Ravell Sumler, Appellant, v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 834 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Ravell Sumler, Appellant, v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 834 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DeAngelis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Hill) (pawb, 2010-10-05)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeAngelis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Hill)
Bankr. W.D. Pa. · 2010 · confidence medium
Co. of America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.2002), Arrow Drilling Co., Inc. v. Carpenter, 125 Fed.Appx. 423 (3d Cir.2005), Sermak v. Manuel 194 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir.1999), and Sumler v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 834 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cobell v. Norton
D.D.C. · 2002 · confidence medium
The district court’s issuance of an order to show cause for contempt is likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Sumler v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1987) (noting that “[t]he use of a show cause order is within the discretion of the district eourt[.]”); Bermudez v. HUD, 84 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1097 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (determining that “the Court will exercise its discretion in this instance and forbear the issuance of an Order to Show Cause[.]”); Xpressions Footwear Corp. v. Peters, 1996 WL 554602 at * 3 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Knagge v. Sullivan
M.D. Fla. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Sumler v. Bowen, 656 F.Supp. 1322, 1338-39 (W.D.Ark.), affd, 834 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1987); Dowdy v. Bowen, 636 F.Supp. 591, 594 (W.D.Mo.1986); Taylor v. Heckler, 608 F.Supp. 1255, 1259-61 (D.N.J.1985) [hereinafter Taylor N.J.]. “[Wjhenever a credible argument can be made that the government’s position in opposing certain social security benefits was not substantially justified, the attorney working under a contingent-fee agreement can best defray the client’s cost of legal services by seeking both EAJA and SSA fees.” Wells, 855 F.2d at 42 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
20 soc.sec.rep.ser. 31, unempl.ins.rep. Cch 17,697 Ravell Sumler
v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services
87-1429.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Dec 8, 1987.
834 F.2d 711
Denver L. Thornton, El Dorado, Ark., for appellant., Larry R. McCord, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Smith, Ark., & Karen J. Behner, Health and Human Services, Dallas, Tex., for ap-pellee.
McMillian, Fagg, Bowman.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Ravell Sumler appeals the district court’s order denying attorney fees under the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. Ill 1985). We affirm.

Sumler applied for disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. Following an administrative law judge’s denial of her claim for benefits, Denver L. Thornton became Sumler’s attorney. Thornton filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Sumler, and when the request for review was denied, he filed a complaint in the district court seeking judicial review. Before the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) answered and before the transcript of the administrative proceedings was filed, Thornton filed a motion to remand. Fourteen months after the Secretary filed an answer to the complaint, the Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment, which Thornton did not oppose in any manner.

The district court issued an order reversing outright the final decision of the Secretary on the basis that the administrative law judge’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. In the same order, the district court expressed its view that Thornton’s apparent failure diligently to represent Sumler in this case raised substantial questions about whether he unreasonably protracted the litigation to Sum-ler’s detriment. The district court thus ordered Thornton to show cause why he should not be denied attorney fees.

In response to the show cause order, Thornton asserted his motion for remand was procedurally correct, and that he had conducted Sumler’s case appropriately. Thornton requested amendment of the district court order with regard to the remarks made about his professional conduct. In a supplemental order the district court concluded the filings by Thornton were of no substantial benefit to Sumler and were of no assistance in the court’s[*713] determination to reverse the Secretary outright. The court thus denied attorney fees under both the SSA and the EAJA.

On appeal, Thornton’s brief for Sumler argues the district court did not follow customary and proper procedures in issuing the show cause order. He also argues the negative assessment of his professional performance was unjustified and should be stricken from the district court’s orders.

The use of a show cause order is within the discretion of the district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(b), and absent a showing of prejudice, its use does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Thornton does not identify how he was harmed by the show cause procedure utilized by the district court. He was given an opportunity to justify the work performed and to demonstrate why he was entitled to attorney fees, but he failed to do so. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion.

Both the SSA and the EAJA give the district court discretion to award reasonable attorney fees, and a fee determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless the district court abused its discretion. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (EAJA); Rohrich v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir.1986) (SSA). In light of Thornton’s use of standardized pleadings, his filing of a routine and premature motion to remand, and his failure to respond to the Secretary’s motion, we cannot say the district court’s assessment of Thornton’s professional conduct was clearly erroneous. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees.

Accordingly, we affirm.