Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Pierre v. Planet Automotive, Inc. (nyed, 2016-06-21)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#2 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(ii) cited 1× in this case · 4 total citations of statute #1 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(b)(1)(i) cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute #1 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(c) cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pierre v. Planet Automotive, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2016 · confidence medium
Athough the Holder Rule normally permits an individual to assert all claims and defenses against an assignee that he or she could have asserted against the assignor, “[Regulations cannot trump the plain language of statutes.” Taylor, 150 F.3d at 693 (first quoting Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir.1994); and then citing Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 91 (2d Cir.1988)); see also Decker v. Nw.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerry and Mary Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., and Bank One Chicago, N.A., Davita M. Smith v. Desi Auto Sales, Inc., and Guardian National Acceptance Corp.
7th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir.1994) ("Regulations cannot trump the plain language of statutes ..."); Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc.
7th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir.1994) (“Regulations cannot trump the plain language of statutes ...”); Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) West v. Bowen
3rd Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Murray v. Lyng, 854 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir.1988) (finding deference inappropriate in striking down USDA's regulations counting foster care assistance as income to food stamp households); Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir.1988) (same). 112 Regulations that contravene congressional intent cannot be upheld.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) West v. Bowen
3rd Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See also Murray v. Lyng, 854 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir.1988) (finding deference inappropriate in striking down USDA’s regulations counting foster care assistance as income to food stamp households); Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir.1988) (same).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Murray v. Lyng (3×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
These regulations are the basis of the Foster court's decision that "while a boarder's income is not included in the calculation of food stamp household income," Foster, 683 F.Supp. at 89 , the portion of a foster care maintenance payment that a boarder pays for lodging and meals is includable by the food stamp household as self-employment income, id., aff'd, 849 F.2d at 92.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Murray v. Lyng (3×) also: Cited "see"
8th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
These regulations are the basis of the Foster court’s decision that “while a boarder’s income is not included in the calculation of food stamp household income,” Foster, 683 F.Supp. at 89 , the portion of a foster care maintenance payment that a boarder pays for lodging and meals is includable by the food stamp household as self-employment income, id., aff'd, 849 F.2d at 92.
discussed Cited "see" Filush v. Town of Weston
D. Conn. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir. *332 1988) (holding that regulations that contravene congressional intent cannot be upheld); Insurance Co. of North America v. Gee, 702 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1983).
cited Cited "see" Ledwell v. N.C. Department of Human Resources
N.C. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foster v. Celani, 683 F. Supp. 84, 87-89 (D.Vt. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hope v. Cortines
E.D.N.Y · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence medium
To the extent that one could interpret the DOJ regulation to conflict with section 1415(f), the Court applies the fundamental principle of statutory construction that courts shall “not interpret an agency regulation to thwart a statutory mandate.” Insurance Co. of North America v. Gee, 702 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir.1983); see also Foster v. Celani, 849 F.2d 91, 92 (2d Cir.1988) (“[Regulations that contravene congressional intent cannot be upheld”); Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir.1994) (“Regulations cannot trump the plain language of statutes, and we will not read the two…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sandra Foster and Judith Girouard, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
v.
Veronica H. Celani, as Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare, Gretchen Morse, as Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Human Services, and Richard Lyng as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Richard Lyng, the Secretary of Agriculture
809.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jun 24, 1988.
849 F.2d 91
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

849 F.2d 91

57 USLW 2055

Sandra FOSTER and Judith Girouard, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Veronica H. CELANI, as Commissioner of the Vermont
Department of Social Welfare, Gretchen Morse, as Secretary
of the Vermont Agency of Human Services, and Richard Lyng as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Defendants,
Richard Lyng, the Secretary of Agriculture, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 809, Docket 87-6276.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued March 14, 1988.
Decided June 24, 1988.

Robert D. Kamenshine, Washington, D.C. (Robert S. Greenspan, Jeffrey Clair, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Steven Norman, Burlington, Vt. (Alexander Scherr, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, Vt., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Robert Abrams, New York City, Atty. Gen., State of New York (Lawrence S. Kahn, Deputy Sol. Gen., Robert J. Schack, Laurel W. Eisner, of counsel), for Amici State of New York and Cesar A. Perales, State Commissioner of Social Services.

Before PIERCE and PRATT, Circuit Judges, and WALKER, District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

1

The Secretary of Agriculture appeals from a summary judgment granted to a class of Vermont foster parents whose food stamp benefits had been reduced or terminated because their foster care maintenance payments were included in the calculation of their household income for the purpose of determining food stamp eligibility. The district court held that because foster children may be excluded from the household under the regulation excluding "boarders", 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.1(c) (1986), foster care payments need not be included in the calculation of household income. For substantially the reasons stated in the district court's opinion, 683 F.Supp. 84 (D.Vt. 1987), we affirm.

2

The regulations provide that, while the boarder's income may be excluded from household income, any payments from the boarder to the household "for room and meals" shall be treated as "self-employment income" to the household. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.11(b)(1)(i) (1986). Foster children who, by definition and statutory mandate, are only temporarily assigned to a foster home, closely parallel the circumstances of the "boarders" contemplated by these regulations.

3

The district judge found support, both in the language of the statute that established the food stamp program, 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011-2029, and in its legislative history, for his conclusion that foster children should be treated like boarders and should be entitled to the same option to be excluded from the food stamp household. The legislative history makes clear that congress intended "anyone who pays compensation for his meals that is reasonable * * * " to be considered a boarder. H.R.Rep. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1704, 1978, 2113. Because the foster care grant represents a reasonable payment for food and lodging, along with some other expenses, we agree with the district court that congress intended a foster child to be treated like a boarder.

4

While the secretary correctly asserts that regulatory interpretations by the agency charged by congress with administering a statute are entitled to substantial deference, see Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 294 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 549, 553 n. 14, 50 L.Ed.2d 485 (1977), regulations that contravene congressional intent cannot be upheld. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).

5

The challenged regulation, 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.9(b)(2)(ii), requires foster care maintenance payments to be included as unearned income to the "household". But, as plaintiffs argue, only the income and resources available to members of the "household" may be considered in determining eligibility for food stamps. Thus, when a foster child is not a member of the "household", the secretary cannot, by regulatory fiat that contravenes congressional intent, mandate the inclusion of foster care maintenance payments in calculating household income. Similarly, the secretary cannot mandate, through its parental control regulation, that foster children must be included in the definition of a household.

6

Affirmed.