012)) (“2012 Feasibility Report”) at 2-58. - 17 - Subunit 13 includes the Livaudais,2 Vincent Marshlands,3 Borgnemouth,4 and Lake Eugenie properties.5 See Corrected Joint Status Report, ECF No. 154 (“JSR”). The Central Wetlands “is approximately 30,000 acres and is bordered on the west and south by the populated settlements of Lower Ninth Ward, Chalmette, Meraux, Violet, and St. Bernard.” Gov. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 7at 1 (Land and Forest Area Changes in the Vicinity of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet; Central Wetlands Region, 1935-2010). “Physically, the [Central Wetlands] is bounded by the MRGO on the east, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW) on the north, the back flood protection levees of the Mississippi River on the west, and the back flood protection levees of the St. Bernard Ridge on the south.” Id. The Central Wetlands is distinct from the MRGO Spoil Bank, subunit 32 on the 2012 Feasibility Report and Category 3 of the Court’s Analysis, which separates the Central Wetlands from the MRGO channel itself. See infra. A. Stabilization Doctrine Plaintiffs’ alleged takings theory in the Central Wetlands is premised on saltwater intrusion permeating from the MRGO, rather than any direct erosion on the banks of the MRGO: [S]altwater intrusion kills the natural vegetation of the marsh and the roots of these dead plants can no longer hold the soil together along the MRGO channel banks. . . . This process has caused erosion of plaintiffs’ lands. Am. Compl. at ¶ 31. Application of the stabilization doctrine requires the Court to first determine when erosion made such “substantial encroachment” to make plaintiffs aware of the permanency of the alleged taking. Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In considering when a landowner should be aware of “substantial encroachment,” the Court is to consider “the uncertainties of the terrain, the difficulty in determining the location of the government’s easement, and the irregular process of erosion.” Id. at 1373.