Brooks v. State, 93 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). · Go Syfert
Brooks v. State, 93 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lonnie Lee v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (flmd, 2026-02-02)
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2012 2019 2026
Under fire — who is questioning this case
Citations from separate opinions of courts that could overrule this case. This is a warning signal, not a treatment change. The flag color above is unaffected.
Dissent United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (2017)
“Then Florida’s Second DCA tackled the question in Brooks, 93 So.3d 402 .”
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lonnie Lee v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Brooks v. State, 93 So. 3d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
And while it did include a citation to Hearns, the Fourth DCA’s parenthetical description of that case suggests that the court may have determined that felony battery “cannot be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence” because it may have mistakenly believed that felony battery requires “intentionally causing bodily harm.” See Brooks, 93 So. 3d at 403 (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (7×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 403.
discussed Cited "see" MICHAEL ALLEN LOVETT v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. § 775.082(9)(b).
cited Cited "see" Dominguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. State, 93 So.3d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); State v. Williams, 9 So.3d 658, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
cited Cited "see" Ellington v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. State, 93 So.3d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Albert Edwin BROOKS, Jr.
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 2D11-3130.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jun 29, 2012.
93 So. 3d 402
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Altenbernd, Kelly, Khouzam.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
KHOUZAM, Judge.

Albert Edwin Brooks, Jr., appeals his judgment and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Prison Releasee Reof-fender (PRR) because the offense of felony battery under section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2010), is not a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2010). We hold that the offense of felony battery under section 784.041 is a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing, and we affirm.

A jury found Brooks guilty of felony battery, and he was sentenced as a PRR to five years in prison. On appeal, Brooks argues that his felony battery conviction does not qualify him for PRR sentencing because it is not specifically listed in and does not fall under the catch-all provision of the PRR statute. But felony battery does fall under the catch-all provision, and thus Brooks’ PRR sentence was proper.

Qualifying offenses for PRR sentencing are listed in section 775.082(9)(a)(1). Felony battery is not included in the list of qualifying offenses. However, section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(o) contains a catch-all provision which states “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” is a qualifying offense.

Felony battery falls under this catch-all provision. The felony battery statute, section 784.041, provides as follows:

(1) A person commits felony battery if he or she:
(a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; and
(b) Causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.

(Emphasis added.) As the Fourth District explained in State v. Williams, a conviction for felony battery under this section “requires great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement” and thus “cannot ‘be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence.’ ” 9 So.3d 658, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Spradlin v. State, 967 So.2d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)); cf. State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 218-19 (Fla.2007) (holding that the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer does not qualify as a forcible felony for purposes of violent career criminal sentencing because it does not necessarily involve the use of threat of physical force or violence, and acknowledging that “intentionally causing bodily harm involves the use or threat of physical force or violence”).

Accordingly, we affirm because felony battery is a qualifying offense for PRR[*404] sentencing, and Brooks’ PRR sentence was proper.

Affirmed.

ALTENBERND and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.