United States v. Russell Dereck Battle, A/K/A Buck, 836 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Russell Dereck Battle, A/K/A Buck, 836 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we emphasize that under batson, the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.”
144 citation events (34 in the last 25 years) across 32 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Knight (mich, 2005-07-21) · Strongest negative: United States v. Rafael Chinchilla and Carlos Alberto Escobar (ca9, 1989-05-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" United States v. Rafael Chinchilla and Carlos Alberto Escobar (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1987) (government’s use of five of its six (83%) allowable peremptory challenges to strike five of the seven (71%) blacks from the jury panel sufficient to establish a prima facie case).
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Knight (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Mich. · 2005 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we emphasize that under batson, the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
(See People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225 [allowing a prosecutor to “ ‘ “avoid the appearance of systematic exclusion by simply passing the jury while a member of the cognizable group that he wants to exclude is still on the panel” ’ ” would “ ‘ “ignore[] the fact that other members of the group may have been excluded for improper, racially motivated reasons” ’ ”]; accord, Sanchez v. Roden (1st Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 279, 288, 306-307 [finding an inference of discrimination, despite the presence of five African Americans on the jury panel]; U.S. v. Battle (8th Cir. 198…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Phillips, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
In determining whether the prosecution has satisfied its burden of producing a race-neutral explanation for a questioned peremptory strike, it is important to be mindful that " ' ... the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.' " Commonwealth v. Cook supra 597 Pa at 593-94, 952 A.2d at 607 (Emphasis in original.) quoting Rice. v. Collins, 546 U.S. 3 -33, 338, 126 s.c. 969, 974 (2006). "[W]hile a defendant can prove a Batson violation by showing that even one black juror· was struck for a racial reason, ... a pros…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hampton
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Simply put, this court cannot discern why the state chose to excuse this potential juror and neither could the trial court. {¶39} Further, “‘[t]he striking of a single black [or female] juror for racial [or gender] reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black [or female] jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black [or female] jurors.’” United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir.1999), quoting United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); Johnson, 144 Ohio St.3d 518 , 2015-Ohio-4903 , 45 N.E.3d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson (Slip Opinion) (2×)
Ohio · 2015 · confidence medium
Accordingly, a prosecutor may not “challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” Id. at 89 . “ ‘[T]he striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.’” United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir.1999), quoting United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Cook (2×)
Pa. · 2008 · confidence medium
Thus, while a defendant can prove a Batson violation by showing that even one black juror was struck for a racial reason, Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986), a prosecutor's failure to explain every peremptory challenge of black jurors is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutor's burden of production, Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 653 , 169 L.Ed.2d 517 (2007); Bui, 321 F.3d at 1317 ; David, 803 F.2d at 157…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abu-Jamal v. Horn
3rd Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
In fact, in United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir. 1988), we explained that “[s]triking a single black juror could constitute a prima facie case even when blacks ultimately sit on the panel and even when valid reasons exist for striking other blacks.” Accord Snyder, 2008 WL 723750 , at *4; Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abu-Jamal v. Horn (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
In fact, in United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir.1988), we explained that “[s]triking a single black juror could constitute a prima facie case even when blacks ultimately sit on the panel and even when valid reasons exist for striking other blacks.” Accord Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208 ; Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Snyder v. Louisiana (2×)
SCOTUS · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (C.A.9 1994) ("[T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose"); United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (C.A.4 1989); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (C.A.3 1988); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (C.A.8 1987); United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (C.A.11 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. Superintendent, Elmira Correctional Facility
E.D.N.Y · 2005 · confidence medium
And in United States v. Moore, where, as in the present case, the proportion of blacks on the jury was the same as in the venire, the Eighth Circuit “recognize[d] that it is the exclusion of blacks and not their inclusion (i.e., the final number) that is vital to a prima facie case of discrimination.” 895 F.2d 484 , 487 n. 5 (8th Cir.1990); see also Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423 , 434 n. 2 (6th Cir.2003) (“[T]his Court and our sister *493 circuits have held that the presence of one or more African-American venire members on the jury, standing alone, does nothing to preclude a valid cl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holloway v. Horn
3rd Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that relief must be granted under Batson “when even one black person is excluded for racially motivated reasons”); see also United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.1994) (recognizing that “the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose”); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) (“[W]e emphasize that under Batson , the striking of a single black juror for facial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors ar…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holloway v. Horn
3rd Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that relief must be granted under Batson "when even one black person is excluded for racially motivated reasons"); see also United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.1994) (recognizing that "the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose"); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) ("[W]e emphasize that under Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burt Lancaster v. Stanley Adams, Warden
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Harris, 192 F.3d at 587 ; Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971 (3d Cir.1993) ("Although one black person was ultimately empaneled, the mere presence of a single black on the jury would not necessarily prevent a finding of a prima facie case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) ("[W]e emphasize that under Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black ju…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Overton v. Newton
