Rockwell Int'l Credit Corp., a Delaware Corp. v. United States Aircraft Ins. Grp., an Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Rockwell Int'l Credit Corp., a Delaware Corp. v. United States Aircraft Ins. Grp., an Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
58 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Marcy v. J.R. Simplot Company (caed, 2023-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcy v. J.R. Simplot Company
E.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
Grp., 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987), 15 overruled on another ground by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991)). 16 In the instant case, the Complaint was removable on its face based on diversity 17 jurisdiction under CAFA.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hillman v. PacifiCorp
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · confidence medium
Grp., 27 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on another ground by Partington v. Gedan, 28 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arnhoelter v. Kaus
D. Ariz. · 2020 · confidence medium
Rockwell Int’l Credit 13 Corp. v. U.S. Aircraft Ins., 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds 14 by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam); Herod v. 15 Potter, 255 F. App’x 894, 896 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting party’s argument regarding 16 equitable considerations because the party did not show district court erred in dismissing 17 case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction); LPP Mortg.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Markowitz v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
S.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 28 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hartford Casualty Insurance v. Trinity Universal Insurance
D.N.M. · 2015 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987), overruled on other grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.1991); U.S. Fire Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gentek Building Products, Inc., Steel Peel Litigation Trust, Formerly Known as Sherwin-Williams Claims Trust v. The Sherwin-Williams Company
6th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Group., 823 F.2d 302, 304-05 (9th Cir.1987) (failure to determine accurately citizenship of removing party as grounds for sanctions), overruled on other grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir.1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Roche Juanita Roche v. Lincoln Property Company Swib Investment Company, and Invesco Institutional
4th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987)) (burden on party seeking federal jurisdiction to establish diversity of real parties in interest); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.1966) (addressing subject matter jurisdiction, even though defendant did not seek leave to appeal district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff and limited partner of defendant general partnership were not diverse).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roche v. Lincoln Property Co
4th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987) (burden on party seeking federal jurisdiction to establish diversity of real parties in interest); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1966) (addressing subject matter jurisdiction, even though defendant did not seek leave to appeal district court’s denial of its motion to dis- miss on the ground that plaintiff and limited partner of defendant gen- eral partnership were not diverse).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Earle A. Partington v. Joseph M. Gedan Howard T. Chang
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
We did so based upon three prior cases which held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11, were incorporated into our Circuit Rules. 9th Cir.R. 1-1 (old Rule 5). 1 See In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1988); Rockwell International Credit Corp. v. United States Aircraft Insurance Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304-05 (9th Cir.1987); In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1986).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Earle A. Partington v. Joseph M. Gedan Howard T. Chang (4×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
In Re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1988) (“Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 is incorpo rated into the Rules of this court.”); Rockwell International Credit Corp. v. United States Aircraft Insurance Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304-05 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that we may sanction pursuant to Rule 11 since “[b]y Rule 5 of the Rules of this court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘whenever relevant,’ are part of the rules of this court”); In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1986) (sanction imposed pursuant to Rule 5’s incorporation of Rule 11 for brief filed in court of appeals).
cited Cited as authority (rule) RLI Insurance Ex Rel. Haag v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 1990 · confidence medium
Group 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peerless Insurance v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
D.N.H. · 1990 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987); Trombino v. Transit Casualty Co., 110 F.R.D. 139, 144 (D.R.I. 1986); Windward City Center of Hawaii v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain (2×)
SCOTUS · 1989 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F. 2d 302, 304 (CA9 1987); Sarnoff v. American Home Products Corp., 798 F. 2d 1075, 1079 (CA7 1986); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hillman, 796 F. 2d 770, 775-776 (CA5 1986); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F. 2d 504, 512 (CA5 1985); Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F. 2d 889 , 893 (CA2), cert. dism'd, 463 U. S. 1233 (1983); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F. 2d 293, 305-306 (CA3 1980); cf. Carson v. Allied News Co., 511 F. 2d 22, 24 (CA7 1975); Thomas v. Anderson, 223 F. 41, 43 (CA8 1915). [6] See, e. g., Fritz v. American …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Earle A. Partington v. Joseph M. Gedan Howard T. Chang (4×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1988); Rockwell International Credit Corp. v. United States Aircraft Insurance Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304-05 (9th Cir.1987); In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1986). 8 Though Gedan and Chang's request for Rule 38 sanctions appears in their opening brief, we consider their request as a separate motion to this court, severable from the balance of the brief. 47 The Seventh Circuit's discussion of a request for sanctions under Fed.R.App.P. 38 is particularly appropriate.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Finalco Equipment Investors X v. Welch
N.D. Cal. · 1989 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leroy Tuck v. United Services Automobile Association
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir.1987); Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir.1976); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96, 102-06 (D.N.J.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tuck v. United Services Automobile Ass'n
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir.1987); Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir.1976); Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96, 102-06 (D.N.J.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Elizabeth O'HallOran v. University of Washington, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Third-Party-Defendant
3rd Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) O'Halloran v. University of Washington
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alejandro Alfonzo-Larrain R. (2×)
7th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir.1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775-76 (5th Cir.1986); Pressroom Unions, Etc. v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 , 893 (2d Cir.1983); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir.1971); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, supra, 626 F.2d at 306 . 10 No statute or rule authorizes us, by the expedient of dropping--retroactively to the date the complaint was filed--an inconvenient party whose presence destroyed jurisdiction, to enter a judgment on the m…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Fire Insurance Company, Inc. v. Charter Financial Group, Inc.
unknown court · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987); Matchett v. Wold, 818 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 230 , 98 L.Ed.2d 189 (1988); Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 778 (7th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Fire Insurance v. Charter Financial Group, Inc.
unknown court · 1988 · confidence medium
Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1987); Matchett v. Wold, 818 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 230 , 98 L.Ed.2d 189 (1988); Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 778 (7th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.
C.D. Cal. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Rockwell, supra (court denied defendant leave to amend its notice by changing the identity of the defendant, and real party in interest, in order to create total diversity).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CREDIT CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT INSURANCE GROUP, an Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee
86-2499.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 27, 1987.
823 F.2d 302
Richard K. Mahrle, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant., Christopher L. Callahan, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellee.
Hug, Nelson, Noonan.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Rockwell International Credit Corporation (Rockwell) appeals from summary judgment in favor of United States Aircraft Insurance Group (USAIG). We find that federal jurisdiction does not exist and remand to the district court with directions to return the case to the courts of Arizona.

