United States v. William Cornelius Campbell, Franklin Leon Blige, 888 F.2d 76 (11th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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United States v. William Cornelius Campbell, Franklin Leon Blige, 888 F.2d 76 (11th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Spoerke (ca11, 2009-05-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Spoerke
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Unless the court’s determination is without foundation, it should not be overturned on appeal.’” United States v. De La Rosa, 922 F.2d 675, 680 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Desmond Charles Lawrence
4th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Third, a sentencing court may act as the district court did in the present case and directly depart to sentencing based on de fac-to career offender status: “[o]nce the district court determines that a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 is warranted and that the defendant’s prior criminal conduct is of sufficient seriousness to conclude that he should be treated as a career offender, the district court may *729 depart directly to the guideline range applicable to career offenders similar to the defendant.” Id. at 562; see also United States v. Hines, 943 F.2d 348, 354-55 (4th Cir.1991) (p…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lawrence
4th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Third, a sentencing court may act as the district court did in the present case and directly depart to sentencing based on de facto career offender status: "[o]nce the district court determines that a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 is warranted and that the defen- dant’s prior criminal conduct is of sufficient seriousness to conclude that he should be treated as a career offender, the district court may depart directly to the guideline range applicable to career offenders similar to the defendant." Id. at 562; see also United States v. Hines, 943 F.2d 348, 354-55 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Paul Edward Hromada
11th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barry Lawrence Spell
11th Cir. · 1995 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 79 (11th *939 Cir.1989) (government conceding that burglaries involving commercial buildings, rather than dwellings, do not constitute crimes of violence under the Guidelines), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Willis Ray Cash
4th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See United States v. Hines, 943 F.2d 348, 354-55 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 613 , 116 L.Ed.2d 635 (1991); 8 United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1100 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1437-39 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875 , 111 S.Ct. 202 , 112 L.Ed.2d 163 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charles Wayne Shores (2×)
11th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Shores does not point out anything else in the record indicating his acceptance of responsibility. ’ “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility_ [Her] determination ... is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 5); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 , 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Rudolph Cruz
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Miguel Suarez
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom., Blige v. United States, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph Jones, Thomas Jones
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
The comments to section 3E1.1 in effect when appellants were sentenced stated that due to the sentencing judge's "unique position to evaluate" whether a defendant sufficiently demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, the judge's determination was entitled to "great deference" on review; it would not be disturbed unless it was "without foundation." United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990) (quoting Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 3E1.1 application note 5 (Nov.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jones
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
The comments to section 3E1.1 in effect when appellants were sentenced stated that due to the sentencing judge’s “unique position to evaluate” whether a defendant sufficiently demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, the judge’s determination was entitled to “great deference” on review; it would not be disturbed unless it was “without foundation.” United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990) (quoting Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1 application note 5 (Nov.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harris (2×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Ala. · 1991 · confidence medium
The court has considered the non-exhaustive list of criteria set forth in the sentencing guidelines for determining whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime, and has also examined the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation and application of these criteria. 12 The court is also aware that entry of a guilty plea “with truthful admission of involvement in the offense and related conduct” will constitute “significant evidence” of acceptance of responsibility, but that “this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ira Simmons
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
In United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990), the court held that a sentencing court may use certain “non-qualifying” pri- or convictions to justify a departure.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. Luis Fernando De La Rosa, Cross-Appellee (2×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Unless the court's determination is without foundation, it should not be overturned on appeal." United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom., Blige v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990); accord United States v. Pritchett, 908 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1990).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James T. Weaver (4×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 888 F.2d 117, 118 (11th Cir.1989) (district court's factual findings must be accepted unless clearly erroneous); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir.1989) (same); Crawford, 883 F.2d at 964-66 (exercising de novo review of sentencing court's determination that guidelines did not adequately consider certain aggravating circumstances and concluding that nothing in record indicates that the departure was unreasonable).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Efrain E. Villali, A/K/A \Carlos\"
unknown court · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Armstrong, 901 F.2d 988, 989 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael J. Collins
11th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See United States v. Jackson, 883 F.2d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 747 , 107 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990) (upward departure warranted because offender’s criminal history category did not accurately reflect the likelihood that the defendant would commit future crimes); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1484 , 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1989) (criminal history under-represents past crimes); United States v. Dorsey, 888 F.2d 79, 81 (11th Cir.1989) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 756 , 107 L.Ed.2d 772 (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Douglas Mark Pritchett, Phillip Doyle Boothe, David E. Pritchett, Joseph C. Pritchett, Rhonda Pritchett (Reinstated)
11th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lee Terry
7th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Circuit remanded the case to the district court noting that “[a] sentencing judge retains the discretion to examine the facts of a predicate crime to determine whether it was a crime of violence notwithstanding the Commentary to the guidelines’ predetermined list of crimes which it considers to be crimes of violence.” The court noted that the Commentary was the proper starting point in determining whether a crime was one of violence but that “it might be appropriate, as provided by the guidelines, for a district judge to depart from the guidelines’ statutory definition of a particula…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Harvey Gene Hawkins, Jr.
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Without regard to the propriety of the second proceeding, we believe once again the court was without a factual basis for the application of an upward departure. *867 The government suggests United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 79 (11th Cir.1989), supports the district court’s decision to apply career offender status to defendant.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Quincey Lemond Jones
11th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir.1989).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Hernandez
S.D. Fla. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76 (11th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Leonard Brady Jackson (2×)
10th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See, for example, United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 79 (11th Cir.1989) (nine separate crimes, committed from age seventeen to age thirty-one, indicate “likelihood of recidivism” even though such indication was not reflected in criminal history); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 606 (5th Cir.) cert. denied — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 175 , 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989) (almost continuous incarceration since age seventeen for various felony convictions bespeaks propensity for future criminal conduct); United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 411-12 (2d Cir.1989) (merely adding three points for e…
cited Cited "see" United States v. Phillip Lance Armstrong
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 77 (11th Cir.1989).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Cornelius CAMPBELL, Franklin Leon Blige, Defendants-Appellants
88-8370.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 29, 1989.
888 F.2d 76
A. Montague Miller, Dye, Miller, Tucker, Everitt, Augusta, Ga., for Campbell., Richard E. Allen, Augusta, Ga., for Blige., J.Michael Faulkner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Augusta, Ga., Andrew Levchuk, Appellate Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.
Roney, Fay, Allen.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
RONEY, Chief Judge:

Codefendants William Cornelius Campbell and Franklin Leon Blige appeal sentences imposed under the federal sentencing guidelines. Campbell raises constitutional challenges to the Sentencing Reform[*77] Act of 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission, and the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Commission. Blige challenges the manner in which the district court applied the guidelines to him. We affirm.

Facts

In December 1987, Campbell and Blige, using toy guns, robbed a C & S Bank in Augusta, Georgia. They took approximately $25,000 and fled on foot. Within eight minutes, police caught them both still in possession of most of the money.

Police apprehended Campbell in a wooded area about half a block from the bank. He confessed at once and provided details of the crime, including a hand-drawn diagram, and assisted in recovering the plastic gun and clothing he had discarded immediately after the robbery.

Apprehending Blige was more difficult. With guns drawn, police chased him into a residential area and fired at least one shot at him before realizing he was unarmed. Initially, he lied to FBI agents, telling them that he was in the area visiting a friend and had run from the police only because he had a prior criminal record.

Later, both defendants obtained counsel and reached plea agreements, each promising to plead guilty and testify honestly if called as a witness. Both defendants pled guilty. The district court applied the new sentencing guidelines. The court departed downward from the applicable guideline range for Campbell and upward for Blige, sentencing each to 144 months imprisonment. The court allowed Campbell, but not Blige, a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Constitutional Challenges

Defendant Campbell argues that application of the sentencing guidelines is unconstitutional because—

(1)The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 violated the Delegation Doctrine by assigning an essentially legislative role to the Sentencing Commission.
(2) The Act violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine by including Article III judges on the Commission.
(3) The guidelines which were ultimately adopted created a sentencing scheme which was so mechanical, rigid, and restrictive of the judge’s discretion as to deny due process.

In a decision handed down after the briefs were filed in the present case, the Supreme Court upheld the guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 against these same delegation and separation of powers arguments. Mistretta v. United States, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).

Mistretta did not involve a due process challenge to the guidelines. Procedural and substantive due process challenges to the guidelines identical to those raised here, however, have been rejected subsequently by this court. See United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376 (11th Cir.1989).