E.D.N.Y · 2001 · confidence medium
In addition to citing Alvarado , the court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147 , 117 S.Ct. 1320 , 137 L.Ed.2d 482 (1997), for the proposition that the inference of discrimination may arise “where there are only a few members of a racial group on the venire panel and one party strikes each one of them;” the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 , 698 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1989), where the striking of the only two minority jurors was deemed sufficient; the Ninth Circuit’s d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tyransee A. Harris
6th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971 (3d Cir.1993) (“Although one black person was ultimately empaneled, ‘the mere presence of a single black on the jury would not necessarily prevent a finding of a prima facie case.’ ”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) (“[T]he striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelvin Malone v. Daniel Vasquez, Warden, San Quentin State Prison Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Missouri Attorney General (2×)
unknown court · 1998 · confidence medium
I next consider whether the government offered race-neutral reasons for peremptorily challenging all four blacks on the thirty-four-person venire from which the jury was selected. “[Ujnder Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987); and United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelvin Malone v. Daniel Vasquez
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
It is difficult to understand the confusion of this question at various points in Malone’s state proceedings, such as when the trial court reported that Malone was “an Asiatic-Moorish-American.” -31- reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987); and United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin H. Tankleff v. D.A. Senkowski, Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, the fact that the government tried to strike the only three blacks who were on the panel constitutes a sufficiently dramatic pattern of actions to make out a prima facie case. 3 See United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir.1991) (finding a prima facie case when the prosecution struck four out of seven minority jurors); see also McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 117 S.Ct. 1320 , 137 L.Ed.2d 482 (1997) (“[Wjhere there are only a few members of a racial group on the venire panel and one party strikes each one of them,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turner v. Marshall
9th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider Turner’s arguments concerning the remaining four prospective jurors. ”[T]he striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rahman (2×)
W. Va. · 1996 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Coulter v. Gramley, 93 F.3d 394, 396 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 , 109 S.Ct. 97 , 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); but cf. United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir.1987) (fact that jury included two blacks when prosecution could have struck them shows lack of intent to exclude blacks from jury).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brewer v. Marshall (2×)
D. Mass. · 1996 · confidence medium
See Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.1995) (finding prima facie case established when prosecution used five of its nine peremptory challenges to strike five out of nine African-Americans from the jury); Montiel, 2 F.3d at 339 (holding that prima facie ease established when defendant in civil rights case used five of seven peremptory challenges to excuse all three prospective jurors with Spanish surnames and two of three African-Americans); Jones, 987 F.2d at 971 (prosecution’s use of three of his seven available peremptories to exclude three of four African-American venireperson…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whittlesey v. State
Md. · 1995 · confidence medium
Indeed, the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause, Stanley, 313 Md. at 88 , 542 A.2d at 1286 (quoting U.S. v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987)), and “any doubt as to whether the complaining party has met its initial burden should be resolved in that party’s favor.” State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1988).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Robert TURNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles D. MARSHALL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ; United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emanuel George Devose v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction (2×)
8th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
He then " 'must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [his peremptory] practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.' " United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. Norris
E.D. Ark. · 1994 · confidence medium
In order to establish an equal protection violation, “a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the jury panel.” Unit *595 ed States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Devose v. Norris
E.D. Ark. · 1994 · confidence medium
In order to establish an .equal protection violation, “a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the jury panel.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simon v. State
Miss. · 1993 · confidence medium
Nor can we conclude that inclusion of blacks on a jury bars a prima facie case, especially where other facts and circumstances may constitute an inference of prosecutorial discrimination in the selection process."); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) ("the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors"); Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir.1986) (fact that not all black veniremen were excluded from…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jefferson v. United States (2×)
D.C. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295 , 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1067 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485-86 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987); Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522 , 616 A.2d 356, 361 (1992); People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550 , 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12-13 , 554 N.E.2d 47, 49-50 (1990); see also United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1448 (8th Cir.1990) ("number of peremptory challenges the prosecutor exercises to exclude black members of the venire” is not enough for prima facie showing, trial court should consider all facts a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Carter
Ala. · 1993 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated, rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds on reh., 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 , 109 S.Ct. 28 , 101 L.Ed.2d 979 (1988) (stating that "under Batson, the striking of a single black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors."); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987) (same); Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 19 , 553 A.2d 228,…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Honomichl v. Leapley (4×)
