2021 IL App (2d) 200047 No. 2-20-0047 Opinion filed March 9, 2021 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

DAVID SOUZA, JEFFREY POSADZY, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ATCHERSON ASSOCIATION, and ) of Du Page County. ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) No. 19-MR-164 ) THE CITY OF WEST CHICAGO and ) WATER RESOURCES, INC., ) Honorable ) Paul M. Fullerton, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiffs, David Souza, Jeffrey Posadzy, and Atcherson Association, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, appeal the trial court’s decision granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings under section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735

ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2018)) filed by defendant the City of West Chicago (City), as well as its earlier decision granting the motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (id. § 2-

619(a)(9)) filed by defendant Water Resources, Inc. (Water Resources). At issue on appeal, generally, is whether the court correctly determined that the City’s home rule authority permits it to exempt itself, via an amended ordinance passed after the amended complaint in this case was

2021 IL App (2d) 200047 filed, from statutory requirements concerning water-utility billing. In addition, we are asked to consider whether the City’s ordinance may be applied retroactively. Finally, plaintiffs challenge the court’s dismissal of the counts against Water Resources. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. Complaint Allegations and City Ordinance

¶4 On February 14, 2019, Souza and Posadzy filed a three-count class action complaint against defendants, alleging that plaintiffs Souza, Posadzy, and all potential class members were residential water-service customers and that the City, a municipality formed under the Illinois

Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2018)), 1 had engaged in unlawful billing practices, charging them for water and sewer services outside of the 12-month period prescribed by the water-utility billing provision of the Municipal Code, section 11-150-2 (id. § 11-150-2).2

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Specifically, the complaint alleged that the City owned a water and sewage system that provided services to residential and commercial properties within City boundaries. In July 2011, defendants

contracted with Water Resources to replace residential water meters, update meter equipment, and implement electronic advancements that would benefit customers by allowing electronic access to monitor water consumption. Shortly after the equipment installation, the City learned that numerous customers were experiencing deficient, inaccurate, and/or missing water meter readings.

After experiencing years of these errors, the City terminated its contract with Water Resources, effective July 30, 2016. However, despite the water-meter and software malfunctions, the City attempted to bill and collect water-usage charges from affected residents.

¶5 The complaint’s first two counts sought declaratory and injunctive relief and economic damages from the City, based on the City’s attempt to bill more than 12 months after the alleged usage, in contravention of section 11-150-2’s restriction, effective August 18, 2017, that billing must occur within 12 months of the service provided. Plaintiffs alleged that, since 2013, the City

issued bills for services that were provided several years prior to the invoice. In the third count, plaintiffs sought economic damages from Water Resources, for breach of its contract with the City, premised upon plaintiffs’ alleged status as third-party beneficiaries of that contract. Plaintiffs alleged that, to the extent that the City’s billing was based on a breach of contract occasioned by

Water Resources, plaintiffs, as third-party beneficiaries to that contract, were entitled to recover

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2021 IL App (2d) 200047 all service charges wrongfully billed and/or collected by the City. A few days later, plaintiffs moved for class certification.

¶6 On March 19, 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding Atcherson Association as a nonresidential plaintiff and adding two counts relating to section 11-150-2’s requirement that

nonresidential customers be billed within 24 months of the service. Counts III and VI of the amended complaint pertained to Water Resources, again alleging third-party beneficiary breach- of-contract claims related to the City’s contract with Water Resources.

¶7 On March 26, 2019, the court granted the City’s earlier-filed motion for an extension of time to answer the complaint, ordering a response by May 22, 2019.

¶8 Between the court’s March 26, 2019, order, and the May 22, 2019, response due date, the City amended its local ordinance concerning billing practices. Specifically, on April 15, 2019, the City amended section 18-37 of the West Chicago Code of Ordinances (City Code) with ordinance

No. 19-O-0010 (Ordinance). See West Chicago Ordinance No. 19-O-0010 (eff. Apr. 15, 2019)

(amending West Chicago Code of Ordinances § 18-37). (The amended ordinance is summarized in the next section).

