John H. Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
John H. Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Vignola
Bankr. N.D. Cal. · 2007 · confidence medium
“The tax code does not contemplate the interest-free use of government funds.” Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SouthTrust Bank of Florida, N.A. v. Wilson
M.D. Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1989); see Causey v. United States, 683 F.Supp. 1381, 1387 (M.D.Ga.1988) (using sections 6601 and 6621 to award prejudgment interest running from the date of notice and demand to the date of judgment).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ghandour v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 1997 · confidence medium
Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles E. Bradley and David P. Agnew v. United States
2d Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1989); see also Turchon, 77 B.R. at 401 (“the bankruptcy court erred in holding that absent a liability running from the employer for taxes, Turchon was not liable for unpaid interest on the tax assessment against him”).
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Comm'r
Tax Ct. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Holland v. United States , 873 F.2d 1321 , 1322 (9th Cir. 1989) ; Ghandour v. United States , 37 Fed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Indian Wells Estates, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Purcell, 1 F.3d at 943 ("[T]he trial court was plainly divested of discretion with respect to the government's entitlement to interest by section 6601(e)(2)(A) of the Tax Code."); see also Holland v. United States, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1989) ("The tax code does not contemplate the interest-free use of government funds.").
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John H. HOLLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
88-1864.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
May 5, 1989.
873 F.2d 1321
John R. Vaught, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant., Gary R. Allen, David English Carmack, and Murray S. Horwitz, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Norris, Beezer, Brunetti.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:

John H. Holland appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California holding that a partial payment of delinquent employee withholding and social security taxes would not abate the statutory interest that had accrued on the penalty assessment. We affirm.

The facts are not disputed. The appellant was the sole shareholder and president of Roseville Ford, Inc., a California corporation with approximately sixty employees. Roseville Ford failed to pay its employee[*1322] withholding and social security taxes for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1980. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determined that for the periods involved there were $74,127.07 in unpaid taxes and assessed a penalty against the appellant in that amount pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672.

The appellant disputed the assessment and sent the IRS payments of $2.28, $2.47, and $1.54 for the withholding taxes of one employee for the second, third and fourth quarters of 1980. These payments were credited against the penalty assessment. The following day the appellant filed a separate refund claim for each payment. The IRS denied the refund, and the appellant responded with a tax refund suit for $6.29. The IRS counterclaimed for $74,-120.77, representing the penalty assessment less the partial payments.

A three day trial followed. On the third day of trial the appellant tendered a check for $18,125.63 to the IRS. This was credited against the appellant’s penalty assessment, which had grown to over $110,000 with the addition of statutory interest. At the conclusion of trial the district court rendered a judgment against the appellant for $94,856.28, which represented the counterclaim and statutory interest, reduced by the amount of the partial payment. The appellant appeals the computation of the judgment, claiming that the payment of $18,125.63 should have negated any statutory interest that had accrued on that amount.

Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., provides:

Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 for any offense to which this section is applicable.

The appellant concedes that he falls within the purview of this provision and that he liable for a penalty “equal to the total amount of the tax evaded.” He does not dispute that the original penalty assessment of $74,127.07 was equal to the unpaid taxes of Roseville Ford. His argument is that his prejudgment payment was made on behalf of the corporation, and that this payment should have been credited against the original penalty assessment rather than the inflated balance of penalty assessment plus statutory interest. Thus, the appellant claims that the partial payment by the corporation should have abated the interest that had accrued on the penalty assessment.

We are not persuaded. The cases and examples cited by the appellant to support his position are inapposite. There is no indication that Congress intended to waive the interest that accrues on a penalty assessment when a payment is made, against the corporate tax liability that gave rise to the assessment. Section 6601(e)(2)(A) provides for the assessment of interest on any assessable penalty. Under § 6672 the appellant was liable for a penalty that was originally equal to the unpaid corporate tax, and interest ran on the penalty pursuant to § 6601. The payment made on the last day of trial was properly credited against this amount.

This is the only logical interpretation of the applicable statutes. Were it otherwise a responsible party could evade corporate taxes with the knowledge that his potential liability could never exceed the initial tax liability, and that any lapse of time between assessment and collection would work to his advantage because interest could not accrue on the penalty. The tax code does not contemplate the interest-free use of government funds.

AFFIRMED.