United States v. Floyd Vance Conner, Jr., 886 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. Floyd Vance Conner, Jr., 886 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Stanley Moody (ca8, 2007-04-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stanley Moody
8th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
The double-jeopardy and criminal-history arguments fail: the ACCA does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, see United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam), and any error in assessing criminal history points was harmless as Moody received the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, see United States v. Road, 406 F.3d 1322 , 1323 n. 1 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (when district court correctly imposes statutory mandatory minimum sentence, any error in Guidelines calculations is harmless), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 196 , 163 L.Ed.2d 207 (2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Love
5th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
But Love’s argument that, because child support orders are always state orders, there is no Double Jeopardy problem for the child support condition on supervised release, is correct. 24 See United States v. Witte, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) ("In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes [such as three-strikes laws], we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime[.]"); United States v. Co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Laulette Marie Love
5th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 , 115 S.Ct. 2199 , 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) ("In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes [such as three-strikes laws], we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime[.]”); United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding the Armed Career Criminal Act against a Double Jeopardy challenge), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 , 11…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Berg
Md. · 1996 · confidence medium
Similarly, in Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 , 96 S.Ct. 498 , 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), the Supreme Court, in applying 18 U.S.C. § 922 (h), which ultimately was incorporated in the current § 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g), held the statute to be constitutional in reaching intrastate transactions between the convicted persons and gun dealers so long as the firearms had been transported at some *142 time in interstate or foreign commerce. 11 See also United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edward Joseph Farris
6th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 259 (1993); United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1827 (1993); United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 999-1001 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d 143, 145 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 493-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 857 (1988). 25 In this case, d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hart
N.D. Ohio · 1995 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Donald Lee Presley
4th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1156 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harry N. Carter
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
These courts have held that on its face, § 922(g)(1) “applies to a possession of a gun that previously moved in interstate commerce.” United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 857 , 109 S.Ct. 147 , 102 L.Ed.2d 119 (1988); see United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, *648 493 U.S. 1089 , 110 S.Ct. 1156 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Douglas Wayne Whitehead
4th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. James Poole, Sr.
10th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
The phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) was intended by Congress to mean “that the firearm had been at some time, in interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 , 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1969 , 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977); see United States v. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 1156 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1990).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Floyd Vance CONNER, Jr., Appellant
89-1541.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Nov 1, 1989.
886 F.2d 984
Mark Godwin, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant., Linda R. Reade, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.
McMillian, Fagg, Heaney.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Floyd Vance Conner, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Supp. V 1987). The district court enhanced Conner’s sentence based on his three state armed robbery convictions. See id. § 924(e)(1). We affirm.

Conner contends section 922(g) is unconstitutionally vague. Conner argues “[a] convicted felon possessing a firearm * * * would have no reason to know the words ‘in or affecting commerce’ would subject him to federal felony prosecution if that firearm had once traveled in interstate commerce.” This argument is meritless. The challenged phrase clearly signals Congress’s intent “that the firearm [has] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1969, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1976).

Conner next contends the district court violated the Constitution’s double jeopardy clause when it used his three state armed robbery convictions to enhance his federal sentence. Although Conner concedes the armed robbery convictions are violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), he argues that because he received mandatory prison sentences under state law, the use of his state convictions to enhance his federal sentence constitutes multiple punishments for the same crimes. We disagree.

The double jeopardy clause only protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). Conner’s state robbery convictions and the federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon resulted from charges brought by separate sovereigns for conduct arising out of unrelated incidents. The double jeopardy clause has no relevance to Conner’s enhanced federal sentence.

We affirm the district court.