² It is apparent from the record that the trial court was reading a transcription of the recorded phone call that Foster made to another individual on July 29, 2020, while he was in the jail awaiting the resolution of this case. 3 The record also indicates that Ms. Chambers was Foster’s longtime girlfriend and accomplice in the underlying cases. Ms. Chambers claimed that Foster forced her to participate in the breakings and enterings under threat of physical violence.

⁴ Regan Tokes Law provides that a court imposing a non-life imprisonment term for certain first and second- degree felonies committed after the law’s March 22, 2019 effective date, defined as a qualifying felony, must impose a minimum prison term which may be extended by one-half the minimum term due to institutional infractions as determined by the Ohio Department of Corrections. See State v. Acosta, 6th Lucas Nos. L-20- 1068, L-20-1069, 2021-Ohio-757, ¶ 6. - 13 - Case No. 14-20-26 {¶21} Revised Code Section 2901.011 states in its entirety: The amendments to sections 109.42, 121.22, 149.43, 2903.06, 2903.08, 2903.11, 2903.12, 2905.01, 2905.32, 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.05, 2907.07, 2919.22, 2919.25, 2921.321, 2921.36, 2923.132, 2925.01, 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04, 2925.041, 2925.11, 2929.01, 2929.14, 2929.142, 2929.15, 2929.19, 2929.191, 2929.20, 2929.61, 2930.16, 2943.032, 2953.08, 2967.01, 2967.021, 2967.03, 2967.13, 2967.19, 2967.191, 2967.193, 2967.26, 2967.28, 2971.03, 3719.99, 5120.021, 5120.53, 5120.66, and 5120.80 and the enactment of sections 2901.011, 2929.144, 2967.271, and 5120.038 of the Revised Code by S.B. 201 of the 132nd general assembly constitute the Reagan Tokes Law. (Emphasis added). {¶22} Foster claims that because R.C. 2923.32, the statute outlining the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, does not appear in the list of amended statutes it is not a qualifying felony under the Regan Tokes Law, and therefore not subject to indefinite sentencing. However, in making this argument Foster overlooks the fact that in R.C. 2901.011 the Ohio Legislature defined the “Reagan Tokes Law” to constitute all of the amendments listed in R.C. 2901.011 and four other statutes, one of which is R.C. 2929.144. {¶23} Revised Code Section 2929.144 sets forth the guidelines for determining a maximum prison term under indefinite sentencing and defines a “qualifying felony of the first or second degree” as “a felony of the first or second degree committed on or after the effective date of this section.” R.C. 2929.144(A). The effective date of the Regan Tokes Law is March 22, 2019. Incidentally, the - 14 - Case No. 14-20-26 record in this case clearly establishes that Foster committed his offenses after the effective date. {¶24} This definition of qualifying felony is reiterated in R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), which governs the permissible statutory range for prison terms for a second degree felony, and notably was the same statute by which trial court sentenced Foster. Specifically, R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), states: For a felony of the second degree committed on or after the effective date of this amendment, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes the conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that section shall control in determining the minimum term or otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum term or sentence imposed under that specific language shall be considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been imposed under this division. {¶25} Based on the foregoing, we find Foster’s reliance on R.C. 2901.011 to be misplaced, as Foster fails to consider the other statutes which also constitute the Regan Tokes Law. In other words, R.C. 2901.011 simply delineates what statutes and amendments comprise the Regan Tokes Law. Unlike R.C. 2929.144, R.C. 2901.011 contains no operative language defining a qualifying felony. Therefore, we conclude that under the language of R.C. 2929.144(A) the trial court correctly determined that Foster’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was - 15 - Case No. 14-20-26 a qualifying second-degree felony subject to indefinite sentencing under R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a). Accordingly, the first assignment is overruled. Second Assignment of Error {¶26} In his second assignment of error, Foster claims that his sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law because the trial court failed to adequately consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing and failed to properly apply the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when it imposed the maximum prison terms and ordered the prison terms to run consecutively. Standard of Review {¶27} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “ ‘which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. - 16 - Case No. 14-20-26 Relevant Authority {¶28} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than [a] minimum sentence[ ].” State v. Castle, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-16, 2016-Ohio-4974, ¶ 26; State v. White, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-32, 2020-Ohio-717, ¶ 8. Nevertheless, when exercising its sentencing discretion, a trial court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Kerns, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-05, 2018-Ohio-3838, ¶ 8, citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. Maximum Prison Terms {¶29} Here, the trial court imposed upon Foster an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum of 8 years and a stated maximum of 12 years for the qualifying felony of the second degree; a maximum term of 18 months for the fourth degree