S.D. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Dominguez (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.M. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Cf. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 699 , 736 P.2d at 505 (prima facie case established where prosecutor struck only two Hispanic jurors with chance of serving on the jury); Battle, 836 F.2d at 1085-86 (prima facie case established where government used five of six peremptories to strike five of seven blacks from panel).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charles Okeezie
6th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); see also Clemons, 843 F.2d at 748 "[W]e [cannot] conclude that inclusion of blacks on a jury bars a prima facie case, especially where other facts and circumstances may constitute an inference of prosecutorial discrimination in the selection process.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Little v. United States (2×)
D.C. · 1992 · confidence medium
The exclusion of even one black member of the venire for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause. *886 United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated in part, 836 F.2d 1312 , cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 , 109 S.Ct. 28 , 101 L.Ed.2d 979 (1988); see People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550 , 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14-15 , 554 N.E.2d 47, 51-52 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Parker (2×)
Mo. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Matha, 915 F.2d 1220, 1221 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); see also Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 543 , 110 S.Ct. 2995, 2996 , 111 L.Ed.2d 439 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Leo Bishop (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
The latter scenario collides with the fundamental principle that "under Batson, the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause." United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 , 109 S.Ct. 97 , 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alonzo Day
8th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
By the same token, “the striking of a single ... juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other ... jurors [of the same cognizable group] are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some [of the group’s] jurors.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Mathews (2×) also: Cited "see"
Mass. App. Ct. · 1991 · confidence medium
See also United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747-748 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139-1140 (8th Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ronald D. Ferguson (2×)
7th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
It is the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons that invokes the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause, even though other black jurors are impanelled. 2 Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1489 ; United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. David Dean Prine, United States of America v. Michael Dean Freeman
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Dawn, 897 F.2d at 1448 ; United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ricky Dawn A/K/A \Money\"
unknown court · 1990 · confidence medium
Dawn and McCree assert that they met this burden and established a prima facie case simply because the prosecutor used six of his seven peremptory challenges to exclude black members of the venire from the petit jury. 3 While the exclusion of even one black member of the venire for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Briscoe
7th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Although “the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated,” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), the fact that ten black jurors were seated when the government left five of its twelve allotted peremptory challenges unused strongly supports the trial court’s finding that the government did not act with discriminatory intent during jury selection.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Briscoe
7th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Although "the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated," United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), the fact that ten black jurors were seated when the government left five of its twelve allotted peremptory challenges unused strongly supports the trial court's finding that the government did not act with discriminatory intent during jury selection.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Craig Young-Bey
8th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Young-Bey places great emphasis on our statement in United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), that “the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Quontrell Wayne Lewis
8th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
We note that percentages may evidence a pattern of racial discrimination where the use of peremptories blatantly excludes most black venirepersons, and the government refuses to state reasons for its strikes as in United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir.1987).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jimmie L. Wilson (4×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
(Tr. 5). “[UJnder Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Reginald Hughes A/K/A Raymond Dashun Calloway (2×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), this court noted, “[ijn remanding this case, we emphasize that under Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” See also United States v. Rodrequez, 859 F.2d 1321, 1324 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 28 ,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Lamont Johnson
8th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987), this court “emphasize[d] that under Batson , the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.” 1 See also, United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.1988) (“Nor can we conclude *1140 that the inclusion of blacks on a jury bars a prima facie case, especially where other facts and circumstances may constitute an inference of prosecutorial discrimination i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Feddiman v. State
Del. · 1989 · confidence medium
Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir.), vac. denied, 478 U.S. 1002 , 106 S.Ct. 3314 , 92 L.Ed.2d 706 (1986); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.1987); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50 , 542 A.2d 1267, 1283-86 (1988). 25 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Holloway
Conn. · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 814 (1987) (removal of three of five black venirepersons did not establish prima facie Batson case where state accepted two other black venirepersons); cf. United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1987) (prima facie case established where five of seven black venirepersons removed); Oliver v. State, 526 So. 2d 892 , 893 (Ala. Crim.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Russell Dereck BATTLE, A/K/A Buck, Appellant
86-2389.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Jul 8, 1988.
836 F.2d 1084
Stephen Gilmore, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant., Richard Poehing, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Lay, Henley, Bowman.
Cited by 104 opinions  |  Published
LAY, Chief Judge.

