Betsy M. McRae v. Librarian of Cong., 843 F.2d 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Betsy M. McRae v. Librarian of Cong., 843 F.2d 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“by requiring exhaustion before the agency in the first instance, congress did not intend to erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts.”
41 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Romero v. Attorney General of the United States (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
by requiring exhaustion before the agency in the first instance, congress did not intend to erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Romero v. United States Department of Justice
S.D. Cal. · 2021 · confidence medium
No. 21-1.]. 10 “[I]f an agency reaches the merits of a claim, despite a claimant’s failure to comply 11 with requests for information, administrative remedies should be presumed sufficiently 12 exhausted to permit suit in federal court.” Jasch, 302 F.3d at 1094 (citing McRae v. 13 Librarian of Congress, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 166 , 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. Lee
E.D. Va. · 2017 · confidence medium
This is a logical interpretation of the regulatory structure because it minimizes “‘judicial interference with the operation of the federal government ]’ [and] also affords an ‘agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.’ ” Austin v. Winter, 286 Fed.Appx. 31, 35 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2006); McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kathleen Melendez v. Secretary Kathleen Sebelius
4th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
The requirement is meant “‘to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.’ ” Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Saunders v. Mills
D.D.C. · 2012 · confidence medium
The exhaustion requirement is not “a massive procedural roadblock to access to the *290 courts.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniels v. Tapella
D.D.C. · 2008 · confidence medium
The exhaustion requirement is not meant as a “procedural roadblock” but instead “is intended to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Austin v. Winter
4th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
It also affords an “agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988). 6 Appellant initially availed herself of the administrative process but never followed the process through to completion.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jane Doe, and Jane Roe and Jane Roe 2, Proposed-Intervenors-Appellants v. Oberweis Dairy
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2002); McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam); cf. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Doe, Jane v. Oberweis Dairy
7th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blackmon-Malloy v. United States Capitol Police Board
D.D.C. · 2004 · confidence medium
Here, to the extent that only a few plaintiffs attended mediation, defendant was not afforded an “opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.” See Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2002)(citing McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald Jasch v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Title VIPs exhaustion requirements for suits against federal government agencies were not meant to “erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts” but rather “to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal quotations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Henderson
S.D.N.Y. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Charles v. Garrett, 12 F.3d 870, 874-75 (9th Cir.1993) (federal employee may sue after 180 days as long as he cooperated with the agency investigation for the first 180 days following the filing of his formal complaint); Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (5th Cir.1990) (“Where, as here, a case languishes in the administrative phase for long beyond 180 days, indeed without activity for over 180 days, we cannot say that abandoning the administrative process constitutes such a lack of cooperation as to bar suit by reason of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”); McR…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher v. Billington
D.D.C. · 1999 · confidence medium
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (authorizing the commencement of a civil action after the receipt of a notice of final action by an agency); McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Saksenasingh v. Secretary of Education
D.C. Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Upon exhaustion of the administrative proceedings, a complainant is entitled to trial de novo.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herbert K. Wilson v. Federico F. Pena, Secretary, Department of Transportation
D.C. Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
It also avoids creation of “a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts.” McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam) (quoting President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C.Cir.1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richard O. Reb'll v. Donald B. Rice, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Air Force, in His Capacity as Head of the Department of the Air Force
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
The purpose of exhaustion is not to "erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts," but rather "is intended to give the agency notice and the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed." McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal quotation omitted); see also Wade v. Secretary of the Army, 796 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir.1986) ("Good faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the agency ... and to provide all relevant, available information is all that exhaustion requires."); President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C.Cir.1980) (Stri…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Townsend v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
D.D.C. · 1990 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 , 101 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2193 , 2200 n. 14, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“In Title VII, Congress expressed a preference for voluntary settlements of disputes through the conciliation process.” (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 , 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1017 , 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974))); cf. McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam) ("the exhaustion requirement is intended to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed”).
discussed Cited "see" Blackmon-Malloy v. United States Capitol Police Board
D.C. Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
So, too, courts must take care not to construe the CAA in such a manner as to “erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts.” Id. at 362 ; see McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal quotations omitted).
cited Cited "see" Erickson v. West
D. Haw. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988); Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 318-20 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Saunders v. Mills
D.D.C. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 14 *98 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“Exhaustion is required in order to give federal agencies an opportunity to handle matters internally whenever possible and to ensure that the federal courts are burdened only when reasonably necessary.”); see also McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (noting that the'exhaustion requirement “is intended to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ramsey v. Moniz
D.D.C. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 95 ; see also Pearsall v. Holder, 610 F.Supp.2d 87 (D.D.C.2009) (dismissing claims that were asserted but withdrawn at the administrative level). 8 Absent from those cases, and from the parties briefing in this case, is any discussion of McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam), which controls the outcome of the present ease.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Charles v. Garrett
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-26 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 2137, 2148; see also McRae v. Librarian of Cong., 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988); Clark, 619 F.2d at 1334 ; Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C.Cir.1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." 63 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 702, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,722 Bette M. Charles Ruby Asque William Burns, on Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated v. H. Lawrence Garrett, Iii, Secretary of the Navy
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-26 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2148; see also McRae v. Librarian of Cong., 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988); Clark, 619 F.2d at 1334 ; Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C.Cir.1975). 17 The only reasonable interpretation of this provision is to permit a complainant to file in district court once 180 days have elapsed from the date of filing the initial charge, or if either party appeals, 180 days from the date the first administrative appeal is filed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rochon v. Attorney General of the United States
D.D.C. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In evaluating the sufficiency of an EEO complaint, “the relevant inquiry is not whether the complainant has filed a detailed statement spelling out precisely his objections but whether the actions he did take were ‘adequate to put the [agency] on notice.’ ” Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) (quoting President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C.Cir.1980)); see also McRae v. Librarian of Congress, 843 F.2d 1494, 1496 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam) (“[B]y requiring exhaustion before the agency in the first instance Congress did not intend to ‘erect a massive procedural roadbloc…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Betsy M. McRAE, Appellant,
v.
LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, Et Al.
87-5336.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Apr 15, 1988.
843 F.2d 1494
Peter S. Leyton and Stanley A. Freeman, Washington, D.C., for appellant., Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., with whom Michael J. Ryan, John C. Martin, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., for appellees.
Per Curiam, Robinson, Silberman, Williams.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published

ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

Betsy McRae has appealed from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Librarian of Congress (“LOC”) in this Title VII discrimination action. The district court ruled that appellant had not exhausted her administrative remedies. Because we find that appellant pursued her administrative remedies in good faith, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant McRae has been employed by the Library of Congress since 1957. She served as a supervisory personnel assistant for several years. In October of 1981, McRae filed a formal complaint against two of her supervisors, alleging that they discriminated against her on the basis of sex and race. Thereafter, in 1982, appellant was transferred to a nonsupervisory position for reasons she believed to be retaliatory.

Approximately four years after her complaint was filed with the agency, following an extensive investigation by an Equal Em[*1496] ployment Opportunity (“EEO”) Investigator, the LOC EEO Chief found nothing to support McRae’s claim of discrimination and denied her any further support from the LOC EEO office. The Chief informed appellant of her appeal rights in accordance with LOC regulations: (1) reconsideration by the LOC EEO Chief; (2) a hearing by a Complaints Examiner, with the final agency decision by the Librarian; or (3) a final agency decision by the Librarian without a hearing. [1] LRC 2010-3.1 § 9. Although appellant could have refused all of these options and instead sought immediate judicial relief because one hundred eighty days had elapsed since the filing of her formal complaint, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), she chose to pursue a hearing before a Complaints Examiner.

Before any evidence was taken at the hearing, however, the Complaints Examiner made a preliminary ruling with regard to sequestration of witnesses. McRae had sought sequestration to ensure that her witnesses yvould not be inhibited by the presence of the supervisors who allegedly discriminated against her. These supervisors also supervised the employees that McRae had called as witnesses. The Complaints Examiner rejected-McRae’s arguments, and ruled that one supervisor could be present during the hearing. Due to the adverse procedural ruling, McRae decided that she would not go forward with the hearing.

The Complaints Examiner subsequently dismissed McRae’s complaint with prejudice and expressly denied the allegations contained therein. The LOC then issued a final agency decision, concurring with the procedural ruling made by the Complaints Examiner and also concurring with his finding and recommendation. The LOC then dismissed the appeal, and notified McRae that she had the right to file a civil action within thirty days of the decision.

McRae filed this civil action. Despite the “right to sue” letter issued by the LOC, the district court determined that McRae had not exhausted her administrative remedies because she did not follow through with the optional hearing.

Before a complainant files suit in federal district court on a discrimination claim pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), (c) (1982), section 717(c) demands that she first file her initial charge with the employing agency. See Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 417 (D.C.Cir.1985); President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 360 (D.C.Cir.1980). Upon exhaustion of the administrative proceedings, a complainant is entitled to a trial de novo on her claims. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976); Vance, 627 F.2d at 360.

As we have stated previously, by requiring exhaustion before the agency in the first instance, Congress did not intend to “erect a massive procedural roadblock to access to the courts.” Vance, 627 F.2d at 362. Rather, the exhaustion requirement is intended to give the agency the opportunity to right any wrong it may have committed. Id.

In this case, appellant cooperated with an agency investigation of her complaint for almost two years. The agency had before it a record complete enough to issue an initial denial of her complaint. At that point McRae was given three options for appeal, completion of any one of which would have given her the right to file suit for de novo review in district court. Had McRae chosen to proceed without a hearing, no more would have been required of her. On completion of a full hearing, she would have been entitled to trial de novo in court. As the least favorable action imaginable would not have prejudiced her suit in any way, we see no reason why her good faith refusal to pursue the hearing should now bar her claim.

Accordingly, this case does not fall within the ambit of those cases precluding suit in the district court by virtue of a final agency decision ensuing upon a claimant’s own default. Cf. Jordan v. United States, [*1497] 522 F.2d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir.1975) (plaintiff’s refusal to cooperate with investigation prevented the operation of administrative procedure); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1140 (5th Cir.1972) (cannot withhold information from agency in order to raise it in federal court for first time); Mackay v. United States Postal Service, 607 F.Supp. 271, 276 (E.D.Pa.1985) (exhaustion requires that administrative procedures be pursued to conclusion).

Accordingly, the order dismissing appellant’s complaint is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is

So ordered.

1

. Had McRae chosen reconsideration, she would have been entitled to steps (2) and (3) following reconsideration, if the Chief did not change his initial decision.