¶9 B. Responsive Motions and Court Rulings Thereon

¶ 10 On April 5, 2019, Water Resources filed a section 2-619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (a)(9)

(West 2018)) motion to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing to

bring claims against it, as plaintiffs were not parties to its contract with the City. Attaching the contract to its motion, Water Resources argued that a third party may sue for breach of contract only if the actual parties to the contract intended to confer upon the third party a “direct benefit” and that mere incidental benefits were insufficient to sustain a cause of action. Water Resources disagreed with plaintiffs’ conclusory complaint allegation that they were third-party beneficiaries

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2021 IL App (2d) 200047 of the contract, noting that nothing in the contract expressed any intent to protect plaintiffs from

improper billing practices that the City might perform. Rather, the intent of the contract was for Water Resources to upgrade almost 7000 water meters managed by the City, as well as its hardware

and software, and, therefore, any benefit to plaintiffs from the contract was merely incidental. In short, Water Resources argued, the contract “simply does not address any intent to provide a

benefit to [p]laintiffs with respect to the alleged harm at issue in the instant lawsuit.” On June 5, 2019, the court agreed, and it dismissed counts III and VI against Water Resources. In so doing, it noted that virtually every contract into which a city enters is for the benefit of its citizens but that

those contracts do not all provide citizens third-party beneficiary status. Here, the court found, the contract’s purpose was to provide good working water meters and technology for the City and its citizens but the benefit to citizens was incidental, not direct.

¶ 11 On May 22, 2019, the City filed its section 2-615(e) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to counts I, II, and V of the amended complaint. The City conceded that, since 2013, it had to delay issuing water bills to many of its customers. It explained that, in 2011, the City contracted with Water Resources to implement an “Advanced Metering Infrastructure,” which required installation of new smart water meters, radio signal transmission devices, and other infrastructure

that could deliver “real time” meter reads to the City through installed software. According to the City, Water Resources was to ensure that the software (which compiled meter-usage data) interfaced with the City’s billing software, so as to allow the City to automatically issue bills.

Almost immediately, numerous problems ensued with the installed hardware, and significant software-interfacing and hardware errors impacted the City’s ability to provide timely billing to its customers. Accordingly, as the meter issues persisted for years, the City agreed that some water

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2021 IL App (2d) 200047 bills were issued to customers more than one year after the water service was provided. The City noted that it continued to attempt to bring its customer accounts current.

¶ 12 However, even assuming that the amended complaint’s allegations were true, the City

argued that it was, nevertheless, entitled to judgment on the pleadings, i.e., as a matter of law, for two reasons. First, it argued, its exercise of home rule authority under section 18-37 of the City

Code (West Chicago Code of Ordinances § 18-37 (amended Apr. 15, 2019)), as amended by the Ordinance, controlled over section 11-150-2 of the Municipal Code. Alternatively, the City argued

that the procedural commands in section 11-150-2 of the Municipal Code are merely directory, precluding plaintiffs’ requested relief. It further explained:

“[S]ection 11-150-2 sets forth certain procedural commands concerning municipal water billing practices, [but] it contains no explicit limitations on the power of home rule

municipalities or any consequence to home rule or non-home rule municipalities for the failure to strictly follow the procedural commands therein. Concurrently, section 18-

37(a)(3) of the City Code provides for the City’s water billing practices. Section 18-

37(a)(3) was recently amended by City Ordinance No. 19-O-0010 and likewise sets forth

certain procedural commands concerning the City’s billing practices. Section 18-37 of the City Code has never contained a consequence for the City’s failure to follow the procedural commands set forth therein.”

¶ 13 The Ordinance provides, in sum:

“The aforesaid rates apply to bimonthly billing periods, or as otherwise determined by the city administrator or his designee, and the charge shall be based upon meter

readings, provided however, that the minimum charge set forth is as above. The reading device on the meter shall be considered the primary reader and will be used

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for billing if different than the remote reader. For cases of faulty meters or unmetered service, the minimum charge plus a usage estimate by the director of administrative services or his designee shall establish the charges. All charges provided herein may be billed bimonthly. Failure to bill any charges provided herein on a bimonthly basis shall have no impact on liability for any outstanding usage charges incurred for any period of time.” (Emphases added.) West Chicago

Code of Ordinances § 18-37(a)(3) (amended Apr. 15, 2019).

