ILCS » Chapter 735 · Act 5
Illinois Compiled Statutes

735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (2026)

Judgments - Default - Confession

✓ current as of May 2026
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(735 ILCS 5/2-1301) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1301)
    Sec. 2-1301. Judgments - Default - Confession. (a) The court shall determine the rights of the parties and grant to any party any affirmative relief to which the party may be entitled on the pleadings and proofs. Judgments shall be in the form required by the nature of the case and by the recovery or relief awarded. More than one judgment may be rendered in the same cause. If relief is granted against a party who upon satisfying the same in whole or in part will be entitled by operation of law to be reimbursed by another party to the action, the court may determine the rights of the parties as between themselves, and may thereafter upon motion and notice in the cause, and upon a showing that satisfaction has been made, render a final judgment against the other party accordingly.
    (b) A determination in favor of the plaintiff on an issue as to the truth or validity of any defense in abatement shall be that the defendant answer or otherwise plead.
    (c) Except as otherwise limited by this subsection (c), any person for a debt bona fide due may confess judgment by himself or herself or attorney duly authorized, without process. The application to confess judgment shall be made in the county in which the note or obligation was executed or in the county in which one or more of the defendants reside or in any county in which is located any property, real or personal, owned by any one or more of the defendants. A judgment entered by any court in any county other than those herein specified has no force or validity, anything in the power to confess to the contrary notwithstanding.
    No power to confess judgment shall be required or given after September 24, 1979 in any instrument used in a consumer transaction; any power to confess given in violation hereof is null and void and any judgment entered by a court based on such power shall be unenforceable. "Consumer transaction" as used in this Section means a sale, lease, assignment, loan, or other disposition of an item of goods, a consumer service, or an intangible to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household.
    (d) Judgment by default may be entered for want of an appearance, or for failure to plead, but the court may in either case, require proof of the allegations of the pleadings upon which relief is sought.
    (e) The court may in its discretion, before final order or judgment, set aside any default, and may on motion filed within 30 days after entry thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall be reasonable.
    (f) The fact that any order or judgment is joint does not deprive the court of power to set it aside as to fewer than all the parties, and if so set aside it remains in full force and effect as to the other parties.
    (g) If any final judgment is entered against any defendant who has been served by publication with notice of the commencement of the action and who has not been served with a copy of the complaint, or received the notice required to be sent him or her by mail, or otherwise brought into court, and such defendant or his or her heirs, legatees, or personal representatives, as the case may require, shall, within 90 days after notice in writing given him or her of the judgment, or within 1 year after the judgment, if no notice has been given, appear in open court and petition to be heard touching the matter of the judgment, the court shall upon notice being given to the parties to such action who appeared therein and the purchaser at a sale made pursuant to the judgment, or their attorneys, set the petition for hearing and may allow the parties and the purchaser to answer the petition. If upon the hearing it appears that the judgment ought not to have been made against the defendant, it may be set aside, altered or amended as appears just; otherwise the petition shall be dismissed at petitioner's costs. If, however, a sale has been had under and pursuant to the final judgment, the court, in altering or amending the judgment may, upon terms just and equitable to the defendant, permit the sale to stand. If upon the hearing of the petition it appears that the defendant was entitled under the law to redeem from the sale, the court shall permit redemption to be made at any time within 90 days thereafter, upon terms that are equitable and just.
(Source: P.A. 83-707.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 236 cases (92 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886 (Ill. 2011).
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In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886 (Ill. 2011). · cites it 5× “¶ 33 On June 1, within the time allowed by the court, Ralph, through counsel, duly filed a motion to have the default set aside pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2008)). At the previously scheduled June 2 hearing, the…”
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Kmiecik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121700 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 3× “After the court entered an order approving the sale and distribution of the property at issue, defendant filed a combined motion to quash and motion to vacate all orders pursuant to section 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2010)). The trial…”
Galaviz v. Mietus Restoration, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 220514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). · cites it 5× “In his motion to reconsider, plaintiff contended that (1) the DWP order was not a final order and was therefore subject to being vacated pursuant to section 2-1301 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2020)) at the time that plaintiff filed his motion to vacate and (2) in the…”
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. 2010 Real Est. Foreclosure, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 120711 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 3× “Intervenor, 2010 Real Estate Foreclosure, LLC, sought to vacate the confirmation of the sale pursuant to both section 2- 1301(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010)) and section 15-1508(b) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law…”
Progressive Universal Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 770 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 5× “" 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2000). Finally, section 13-217 of the Code provides that, when an action is dismissed for want of prosecution, the plaintiff "may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater.”