Application to Blige

Defendant Blige’s presentence report recommended that he not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due in part to his initial lies to authorities. The report stated that although Blige had a substantial criminal record, he did not fit Guidelines § 4Bl.l’s definition of a career offender since he had only one prior felony conviction for a violent or drug-related felony. Without a career criminal adjustment, his total offense level was 20. This level 20 and his criminal history category VI put him in a guidelines range of 70-87 months. See Guidelines, Chap. 5 at 5.2. The report, however, recommended an upward departure to 120 months because Blige’s criminal history category did not adequately reflect the seriousness of his past criminal conduct.

Blige maintains that (a) denying him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility was an incorrect application of the guidelines, and (b) the upward departure was unreasonable. Sections 3742(e)(2) & (3) of Title 18 U.S.C. authorize this Court to review Blige’s claims. Blige’s presen-tence investigation can be contrasted to[*78] that of Campbell who received the benefit of a downward departure from the guidelines. Campbell’s presentence investigation report recommended a two-level guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility under Guidelines § 3El.l(a). The report further stated that because Campbell had two prior violent-felony convictions for robbery and aggravated assault (in addition to convictions for burglary, grand larceny, concealing stolen goods, and escape), he was considered a career criminal under Guidelines § 4B1.1. His total offense level of 34 as a career offender and his criminal history category of VI placed his guidelines range at 262-327 months. See Guidelines, Chap. 5 at 5.2 (guidelines sentencing table). The report recommended a downward departure to 200 months because Campbell had been cooperative throughout and since under recent guidelines changes the applicable level would have been 32 with a range of 210-262 months if the crime had occurred after January 15, 1988.

We must accept the district court’s findings of fact concerning presentence information unless they are “clearly erroneous,” give “due deference” to the court’s “application of the guidelines to the facts,” and determine whether the departure from the guidelines was “unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).

A. Acceptance of Responsibility

Guideline § 3E1.1 provides:
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this section without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practical certainty of a conviction at trial.
(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.

Due to the judge’s “unique position to evaluate” whether a defendant sufficiently demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, “the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.” Guidelines § 3E1.1, Commentary, Application Note 5; United States v. Spraggins, 868 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir.1989).

Other than entering a plea agreement and pleading guilty, Blige did little to demonstrate an “affirmative acceptance of responsibility.” He initially denied responsibility, lying to the FBI. Although he did not deny involvement when questioned by the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report, Blige characterized the robbery as an “accident” which resulted from “joking around.” Perhaps, as he now contends, he meant “incident” when he said “accident,” but nonetheless he denigrated the seriousness of a crime in which he terrified bank employees, stole $25,000, and led police on a dangerous chase into a residential area. There clearly was a foundation for the district court’s finding that Blige failed to demonstrate an affirmative acceptance of responsibility.

B. Departure from the Guidelines

Guidelines § 4A1.3 authorizes a departure from the guidelines if “the criminal history category significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that [he] will commit further crimes.” Section 4B1.1 states that a defendant is a career offender if—

(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense,
(2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and
(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.

Blige concededly met the first two career offender requirements. His criminal record did not meet requirement three, however, because he had only one prior felony conviction (for robbery) which satis[*79] fied the definition of a qualifying offense. He had three prior burglary convictions, but they involved commercial buildings rather than dwellings and thus, the government concedes, did not constitute violent crimes under the guidelines. See Guidelines § 3B1.2, Commentary, Application Note 1. He had two prior controlled substance convictions, but pursuant to plea bargains, they were reduced from felony charges to misdemeanor convictions. Therefore, they too did not qualify for career offender purposes under the guidelines.

He also had non-qualifying convictions for credit card theft and receiving stolen property. In total, Blige had prior convictions for eight separate crimes in just eleven years, beginning when he was 17 and continuing until he was 29. The present offense occurred when he was 31.

The absence of a second qualifying prior felony placed Blige 14 levels lower than he would have been as a career criminal. The potential sentences at this lower level were approximately one-fourth (70-87 rather than 262-327 months) the length of those within the higher range for a career criminal.

The district court found that Blige was a habitual criminal with a “likelihood of ... recidivism,” even though his criminal history category failed to reflect this. These findings were not clearly erroneous. Although Blige’s prior offenses did not meet the definitional requirements of Guidelines § 4B1.1, his crimes were substantial in number and serious in character. In fact, the number and nature of his criminal convictions were not significantly less serious than the convictions which qualified Campbell as a career offender.

The upward departure for Blige was warranted under the circumstances, and the amount of the departure was not unreasonable, given his ongoing criminal involvement.

AFFIRMED.