¶ 14 In addition, the City noted that the Ordinance (again, amended after the amended complaint

in this case was filed) also expressly provided that it (1) controlled over section 11-150-2 of the Municipal Code; (2) applied to any and all billed or unbilled charges incurred for water usage prior to and subsequent to the amended ordinance’s effective date; and (3) applied to “any and all causes of action that have accrued, will accrue, or are currently pending before a court of competent jurisdiction, including courts of review.” Thus, the City concluded, “[t]here can be no question that section 18-37(a)(3) as amended by City Ordinance No. 19-O-0010 precludes [p]laintiffs’ claims against the City.” Moreover, the City argued that the language in the Municipal Code was merely directory, not mandatory, with no prescribed consequence for noncompliance.

¶ 15 Alternatively, the City also filed a section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) motion

to dismiss the complaint. In sum, the City argued that plaintiffs were seeking to avoid payment for consumed water and that the complaint should be dismissed because (1) plaintiffs had not

identified a cognizable legal theory to support their claims for declaratory relief, (2) no cause of action had been alleged for the claims seeking injunctive relief and damages, (3) the claims for damages were barred by the Moorman doctrine (see Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National

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Tank Co. 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982)), and (4) plaintiffs fundamentally misunderstood the requirements of the statute at issue.

¶ 16 In separate responses to the motions, plaintiffs noted, in sum, that the State’s express public policy when enacting section 11-150-2 was to protect consumers of municipally provided water services from being billed for services provided more than 12 months earlier. Plaintiffs argued that the provision’s application to “any municipality operating a waterworks or combined waterworks and sewage system,” included home rule municipalities. They noted that, after receiving a complaint concerning its violations of state requirements for public-utility billing, the City took three months to respond and, during that time, sought to “retroactively alter its utility ordinance and invoke its home rule status as a defense.” Plaintiffs argued that the City’s position was meritless and that home rule powers cannot preempt statewide concerns relating to utilities.

Moreover, plaintiffs disagreed that the Municipal Code was directory, asserting that it was, instead, a “mandate to municipal providers to be put in the same regulatory footing as private utility providers.”

¶ 17 In addition to other points raised, we note that, in its reply in support of its section 2-615(e) motion, the City, in a footnote, commented:

“Plaintiffs acknowledge the retroactive application of City Ordinance No. 19-O-

0010 negating their claims for relief in this matter; yet, [p]laintiffs make no argument that

City Ordinance No. 19-O-0010 is impermissibly retroactive. Notwithstanding, the retroactive effect of City Ordinance No. 19-O-0010 is permissible under Illinois law.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 38 *** (2001) (‘[I]f the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be

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2021 IL App (2d) 200047 given effect.’). Ordinance 19-O-0010 clearly expresses its temporal reach and explains that it clarifies section 18-37 of the City Code.”

It also noted that plaintiffs did

“not dispute that they have no fundamental right to complimentary water usage and service.

Moreover, untimely water billing does not affect plaintiffs’ ability to evaluate and contest the reasonableness of charges. *** [A]ny economic hardship occasioned by a delayed water bill can be remedied through extended payment plans as authorized under section

18-30.1 of the City Code.”

¶ 18 On September 10, 2019, the court held argument on the City’s two motions. ^[3] Thereafter, on October 15, 2019, the court granted the City’s section 2-615(e) motion for judgment on the pleadings. In its written memorandum decision, the court determined that two conflicting laws were at issue—section 11-150-2 (which contains billing timeframes) and the Ordinance (which does not contain billing timeframes)—but that the Ordinance governed because it was a valid exercise of the City’s home rule authority, which section 11-150-2 did not expressly limit.

Specifically, the court found that the City’s water-billing practices were a function pertaining to its government and local affairs and that the Ordinance addressed unique problems that the City faced, for example, with defective water meters and missed meter readings. The court did not agree with plaintiffs’ argument that municipal control over public utilities had been preempted by statewide control of public utilities, thus rendering the Ordinance void. Rather, the court found

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2021 IL App (2d) 200047 that the argument failed, in light of the absence of any express language in section 11-150-2

limiting home rule authority. The court noted, “home rule authority is not subservient to the doctrine of implied preemption,” and “[u]nless there is a clear expression of preemption, home

rule authority will stand.” Although plaintiffs cited “ostensibly compelling” legislative history, which would reflect an intent to prevent back-billing in situations such as those alleged in this case, statutory interpretation principles did not permit the court to read into the statute a legislator’s comments. Again, the court noted, the legislature was well aware of its duty to use specific language to limit or deny home rule authority. The court determined that, because the Ordinance was a valid exercise of home rule power, the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Moreover, because the court granted the section 2-615(e) motion, it found no need to address the City’s alternative section 2-615 motion and ordered it stricken as moot.

