Donald Milton Boysaw v. C & P Tel. Co. of Virginia, 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Donald Milton Boysaw v. C & P Tel. Co. of Virginia, 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Burger King Corp. v. Agad (gand, 1996-02-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Burger King Corp. v. Agad
N.D. Ga. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fickling v. Burger King Corp., 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 1988); Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, Case No. 90-2191-CIV-MARCUS (S.D.Fla., Sept. 18, 1995); Dickey v. Holiday Inns of Amer., Inc., 226 So.2d 406, 407 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Sriram
N.D. Ill. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Brown v. Hoffman, 843 F.2d 1386 1988 WL 30670 (4th Cir.1988) (citing BlaCK’s Law Dictionary for proposition that while the word “offense” is used in various senses, it generally implies a felony or misdemeanor infringing public rather than merely private rights and is punishable under the criminal laws — although it may also include violations of a criminal statute for which the remedy is merely a civil suit to recover the penalty.) While there are times that the word “offense” may connote a civil violation, the context of Section 1345 indicates that is not the case here.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donald Milton Boysaw
v.
C & P Telephone Company of Virginia
87-7756.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Apr 7, 1988.
843 F.2d 1386
Unpublished

843 F.2d 1386
Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Donald Milton BOYSAW, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C & P TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-7756.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 24, 1988.
Decided: April 7, 1988.

Donald Milton Boysaw, appellant pro se.

Before K.K. HALL and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

1

Donald Milton Boysaw, a Virginia inmate, filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against C & P Telephone Company of Virginia for allegedly charging him one dollar for local calls when the price charged the general public was twenty-five cents. The district court dismissed the suit because the activity complained of did not constitute state action. We affirm.

2

Boysaw failed to demonstrate that the price charged for phone calls was "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Phone service is not an activity "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). Further, the possibility that the state may regulate the defendant telephone company, without more, is an insufficient basis to convert private action into state action. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345; Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.1984). Because Boysaw failed to demonstrate the state action necessary to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the district court properly dismissed his complaint.

3

On appeal, Boysaw contends that he should not have been assessed a partial filing fee as a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action. This contention lacks merit. The procedure utilized by the district court in determining the fee to be assessed comported with the process approved in Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982).

4

Finally, Boysaw contends that the district court erred in disallowing an amendment to the complaint which sought to add two defendants. The court denied Boysaw's motion to amend because the motion was made following entry of final judgment dismissing the case. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend. See Clardy v. Duke Univ., 299 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.1962).

5

Finding no merit to any of Boysaw's contentions on appeal, we affirm the decision of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the record and because oral argument would not significantly aid our resolution of the issues.

6

AFFIRMED.