Russell Dereck Battle appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Battle was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (possession with intent to distribute heroin) and sentenced to ten years imprisonment to be followed by a special parole term of three years. Battle challenges the admissibility of certain evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. In[*1085] addition, Battle maintains the government improperly exercised its peremptory challenges in selection of the jury. At this time we need only address the peremptory challenges exercised by the government. [1]

Battle, who is black, maintains that the government unconstitutionally used its peremptory challenges to substantially reduce the number of blacks available to sit on the jury. To establish a constitutional violation, a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the jury panel. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). “[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination * * * solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial.” Id, at 96. To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the jury. He then “must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [his peremptory] practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Id. In determining whether a defendant has established the requisite showing of purposeful discrimination, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances including, but not limited to, a pattern of strikes against black jurors, as well as the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire. Id. at 96-97. If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate a neutral explanation for challenging the black veniremen. While the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level necessary to justify a challenge for cause, a mere affirmation of good faith is insufficient. Id. at 97.

In the instant case,. the record demonstrates that there were seven blacks on the original jury panel. The government exercised five of its six (83%) allowable peremptory challenges to strike five of the seven (71%) blacks from the jury panel. The voir dire revealed that two of the five were involved in some type of criminal or civil law suit. Each of these jurors stated it would not influence their judgment on the case. Three of the five jurors testified they or their families were victims of crimes.

After Battle objected to the government’s use of its peremptory challenges, the trial court asked the government if it would like to state on the record the reasons why it so exercised its challenges. The government replied that it did not believe it was under any requirement to make a record. The trial court agreed, stating that it understood Batson to provide a permissive, rather than a mandatory procedure for articulating the reasons for the strikes. [2]

After the government refused to provide the reasons for striking the black jurors,[*1086] the trial court thereafter found there was no discrimination. [3] We believe this finding was improper in view of the standards set forth in Batson. In our view, Battle did establish sufficient facts to establish a pri-ma facie case of racial discrimination. Moreover, like the trial court, we believe that the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Batson are applicable in this case. However, unlike the trial court, we conclude that in circumstances such as these, Batson requires that the government articulate racially neutral reasons for so exercising its peremptory challenges. The choice is not discretionary.

Because the government failed to articulate the reasons for its peremptory strikes in this case, we remand to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the government’s reasons for using its peremptory challenges to exclude the five black veniremen. In remanding this case, we emphasize that under Batson, the striking of a single black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors. United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1986).

The evidentiary .hearing and the trial court’s findings should be entered within sixty days; upon entry the matter should be certified to this court for further consideration by the panel. [4]

1

. This appeal was consolidated for argument with U.S. v. Parker, 836 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir.1987), decided this same date. Although the drug transactions arose out of the same sequence of events as recited in the Parker case, both Battle and Parker were tried before The Honorable Clyde S. Cahill, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, in separate trials.

2

. The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and the government:

THE COURT: All right. The objections are made under the recent Supreme Court opinion, which indicated that lawyers, particularly the prosecution, should not remove jurors from the list of veniremen by preemptory [sic] challenges simply because they were black, and that when they did so, if they did so, they’d be given an opportunity to explain, and while the evidence does not have to be the same evidence as is required in a case in which a reasonable doubt is the norm, they would be expected to give some explanation as to why they did what they did do.
So Mr. Poehling, you did strike five of the seven black veniremen. You left two on. Do you care to make a record as to why you took—
MR. POEHLING: I don’t think the Government is under any requirement to make a record as to why—
THE COURT: I don’t think you’re under any requirement. I understand the case to say that you may do so.

[*1086] Transcript at 42-43.

3

. Without benefit of explanation from the government, the trial court determined that the government’s challenge to three of the black jurors was justifiable without respect to race because the jurors were either defendants or had close friends or relatives who were defendants in criminal cases. The record also reflects that two of these stricken jurors had been victims of crimes. The trial court opined that the government would not ordinarily strike jurors who had been victims of crime because they are normally more friendly to the government. We must respectfully disagree with the trial court’s opinion that the government would not discrim-inatorily strike jurors who had been victims of crime. Even assuming one might find these jurors were friendly to the government, an assumption which in our opinion does not necessarily follow, one could equally speculate that the fact the government exercised a peremptory strike as to each might serve to reinforce an inference of purposeful racial discrimination. Moreover, there was no explanation provided by the government at trial or by the trial court with respect to the other two black veniremen who were striken by the government in this case.

4

. In view of our interlocutory order of remand we hold in abeyance review of the other issues Battle has raised.