¶ 19 C. Postjudgment Motions

¶ 20 On November 12, 2019, plaintiffs filed a “motion to limit the scope of [the trial] court’s

October 15, 2019[,] ruling and to strike as unconstitutional any retroactive application of the City’s newly amended ordinance.” In the motion, plaintiffs argued that the court admittedly ruled on two

contradictory laws but did not address that the Ordinance was adopted after the state law and, further, after the amended complaint had been filed in this case. Plaintiffs argued that the court

made no finding concerning how applying the Ordinance retroactively might deprive them of vested abatement rights granted under state law before the Ordinance’s passage. Plaintiffs argued

that permitting retroactive application of the Ordinance would violate their due process rights and, while expressly claiming that they were not waiving their underlying position that state law

expressly preempts the City’s contradictory home rule ordinance, asked the court to limit the breadth and scope of its judgment in to apply the Ordinance only prospectively.

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¶ 21 The next day, November 13, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. They argued that the court’s judgment constituted a misapplication of existing law, that it effectively allowed the “fox to guard the hen house,” and that the court should reverse the judgment and deny the section 2-615(e) motion in its entirety.

¶ 22 On November 20, 2019, the City moved to strike plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, arguing that it violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 274 (eff. July 1, 2019) in that the rule permitted only one postjudgment motion. In a separate motion, the City also moved to strike plaintiffs’

motion to limit the scope of the court’s judgment, arguing, in sum, that the issues raised therein (namely, the constitutionality of the Ordinance’s retroactive application) were being improperly raised for the first time postjudgment and, accordingly, were forfeited.

¶ 23 In response, plaintiffs specified that their motion to limit the scope was not a motion to reconsider but, rather, it was a motion to modify the judgment and was being brought pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2018) (the trial court “may on motion

filed within 30 days after entry thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall be reasonable”). Section 2-1301(e), plaintiffs argued, simply considered whether substantial justice was done between the litigants. Further, plaintiffs noted that the issue

of retroactivity did not arise until the City mentioned it in a footnote in its reply in support of the motion for judgment on the pleadings and that, thus, plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to respond. In any event, they argued, the court itself was required to perform constitutional scrutiny

of an attempt to retroactively apply a changed law and, here, the court did not, in its decision, perform that analysis.