felony offense; and a maximum term of 12 months for the fifth degree felony offense. These prison terms are within the appropriate statutory range and are compliant with the relevant statutes, therefore they are presumptively valid. State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 31; R.C. 2929.14. Moreover, the record clearly establishes the trial court analyzed the purposes and principles of felony sentencing and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 - 17 - Case No. 14-20-26 and R.C. 2929.12 factors, both at the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry of sentence. {¶30} On appeal, Foster simply disagrees with the trial court’s application of these factors to the facts and circumstances of his case. Appellate Review of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 Factors {¶31} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently clarified an appellate court’s review of felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See, State v. Jones, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39. The Supreme Court ruled that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) “clearly does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 because * * * R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 are not among the statutes listed in the provision.” Id. at ¶ 31. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that an appellate court may not modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s “findings” under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. See id. at ¶ 42 (“Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”). - 18 - Case No. 14-20-26 {¶32} The Supreme Court in Jones also confirmed that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a mechanism for an appellate court to modify or vacate a felony sentence based upon a finding that the sentence is “contrary to law” because it clearly and convincingly is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Id. at ¶ 32-39. “As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones, when reviewing felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, we shall no longer analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the record. We simply must determine whether those sentences are contrary to law.” State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18. “A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” Id. citing State v. Brown, 2d Dist. No. 2016-CA-53, 2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74; see State v. D-Bey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109000, 2021-Ohio-60, ¶ 65 (“A sentence is ‘contrary to law’ if it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing a defendant for a felony offense.”). - 19 - Case No. 14-20-26 {¶33} In sum, the record demonstrates that the prison terms imposed by the trial court in this case are within the statutory range and that the trial court considered the statutory factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when it imposed the maximum prison terms upon Foster. Thus, Foster’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, and it must therefore be affirmed. See State v. Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 17; Burks, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-70, 2021-Ohio-224, ¶ 9, (“Under Jones, this ends the inquiry regarding the individual sentences. In this respect, there is no basis upon which to modify or vacate either individual sentence.”); see also, D-Bey, supra, ¶ 75, citing Jones at ¶ 39 (concluding that “this court cannot review D-Bey’s sentences to determine whether they are “excessive” or otherwise not “supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”). Thus, we find no merit to Foster’s argument that the trial court’s imposition of the maximum prison terms was contrary to law. Consecutive Sentences {¶34} Foster also argues that his consecutive sentences are contrary to law because the record does not support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). To the extent that Foster is attempting to challenge the overall length of his aggregate sentence under R.C. 2929.11, the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not apply to consecutive-sentencing review. State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 17. Rather, - 20 - Case No. 14-20-26 appellate review of consecutive sentences is limited to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), as stated in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Id. Accordingly, we cannot review the aggregate length of Foster’s consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.11 and the issue of consecutive sentences is limited to appellate review under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). {¶35} Revised Code section 2929.14(C)(4) provides as follows: If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post- release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶36} The statute requires the trial court to make three statutory findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018- - 21 - Case No. 14-20-26 Ohio-493, ¶ 252; State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 26. The court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger that the offender poses to the public; and (3) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) is applicable. Beasley at ¶ 252. “[T]he trial court must make the requisite findings both at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 253, citing Bonnell at ¶ 37. A trial court’s failure to make the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) renders the imposition of consecutive sentences contrary to law. See Bonnell at ¶ 37. {¶37} Here, the record reflects that the trial court made the requisite findings both at sentencing