John Isfan Constr., Inc. v. Longwood Towers, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 143211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 4× “¶3 The Husmans eventually moved to vacate the default judgment against Longwood under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2012)). Their motion was denied.”
Godfrey Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Toigo, 2019 IL App (5th) 170473 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 3× “1 judgment, and the subsequent order denying his pro se motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2014)). We reverse and remand.”
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Brewer, 2012 IL App (1st) 111213 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 2× “Any vesting of title *** by deed pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 15-1509, unless otherwise specified in the judgment of foreclosure, shall be an entire bar of *** all claims of parties to the foreclosure ***, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (g) of Section…”
Wolkowitz v. Jamison, 2024 IL App (1st) 230455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). · cites it 3× “¶ 32 To this question, defendant asserts that section 2-1203 applies, while plaintiff argues that our review should be governed by section 2-1301 (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2020)). We set forth both, and we find, as we explain below, that the ultimate result is the same whichever…”
In re Est. of Young, 2020 IL App (2d) 190392 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 2× “The trial court dismissed both cases for want of prosecution (DWP) and subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the will contest (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2018)). Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing both cases, denying…”
Northbrook Bank & Trust Co. v. 2120 Div. LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133426 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “2d 321 (indicating that prior to the filing of the motion to confirm sale, the borrower may seek to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure under the standards set forth in section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010)), but after the…”
Crim v. Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318 (Ill. 2020). · cites it 2× “2d 266, 277 (1984)); 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(a) (West 2018). When a trial court grants a motion for directed verdict on a claim, it removes the claim completely from the “province of the jury” (Mohn v.”
Show all 236 citing cases →
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(a) — 2 cases
Crim v. Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318 (Ill. 2020). “2d 266, 277 (1984)); 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(a) (West 2018). When a trial court grants a motion for directed verdict on a claim, it removes the claim completely from the “province of the jury” (Mohn v.”
Crim v. Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318 (Ill. 2021).
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(b) — 1 case
Afl-Cio (Afscme) v. Dept. of Cent. Mgt., 671 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. 1996).
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(c) — 7 cases
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230087 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
Cole v. Davis, 2016 IL App (1st) 152716 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Sopris Concrete, LLC v. Meeks, 2022 IL App (2d) 210331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
Cole v. Davis, 2016 IL App (1st) 152716 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Bottalla v. Serpe, 2024 IL App (1st) 231779-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) — 49 cases
O'Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition Xvi, LLC, 635 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011).
People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency, 685 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. 1997).
Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
Higgens v. House, 680 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
DUPREE v. Hardy, 960 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) — 126 cases
In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886 (Ill. 2011). “¶ 33 On June 1, within the time allowed by the court, Ralph, through counsel, duly filed a motion to have the default set aside pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2008)). At the previously scheduled June 2 hearing, the…”
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. 2010 Real Est. Foreclosure, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 120711 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “Intervenor, 2010 Real Estate Foreclosure, LLC, sought to vacate the confirmation of the sale pursuant to both section 2- 1301(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010)) and section 15-1508(b) of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law…”
Progressive Universal Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 770 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “" 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2000). Finally, section 13-217 of the Code provides that, when an action is dismissed for want of prosecution, the plaintiff "may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater.”
John Isfan Constr., Inc. v. Longwood Towers, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 143211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “¶3 The Husmans eventually moved to vacate the default judgment against Longwood under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2012)). Their motion was denied.”
Galaviz v. Mietus Restoration, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 220514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “In his motion to reconsider, plaintiff contended that (1) the DWP order was not a final order and was therefore subject to being vacated pursuant to section 2-1301 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2020)) at the time that plaintiff filed his motion to vacate and (2) in the…”
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(g) — 3 cases
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Brewer, 2012 IL App (1st) 111213 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “Any vesting of title *** by deed pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 15-1509, unless otherwise specified in the judgment of foreclosure, shall be an entire bar of *** all claims of parties to the foreclosure ***, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (g) of Section…”
Am. Chartered Bank v. USMDS, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
The Habitat Co., LLC v. Peeples, 2018 IL App (1st) 171420 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.