- 11 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 ¶ 24 On November 20, 2019, the court entered an order granting plaintiffs leave to withdraw their motion to reconsider, filed November 13, 2019, “without prejudice to assert arguments made therein on any appeal.” ¶ 25 On December 17, 2019, the court held oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion to limit the scope of the judgment. It granted the City’s motion to strike; however, it also denied on the merits plaintiffs’ motion to limit the scope of the judgment. The court explained that it agreed with the City that section 2-1301(e), which allows a court to set aside a judgment, does not permit modification of a judgment and that, thus, plaintiffs improperly used it and should have instead filed the motion under section 2-1203(a) of the Code (id. § 2-1203(a)) (“In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.”). However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that, regardless of the motion’s label, it was, nevertheless, appropriate for the court to consider the arguments on their merits. Doing so, it rejected plaintiffs’ arguments, finding their cited cases distinguishable and noting that curative legislation is permissible, legislative intent formed the primary consideration in a retroactivity analysis (as opposed to vested rights, as plaintiffs had asserted), and the Ordinance was permissible. It found no unconstitutionality in the City’s retroactive application of the Ordinance. Thus, the scope of its prior order was appropriate. ¶ 26 In accordance with the oral ruling, the written order granted the City’s motion to strike on the basis that plaintiffs’ motion to limit the scope of the judgment, was not properly brought under section 2-1301(e). However, it held “additionally,” having considered the merits of plaintiffs’ motion to limit the scope of the order, the motion was denied. - 12 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 ¶ 27 On January 15, 2020, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. ¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 29 Plaintiffs raise numerous arguments on appeal, which can be distilled into three overarching categories. First, plaintiffs challenge the propriety of the court’s analysis and ruling that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of home rule authority and, thus, the City is not bound by section 11-150-2’s requirements for water-utility billing. Second, plaintiffs challenge the court’s denial of their motion to limit the scope of the judgment, resulting, they argue, in unconstitutional retroactive application of the Ordinance. Third, they challenge the propriety of the court’s decision granting Water Resources’ section 2-619 motion to dismiss, which had asserted that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims, as they were not third-party beneficiaries to defendants’ contract. We note that the City and Water Resources have filed separate appellee briefs. ¶ 30 A. Jurisdiction and Forfeiture ¶ 31 After plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, the City moved this court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On March 4, 2020, in a minute order, we denied the motion. The City has again challenged jurisdiction, and it also asserts that plaintiffs’ arguments are forfeited. The denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction is not final, the question of our jurisdiction may be revisited at any time prior to our disposition of the appeal, and “we have the obligation to be certain of our jurisdiction before proceeding.” In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 58 (1999); see also, e.g., Buffa v. Haideri, 362 Ill. App. 3d 532, 536 (2005) (“we have an independent obligation to verify our jurisdiction over every appeal that is filed in this court”). Thus, we address this issue first. ¶ 32 The City asserts that plaintiffs’ appeal is “too little too late” and must be dismissed because it (1) is untimely, (2) raises new legal arguments and theories for the first time on appeal, and - 13 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 (3) presents belated legal arguments “on a belated request for declaratory relief concerning an unpled challenge to the City’s [o]rdinance in a postjudgment motion.” ¶ 33 As to the first point, the City contends that the appeal is untimely because the trial court entered a final judgment on October 15, 2019, and the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days later (specifically, on January 15, 2020). The City acknowledges that, on November 12, 2019, plaintiffs moved to limit the scope of the court’s judgment, which the court substantively denied on December 17, 2019, but the City points out that the court also struck plaintiffs’ motion as improperly filed under section 2-1301(e). The City argues that plaintiff’s motion did not request proper section 2-1301 relief and it was not a motion to reconsider under section 2-1203; thus it was not a motion directed against the judgment, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), and so did not toll the time for appeal. The City notes that plaintiffs’ motion did not ask the trial court to set aside or vacate the judgment but, rather, it requested for the first time the court to declare the Ordinance unlawfully retroactive and to limit, on that basis, the scope of the final order. ¶ 34 This transitions into the City’s second argument, i.e., that plaintiffs’ request to the court to deem the Ordinance unlawfully retroactive was not pleaded in their amended complaint and was a new legal theory raised for the first time after judgment was entered. The City notes that the motion did not request any modification of the judgment concerning the court’s disposition of the claims pleaded in the complaint. According to the City, because plaintiffs never previously requested a declaration that the Ordinance was unconstitutionally retroactive, the court had no authority to grant their request, made for the first time in a postjudgment motion. The City concludes that, since the motion to limit the scope of the judgment was requesting, for the first time, new relief on an unpleaded claim, it was not sufficient to toll the time for appeal. - 14 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 ¶ 35 In addition, separate from timeliness, the City contends that we should dismiss the appeal because plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition to the court’s judgment are forfeited as being raised for the first time on appeal. For example, the City contends that plaintiffs argued below that the Ordinance must yield to the Municipal Code but that plaintiffs have abandoned that