and in its judgment entry. Notably, Foster does not dispute that the necessary findings were made. Instead, he makes several unsupported arguments based upon conjecture that the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was “purely arbitrary,” retaliatory against him for exercising his right to appear in person for sentencing rather than remotely, and an opportunity to impose additional time for the charges that were dismissed. (Appt. Brief at 8). Despite these claims, Foster fails to cite any evidence in the record to demonstrate that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not supported by the record. - 22 - Case No. 14-20-26 {¶38} This notwithstanding, our review of the record reveals ample support for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court observed the presentence investigation showed that Foster had an extensive criminal record consisting of numerous felony offenses. Almost all of these prior convictions included conduct similar to the felonies committed in the instant case. In particular, Foster had prior convictions for breaking and entering, safe cracking, grand theft, forgery, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Even though Foster had successfully completed a drug program at a CBCF in 2012, he quickly returned to a life of crime and addiction committing felony offenses similar to the ones he had committed in the past. In addition, the record indicates that the criminal conduct comprising the underlying offenses was pre-planned, organized, and pervasive, resulting in numerous victims suffering serious economic loss. {¶39} In sum, we conclude that the record fully supports the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Given that the trial court made all three of the necessary findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and that those findings are supported by the record, we find that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences upon Foster. Moreover, as already discussed, we also conclude that Foster has failed to establish that the trial court’s imposition of the maximum prison - 23 - Case No. 14-20-26 terms upon him is contrary to law. Accordingly, Foster’s second assignment of error is overruled. Fourth Assignment of Error {¶40} In his fourth assignment of error, Foster challenges the trial court’s order of restitution. Specifically, Foster argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the amount of economic loss suffered by the victims, and therefore the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution. {¶41} At the outset we note the record shows that Foster failed to object to the amount of restitution in the trial court proceedings. A failure to object to a trial court’s award of restitution waives all but plain error. See State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Allen No. 16-08-11, 2008-Ohio-5823, ¶ 7. Notice of plain error under Crim. R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 111 (1990). {¶42} Revised Code section 2929.18 governs the payment of restitution and provides in relevant part: (A)(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim's economic loss. * * * If the court imposes restitution, at sentencing, the court shall determine the amount of restitution to be made by the offender. If the court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of - 24 - Case No. 14-20-26 repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. * * * (Emphasis added.) {¶43} Before imposing an order of restitution, a sentencing court must determine that “ the amount of restitution bears a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.” State v. Borders, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2004-12-101, 2005-Ohio- 4339, ¶ 36. The amount of restitution must be determinable to a reasonable degree of certainty and supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Perkins, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-52, 2014-Ohio-2242, ¶ 12. {¶44} Prior to sentencing, the State filed a restitution report compiled by the victim advocate which listed each of the 13 victims, the date the economic loss occurred, and an itemization the specific amounts comprising the total economic loss to each victim. The majority of the losses suffered by the victims was a result of the cost to repair the damage store doors and a substantial amount of cigarettes stolen from their inventories. In addition to this summary, the restitution report also included police reports, inventory loss reports, and invoices for repairs made to the store doors. The total economic loss of the victims shown in the restitution report amounted to $25,385.85 At sentencing, the trial court referenced the restitution report and stated that it would be submitted as Exhibit A. As previously noted, there was no objection from Foster regarding the restitution report at sentencing. - 25 - Case No. 14-20-26 {¶45} After reviewing the record, we find no error, plain or otherwise, with respect to the trial court’s restitution order. Specifically, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in determining the amount of restitution based upon the restitution report compiled by the victim advocate and presented by the State. The information submitted in the restitution report clearly satisfied R.C. 2929.18. Contrary to Foster’s assertion, the amount of the economic loss was not required to be established by testimony or other documentary evidence from insurance agencies. Accordingly, on this basis the fourth assignment of error is overruled. {¶46} For all these reasons, the assignments of error are overruled and the judgment and sentence of the Union County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Judgment Affirmed ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur. /jlr - 26 -