PROCEEDINGS

On April 2, 1985, Rockwell, a Delaware corporation, filed its complaint against USAIG in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, seeking recovery on an insurance policy. On May 8, 1985, USAIG removed the case to the United States District Court on the basis of the diversity of the Connecticut citizenship of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the issuer of the insurance policy. USAIG’s removal petition stated that it was “the named defendant” and that the controversy was “wholly between citizens of different states.” Rockwell did not dispute the removal petition, and the district court assumed that jurisdiction existed. After summary judgment in favor of USAIG, Rockwell appealed to this court. Jurisdiction was still not disputed. After oral argument, however, we of our own accord raised the question of jurisdiction and requested briefing from both parties.

ISSUES: Does diversity jurisdiction exist?

May USAIG amend its removal petition?

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff, Rockwell, is a Delaware corporation. The defendant is not[*304] Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, but USAIG. USAIG is a group of independent insurance companies. All members of an unincorporated association must be diverse from the opposing party; it is irrelevant whether the unincorporated association is plaintiff or defendant. Baer v. United Servs. Automobile Ass’n, 503 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir.1974). Neither in the removal petition nor in the record is there indication that one of the USAIG group is not a Delaware corporation. Seeking removal, USAIG had the burden of establishing diversity. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir.1986). As the burden has not been met, federal jurisdiction does not exist. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806).

USAIG now seeks to amend its removal petition. USAIG now tells us that under Arizona law it is not even subject to suit in its common name. USAIG now states for the first time that the proper defendant and real party in interest is United States Aviation Underwriters Inc. (USAU). USAU, we are now told, makes all underwriting decisions regarding the aviation risks insured by the companies comprising USAIG. USAU has authority to settle all claims against USAIG members. USAU has authority to allocate liability in the event Rockwell prevails. USAU is diverse from Rockwell because USAU is a New York corporation.

Two impediments exist to USAIG’s motion. First, the insurance policy itself establishes that USAU is not the real party in interest. On the cover page of the policy, thirteen different insurance companies are listed. On page 1 of the policy, in admirably clear language, it is stated:

We, our and us mean the insurance companies listed on the front page of your policy who are individually and together responsible under this policy. Aviation Managers means United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. [Emphasis in original]

Under the heading “Legal actions” on the second page, the policy states:

Each of us named on the front cover of this policy, or the Aviation Managers, can bring a suit against you if you fail to pay a premium when it’s due, or fail to live up to the terms of this policy in any other way. Any judgment involving one of us or the Aviation Managers will be binding on all.

Under the policy, USAU may be, as USAIG now tells us, its manager; USAU is not the real party in interest.

Second, the proposed amendment is not merely technical like the dismissal of a nonessential nondiverse party. The proposed amendment seeks more than the correction of “defective allegations of jurisdiction,” a correction permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1653. The proposed amendment attempts to create jurisdiction where none existed. The proposed amendment is not acceptable. Aetna Casualty, 796 F.2d at 774.

USAIG invokes an equitable consideration: the waste of judicial resources involved in sending this case, already tried in the district court and already briefed and argued here, back to Maricopa County. Equity is no substitute for subject matter jurisdiction. Argument of this sort is unavailing.

Judicial resources have nonetheless been squandered because of USAIG’s removal of the case to the federal courts. USAIG in its motion to amend informs us that its original removal petition involved a procedure that was “misguided.” USAIG goes on to say:

In its removal petition, USAIG should have specifically apprised the court of the defect in the proper party defendant and should have advised the court that it would move to substitute USAU as the proper party defendant once removal was effected. USAIG did not do so.

In short, USAIG now maintains that it failed to disclose the true state of affairs to the district court.

By Rule 5 of the Rules of this court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “whenever relevant,” are part of the rules of this court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 prescribes that “the signature of an attorney” constitutes “a[*305] certificate by him” that to the “best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry,” the paper he is filing with the court is “well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”

How could USAIG’s original removal petition, filed by the same attorneys who represent it now on appeal, have accurately stated that the controversy was “wholly between citizens of different states”? How could the removal petition reflect reasonable inquiry into the nature of USAIG? How could the removal petition, asserting a jurisdiction that did not exist, have been for a proper purpose?

These questions, which could have been asked by the district court, are also appropriately asked by us. This case would not be before us but for the removal petition that provides these questions. We are, moreover, confronted with a motion to amend that itself appears to run counter to the record, asserting that USAU is the real party in interest when the policy at issue clearly establishes that each of the members of USAIG is the real party in interest. This motion, like the original removal petition, raises the question of whether or not counsel for USAIG have violated Rule 11.

REVERSED. The case is to be remanded by the district court to the state court. Counsel for USAIG are ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.