argument on appeal, instead arguing, for the first time, that the City lacked home rule authority to assess water charges, that the ordinance did not pertain to the City’s government and affairs, that the ordinance was impliedly or expressly preempted by the Municipal Code, and that the ordinance should be stricken because it interferes with section 11-150-2 of the Municipal Code and leads to absurd results. Similarly, in its third point, the City notes again that plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the Ordinance’s retroactivity were raised for the first time postjudgment. Thus, the City argues, those, too, are forfeited because it is improper to raise new arguments postjudgment. For the following reasons, we reject the City’s arguments. ¶ 36 As described above, the City’s challenges concern both jurisdiction and forfeiture. As to jurisdiction, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Joseph v. Evergreen Motors, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 180360, ¶ 19. Rule 303(a)(1) provides, in part, that, when a party files a postjudgment motion, the notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). ¶ 37 The court’s order, both striking plaintiffs’ “motion to limit the scope” and substantively denying it, was a bit unusual. Nevertheless, we agree with plaintiffs that, regardless of whether the motion was filed pursuant to section 2-1203 or section 2-1301 of the Code it was a motion directed against the judgment, because it sought a substantive modification of the judgment. “A postjudgment motion extends the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 303(a)(1) only when - 15 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 it seeks rehearing, retrial, modification or vacation of the judgment, or other similar relief.” (Emphases added.) Heiden v. DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc., 396 Ill. App. 3d 135, 138 (2009). The City correctly points out that a motion is directed against the judgment only if it actually challenges the judgment, not when it merely requests a change to the language of the judgment (see, e.g., In re Estate of Russell, 372 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594-95 (2007)), but the motion to limit the judgment’s scope here was not requesting merely a superficial change. Namely, it requested that the court modify the judgment to include a constitutional assessment of the City’s retroactive application of a newly enacted ordinance that was passed after plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. The requested modification had the potential to affect plaintiffs’ relief, and, regardless of form or how and when the question arose, the court agreed that the requested analysis was required. It performed the substantive analysis but denied the motion. The notice of appeal was filed within 30 days after the court’s ruling, and, therefore, it tolled the time to appeal. Our jurisdiction is proper. ¶ 38 Whether all of the issues raised on appeal (particularly those that were contemplated in the withdrawn motion to reconsider) are preserved is a question different from that of jurisdiction. We are mindful of the fact that, after plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the City amended the Ordinance and then, instead of answering the complaint, moved for judgment on the pleadings. Thus, plaintiffs became respondents to the motion, thereby positioned only to respond to the allegations in the motion and were, therefore, somewhat constrained in what arguments could be proffered. Their overarching argument in opposition to the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings centered around their dispute that the City could validly assert home rule authority as a defense to Municipal Code regulations. The trial court ultimately sided with the City on that issue; plaintiffs were then presented with their first opportunity to dispute the trial court’s rationale for - 16 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 its decision (including noting that the court’s order had not addressed the propriety of applying the Ordinance retroactively). In their motion to limit the scope of the judgment, plaintiffs expressed that they did not intend to forfeit their other challenges to the merits of the court’s judgment. They also filed a motion to reconsider the judgment and, although they ultimately withdrew that motion, the order itself allowed conditional withdrawal, i.e., withdrawal under the condition that plaintiffs’ arguments remained preserved for appeal. Without question, that court order was also unusual. A party generally preserves an issue by actually presenting it to the trial court and, so, it seems incongruous for the trial court here to order that an issue is preserved, even though it was not, ultimately, presented to the trial court. Indeed, we implore trial courts to carefully consider the impact of their orders, remaining mindful that they are not necessarily positioned to pronounce as preserved issues that are not or to bestow upon us jurisdiction where there is none. In any event, it is well settled that the issue of forfeiture, as opposed to jurisdiction, is a limitation on the parties, not on this court. See, e.g., Jill Knowles Enterprises, Inc. v. Dunkin, 2017 IL App (2d) 160811, ¶ 22. All things considered, it strikes us as unfair to deny plaintiffs what the trial court specifically allowed, i.e., the ability to raise these issues on appeal (even if the trial court was misguided in doing so). ¶ 39 As such, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the appeal. Further, under these circumstances, forfeiture is not a basis for dismissal. ¶ 40 B. Standards of Review ¶ 41 We review de novo a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Gillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 385 (2005)), the constitutionality of an ordinance (Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 14), and a section 2-619 motion to dismiss (Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 571 (2002)). - 17 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 ¶ 42 Judgment on the pleadings is proper where the pleadings disclose that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gillen, 215 Ill. 2d at 385. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will consider only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record. Id. We take as true all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences. Id. On review, we must determine whether any issues of material fact exist and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. ¶ 43 In addition, to the extent that the judgment on appeal concerns statutory interpretation, that, too, is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 237 Ill. 2d 30, 39 (2010). When interpreting statutes, we must ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, and we must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd results. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 561 (2010); In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill. 2d 107, 116 (2008). “The best indicator of the legislative intent is the language in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062, ¶ 16. We must not interpret a statute in a manner that renders other statutory provisions meaningless (see, e.g., Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 561), nor may we read into statutes exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the General Assembly did not express (see Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 221 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2006)). ¶ 44 C. Judgment on the Pleadings ¶ 45 On October 15, 2019, the trial court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding, in sum, that the Ordinance reflected a valid exercise of its home rule authority and that, as section 11-150-2 did not expressly limit home rule authority, the statute’s billing requirements did not preempt the Ordinance. Plaintiffs argue that the court’s ruling is - 18 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 incorrect because, while both state and local legislation may attempt to regulate the same subject matter or issue, the concept of home rule authority generally provides a basis for local governments to tailor local solutions to local affairs. That concept does not make sense here, plaintiffs contend, because section 11-150-2 imposed requirements on the local entity itself, in order to pursue a vital state interest of consumer protection. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, it is absurd to interpret home rule power as allowing a municipality to nullify a state mandate, designed to regulate it, by passing a directly contradictory ordinance. According to plaintiffs, it is critical here to identify (1) what or who is being regulated under the conflicting state and local laws, (2) what problem is being addressed by those laws, and (3) which unit of government has a more vital interest in regulating the issue. Doing so, plaintiffs argue, reveals that the Ordinance is not a valid exercise of home rule authority and that, even if it were, section 11-150-2 expressly limits that authority. For the following reasons, we disagree. ¶ 46 1. Home Rule Authority ¶ 47 We first summarize pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as case law interpreting those provisions, concerning home rule authority. The 1970 Illinois Constitution bestows broad authority on home rule units. Article VII, section 6(a), states in part: “Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a). ¶ 48 Home rule is “based on the assumption that municipalities should be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to their local needs” (Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 29), and section 6(a) intends to give home rule units the - 19 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 broadest powers possible, with section 6(m) of the Illinois Constitution providing that the “ ‘[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally’ ” (id. ¶ 30 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(m))). However, under article VII, section 6(h), the General Assembly “may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(h). To limit or deny a municipality’s home rule powers, the statute “must contain an express statement to that effect,” and if there is no express limitation or denial of home rule authority, a municipal ordinance and a state statute may operate concurrently. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31. Indeed, section 6(i) of the Illinois Constitution provides: “Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.” (Emphases added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i). ¶ 49 In Palm, our supreme court reiterated that, even if the State has regulated activities, home rule units may continue to regulate the same activities, unless the General Assembly restricts the concurrent exercise of home rule power by enacting “a law specifically stating home rule authority is limited.” (Emphasis in original.) Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 32. The legislature also codified this principle in section 7 of the Statute on Statutes, which provides: “No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits any power or function of a home rule unit *** unless there is specific language limiting or denying the power or function and the language specifically sets forth in what manner and to what extent it is a limitation - 20 - 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 on or denial of the power or function of a home rule unit.” 4 (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2018). ¶ 50 The court in Palm also noted that, in the Home Rule Note Act (25 ILCS 75/5 (West 2018)), the legislature provided that any bill seeking to limit home rule power must, before a second reading, include an explanation that reliably estimates the probable impact of the bill on the powers and functions of home rule units. Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 33. “Accordingly, the legislature has recognized its principal role in determining whether to preempt or limit home rule power and its responsibility to use specific language when preempting or limiting that power.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 51 Collectively, the constitutional provisions and the statutes reflect an intention to minimize limitations on home rule powers, and, due to the constitutional design, courts should apply “judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative inaction” to limit home rule powers only in the “clearest cases,” wherein local ordinances interfere with “vital” state policy. (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 34. It is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to restrict home rule authority. Id. In short, the Illinois Constitution, the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)), and our supreme court’s case law evidence that, unless there are unequivocal, clear, and, indeed, almost “magic words” expressed in a statute reflecting an intent to limit home rule authority, we cannot interpret the statute in a manner to impose such restrictions. See, e.g., Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶¶ 80-81 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).